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International Court of Justice

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U S S R -127.

-A-B S C H R I F T !-

Abschrift

Der Beauftragte fuer den Vierjahresplan — Berlin, 31. Maerz 194
Der Generalbevollmaechtigte fuer
den Arbeitseinsatz
G.Z. V a 5680.28/729 — Fernschreiben!

Betrifft: Russeneinsatz; hier: Taetigkeit der Anwerbekommission

Vorstehendes Fernschreiben an die Werbekommissionen uebersende ich mit der Bitte, von dem Inhalt Kenntnis zu nehmen und das Fernschreiben im Interesse der Sicherstellung der dringend benoetigten Arbeitskraefte zur ausreichenden und rechtzeitigen Versorgung des Heeres mit Geraet und Munition unverzueglich an meine Kommission weiterzuleiten.

Ich bitte sie, die Werbung, fuer die sie mir gemeinsam mit den Kommissionen verantwortlich sind, auch ihrerseits durch alle geeigneten Massnahmen, noetigenfalls durch schaerfste Anwendung der Arbeitspflicht, so zu foerdern, dass in kuerzester Frist das Anwerbeergebnis verdreifacht werden kann. Die dahingehenden Vorschlaege der Kommission erbitte ich, erforderlichenfalls Ihrerseits zu ergaenzen. Der Eigenbedarf an Arbeitskraeften ist weitgehend zurueckzustellen und nur auf unmittelbar kriegswichtige Auftraege zu beschraenken. Mit den Kommissionen bitte ich, kameradschaftlich zusammenzuarbeiten.

Gez. S A U C K E L

An
a) die Herren Reichskommissare - Abteilung Arbeitspolitik und Sozialverwaltung,
b) die Wi In, Gruppe Arbeit.

T. J. Dodd.
I thought Col Amen might like a spare copy so I'll let him have mine

U.S.S.R 467

Статья в Фелькишер Беобахтер 29 марта 1942г.

В рамках четырехлетнего плана.

Назначение Заукеля генеральным уполномоченным по использованию рабочей силы.

Берлин, 28 марта.

Из осведомленного источника узнали мы еще следующее:

Задача генерального уполномоченного простирается на упорядочение использования рабочей силы всех без исключения располагаемых рабочих сил, включая завербованных иностранцев и военнопленных, в частности в военной промышленности и в промышленности питания, а также мобилизации всех еще неиспользованных рабочих сил.

Генеральный уполномоченный по использованию рабочей силы в рамках четырехлетнего плана будет работать в тесной связи со всеми экономическими ведомствами, а именно с имперским министром вооружения и боеприпасов, который одновременно является генеральным уполномоченным по вооружению в рамках четырехлетнего плана.

Назначение гаулейтера Заукеля последовало по желанию имперского министра Шпеера вследствие чрезмерного значения вопроса использования рабочей силы в военной промышленности.

В связи с этим новым распорядком деятельность бывшего до сих пор /Генефтегруппе айнзац/ 4-летнего плана доставка и распределение рабочей силы, а также регулирование условиями рабочей силы переходит к генеральному уполномоченному.

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Exhibit U.S.A. 204
Filed Dec. 12, 1945

PARTIAL-TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R 103
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Polish Main Committee
5 Vischer Street
Cracow

Cracow, 17th May 1944

To the
Administration of the General Government,
Main Department Home Administration,
Dept. Population and Welfare,

C r a c o w

13 University Street.

No. Pa 1/724
6699/44

Subject: Situation of the Polish Workers in the Reich

The conditions of life for about 2 millions of Polish male and female workers in the Reich have given rise to difficulties which are to a large extent, lowering the will and the power to work of many workers, endangering their health and even their lives, and also having a strong influence on the situation of their families within the General Government, thus even directly affecting the sphere of our own work.

These bad conditions are felt especially by those groups of workers who have been assigned for work in factories and have been lodged in large camps. With regard to workers on the land they only occur for individual cases which are easily dealt with. The conditions have become worse since whole families often with many children were brought into the Reich and, defenceless and unprotected against the outrages of Ukrainian murder gangs, were placed in camps for Eastern workers.

The sanitary and moral effect of the bad conditions is for us too far reaching to be considered with indifference; we beg therefore to draw attention to them and to ask to consider the elimination of these bad conditions.

They concern housing, feeding clothing, care of children and their education, sanitary conditions, and finally separation of families.

Original

Question of housing

First consideration is due to the situation of families who have been inducted into camps for Eastern workers, together with numerous younger and older children ..... Once arrived in the camps they have been deprived of any liberty of movement and are

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being treated as prisoners without any rights. The privileges of voluntary workers, which are due to them, are not granted. Nobody is asked what work he is suited for. Land workers are assigned to factories where they are unused to the work and unable to accomplish as much as they could on the land .... Husband, wife and older children are called to work in factories, the younger children remain without due supervision in the camp areas, behind barbed wire, without any opportunities of exercising in the open air and not subject to any discipline.

The cleanliness of many overcrowded camp rooms is contrary to the most elementary requirements. Often there is no opportunity to obtain warm water for washing, therefore the cleanest parents are unable to maintain even the most primitive standard of hygiene for their children of often even to wash their only set of linen. A consequence of this is the spreading of scabies which cannot be eradicated.

(Next three paragraphs irrelevant.)

Original in page 3

Help in Feeding.

We receive imploring letters from the camps of Eastern workers and their prolific families beseeching us for food. The quantity and quality of camp rations mentioned therein - the so-called fourth grade of rations - is absolutely insufficient to maintain the energies spent in heavy work. 3,5 kg of bread weekly and a thin soup at lunch time, cooked with swedes or other vegetables without any meat or fat, with a meager addition of potatoes now and then is a hunger ration for a heavy worker.

Sometimes punishment consists of starvation which is inflicted e.g. for refusal to wear the badge "East". Such punishment has the result that workers faint at work - (Klosterteich Camp, Gruenheim,Saxony) - The consequence is complete exhaustion, an ailing state of health and tuberculosis. The spreading of tuberculosis among the Polish factory workers is a result of the deficient food rations meted out in the community camps because energy spent in heavy work cannot be replaced.

(Next paragraph irrelevant).

The food and bread fixed for Polish children in the camps are by no means sufficient for building up the substance for growing and developing their organism. In some cases children up to the age of 10 and more are alloted 200 gr. of bread weekly, 200 gr. of butter or margarine and 250 gr. of sugar monthly and nothing else - (Zeititz near Wurzen, Saxony).
Prices in the open market are far too high. The call for help which reaches us, brings to light starvation and hunger, severe stomach and intestinal trouble especially in the case of children resulting from the insufficiency of food which does not take into consideration the needs of children. Proper medical treatment or care for the sick are not available in the mass camps.

Original in page 4

Question of Clothing.

(Describes in some detail the general lack of clothing and of replacement of worn clothing.)

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-103
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL
(CONT'd)

Original page 5

Care of Children

In addition to these bad comditions, there is lack of systematic occupation for and supervision of these hosts of children which affects the life of prolific families in the camps. The children, left to themselves without schooling or religious care, must run wild and grow up illiterate. Idleness in rough surroundings may and will create unwanted results in these children. (Suggestions follow to remedy the situation.) ..... An indication of the awful conditions this may lead to, is given by the fact that in the camps for Eastern workers - (camp for Eastern workers "Waldlust", Post Office Lauf, Pegnitz) there are cases of 8 year old delicate and under nourished children put to forced labor and perishing from such treatment. ....

Sanitary Treatment.

The fact that these bad conditions dangerously affect the state of health and the vitality of the workers is proved by the many cases of tuberculosis found in very young people returning from the Reich to the General Government as unfit for work. Their state of health is usually so bad that recovery is out of the question.

The reason is that a state of exhaustion resulting from overwork and a starvation diet is not recognized as an ailment until the illness betrays itself by high fever and fainting spells.

Although some hostels for unfit workers have been provided as a precautionary measure, one can only go there when recovery may no longer be expected - (Neumarkt in Bavaria). Even there the incurables waste away slowly, and nothing is done even to alleviate the state of the sick by suitable food and mediciness

Original p. 6

There are children there with tuberculosis whose cure would not be hopeless, and men in their prime who, if sent home in time to their families in rural districts, might still be able to recover.

Leave for Sick Persons and for Recreation.

Irrelevant.

Protection of the Community of Families.

"Grave depression is caused among the Eastern workers by the ordinance forbidding marriage among them within the borders of the Reich." ..... (Partly irrelevant)..... "No less suffering is caused by the separation of families when wives and mothers of small children are torn away from their families and sent to the Reich for forced labor.

Original p. 7

There are also fathers who occasionally volunteered for labor and who have already been working for four years in the Reich, without ever getting any leave, from whom their own children have been alienated because of their long absence, who often do not even know their own children born after their departure, because they have had no opportunity of visiting their families on leave. ....,

Next two paragraphs irrelevant.

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Religious Care.

If under these bad conditions there is no moral support such as is normally provided by regular family life, then at least such moral support which the religious feelings of the Polish population require should be maintained and increased. The elmination of religious services, religious practice and religious care from the life of the Polish workers, the prohibition of church attendance at a time when there is a religious service for other people and other measures show a certain contempt for the influence of religious on the feelings and opinions of the workers. ...."

(The remainder is irrelevant.)

(signed) The Polish Central Committee

name illegible
President

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO R-103

18 November 1945

I, ENID M. STANDRING, P/O, 52012, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document R-103.

ENID M. STANDRING
P/O
52012

Exhibit U.S.A. 202
Filed Dec. 12, 1945

Essen. 15 October1945

Sworn Statement

Document No. D288.

I, Dr.Wilhelm JAGER, am a general practitioner in ESSEN, GERMANY, and its surroundings. I was born in Germany on 2 December 1888, and now live at KETTWIG? SENGENHOLZ 6, GERMANY. I make the following statement of my own free will. I have not been threatened in any way and I have not been promised any sort of reward.

On the 1st of October 1942, I became senior camp doctor in KRUPP's workers' camps, and was generally charged with the medical supervision of all of Krupp's workers camps in ESSEN. In the course of my duties it was my responsibility to report upon the sanitary and health conditions of the workers' camps to my superiors in the Krupp works. It was a part of my task to visit every KRUPP camp which housed foreign civilian workers and I am therefore able to make this statement on the basis of my personal knowledge.

My first official act as senior camp doctor was to make a thorough inspection of the various camps. At that time, in October 1942, I found the following conditions:

The eastern workers and Poles who laboured in the Krupp works at Essen were kept at camps at SEUMANNSTRASSE, SPENLESTRASSE, GRIEPERSTRASSE, HEECSTRASSE, GERMANIASTRASSE, KAPITAN-LEHMANNSTRASSE, DECHENSCHULE, and KRAMERPLATZ. (When the term eastern workers is hereinafter used, it is to be taken as including Poles). All of these camps were surrounded by barbed wire and were closely guarded

Conditions in all of these camps were extremely bad. The camps were greatly overcrowded. In some camps there were twice as many people in a barrack as health conditions permitted. At KRAMERPLATZ, the inhabitants slept in treble tiered bunks, and in the other camps they slept in double tiered bunks. The health authorities prescribed a minimum space between beds of 50 cm, but the bunks in these camps were separated by a maximum of 20-30 cm.

The diet prescribed for the eastern workers was altogether

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insufficient. They were given 1,000 calories a day less than the minimum prescribed for any German. Moreover, while German workers engaged in the heaviest work received 5,000 calories a day, the eastern workers in comparable jobs received only 2,000 calories. The eastern workers were given only 2 meals a day and their bread ration. One of these two meals consisted of a thin, watery soup. I had no assurance that the eastern workers, in fact, received the minimum which was prescribed. Subsequently, in 1943, when I undertook to inspect the food prepared by the cooks, I discovered a number of instances in which food was withheld from the workers.

The plan for food distribution called for a small quantity of meat per week. Only inferior meats, rejected by the vetenary such as horse meat or tuberculin infested was permitted for this purpose. This meat was usally cooked into a soup.

The clothing of the eastern workers was likewise completely inadequate. They worked and slept in the same clothing in which they had arrived from the east. Virtually all of them had no overcoats and were compelled, therefore, to use their blankets as coats in cold and rainy weather. In view of the shortage of shoes many workers were forced to go to work in their bare feet, even in the winter. Wooden shoes were given to some of the workers, but their quality was such as to give the workers sore feet. Many workers preferred to go to work in their bare feet rather than endure the suffering caused by the wooden shoes. Apart from the wooden shoes, no clothing of any kind was issued to the workers until the latter part of 1943, when a single blue suit was issued to some of them. To my knowledge, this represented the sole issue of clothing to the workers from the time of their arrival until the American forces entered Essen.

Sanitary conditions were exceedingly bad. At KRAMERPLATZ, where approximately 1,200 eastern workers were crowded into the rooms of an old school, the sanitary conditions were atrocious in the extreme. Only 10 childrens' toilets were available for the 1,200 inhabitants. At DECHENSCHULE, 15 childrens' toilets were

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available for the 400-500 eastern workers. Excretion contaminated the entire floors of these lavatories. There were also few facilities for washing. The supply of bandages, medicine, surgical instruments, and other medical supplies at these camps was likewise altogether insufficient. As a consequence, only the very worst cases were treated.

The percentage of eastern workers who were ill was twice as great as among the Germans. Tuberculosis was particularly widespread among the eastern workers. The T.B. rate among them was 4 times the normal rate (2% eastern workers, German .5%). AtDECHENSCHULE approximately 2½% pf the workers suffered from open T.B. These were all active T.B. cases. The Tarters and Kirghis suffered most; as soon as they were overcome by this disease they collapsed like flies. The cause was bad housing, the poor quality and insufficient quantity of food, overwork, and insufficient rest.

These workers were likewise afflicted with spotted fever. Lice the carrier of this desease, together with countless fleas, bugs and other vermin tortured the inhabitants of these camps. As a result of the filthy conditions of the camps nearly all eastern worker were afflicted with skin desease. The shortage of food also caused many cases of Hunher-Ödem, Nephritis and Shighakruse.

It was the general rule that workers were compelled to go to work unless a camp doctor had prescribed that they were unfit for work. At SEUMANNSTRASSE, GRIEPERSTRASSE, GERMANISTRASSE, KAPITAN-LEHMANNSTRASSE, and DECHENSCHULE, there was no daily sick call. At these camps, the doctors did not appear for two or three days. As a consequence, workers were forced to go to work despite illnesses.

I undertook to improve conditions as well as I could. I insisted upon the erection of some new barracks in order to relieve the overcrowded conditions of the camps. Despite this, the camps were still greatly overcrowded, but not as much as before. I tried to alleviate the poor sanitary conditions in KRAEMERPLATZ AND DECHENSCHULE by causing the installation of some emergency toilets, but the number was insufficient, and the situation was not materially altered.

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With the onset of heavy air raids in March 1943, conditions in the camps greatly deteriorated. The problem of housing, feeding, and medical attention became more acute then ever. The workers lived in the ruins of their former barracks. Medical supplies which were used up, lost, or destroyed, were difficult to replace. At times, the water supply at the camps was completely shut off for periods of 8-14 days. We installed a few emergency toilets in the camps, but there were far too few of them to cope with the situation.

During the period immediately following the March 1943 raids many foreign workers were made to sleep at the Krupp factories in the same rooms in which they worked. The day workers slept there at nights, and the night workers slept there during the day despite the noise which constantly prevailed. I believe that this condition continued until the entrance of American troops into Essen.

As the pace of air raids was stepped up, conditions became progressively worse. On 28 July 1944, I reported to my superiors that:

> "The sick barrack in camp RABENHORST is in such a bad condition one cannot speak of a sick barrack any more. The rain leaks through in every corner. The housing of ill is therefore impossible. The necessary labour for production is in danger because those persons who are ill cannot recover".

At the end of 1943, or the beginning of 1944,-I am not completely sure of the exact date - I obtained permission for the first time to visit the prisoner of war camps. My inspection revealed that conditions at these camps were worse than those I had found at the camps of the eastern workers in 1942. Medical supplies at such camps were virtually non-existent. In an effort to cure this intolerable situation, I contacted the WEHRMACHT authorities whose duty it was to provide medical care for the prisoners of war. My persistent efforts came to nothing. After visiting and pressing them over a period of two weeks, I was given a total of 100 aspirin tablets for over 3,000 prisoners of war.

The French P.O.W. camp in NOGERRATSTRASSE had been destroyed

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in an air raid attack and its inhabitants were kept for nearly half a year in dog kennels, urinals, and in old baking houses. The dog kennels were three feet high, nine feet long, and six feet wide. Five men slept in each of them. The prisoners had to crawl into these kennels on all fours. The camp contained no tables, chair, or cupboards. The supply of blankets was inadequate. There was no water in the camp. That treatment was extended was given in the open. Many of these conditions were reported to me in a report by Dr. STEINESBECK dated 12 June 1944, in which he said:

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> "315 prisoners are still accommodated in the camp. 170 of these are no longer in barracks but in the tunnel in Gruhertatrasse under the Essen-Mulheim railway line. This tunnel is damp and is not suitable for continued accommodation of human beings. The rest of the prisoners are accommodated in 10 different factories in Krupps works. The first medical attention is given by a French Military Doctor who takes great pains with his fellow country men. Sick people from Krupp factories must be brought to the sick parade. This parade is held in the lavartory of a burned out public house outside the camp. The sleeping accommodation of the 4 French Ordlies is in what was the men's room. In the sick bay there is a double tier wooden bed. In general, the treatment takes place in the open. In rainy weather it is held in the above mentioned small room. These are insufferable conditions: There are no chairs, tables, cupboards, or water. The keeping of a register of sick people is impossible. Bandages and medical supplies are very scarce, although badly hurt in the worksare very often brought here for first aid and have to be bandaged here before being transported to hospital. There are many loud and lively complaintsabout food which the guard personnel confirms as being correct.
>
> Illness and loss of man power must be reckoned with under these conditions.

In my report to my superiors at Krupps dated 2 Sep. 1944, I stated:

Camp Humboldstrasse has been inhabitated by Italian prisoners of war. After it had been destroyed by an air raid, the Italians were removed and 600 Jewish females from Buchenwald Concentration Camp were brought in to work at the Krupp factories. Upon my first visit at Camp Humbolstrasse, I found these females suffering from open festering wounds and other deseases,

I was the first doctor they had seen for at least a fortnight. There was no doctor in attendance at the camp. There was no medical supplies in the camp. They had no shoes and went about in their bare feet. The sole clothing of each consisted of a sack with holes for their arms and head. Their hair was shorn. The

camp was surrounded by barbed wire and closely guarded by SS guards.

The amount of food in the camp was extremely meagre and of very poor quanlity. The houses in which they lived consisted of the ruins of former barracks and they afforded no shelter against rain and other weather conditions. I reported to my superiors that the guards lived and slept outside their barracks as one could not enter them without being attacked by 10, 20 and up to 50 fleas. One camp doctor employed by me refused to enter the camp again after he had been bitten very badly. I visited this camp with a Mr. Grëne on two occasions and both times we left the camp badly bitten. We had great difficulty in getting rid of the fleas and insects which had attacked us. As a result of this attack by insects of this camp, I got large boils on my arms and the rest of my body. I asked my superiors at the Krupp works to undertake the necessary steps to de-louse the camp so as to put an end to this unbearable, vermin-infested condition. Despite this report, I did not find any improvement in sanitary conditions at the camp on my second visit a fortnight later.

When foreign workers finally became too sick to work or were completely disabled they were returned to the labour Exchange in Essen and from there, they were sent to a camp at Friedrichsfeld. Among persons who were returned over to the Labour Exchange were aggrevated cases of tuberculosis, malaria, neurosis, career which could not be treated by operation, old age, and general feeblness. I know nothing about conditions at this camp because I have never visisted it. I only know that it was a place to which workers who no longer of any use to Krupp were sent.

My colleagues and I reported all of the foregoing matters to Mr. IHN, Director of Friedrich KRUPP A.G., DR. WIELS, personal physiecian of Gustav KRUPP von Bohlen und HALBACH, Senior Camp Leader KUPKE and at all times to the health department. Moreover, I know that these gentlemen personnally visited the camps.

Signed. Dr. Wilhelm JAGER.

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Document No. D-288

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, M/SGT. ISSERMAN, U.S. Army, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English, and German languages; and that the attached is a true and correct translation, made under my supervision, into the English language from the German language, of the document (or excerpts therefrom as indicated)*attached to, and referred to in the Certificate dated 14/10/45, bearing No._____ signed by Capt. N. Webb.

Manfred G. Isserman.

H1126 - 0018

Not offered

Essen, 5th Oct 1945

Sworn Statement.

Document No.D305

I the undersigned, HEINRICH BUSCHHAUER, residing in Essen-Frillendorf, Banschenhöhe 23, make the following statement voluntarily and on oath.

Re:- WERNER THEILE, c/-KÖNNING, 6 Mainzerstr.

Mishandling of Russian Ps.W.

In September the first Russian Ps.W. came. At first over 100 men came and were employed in boiler making. When these came the Works Manager THEILE said to me that I should take over the control of these Russians. He said to me, "Go to the stores, draw an axe-shaft and then go to the Bottroperstr. Camp ready to receive the Russians. Use the axe-shaft if anybody becomes swkward in any way." I did not do it and went without the axe-shaft. I admit that I hit Russians (Ps.W.) The Russians were very willing and attentive. The clothing of the Russians was very bad and torn. Their feet were wrapped in rags. The appearance of the people was bad, they were thin and pale. Their cheeks had fallen in completely. In spite of this, I was forced to ill-treat the people on the orders of works manager THEILE. I have boxed the people's ears and beaten them with a 3/4 Rubber tube and a wooden stick. Once I had to take a Russian who had stolen a piece of bread, to the camp in HAFENSTR. (The Russians would let themselves be beaten half dead for a piece of bread and not even murmur). A corporal received us there and took us into the camp. After a few minutes, the corporal came out of the cellar again and said, "He's confessed to the theft already. Down there, there is one who knows how to deal with the Russians better than you." He also said, "Down there, we have a Russian who is specially well fed, who is only there to beat the prisoners and he treats the fellows inhumanly." I saw the prisoner the next day. He was completely washed out and his body was covered in bruises. He showed me. I promised myself never to take another prisoner there, but preferably punish them myself. I have complained innumberable times to the Works manager, THEILE, that I could no longer take part in these beatings as the whole of the works personnel was so much against the ill-treatment of the Russians. The Russians were so hungry that they were never satisfied.

H1126 - 0019

H1126 - 0020

The Russians' food consisted of a dirty watery soup in which were a few foul potatoes and a bit of cabbage. When the food containers were opened the whole works stank. Our people often held their noses whenever they came near the food containers. Once, each of them received 5 medium sized potatoes in their jackets, of which half were bad. The Russians were so hungry that they ate potatoes skin and all without removing the bad parts. I distributed the food generally. Nearly every week I made complaints to the works manager about the food and treatment of the Russians and said I could no longer carry on. He always explained to me that I must carry on. I showed him samples of the food with the bad pieces of potato. The more [illegible]rgetic I went against these people, the more the Works Manager liked it. [illegible]s the "whipping boy" for the whole of the works and had to drive and beat the Russians in order to get increased production from them. At times, I had up to two thousand foreigners under me. The Russians could not possibly work more than they did, because the food was too bad and too little. The Works management, however, wanted to get still higher performance from them. It often happened that the Russians, so utterly weakened, collapsed. At least 6 or 7 times I have had to take prisoners back to the camp on an electric trolley because they could not walk any more.

I can remember one occurrence perfectly. It was in Summer 1942. The Nazi Obmann (Works liaison officer) ROGGE and I took a prisoner in to the bathroom. There I had to hold him whilst the Nazi Obmann beat him with a rubber tube all over. That lasted about 10 minutes. The grounds for this ill treatment was as follows. The Russian had stolen 3 slices of bread because he had had nothing to eat and was mad with hunger.

The conditions which I have described above, continued the whole of the years I was in the boiler making dept. On 20th Feb. 1943, I was transferred from the boiler making shop to WIDIA.

Signed. H. Buschhauer.

J.W.L. Rathborne, Major

Mil Gov Stamp. Presidient

H1126 - 0021

D-505

dated 14/10/1945 signed by Capt N. Webb. Place: Essen 14/10 1945.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION.

I, Capt. N. Webb, British Army, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English, French and German languages; and that the attached is a true and correct translation, made under my supervision, into the English language from the German language, of the document (or excerpts therefrom as indicated) attached to and referred to in the Certificate dated 14/10 1945.

Exhibit U.S.A. 201
Filed Dec. 12, 1945

H1126 - 0022

DOCUMENT NO. D-316

14th. 3. 1942.

Machine Building Workshop 8

through Mr. KOCH

To:

Mr. HUPE

Re. Employment of Russians.

During the last few days we have established that the food for the Russians employed here is so miserable that the people are getting weaker from day to day.

Investigations showed that single Russians are not able to place a piece of metal for turning into position, for instance, because of lack of physical strength. The same conditions exist at all places of work, where Russians are employed.

If it can not be seen to, that the feeding is changed in such a way that a normal output can be demanded from these people, then the employment of these people, with the necessary expense connected thereto, has been in vain. I do not think it is worth while employing any more Russians, from whom I cannot expect any results in production, although they are sent to me as productive workers.

I expect that the same conditions prevail inside all the other works. It would only be right if you via the firm take steps to clear up this matter.

Signature:

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, Capt. N. Webb, British Army, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the attached is a true and correct translation, made under my supervision, into the English language from the German language, of the documents (or excerpts therefrom as indicated) attached to, and referred to in the Certificate dated 24.10.1945 bearing No_____ signed by me.

N. Webb.
Capt.

Exhibit U.S.A. 205
Filed Dec. 12, 1945

OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT EC-68

49-7 III B 5 C (in pencil)

Copy

Minister for Finance and Economy of Baden

Karlsruhe, 6 March 1941

State Food Office Dept. A.

(State Peasants Association)
(Landesbauernschaft)

Confidential

To all District Peasants Association
(Kreisbauernschaften)

Only for Official Business

Subject: Directives on the treatment of foreign farmworkers of Polish Nationality

The agencies of the Reich Food Administration (Reichsnaehrstand) - State Peasant Association of Baden have received the result of the negotiations with the Higher SS and Police officer in Stuttgart on 14 February 1941, with great satisfaction. Appropriate memoranda have already been turned over to the District Peasants Associations. Below, I promulgate the individual regulations, as they have been laid down during the conference and how they are now to be applied accordingly:

1. Fundamentally, farmworkers of Polish nationality no longer have the right to complain, and thus no complaints may be accepted any more by any official agency.

2. The farmworkers of Polish nationality may not leave the localities in which they are employed, and have a curfew from 1 Oct. to 31 March from 2000 hours to 0600 hours, and from 1 Apr. to 30 Sep. from 2100 hours to 0500 hours.

3. The use of bicycles is strictly prohibited. Exceptions are possible, for riding to the place of work in the field, if a relative of the employer or the employer himself is present.

4. The visit of churches, regardless of faith, is strictly prohibited, even when there is no service in progress. Individual spiritual care by clergymen outside of the church is permitted.

5. Visits to theaters, motion pictures or other cultural entertainment are strictly prohibited for farmworkers of Polish nationality.

6. The visit of restaurants is strictly prohibited to farmworkers of Polish nationality except for one restaurant in the village, which will be selected by the Rural Councillor's Office (Landratsamt), and then only one day per week. The day, which is determined as the day to visit the restaurant, will also be determinedby the Landratsamt. This regulation does not change the curfew regulation, mentioned above under no. 2.

H1126 - 0023

7. Sexual intercourse with women and girls is strictly prohibited, and wherever it is established, it must be reported.

8. Gatherings of farmworkers of Polish nationality after work is prohibited, whether it is on other farms, in the stables or in the living quarters of the Poles.

9. The use of railroads, buses or other public conveyances by farmworkers of Polish nationality is prohibited.

10. Permits to leave the village may only be granted in very exceptional cases, by the local police authority (mayor's office). However, in no case may it be granted if he wants to visit a public agency on his own, whether it is a labor office or the District Peasants Association or whether he wants to change his place of employment.

11. Arbitrary change of employment is strictly prohibited. The farmworkers of Polish nationality have to work daily so long as the interests of the enterprise demands it, and as it is demanded by the employer. There are no time limits to the working time.

12. Every employer has the right to give corporal punishment toward farmworkers of Polish nationality, if instructions and good words fail. The employer may not be held accountable in any such case by an official agency.

13. Farmworkers of Polish nationality should if possible be removed from the community of the home, and they can be quartered in stables etc. No remorse whatever should restrict such action.

14. Report to the authorities is compulsory in all cases, when crimes have been committed by farmworkers of Polish nationality, which are to sabotage the enterprise or slow down work, for instance unwillingness to work, impertinent behaviour; it is compulsory even in minor cases. An employer, who loses his Pole who must serve a longer prison sentence because of such a compulsory report, will receive another Pole from the competent labor office on request with preference.

15. In all other cases, only the state police is still competent.

For the employer himself, severe punishment is contemplated, if it is established that the necessary distance from farmworkers of Polish nationality has not been kept. The same applies to women and girls. Extra rations are strictly prohibited. Noncompliance of the Reich tariffs for farmworkers of Polish nationality will be punished by the competent labor office by the taking away of the worker.

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In any case of doubt, the State Peasants Association - I B will give information.

Forwarding in writing of the above agreement to the farm-workers of Polish nationality is strictly prohibited.

These regulations do not apply to Poles who are still prisoners of war and are thus subordinated to the armed forces. In this case, the regulations published by the armed forces apply.

Heil Hitler!

By Order

/s/ Dr. KLOTZ

- -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. EC-68

27 November 1945

I, WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE, Lt. (j.g.) USNR 391590, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. EC-68.

WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE
Lt. (j.g.) USNR
391590

H1126 - 0025

Exhibit U.S.A. 214
Filed Dec. 12, 1945

H1126 - 0026

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT EC-194
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

COPY

The Chief of the
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

Fuehrer's Hq, 31 October 1941.

WFSt/Abt.L (II Org/IV qu
No. 0 2588/41 Secret

Secret

Subject: Use of prisoners of war in the war industry.

The lack of workers is becoming an increasingly dangerous hindrance for the future German war and armament industry. The expected relief through discharges from the armed forces is uncertain as to extent and date, however, its possible extent will by no means correspond to expections and requirements in view of the great demand.

The Fuehrer has now ordered that even the working power of the Russian prisoners of war should be utilized to a large extent by large scale assignment for the requirements of the war industry. The prerequisite for production is adequate nourishment. Also very small wages are to be planned for the most modest supply with a few consumers' goods (Genussmittel) for every day's life, eventual rewards for production.

For the Arbeitseinsatz, following may be considered for example:

I. Armed Forces.

a.) Clearing and construction units of all kinds in the occupied Eastern territories.

b.) Work and construction battalions in the other occupied territories and in Germany.

c.) Closed units of all kinds to relieve soldiers in labor service.

II. Construction and Armament Industry.

a.) Work units for constructions of all kind, particularly for the fortification of coastal defenses (concrete workers, unloading units for essential war plants).

b.) Suitable armament factories which have to be selected in such a way that their personnel should consist in the majority of prisoners of war under guidance and supervision (eventually after withdrawal and other employment of the German workers.)

III. Other War Industries.

a.) Mining as under II b.

b.) Railroad construction units for building tracks, etc.

c.) Agriculture and forestry in closed units.

The utilization of Russian prisoners of war is to be regulated on the basis of above examples by:

To I. The armed forces.
To II. The Reich Minister for Arms and Ammunition and the Inspector General for the German road system in agreement with the Reich Minister for Labor and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (Wi Rü Amt).

H1126 - 0027

Deputies of the Reich Minister for Arms and Ammunition are to be admitted to the prisoner of war camps to assist in the selection of skilled workers.

To III. The Reich Minister of Labor. Limitations are:

1.) The securing of guards to protect the German people from dangers.

2.) Housing in closed camps.

3.) Securing adequate nourishment.

The observance of the counter-intelligence regulations which apply for the use of prisoners of war will be supervised by military counter-intelligence agencies as until now.

OKW (AWA) will furnish the Reich Minister for Labor with blueprints based on professional selection for the appropriate use of labor and will also permanently provide workers for assignment to the Arbeitseinsatz.

Furthermore the Supreme Commander of the Army is asked to take the necessary measures for the recruiting of volunteer labor in the Eastern operational zone in cooperation with the Reich Minister of Labor.

(Signed) Keitel

Distribution:

Ob.d.H/Org. Abt.
/ Gen. Qu.
Ob.d.M/Skl. (Qu A II)
Ob.d.L/Gen. Qu
Reichsarbeitsministerium
Att: Staatssekretaer Syrup
Reichminister fuer Bewaffnung und Munition
Att: Ob. Reg. Baurat Behrens
Reichswirtschaftsministerium
Att: Min. Rat Quecke
Reichsministerium fuer Ernaehrung und Landwirtschaft
Att: Min. Rat Dr. Dietrich
OKW/Wi Rue Amt
A Ausl/Abw
Abt. Ausl
WFSt Abt. L (Chef L I H, I K, I L, IV, II, Ntb)
AWA (3 x)
W H

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. EC-194

23 November 1945.

I, WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE, Lt (jg), USNR, 391590, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. EC-194.

WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE,
Lt (jg), USNR,
391590.

Exhibit U.S.A. 177
Filed Dec. 11, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT L-61
OFFICE OF US CHIEF OF COUNSEL

COPY

The Commissioner for the Four Year Plan
The Plenipotentiary General for Manpower

Saarlandstr. 96
Berlin S.W.11
26 November 1942

Va 5431/7468/42 g

Express letter

SECRET

To the Presidents of the "Landes" Employment Offices - Employment Office Brandenburg excepted -

Subject: Employment of Jews; here: Exchange of Jews in essential employment against Polish labor.

In agreement with the Chief of the Security Police and the SD, Jews who are still in employment are, from now on, to be evacuated from the territory of the Reich and are to be replaced by Poles, who are being deported from the General Gouvernement.

The Chief of the Security Police advises (us) under the date of 26 October 1942 that it is anticipated that during the month of November the evacuation of Poles in the Lublin district will begin, in order to make room there for the settlement of persons of German race (Volksdeutsche).

The Poles who are to be evacuated as a result of this measure will be put into concentration camps and put to work where they are criminal or asocial elements. The remaining Poles where they are suitable for labor, will be transported - without family - into the Reich, particularly to Berlin; there they will be put at the disposal of the labor allocation offices to work in armament factories instead of the Jews who are to be replaced.

The Jews who will become available as a result of the employment of Polish labor will be deported on a shuttle system. This will apply first to Jews engaged in menial work since they can be exchanged most easily. The remaining so-called "qualified" Jewish laborers will be left to the industries until their Polish replacements have been made sufficiently familiar with the work processes by a period of apprenticeship to be determined for each case individually. Loss of production in individual industries will thus be reduced to the absolute minimum.

I reserve the right to issue further instructions. Please inform the labor offices concerned accordingly.

To the President of the "Landes" Labor Office Brandenburg, Berlin W.62

I transmit the foregoing copy for your information. Insofar as the removal of Jews (still) in employment concerns your area (Bezirk) too, I request that you take the necessary measures in cooperation with the competent offices of the Chief of the Security Police and of the SD.

Signed: Fritz Sauckel.

H1126 -0028

The Regierungs President
Economics Admin Staff for
War Economics Area XII (Wehrwirtschaftsbezirk XII)

Wilhelmstr. 48
Wiesbaden
12 Dec. 1942
Tel. 5948

III/11-B.E. 10. 23/3205/42 g

Copy

SECRET

to the Chambers of Commerce and Industry
and the Manual Workers' Guilds (Handwerkskammern)
in War Economics Area XII

- address to individuals or acting deputy -

for your information

By order

Signed: Dr. Schneider

Certified
Hellbach
Employee

Stamp
The Regierungspräsident
Landes Office of Economics
Coblenz
16 Dec 1942
Diary No. 2627 Clerk

Stamp
The Regierungspräsident
Wiesbaden
Economics Admin Staff
for War Economics Area XII

For information:
a) Chambers of Economics
b) "Landes" Master Mechanics.
c) "Landes" Economic Offices Koblenz and Saarbruecken
for War Economics Area XII
- address to individuals or acting deputy

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. L-61

15 November 1945.

I, BETTY D. RICHARDSON, PO, WRNS, 66370, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. L-61.

BETTY D. RICHARDSON
PO, WRNS,
66370

H1126 - 0029

TRANSLTION OF DOCUMENT L79
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Top Secret
To be translmitted by officer only

Minutes
of a Conference on 23 May 39

Place: The Fuehrer's Study, New Reich Chancellery.

Adjutant on duty: Lt-Col. (G.S.) Schmundt.

Present: The Fuehrer, Field-Marshal Goering, Grand-Admiral Raeder.

Col.-Gen. von Brauchitsch, Col-Gen. Keitel, Col-Gen. Milch, Gen. (of Artillery) Halder, Gen. Bodenschatz, Rear-Admi. Schniewindt, Col. (G.S.) Jeschonnek, Col. (G.S.) Warlimont, Lt.- Col. (G.S.) Schmundt, Capt. Engel (Army), lieut-Comd. Albrecht, Capt. v. Below (Army).

Subject: Indoctrination on the political situation and future aims.

The Fuehrer defined as the purpose of the conference:

I) Analysis of the situation.
2) Definition of the tasks for the Armed Forces arising from the situation.
3) Exposition of the consequences of those tasks.
4) Ensuring the secrecy of all decisions and work resulting from these consequences.

Secrecy is the first essential for success.

The Fuehrer's observations are given in systematised form below.

Our present situation must be considered from two points of view:

I) The actual development of events between I933 and I939;
2) The permanent and unchanging situation in which Germany lies.

In the period I933-I939, progress was made in all fields. Our military situation improved enormously.

Our situation with regard to the rest of the world has remained the same.

Germany had dropped from the circle of Great Powers. The balance of power had been effected without the participation of Germany.

This equilibrium is disturbed when Germany's demands for the necessities of life make themselves felt, and Germany re-emerges as a Great Power. All demands are regarded as "Encroachments". The English are more afraid of dangers in the economic sphere than of the simple threat of force.

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H1126 - 0031

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT L 79
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL
(cont.)

A mass of 80 million people has solved the ideological problems. So, too, must the economic problems be solved. No German can evade the creation of the necessary economic conditions for this. The solution of the problems demands courage. The principle, by which one evades solving the problem by adapting oneself to circumstances, is inadmissible. Circumstances must rather be adapted to aims. This is impossible whithout invasion of foreign states or attacks upon foreign property.

Living space, in proportion to the magnitude of the state, is the basis of all power. One may refuse for a time to face the problem, but finally it is solved one way or the other. The choice is between advancement or decline. In 15 of 20 years' time we shall be compelled to find a solution. No German statesman can evade the question longer than that.

We are at present in a state of patriotic fervour, which is shared by two other nations: Italy and Japan.

The period which lies behind us has indeed been put to good use. All measures have been taken in the correct sequence and in harmony with our aims.

After 6 years, the situation is today as follows:

The national-political unity of the Germans has been achieved, apart from minor exceptions. Further successes cannot be attained without the shedding of blood.

The demarkation of frontiers is of military importance.

The Pole is no "supplementary enemy". Poland will always be on the side of our adversaries. In spite of treaties of friendship, Poland has always had the secret intention of exploiting every opportunity to do us harm.

Danzig is not the subject of the dispute at all, It is a question of expanding our living space in the East and of securing our food supplies, of the settlement of the Baltic problem. Food supplies can be expected only from thinly populated areas. Over and above the natural fertility, thoroughgoing German exploitation will enormously increase the surplus.

There is no other possibility for Europe.

Colonies: Beware of gifts of colonial territory. This does not solve the food problem. Remember - blockade.

If fate brings us into conflict with the West, the possession of extensive areas in the East will be advantageous. Upon record harvests we shall be able to rely even less in time of war than in peace.

The population of non-German areas will perform no military service, and will be available as a source of labour.

The Polish problem is inseparable from conflict with the West.

Poland's internal power of resistance to Bolshevism is doubtful. Thus Poland is of doubtful value as a barrier against Russia.

It is questionalbe whether miltary success in the West can be achieved by a quick decision, questionable too is the attitude of Poland.

The Polish government will not resist pressure from Russia. Poland sees danger in a German victory in the West, and will attempt to rob us of the victory.

There is therefore no question of sparing Poland, and we are left with the decision:

To attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity.

We cannot expect a repetition of the Czech affair. There will be war. Our task is to isolate Poland. The success of the isolation will be decisive.

Therefore, the Fuehrer must reserve the right to give the final order to attack. There must be no simultaneous conflict with the Western Poweres (France and England).

If it is not certain that a German-Polish conflict will not lead to war in the West, then the fight must be primarily against England and France,

Fundamentally therefore: Conflict with Poland - beginning with an attack on Poland - will only be successful if the Western Powers keep out of it. If this is impossible, then it will be better to attack in the West and to settle Poland at the same time.

The isolation of Poland is a matter of skilful politics.

Japan is a weighty problem. Even if at first for various r reasons her collaboration with us appears to be somewhat cool and restricted, it is nevertheless in Japan's own interest to take the initiative in attacking Russia in good time.

Economic relations with Russia are possible only if political relations have improved. A cautious trend is apparent in Press comment. It is not impossible that Russia will show herself to be disinterested in the destruction of Poland. Should Russia take steps to oppose,us, our relations with Japan may becaome closer.

If there were an alliance of France, England and Russia against Germany, Italy and Japan, I would be constrained to attack England and France with a few annihilating blows. The Fuehrer doubts the possibility of a peaceful settlement with England, We must prepare ouselves for the conflict. England sees in our development the foundation of a hegemony which would weaken England. England is therefore our enemy, and the conflict with England will be a life-and death struggle.

What will this struggle be like?

England cannot deal with Germany and subjugate us with a few powerful blows. It is imperative for England that the war should be brought as near to the Ruhr basin as possible. French blood will be spared (West Wall). The possession of the Ruhr basin will determine the duration of our resi stance.

The Dutch and Belgium air bases must be occupied by armed force. Declarations of neutrality must be ignored. If England and France intend the war between Germany and Poland to lead to a conflict, they will support Holland and Belgium in their neutrality and make them build fortifications, in order finally to force them into cooperation.

H1126-0032

H1126-0033

Albeit under protest, Belgium and Holland will yield to pressure.

Therefore, if England intends to intervene in the Polish war, we must occupy Holland with lightning speed. We must aim at securing a new defense line on Dutch soil up to the Zuider Zee.

The war with England and France will be a life-and death s struggle.

The idea that we can get off cheaply is dangerous; there is no such possibility. We must burn our boats, and it is no longer a question of justice or injustice, but of life or death for 80 million human beings.

Question: Short or long war?

Every country's armed forces of government must aim at a short war. The government, however, must also be prepared for a war of IO-I5 years, duration.

History hasalwqys shown that the people have believed that wars would be short. In I9I4, the opinion still prevailed that it was impossible to finance a long war. Even today this idea still persists in many minds. But on the contrary, every state will hold out as long as possible, unless it immediately suffers some grave weakening (e.g. Ruhr basin). England has similar weaknesses.

England knows that to lose a war will mean the end of her world power.

England is the driving force against Germany.
(Literally: England: is the motor driving against Germany). Her strength lies in the following:

I. The British themselves are proud, courageous, tenacious, firm in resistance and gifted as organisers. They know how to exploit every new development. They have the love of a adventure and bravery of the Nordic. race. Quality is lowered by dispersal. The German average is higher.

2. World power in itself. It has been constant for 300 years. Extended by the acquisition of allies, This power is not merely something concrete, but must also be considered as a psychological force embracing the entire world. Add to this immeasurable wealth, with consequental financial credit.

3. Geopolitical safety and protection by strong sea power and a courageous air force.

England's weakness:

If in the World War I we had had two battleships and two cruisers more, and if the battle of Jutland had begun in the morning, the British fleet would have been defeated and England brought to her knees. It would have meant the end of World War. It was formerly not sufficient to defeat the fleet, landings had to be mac in order to defeat England. England could provide her own food supplies. Today that is no longer possible.

The moment England's food supply routes are cut, she is forced to capitulate. The import of food and fuel depends on the fleet's protection.

If the German Air Force attacks English territory, England will not be forced to capitulate in one day. But if the fleet is destroyed, immediate capitulation will be the result.

There is no doubt that a surprise attack can lead to a quick decision. It would be criminal, however, for the government to rely entirely on the element of surprise,

Experience has show that surprise may be nullified by:-

I) Betrayal from the wider circle of military experts.

2) Mere chance, which may cause the collapse of the whole enterprise.

3) Human incompetence

4) Weather conditions.

The final date for striking must be fixed well in advance. Beyond that time the tension cannot be endured for long. It must be borne in mind that weather conditions can render any surprise intervention by Navy and Air Force impossible.

This must be regarded as a most unfavourable basis of action.

I) An effort must be made to deal the enemy a significant or the final decisive blow right at the start. Considerations of right and wrong, or treaties, do not enter into the matter. This will only be possible if we are not involved in a war with England on account of Poland.

2) In addition to the surprise attack, preparations for a long war must be made, while opportunities on the Continent for England are eliminated.

The army will have to hold positions essential to the Navy and Air Force. If Holland and Belgium are successfully occupied and held, and if France is also defeated, the fundamental conditions for a successful war against England will have been secured.

England can then be blockaded from Western France at close quarters by the Air Force, while the Navy with its submarines can extend the range of the blockade.

Consequences:

England will not be able to fight on the Continent;
Daily attacks by the Air Force and Navy will cut all her life-lines;
Time will not be on England's side;
Germany will not bleed to death on land.

Such strategy has been shown to be necessary by World War I and subsequent military operations. World War I is responsible for the following strategic considerations which are imperative:-

I. With a more powerful Navy at the outbreak of the War, or a wheeling movement by the Army towards the Channel ports, the end would have been different.

H1126-0034

2. A country connot be brought to defeat by an Air Force, It is impossible to attack all objectives simultaneously and the lapse of time of a few minutes would evoke defensive counter-measures.

3. The unrestricted use of all resources is essential.

4. Once the army, in cooperation with the Air Force and Navy, has taken the most important positions, industrial production will cease to flow into the bottomless pit of the Army's battles and can be diverted to benefit the Air Force and Navy.

The Army must therefore be capable of taking these positions. Systematic preparation must be made for the attack.

Study to this end is of the utmost importance.

The aim will always be to force England to her knees.

A weapon will only be of decisive importance in winning battles, so long as the enemy does not possess it.

This applies to gas, submarines and the Air Force. It would be true of the latter for instance, as long as the English Fleet had no available counter-measures; it will no longer be the case in 1940 and 1941. Against Poland, for example, tanks will be effective, as the Polish Army possesses no counter-measures.

2. Where straight forward pressure is no longer considered to be decisive, its place must be taken by the elements of surprise and by masterly handling.

<u>This is the plan of attack.</u>

3. The plan demands:-

I. A correct estimate of weapons and their effectiveness:-
e.g. (a) Battleship or aircraft carrier; which is the more effective? Individually or considered as a whole?
The aircraft carrier is the better protection for a convoy.
(b) Is air attack more important on a factory than on a battleship? Where are bottle-necks in production located?

2. Immediate preparedness on the part of the Army.
The Army must move straight from its peace stations to battle, overrun neighbouring states. (Literally: Neighbouring states must be overrun direct from barracks).

3. A study of the enemy's weak points.

These studies must not be left to the General Staffs. Secrecy would no longer be guaranteed.

2. The Fuehrer has therefore decided to order the formation of a small planning staff at OKW. It will keep the Fuehrer informed and report to him.

The planning staff is <u>responsible for</u> the planning of operations on the highest level, and of the technical preparations and organization necessarily required by the decision taken.

The purpose of certain regulations, concerns no-one outside the staff.

H1126-0036

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT L 79
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL
(cont.)

However great are the increases in the armaments of our adversaries, they must ,at some time, come to the end of their recources, and ours will be greater. French recruiting - I20,000 men in each age class.

We shall not be forced into a war, but we shall not be able to avoid one.

Secrecy is the decisive requirement for success. Our object must be kept secret even from Italy or Japan. The break-through through the Maginot line is still a possibility for Italy, and must be studied. The Fuehrer considers that such a break-through is possible.

The close combination of the services, for the study of the problem in its entity, is important.

The object:

I. Study of the problem in its entity.
2. Study of the procedure.
3. Study of the necessary requirements.
4. Study of the necessary training.

The staff must include men with great imaginative power and the best technical knowledge, as well as officers of sober and sceptical judgement.

Working principles:

I. No-one must be admitted who is not concerned.
2. No-one may know more than it is necessary for him to know.

3. When must the person concerned know, at latest? No-one may know of a matter earlier than is necessary for him to know of it.

At the request of Field Marshal Goering, the Fuehrer decrees that:

a) The various services shall decide what construction is to be undertaken.
b) There shall be no alterations in the shipbuilding programs.
c) The armaments programs are to be considered with regards to I943 or I944.

Certified correct record
(Sgd) Schmundt, Lt Col.

I8 Nov. I945

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLAION
OF DOCUMENT L 79

I, GOETZ MAYER, T/5 338I2I69, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document L 79.

GOETZ MAYER
T/5 338I2I69

H1126 - 0037

The Deputy for the 4 Year Plan
The General Plenipotentiary for
Labor Mobilization

G B A

Berlin W 8, 24 April 1942

Mohrenstrasse 65
(Thuringia/House)

Phone: 126571

Bureau of Ministry (Ministerburo)
received 27. April 1942, No. o887
Min. 28/v

Dr. R. P. has been informed

Very esteemed and dear Party-member Rosenberg!

Enclosed please find my program for the mobilization of labor. Please excuse the fact that this copy still contains a few corrections.

Heil Hitler !

Your

signed: Fritz Sauckel

5 copies

copie for Dr. Wittenbacher
signed: WACHS

70x

: Chancellory 1 May 1942 :
: (Kanzlei) :
: Mischke :
: read: ILFL/KS 45.42 :
: filed: 1-5, 5/5 42 Fg :

To

The "Reichsminister"
for the Occupied Territories of the East,
Party-Member Rosenberg

B e r l i n

Exhibit USA 168
Filed Dec. 11, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 016/PS
Office of U. S. Chief of Counsel

The Deputy for the Four Year Plan
The Plenipotentiary for Labor-Mobilization

20 April 1942

Schl./We.

The Labor-Mobilization Program

On the occasion of the Hero/Memorial Day, in 1942, the hardest and most gigantic commitment of German soldiefy in all history was announced to the German people by the Fuehrer. Besides the heroic and victorious conduct against an enemy of an unheard of superiority in number and material, and fighting with the courage of utter despair and beastly brutality, stands the endurance of hardships unparalleled in history of severest winter of cold, ice, snow and story since 14o years. The conquest of the unbelievable difficulties arising from such a climate and terrible weather conditions elevates our soldiers of the East Front, by comparison with the human and soldierly efforts of all times up to now, without exaggeration, to supermen.

It is now the duty of the Home Front towards those soldiers to summon all its strength for an equally gigantic effort to enable them to win complete, final and most rapid victory.

All the burdens and further necessary restrictions, even in the field of nutrition, must be endured with proud determination in consideration of the shining example of the soldiers.

Our Armed Forces of Greater Germany surpassed themselves in hercism, resistance and endurance at the Front of the East, in Africa, in the air and on the sea. To insure their victory in any case, it is necessary now to produce more and better weapons, materiel and ammunition through another increased effort and endeavors of the entire German people, that is, all the producing workers, intellectual and manual, the women and the entire German Youth.

In this manner will the German Home Front contribute decisively to the frustration of the hopes of our enemies to again escape their complete and final defeat.

The aim of this new, gigantic labor mobilization is to use all the rich and tremendous sources, conquered and secured for us by our fighting Armed Forces under the leadership of Adolf Hitler, for the armament of the Armed Forces and also for the nutrition of the Homeland. The raw-materials as well as the fertility of the conquered territories and their human labor power are to be used completely and conscientiously to the profit of Germany and their allies.

In spite of the fact that most of the German people capable to do so have already made a most commendable effort for the war economy, more considerable reserves must be found and made available under any circumstances.

H1126-0038

H1126 - 0039

The decisive measure to realize this is in the uniformly regulated and directed Labor-mobilization of the nation in the war.

To reach this goal, the following principles must be worked out and executed:

A. All important Production Programs, actually in progress, must under no circumstances be disturbed by the new measures. On the contrary, they should even be increased.

B. All orders of the Fuehrer, Reichs-Fieldmarshal of the Greater German Reich and the "Minister" for ammunition and armament are to be carried out as quickly as possible. Labor supply necessary for that purpose must be freed and made available either in Germany or in the occupied territories.

C. The task concerning the seed and harvest of German peasantry and all the territories under German control with the view to secure the largest production is just as urgent. The lacking laborers must be made available as quickly as possible.

D. A supply system for the vitally necessary materials for the German people will be assured.

The realization of those principles for labor-mobilization requires:

1. The co-operation of all the forces of the party, economy and the state under co-ordinated leadership.

2. The best will of all the German people.

3. The most far-reaching measures to imbue all the employed German workmen and women with the highest confidence in the justice of the consideration of their own personal welfare and their salaries as well as the best possible care for their health and shelter under the actual war circumstances.

4. The quickest and best solution of the question of the use of women and youth labor.

To reach the goal determined by the Fuehrer the simultaneous and quickest use of numerous different measures of unified purpose are absolutely necessary. As any one of those must not interfere with the others, but rather complement them, it is also absolutely necessary that all the offices (Dienststellen) in the Reich, its territories and communities, in party, state and economy, participating in this decisive task act according to co-ordinated, synchronized directives.

Thus, the labor-mobilization of the nation contributes extraordinarily to the quickest and victorious termination of the war. It requires every effort of the German people on the Home front. It is for that German people, for their preservation, their freedom, happiness and amelioration of their nutrition and standards of living that this war is being fought.

H1126-0040

BASIC PRINCIPLES

I. In the districts (Gaue), it is the task of the district-chief 'Gauleiter) to take in his hands the propaganda and orientation of the German people concerning the necessity of labor-mobilization and to carry out important measures for the care of the employed youth and women as well as to supervise the condition of camps and shelters.

They also assure themselves of the closest and friendliest cooperation of all the participating institutions.

II. It is not only the most distinguished duty of the General Plenipotentiary, but a condition sine qua non for the succe of his task, to assure himself of the utmostcooperation and understanding of all the highest Reichs-Bureaus 'Reichs-stellen), especially those offices 'Dienststellen) of the Armed Forces whose department are concerned with his task.

III. Equally necessary is the mutual understanding of all the Reichs-leaders 'Reichsleiter) of the party, especially the cooperation of the German Labor Front 'Deutsche Arbeits-front) and the institutions of economy.

IV. The General Plen potentiary for labor-mobilization will therefore use with the help of the smallest, personal staff of assistants the existing party, state and economic institutions and assure the quickest succes of his measure with the good will and the cooperation of all concerned.

V. The General Plenipot for labor-mobilization has therefore, with the consent of the Fuehrer and the knowledge of the Reichsmarshal of Greater Germany and the director 'Leiter) of the Party Chancellory 'Reichskanzlei) appointed all the district-chiefs 'Gauleiter) as his plenipotentiaries in the German Districts of the National Socialist Party.

VI. The plenipotentiaries for labor-mobilization are using of the offices 'Dienststellen) of the Party in their district The chiefs (Leiter) of the highest offices (Dienststellen of the State and economy of their districts will assist and advise the District-chiefs 'Gauleiters) in all matters concerning the labor-mobilization.

The most important for that purpose would be the following:

The President of the Land-Labor Office 'Praesident des Landesarbeitsamtes)
The Trustees for Labor, (Treuhaender der Arbeit),
The leader of the Peasants 'Landesbauernfuehrer),
The economic-advisor of the district 'Gauwirtschafts-berater)
The District-Superintendant of the German Labor Front 'Gauobmann der Deutschen Arbeitsfront),
The leader of the womanhood of the district 'Gaufrauen-schaftsleiterin),
The leader of the Hitler Youth of the region 'Gebiets-fuehrer der Hitler-Jugend),
The highest representative of the interior and general administration, and of the office for Agriculture 'der hoechste Vertreter der Inneren und Allgemeinen Verwaltung bzw. des Landeswirtschaftsamtes).

H1126 -0041

(Should the confines (Bezirk) of a Land-Labor Office comprise several Districts (Gaue), it seems advisable that the President of the Land-Labor-Office in question should make available to the District-Chiefs (Gauleiter), in whose district capital there is no Land-Labor-Office, his closest and most capable assistants in such a way that also in those offices the continuous information and instruction of the district-chiefs about all the measures concerning the labor-mobilization remains assured.

VII. The most distinguished and important task of the district-chiefs (Gauleiter) of the National Socialist Party in their capacity as plenipotentiaries in their districts consists in assuring the best understanding and cooperation of all the offices (Dienststellen) of their districts participating in the labor-mobilization.

Nevertheless, it must be strictly observed that the dignitaries of the party and the offices (Dienststellen) of the National Socialist Party, its organizations, sub-division and attached institutions do not assume functions coming under the jurisdiction of the State. The Armed Forces or economic institutions and for which only those authorities are responsible; they are not to interfere with official business not coming under their jurisdiction, according to the wish of the Fuehrer.

Should we succeed with the help of the Party to convince all the German intellectual and manual workers of the great importance of the labor-mobilization for the outcome of the war, and succeed to take good care of and keep up the morale of all the men, women, and the German youths who work within the labor-mobilization program under extraordinarily strenuous circumstances, asfar as their physical and mental capabilities of endurance are concerned and should we furthermore be able, also with the help of the party, to use the prisoners of war as well as civilian workmen and women of foreign blood not only without harm to our own people but to the greatest advantage to our war and nutrition industries, then we will have accomplished the most difficult part of the labor mobilization program.

The Task and its Solution

(No figures are mentioned because of secturity reasons. I can assure you, nevertheless, that we are concerned with the greatest labor-problem of all times, especially with regard to figures.)

A. The Task:

1. The conscription of new soldiers to a gigantic extent for all branches and services of the Armed Forces has been rendered necessary by the present war-situation.

   This means:

   a. The removal of workers from all professional enterprises, especially of a great number of trained personnel from armament producing war industries.

   b. Also the removal of especially non essential personnel from the war nutrition industry.

H1126 – 0042

2. The war situation also necessitates the continuation of the tremendously increased and improved armament programs as ordered by the Fuehrer.

3. The most essential commodities for the German people must continue to be produced for minimum requirements.

4. The German housewife's health, particularly the health of those on the farms, must not be endangered in their quality as mothers by the war. On the contrary, they must be relieved in every possible way.

B. The Solution:

1. All skilled workers removed from defense plants through induction into the Armed Forces must absolutely and immediately be replaced in such a way that no bottle-neck or decrease in the production of the war product results. It is the responsibility of all the authorities for the labor-mobilization to make sure that this directive is considered in each case.

The most capable workers must, therefore, be removed from the reserves of discontinued, lesser defense installations, and the discontinued constuction industry and be made available to the enterprises from which specialists are being called into the Armed Forces, 8 weeks before their actual induction, in order to enable them to instruct and familiarize their replacement with their work.

2. Workmen or women available because of destruction or damage of their installations must just as quickly be made available and incorporated again in the war industry.

3. The Armament and Nutrition tasks make it vitally necessary, not only to include the entire German labor power but also to call on foreign labor.

Consequently, I immediately tripled the transport program which I found when I took charge of my mission.

The main effort of that transport has been advanced into the months of May-June inorder to assure in time and under any circumstances the availability of foreign labor power from the occupied territories for an increased production, in view of coming operations of the army, as well as agricultural labor in the sector of the German Nutrition Industry.

All prisoners of war, from the territories of the West as well as of the East, actually in Germany, must be completely incorprorated into the German armament and nutrition industries. Their production must be brought to the highest possible level.

It must be emphasized, however, that an additional tremendous number of foreign labor has to be found for the Reich. The greatest pool for that purpose are the occupied territories of the East.

Consequently, it is an immediate necessity to use the human reserves of the conquered Soviet territory to the fullest extent. Should we not succed in obtaining the necessary amount of labor on voluntary basis, we must immediately institute conscription or forced labor.

H1126 - 0043

Apart from the prisoners of war still in the occupied territories, we must, therefore, requisition skilled or unskilled male and female labor from the Soviet territory from the age of 15 up for the labor-mobilization.

On the other hand, one quarter of the total need of foreign labor can be procured in Europe's occupied territories West of Germany, according to existing possibilities.

The procurement of labor from friendly and also neutral countries can only cover a small part of the total need. Practically only skilled workers and specialists can be considered in this case.

4. In order to relieve considerably the German housewife, especially the mother with many children and the extremely busy farmwoman and in order to avoid any further danger to their health, the Fuehrer also charged me with the procurement of 400,000-500,000 selected, healthy and strong girls from the territories of the East for Germany.

5. The spring cultivation of the fields (Fruehjahrsbestellung) will be assured by the use of the German youth in class-formation, together with their teachers according to an agreement with Reichs-Youth-Leader (Reichsjugendfuehrer) and the responsible, highest Reichs-Authorities.

6. The labor mobilization of the German women is of very great importance.

Examining this very difficult problem and after getting thoroughly acquainted with the fundamental opinion of the Fuehrer as well as of the Reichsmarshal of the Greater German Reich and my own most careful inquiries and their results, I must absolutely reject the possibility of having an obligatory service decreed by the State for all German women and girls for the German War and Nutrition industry.

Although, at the beginning, I myself, and probably the majority of the leading personalities of the party and of the womanhood (Frauenschaft) with me, believed that for certain reasons an obligatory service for women should be decreed, I am of the opinion that all responsible men and women in party, state and economy should accept with the greatest veneration and gratitude the judgment of our Fuehrer Adolf Hitler, whose greatest concern has always been the health of the German women and girls; in other words, the present and future mothers of our nation.

I cannot enmerate all the reasons which made me come to that decision. I only ask for confidence in me as an old fanatical district chief (Gauleiter) of the National Socialist party and to believe that this could be the only possible decision.

We all agree that this decision might appear unjust towards millions of women who are engaged in defense and nutrition industries under the most strenuous condition but we also realize that an evil cannot be remedied by spreading it to the utmost.

H1126 - 0044

The only possibility to eliminate the existing injustices and hardships consists in winning the war in order to enable us to remove all women and girls engaged from jobs unsuitable for women, namely endangering their health, the birth-rate of our nation, and family and national life.

We must also consider the difference, wether a woman or girl has been used to work in the field or in a factory since her young age and whether already she proved to be able to stand this kind of work or not.

Aside from physical harm, the German women and girls under any circumstances must be protected from moral and mental harm according to the wish of the Fuehrer.

It is doubtful that these conditions could be fulfilled in the case of mass-conscription and employment. It is impossible to compare the German Woman with the German soldier in this case, because of the existing fundamental natural and racial differences between man and woman.

We cannot accept the responsibility for the dangers threatening the life of the nation resulting from such a measure in the field of women labor mobilization, in view of the countless men on the fighting front our dead soldiers.

The many millions of women, however, faithfully and industriously engaged in the German economy, and especially now, in war time, rendering valuable services, deserve the best possible care and consideration. They, as well as the soldiers and workmen, deserve the greatest gratitude of our nation. They must be treated in the best possible way by the labor offices and labor authorities and their economic and health necessities must be generously considered. The Fuehrer as well as the Reichsmarshal of the Greater German Reich attach the greatest value to those measures. For instance, it would be completely wrong to threaten pregnant women with punishment and court procedures, as has happened already, if they miss a day of work because of troubles resulting from their condition during the usual period of precaution (Schonungsperiode). Nevertheless, it must and will be possible to maintain the necessary work discipline.

7. A last, but also important reserve consists in the possibility of the Personal, increased production of each German worker. It will be the most distinguished task of the party and the German labor front to achieve that increased production. There is no doubt that the German intellectual and mental worker will accomplish it, no matter where he works and in spite of the difficult conditions of our present nutrition.

This will be the best way for the German worker on the home front to express his gratitude towards the soldier on the fighting front who bears the most gigantic and terrible hardships in this severe winter, thus remaining victorious over our enemies.

It is also the task of the party, State and economy in cooperation to improve the sick rate by 1 percent through the adequate cooperation of health insurance institutions (Krankenkasse) and approved doctors (Vertrauensarzt). This was accomplished in the district (Gau) of Thuringia. Such an improvement of the sick rate throughout the Reich would mean the gain of 200,000 new workers.

H1126 - 0045

The severest measures must be used against loafers, as we can not allow those parasites to shirk their duties in this decisive struggle of our people at the cost of the others.

I tried to determine the exterior solution of the task concerning the labor mobilization, as conditioned by the present war situation, under paragraph B, 1 - 7.

It is only natural that all the possibilities contained in that paragraph will be completely exhausted. The rejection of a general conscription of all the women and girls does not mean that I condemn absolutely to use women and girls who are in a position to make themselves available for a suitable job wherever they can be useful to the war industry without violating the principles of the Fuehrer This will be done in closest cooperation with the competent offices (Dienststellen) of the party, state, the Armed Forces and the econom

The labor mobilization program as laid down in paragraph 1 - 7 constitutes not only the greatest labor mobilization of a people but also in history.

Adolf Hitler, however, made it clear through his idea of National Socialism that figures are not the decisive factor in the life of nations. Besides the tremendous figure of the employed labor forces stands their productive capacity. This productive capacity depends not only on the amount of calories, which I put at their disposal in the form of nourishment, but also on their moral and mental condition.

This makes it necessary to consider besides the gigantic, organizational question, the questions of nutrition, shelter, orientation, propaganda, and spiritual guidance.

Measures to be Taken to Assure the Well-Being of German Workmen and Women

There must be no doubt for the German producing people that they out-do by far all the other workers of the world through their conscientious work and their readiness to accept the most strenuous tasks under proper political and philosophical guidance.

The district Chiefs (Gauleiter) will at this decisive stage of the war assure with the help of all the institutions and organizations of the party the best political and ideological care ever known in the history of labor and humanity in wartime, for the German producing people in their districts.

I am convinced in my quality of general plenipotentiary for labor mobilization that everything will be done by the party to maintain within or without the plants the attitude and morale of the German workers on a high level through the use of allmeans of propaganda and orientation, meetings and appeals, as the only way to make the home front worthy of the fighting front and the only possibility to accomplish this gigantic task and to win the war.

H1126 - 0046

I will constantly see to it, that the authorities for labor mobilization as well as the managers of the plants assist the party and primarily the German labor front in its decisive and great task in this field.

Even Workmen and women employed in war plants in their home towns and living and eating with their families must be properly looked after. I mention only: Provisions of coal and potatoes, consideration of their possibility to get to their place of work. The lack of spring vegetables and other troubles caused by war conditions and affecting the nerves and health of our people must be offset by the strength and satisfaction gathered by the realization of the National Socialist principles of folks community (Volksgemeinschaft) social justic and the necessity to hold out together and the belief and the confidence in our Fuehrer.

This task becomes much more complicated in the case of those millions of workmen and women who have been conscripted for labor far from their homes in jobs they are not used to. This is a necessity of war.

Such utilization of labor power can neither be restricted nor can the hardships connected with it be reduced.

The aim is to make life for our folks comrades (Volkskameraden) as agreeable as possible and to facilitate the conditions of their utilization. All these German people must be assisted by billeting them, if possible, in decently furnished rooms under as decent conditions, by encouraging companionship during their free time through the party and to assure prompt issue of ration tickets and other such things.

In this connection the Politeness-Drive (Aktion "Hoeflichkeit") introduced by Reichs-Director (Reichsleiter) party member Dr. Goebbels will be binding to the utmost for all labor offices and all offices ofeconomy and nutrition.

All camps where German producing people, men or women, are to be quartered, must be perfect examples of German cleanliness, order and hygiene.

The German plants and the German economy must not hesitate to do everything in their power to make life far from their own homes and families tolerable for conscripted folks comrades (Volksgenossen) men or women quartered in those camps. As there is a complete order guaranteed in a way for the German soldier of theArmed Forces in his company for his external requirements as well as for his character, which elevates him far above the soldiers of other nations, so should this also be made possible in adequately applied from for the producing men within the labor mobilization program.

The necessary measures for the care of the producing German people within the labor mobilization program should therefore carried out to the fullest extent by the German labor front.

In case of more extensive commitment of women and girls away from their hometowns and families, the rules for shelter and care as applied by the women's labor service (weiblichen Arbeitsdienstes) must fundamentally be respected.

Extract U.S.A.
Filed Dec. 11, 1945

H1126 - 0047

Prisoners of War and Foreign Workers.

The complete employment of all prisoners of war as well as the use of a gigantic number of new foreign civilian workers, men and women, has become an undisputable necessity for the solution of the mobilization of labor program in this war.

All the men must be fed, sheltered and treated in such away as to exploit them to the highest possible extent at the lowest conceivable degree of expenditure.

It has always been natural for us Germans to refrain from cruelty and mean chicaneries towards the beaten enemy, even if he had proven himself the most bestial and most implacable adversary, and to treat him correctly and humanly, even when we expect useful work of him.

As long as the German defense industry didn't make it absolutely necessary, we refrained under any circumstances from the use of Soviet prisoners of war as well as of civilian workers, men or women, from the Soviet territories. This has now became impossible and the labor power of these people must now be exploited to the greatest extent.

Consequently, I arranged my first measures concerning the food, shelter and treatment of these foreign laborers with the highest competent Reichs-authorities and with the consent of the Fuehrer and the Reichsmarshal of the Greater German Reich in such a way that a top performance be demanded and will be obtained.

It must be remembered, though, that even the effort of a machine is conditioned by the amount of fuel, skill and care given to it. How many more conditions must be considered in the case of men, even of low kind and race, than in the case of a machine!

I could not accept the responsibility towards the German people, if after having brought such a tremendous number of men to Germany these men would one day become a burden for the German people or even endanger their health, instead of doing very necessary and useful work, because of mistakes made in their nutrition, shelter and treatment.

The principles of German cleanliness, order and hygiene must therefore also be carefully applied to Russian camps.

Only in such away will it be possible to exploit that labor to the highest benefit of arms production for the fighting front and for the war nutrition program, without any trace of false sentimentalism.

The necessary instructions concerning the food, shelter and treatment of the people from the East have been communicated to the competent authorities of the police, defense and nutrition bureaus; beyond that, I turn to the district-chiefs (Gauleiter) of the National Socialist Party with the request to assist me also in this field to the best of their abilities, in order to avoid any harm that might result from the use of that kind of labor to the German people.

The subjects of blood related, allied and friendly nations are to be treated with particular care and consideration.

H1126 - 0048

All action making the stay and work in Germany more difficult and unnecessarily unbearable for the foreign workers and exceeding the restrictions and hardships imposed by the war must be avoided. We depend to a large extent on their good will and their production.

It is therefore only logical to make their stay and work in Germany as bearable as possible - without denying anything to ourselves.

This can be realized, for instance, by facilitating their national and folkloristic (volkstuemlich) habits concerning food, shelter, and organization of their evenings after work, etc., as far as conditions and the consideration of our own people permit.

It is very possible that, if the authorities for the labor mobilization, the general and interior administration, party and labor front cooperate inclose harmony in this mobilization of foreign workmen and women, the tremendous advantage resulting from this mass commitment of millions of prisoners of war and foreign civilian working men and women for the German defense and nutrition industries may be supplemented by an equal success for the propaganda of the national socialist Great German Reich and for its prestige throughout the world.

On the other hand the greatest harm for our war industry may result if the cooperation of all forces involved is not assured and all those problems are not solved by all competent offices.

Therefore in closing I would ask you to observe the following principles carefully:

1. All technical and administrative matters for the labor mobilization come exclusively under the authority and responsibility of the General Plenipotentiary for Labor-Mobilization, the National Labor Offices (Landesarbeitsaemter) and the Labor Offices (Arbeitsaemter).

2. All questions and tasks concerning propaganda orientation, observation of political consequences and care (of people engaged in this labor-mobilization program) come under the jurisdiction of:

   a. The party, if outside of the plant

   b. The German Labor Front for manufacturing plants, the Bureau for Farm Politics (Amt fuer Agrarpolitik) for agricultural enterprises.

3. The issue of food and clothing ration cards, financial indemnities and relief (Ausgleichs- und Unterstuetzungszahlung) come exclusively under the jurisdiction of the competent authorities or institutions of economy.

Ask the district chiefs (Gauleiter) of the National Socialist Party, as my plenipotentiaries, to assure a smooth cooperation between those various bureaus as well as the best possible harmony and mutual complete exchange of information.

H1126 - 0049

4. The solution of the task concerning the war mobilization of labor is of such decisive importance that even the most important local or regional interests concerning most vital peace tasks must not interfere with it. Whoever violates that rule must be made responsible if the German soldier in his decisive struggle for the fate of our nation lacks arms and ammunition, synthetic gasoline or rubber, vehicles or airplanes.

Therefore, I want to deeply impress upon all the men and women who participate decisively in this war in the labor mobilization program with insistence to comply with all those necessities, decisions and measures, according to the old National Socialist principle:

Nothing for us, everything for the Fuehrer and his work, that is, for the future of our Nation !

signed: Fritz Sauckel

(Stamp)

(The Deputy for the 4 year plan
The General Plenipotentiary for
labor mobilization)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF
DOCUMENT NO. 016-PS

3 November 1945

I, Gerard Schaefer, 2nd Lt., Inf., 01332102, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation od Document No. 016-PS.

Gerard Schaefer,
2nd Lt., Inf.,
01332102.

Exhibit U.S.A. 180
Filed Dec. 12, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 017 PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Copy /T

The Deputy for the Four Year Plan
The General Deputy for the Mobilization of Labor
Va. Nr. 5780,28/4265

Berlin SW 11, 3 Oct 1942
Saarlandstrasse 96
(Reich Labor Ministry)
Phone of the Ministry 11 00 28
Postal Check account
Pay Master Berlin 10019

Urgent Mail

B-StV
5 Oct. 1942
Nr. 904 /42

To the Reichsminister for
the Occupied Eastern Territories
c/o Gauleiter Meyer
Berlin W.35

Dear Party Fellow member Meyer!

The Fuehrer has worked out new and most urgent plans for the armament which require the quick mobilization of two (?) more million foreign labor forces. The Fuehrer therefore has granted me, for the execution of my decree of 21 March 1942, new powers for my new duties, and has especially authorized me to take whatever measures I think arennecessary in the Reich, the Protectorate, the General Gouvernement, as well as in the occupied territories, in order to assure at all costs an orderly mobilization of labor for the German armament industry. The additional required labor forces will have to be drafted for the majority from the recently occupied eastern territories especially from the Reichskommissariat Ukraine. Therefore the Reichskommissariat Ukraine must furnish

225000 labor forces by 31 December 1942 and
225000 more by 1 May 1942.

I ask you to inform Reichskommissar Gauleiter party fellow member KOCH about the new situation and requirements and especially to see to it that he will support personally in any possible way the execution of this new requirement.

I have the intention to visit Party member KOCH shortly, and I would be grateful to you if you could inform me as to where and when I could meet him for a personal discussion.

Right now though, I ask that the procurement be taken up at once with every possible pressure and the commitment of all powers especially also of the experts of the labor offices. All the directives which had limited temporarily the procurement of Eastern laborers are annulled. The Reichs procurement for the next months must be given priority over all other measures.

I do not ignore the difficulties which exist for the execution of this new requirement, but I am convinced that with the ruthless commitment of all resources, and with the full cooperation of all those interested, the execution of the new demands can be accomplished for the fixed date. I have already communicated the new demands to the Reichskommissar Ukraine via mail.

In reference to our long distance phone call of today, I will send you the text of the Fuehrer's decree at the beginning of next week.

Heil Hitler!

Your devoted

signed FRITZ SAUCKEL

(stamp) Certified conform to the original
(signed) ACKERMANN
clerk-

H1126 - 0050

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 017 PS

23 November 1945

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt., Inf., 0-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 017 PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt. Inf.,
0-1335567

H1126 - 0051

Exhibit U.S.a. 186
Filed Dec. 12, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 018 PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

The Reichsminister :
for the Occupied Eastern Territories

21 December 1942
Nr. 02926/42

To
Gauleiter Fritz SAUCKEL
General deputy for labor deployment
Berlin W 8
Mohrenstrasse 65

Dear party member Sauckel:

I thank you very much for your report on the execution of the great task given to you, and I am glad to hear that in carrying out your mission you have always found the necessary support, even on the part of the civilian authorities in the occupied Eastern territories. For myself and the officials under my command this collaboration was and is self-evident, especially since both you and I have, with regard to the solution of the labor problem in the East, represented the same view-points from the beginning. For political as well as efficiency reasons, you have devoted your attention, above all, to the care of the Eastern workers, employed in the Reich, and in the same sense I also have striven toward an overall satisfactory solution, by the establishmentof special posts, collaborating with the welfare organizations (Betreuungsorganisationen).

If there is now complete agreement between your and my conception of the matter, I nevertheless find it necessary on the grounds of several occurrences during the last months, to point out with reference to the enclosure, the methods applied by a your agencies and collaborators. I thereby do not disregard the fact that considering the scope and urgency of the task to be accomplished, difficulties and hardships, yes even false measures by the executing branches, can in the long run not be avoided. But it seems necessary to me, to follow up these occurrences insofar as they touch the conduct of war and the interests of the Reich. This would always be the case, where the acquisition of new laborers is undertaken in a way which intimidates the population. The report I have received show, that the increase of the guerilla bands in the occupied Eastern regions is largely due to the fact that the methods used for procuring laborersin these regions are felt to be forced measures of mass-deportation, so that the endangered persons, prefer to escape their fate by withdrawing into the woods or going over to the guerilla bands. Add to the occasionally unfavorable news regarding the treatment of the Eastern laborers in the Reich, that experiences with the labor procurement authorities, then the result can only be a strengthening of the number and fighting spirit of the hostile troops. This development is further aided by the return of tens of thousands of useless Eastern workers from the Reich (sick, cripples, etc.).

To this point I should like to add that my repeated plea to establish sick-camps in the regional labor office districts, instead of the mass deportation of the Easterners who are incapable of work, has so far not been answered. Hence I found it necessary to contact the Reichskommissar ((Commissioner) for health and sanitation on this matter. In the session of the propaganda department called by State Counselor, Professor BOERGER on the 17th of this month, the negative repercussions which will be caused in the native provinces by the recently planned return transports were referred to not only by the representatives of my agency, but particularly by the representative of the economic staff East, since such events interfere with the demands for labor and production in the rear military zones. Measures such as conscription, return of the sick or similar things not only impair the procurement and the legal validity of the executive orders of the compulsory-labor order released by me on Dec 19.41, but moreover endanger all the important war work in the occupied Eastern territories. This goes as well for the urban as for the rural procurement districts, where so far, thanks to the self-sacrificing activity of the leaders of the economic land bases, an atmosphere permitting productive work was created between the German administration and the native population, which now threatens to become lost. Even if I do not close my eyes to the necessity that the humbers demanded by the Reichs minister for weapons and ammunition as well as by the agricultural economy justify unusual and hard measurs, I have to ask, due to the

H1126 - 0053

responsibility for the occupied Eastern territories which lies upon me, that in the accomplishmentssof ordered tasks such measures be excluded, the toleration and prosecution of which will some day be held against me, and my collaborators. In order to achieve this, and to bring into agreement the requirements given by the peculiar political situation of the Eastern territories with the measures of the commissions and the staffs of your agencies, I have empowered the Reichs commissioner for the Ukraine insofar as necessary to make use of his right, and to see to it that methods which run contrary to the interest of the conduct of the war and war economy in the occupied East be abolished.

It appears strange to me, that in numerous cases which should have been discussed with the civil authorities, we only receive information through the police and other agencies. I am referring in this connection to the note of my steady (staendig) representative of Nov. 11.42. -
III Wi 5 - 1231 - 3587 - in which I asked for a discussion concerning the mutual cooperation, and especially on the position of your delegates, to which I have infortunately never received an answer from you. With consultation of our mutual wishes, which you personally will certainly understand, it is unfortunately impossible for me to accept a co-responsibility for the consequences, which result from the recounted state of affairs.

I should not like to have informed you of this, without expressing my hope that in the interests of both of us, this condition will be terminated with the coming of the new year. I am personally convinced that you, dear Party member SAUCKEL, have the same desire. I assume that there will be an opportunity for discussion of this in the conference prompted by me on Jan. 11.43.

I am gratefully looking forward to your reports in this connection!

Yours,

signed: A. ROSENBERG

Extracts from the Secret Report on Morale by the Foreign Mail Censorship Post Berlin.
(Reg. No. 7328/42 secret Group VIII)
Selected letters from the occupied Eastern regions regarding the time from Sep. 11 to Nov. 10, 1942.

In the letters from the Ukraine a further sharp decline in the morale is pictured, and under the impact of an increased requisition of labor forces for the Reich, the Ukrainian population has been seized by a terrible fear.

Horrifying picturizations of compulsory measures by the administrative authorities for the seizure of Eastern laborers, form a major part of the news from home to their relatives working in Germany. The disinclination to answer the call to work in the Reich has evidently grown steadily, not only due to the reports of Eastern workers, which fled home and their workshops or have been dismissed. In order to secure the required number for the labor transport, men and women including youngsters from 15 years on up, are allegedly picked upon the street, from the market places and village festivals, and carried off. The inhabitants therefore hide themselves in fear and avoid any appearance in public. After public beatings during the month of October, so available letters state, came the burning down of homesteads, and of whole villages as retribution for failure to comply with the demand for the appropriation of labor forces directed to the communities. The Execution of the latter measures is being reported from various villages.

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Parts from Two Letters

"At our place, new things have happened. People are being taken to Germany. On Dec. 5, some people from the Kowkuski district were scheduled to go, but they didn't want to and the village was set afire. They threatened to do the same thing in Borowytschi, as not all who were scheduled to depart wanted to go. Thereupon 3 trucks loads of Germans arrived and set fire to their houses. In Wrasnytschi 12 houses and in Borowytschi 3 houses were burned.

"On Oct. 1 a new conscription of labor forces took place. From what has happened, I will describe the most important to you. You can not imagine the bestiality. You probably remember what we were told about the Soviets during the rule of the Poles. At that time we did not believe it and now it seems just as incredible. The order came to supply 25 workers, but no one reported. All had fled. Then the German militia came and began to ignite the houses of those who had fled. The fire became very violent, since it had not rained for 2 months. In addition the grain stacks were in the farm yards. You can imagine what took place. The people who had hurried to the scene were forbidden to extinguish the flames, beaten and arrested, so that 7 homesteads burned down. The policemen meanwhile ignited other houses. The people fall on their knees and kiss their hands, but the policemen beat them with rubber trunchions and threaten to burn down the whole village. I don't know how this would have ended if I Sapurkany had not intervened. He promised that there would be laborers by morning. During the fire the militia went through the adjoining villages, seized the laborers, and detained brought them under arrest. Wherever they did not find any laborers, they detained the parents, until the children appeared. That is how they raged throughout the night in Bielosirka. The workers which had not yet appeared till then, were to be shot. All schools were closed and the married teachers were sent to work here, while the unmarried ones go to work in Germany. They are now catching humans like the dog-catchers used to catch dogs. They are already hunting for one week and have not yet enough. The imprisoned workers are locked in at the schoolhouse. They cannot even go out to perform their natural functions, but have to do it like pigs in the same room. People from many villages went on a certain day to a pilgrimage to the monastery Potschaew. They were all arrested, locked in, and will be sent to work. Among them there are lame, blind and aged people".

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 018 PS

22 November 1945

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt., Inf., 0-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 018 PS

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt., Inf.,
0-1335567

H1126 – 0055

Exhibit U.S.A 181
Filed Dec. 12, 1945

H1126 - 0056

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 015 PS
OFFICE OF U.S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

The Commissioner for the
Four Year Plan
The Deputy General for
Labor Supply
No. IVa 5780.28/1138

Berlin, SW 11,17 March 1943
Saarlandstr. 96 (Reich's Ministry
for Labor)
Tel. of the RAM: 11 00 28
Postal Checking Account of
the RAM, Branch: Berlin 100 19

Copies:
1) Gauleiter
2) III W 5
3) Special Deputy for the Eastern
Labor Supply

Receipt stamp 03437
dated 18 March 1943

Personal!

TO: The Reichsminister for the Occupied Eastern Territories.
Att. Mr. Reichsminister ROSENBERG, Berlin
Subject: Draft of workers from the East

Dear Party Member Rosenberg:

After a protracted illness my Deputy for Labor Supply in the occupied Eastern Territories, State Councillor PEUKERT, is going there to regulate the labor supply both for Germany and the territories themselves.

I ask you sincerely, dear party member ROSENBERG, to assist him to your utmost on account of the pressing urgency of PEUCKERT'S mission. Already now I may thank you for the hitherto good reception accorded to PEUKERT. He himself has been charged by me with the absolute and completely unreserved cooperation with all bureaus of the Eastern Territories.

Especially the labor supply for the German agriculture, and likewise for the most urgent armament production programs ordered by the FUEHRER make the fastest importation of approximately 1 million women and men from the Eastern Territories within the next 4 months a must. Starting 15 March the daily shipment must have reached 5000 female and male workers respectively, while beginning of April this number has to be stepped up to 10 000. This is a requisite of the most urgent programs, and the spring tillage, and other agricultural tasks are not to suffer for the detriment of the nutrition and of the armed forces.

I have foreseen the allotment of the draft quotas for the individual territories in agreement with your experts for the labor supply as follows:

Daily quota starting 15 March 1943:

from General Commissariat WHITE RUTHENIA	500 People
Economic Inspection CENTER	500 people
Reich's Commissariat UKRAINE	3 000 people
Economic Inspection SOUTH	1 000 people
TOTAL	5 000 people

Starting 1 April 1943 the daily quota is to be doubled corresponding to the doubling of the entire quota.

I hope to visit personally the Eastern Territories towards the end of the month, and ask you once more for your kind support.

HEIL HITLER!

signed: SAUCKEL

H1126 - 0057

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 019 - PS

2 November 1945

I, FRED NIELBERGALL, 2nd Lt. Inf 0-135 55 57, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 019 - PS

FRED NIELBERGALL

2nd Lt. Inf.
0-135 55 57

Exhibit U.S.a. 171
Filed Dec. 11, 1945

H1126 - 0058

Chief of the Political Directing Staff
- personal referee -

Berlin, 12 June 1944

031 PS

TOP SECRET:

Copy No. 1 of 2 copies

Re: Evacuation of youths from the territory of Army Group "Center" (Heu-Aktion).

1) Memorandum:

The Army Group "Center" has the intention to apprehend 40-50,000 youths at the ages of 10 to 14 who are in the Army Territories, and to transport them to the Reich. This measure was originally proposed by the 9th Army. These youths cause considerable inconvenience in the Theatre of Operations. To the greater part these youths are without supervision of their parents since men and women in the theatres ofoperations have been and will be conscripted into labor battalions to be used in the construction of fortifications. Therefore Children's Villages are to be established behind the front, for the younger age groups, and under native supervision. To collect adequate experiences the 9th Army has already established such a Children's Village and has achieved good results also from the political viewpoint. Army Group further emphasizes that these youths must not be allowed to fall into the hands of the Bolsheviks in case of a withdrawal since that would amount to reinforcing the enemy's potential war strength. This measure is to be strongly fortified by propaganda under the slogan: Care of the Reich for White-Ruthenian Children, Protection against Brigandry. The action has already started in the 5 kilometer zone. The Youth Bureau has already had preliminary talks with the Organization TODT and with the JUNKERS works. It is intended to allot these juveniles primarily to the German trades as apprentices to be used as skilled workers after 2 years' training. This is to be arranged through the Organization TODT which is especially equipped for such a task through its technical and other set-ups. This action is being greatly welcomed by the German trade since it represents a decisive measure for the alleviation of the shortage of apprentices.

The Chief of the Political Directing Staff, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer BERGER, submitted the action to the Minister on the 10th of the month. The Minister feared that the action would have most unfavorable political consequences, that it would be regarded as abudction of children, and that the juveniles did not represent a real asset to the enemy's military strength anyhow. The Minister would like to see the action confined to the 15-17 year olds.

Following are the arguments against this decision of the Minister:

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1. This action is not only aimed at preventing a direct reinforcement of the enemy's military strength but also at a reduction of his biological potentialities as viewed from the perspective of the future. These ideas have been voiced not only by the Reichsfuehrer of the SS but also by the Fuehrer. Corresponding orders were given during last year's withdrawals in the souther sector...

2. A similar action is being conducted at the present time in the territory of the Army Group Ukraine-North (General Field Marshal Model). Even in this politically especially preferred Galizian territory recruiting measures were being taken with the aim to collect 135,000 laborers to be organized in battalions for the construction of fortifications. The youths over 17 were to be detailed to the SS Division and those under 17 to the SS auxiliary. This action which has been going on for several weeks has not led to any political disturbances. While it is true that the population has to be recruited by force, they do show a certain understanding, later on, for this measure of purely military necessity. Provided, of course, that they receive correct treatment, good food and lodgings, etc.

The unified organization of parents in labor battalions makes it possible to extract this group as a whole in the case of withdrawals which are quite conceivable in the case of Army Groups "Center" and South. The children already transported into the Reich would serve as a suitable incentive.

3. As to Army Group "Center" this measure is to be initiated in Army Territories, that is to say in those territories not under a civil administration. During a conference with the Chief of Staff of the 9th Army I gained the impression that the action will be executed, if necessary, even without the consent of the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Territories of the East.

4. If the Ministry for the East should not support or execute this action, it is expected that the procurement will be undertaken by the GBA (Generalbevollmaschtiger fuer den Arbeitseinsatz - General Deputy for the Mobilization of Labor). Army Group "Center" and especially 9th Army thought it of greatest importance not to let the children be put to work in the Reich through the General Deputy for the Mobilization of Labor. They preferred the offices of the Reichs-minister for the Occupied Territories of the East (R.M.f.d.b.O.). Only through these offices did they believe to have a guarantee for correct and proper treatment. This desire of the Army Group is a particular expression of confidence towards the Ministry for the East. Army Group desires that the action be accomplished under the most loyal conditions, as had been done previously in the case of recruiting for the SS Auxiliary. They further desired special arrangements regarding care, mail exchange with parents etc. As far as possible the children are to remain in groups according to their village communities, then be collected in small camps in the Reich where they would be at the disposal of trade establishments. These technical matters have already been discussed. They can be accomplished with the help of the offices of the HITLER YOUTH (HJ) through the Youth Bureau of the Ministry. Thus the Ministry is also able to exercise political guidance over the juveniles and has them at its disposal at all times. If I should re-occupy the territory the Ministry of the East could return the juveniles in the proper manner. Together with their parents they would then most likely represent a positive political element during the reconstruction of the territory.

H1126 - 0060

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 031-PS
OFFICE U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

The Chief of the Political Directing Staff
- personal referee -
p 612 a/44g

Berlin, 14 June 1944

SECRET

Re: "Heu-Aktion"

1. Annotation

The Obergruppenfuehrer (U S Army equivalent: Lt General) has given his consent to again submit the matter "Heu-Akiton" to the Minister, with the aim to bring about a reversal of his decision. This was done on this day. The Minister has approved the execution of the "Heu-Aktion" in the Army Territories, under the conditions and provisions arrived at in talks with Army Group Center (Heeresgruppe Mitte).

2. Write via radio to: Urgent!

Army Group "Center"
Att: Councillor in the Ministry TESMER

(Marginal note) Radio station 2 complied. 14 June 44 (signed)

Re: "Heu-Aktion"
"Heu-Aktion" approved under conditions and provision arrived at in conference.

By order of,
The Reichsminister for the Occupied Eastern Territories

signed: BRANDENBERG

3. Copies to:

a) SS-Obergruppenfuehrer BERGER,
Chief of the Political Directing Staff

(Marginal note) complied 15 June 44 signed: Sg

respectfully submitted for information

b) Chief Labor Bureau

for information

4. Matter p5 for information. Please return.

5. File

(Marginal notes)

June 14, 44
(Initials)

returned from P5
without acknowledgement q
August 25, 44
signed: Bz 24 Aug

P OK by Dr. Streube (?)

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2) To the Chief of the Political Directing Staff,
SS-Obergruppenfuehrer BERGER,

respectfully submitted with the request to re-submit the contents of this memorandum to the minister with view to reconsideration of the Minister's decision.

signed: BRANDENBERG

(Note in ink)

regarding the above-Obergruppenfuehrer BERGER received the memorandum on June 14. Consequently the Reichsminister has approved the Action.

signed: Str. June 16

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 031-PS

16 November 1945

I, Gerard Schaefer, 2d Lt Inf, O-1332102, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 031-PS.

Gerard Schaefer,

2d Lt, Inf

Exhibit U.S.A. 198
Filed Dec. 12, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 054-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

The Reichminister

For The Occupied Eastern Territories C.P., 7 October 1942

The Representative at the Army Sector B. L 14/10

To the
Reich Ministry
for the Occupied Eastern Territories
Chief Section I,

B E R L I N
Unter den Linden 63.

Reprint to Captain Lorenz Hq. of the High Command of the Army

Subject: Treatment of Ukrainian Specialists.

Enclosures: -2-

Attached I send you the copy of a report made by the Commandant of the Collecting Center for Specialists at Charkow. (report submitted at the end of September 1942) as well as the copy of a letter from April 1942.

Relative to the treatment of Ukrainian specialists in the Reich, I was asked by the Chief of Staff of the Commander in Chief to attend to the matter most emphatically since the complaints here never cease. I have discussed it thoroughly with the chief of section VII at the Commander in Chief's. I went to see Captain Schmid and visited the camp. As synopsis of the discussions with the gentlemen and reading of reports the following can be established in general:
a) With some few exceptions the Ukrainians employed individually in the Reich e.g. at small trade plants, as agricultatural laborers, as domestic helps etc. are very satisfied with their conditions.
b) The Ukrainians sheltered in the community camps, however, complain very much.
The enclosed report of Captain Schmid reports these matters in detail;

The question of treatment of the Ukrainians, transported to the Reich as workers of the East worries the bureaus of the Army concerned a great deal. The Commander in Chief urged me, to visit some of the camps in the Reich myself as soon as possible and to report to the proper authorities in order to bring about immediate relief. The Army zone is by no means satisfied. All the circumstances of discontent contribute more and more to more people joining the bands or wandering away to the camp of the Bandera resp. other groups hostile to us.

The best propaganda of all would be to treat the workers of the East well; great demands are not made by the Ukrainians anyhow. If their treatment will only be some what better and humanely decent, these people, who make in part a good impression, will be more than satisfied, these people after all came to the Greater German Reich-at least at the beginning of the employment of workers of the East in the Reich- of their own free will and full of hope. The unsuitable treatment described in the reports is hardly propaganda and is not profitable for us. After all, we are not at war with the Ukrainian population and certainly not with people who by their voluntary enlistment for labor, help us to win the war.

It also would serve out purposes definitely better to utilize the specialist in his specialty.

(signed) Theurer

(Theurer)
1st Lieutenant.

H1126 - 0062

H1126 - 0063

----Copy of Copy----

Collecting Center for Skilled Workers at Charkow.

Captain Schmid, Commandant.

To the
Commander of the Army Sector B. , Section VII

C H A R K O W .

Subject: Abuses in the treatment of Ukrainian skilled workers.

By reason of my capacity as commandant of the Collecting Center for Skilled workers and the transport of skilled workers to the Reich connected with it and thereby being in touch with the various groups of the Ukrainian population, I am informed of the morale of the Ukrainians in the extended surroundings of the Eastern Ukraine. Resulting from this knowledge I have to state that an atmosphere of animosity has taken the place of the original attitude toward the Reich. This sudden change of mood is connected partly with the scarcity of food for the civilian population caused by the war and intensified by the measures for centralization-The more important motive- the extreme abuses which have taken place at various times in the treatment of skilled workers shipped to Germany.

Since a prosperous economic cooperation with the 35 million people of the Ukraine lies within the interest of our coming generations and since the Ukrainians themselves are organically healthy, very capable of development and rich in valuable and willing constructive forces, it is necessary to prevent in time an estrangement starting at the roots and to recognize the beginnings of a disastrous development before it is too late, and to take effective countermeasures.

I. Abuses in recruiting.

AT the beginning of the action the recruiting worked on the basis of voluntary enlistment. Later on a certain pressure had to be put on to reach certain minimum quotas. This however did not give a license to the starosts and to their militia, entrusted with the drafting, to the brutalities mentioned in the following.

The starosts resp. village elders are frequently corruptable, they continue to have the skilled workers, whom they drafted, dragged from their beds at night to be locked up in cellars until they are shipped . Since the male and female workers often are not given any time to pack their luggage etc., many skilled workers arrive at the Collecting Center for Skilled Workers with equipment entirely insufficient(without shoes, only two dresses, no eating and drinking utensils, no blankets etc.). In particularly extreme cases new arrivals therefore have to be sent back again immediately to get the things most necessary for them. If people do not come along at once, threatening and beating of skilled workers by the above mentioned militia is a daily occurence and is reported from most of the communities. In some cases women were beaten unitl they could no longer march. One bad case in particular was reported by me to the commander of the civil police here (colonel Samek) for severe punishment (place Sozolinkow, district Dergatschi). The encroachments of the starosts and the militia are of a particularly grave nature because they usually justfy themselves by claiming that all that is done in the name of the German Armed Forces. In reality the latter have conducted themselves almost throughout in a highly understanding manner toward the skilled workers and the Ukrainian population. The same, however, can not be said of some of the administrative agencies. To illustrate this be it mentioned, that a woman once arrived being dressed with barely more than a shirt.

Particularly distressing is the fact that, on account of issued ordnances to prevent smuggling, all foodd acquired by the skilled workers and the rest of the population by buying or bartering household utensils etc. is being taken away by the militia on the way. This is not rarely accompanied by beatings(without regard to objections or given circumstances).

H1126 - 0064

It happened that skilled workers who came to Germany had sold or bartered their own belongings partly or completely in that way, thus they owned neither household furniture etc. nor any other goods or food. By combatting smuggling in that manner, unfortunately only too often very poor people are being affected and robbed of their last property, while the real smugglers are hard to catch. Furthermore food has disappeared from the market due to a freezing of prices.

Family members left behind and formerly supported by those who went to Germany get social care. This, however, is only the case in the city of Charkow, not in the case of people on the country (note: used to be the case, now all get special food distrubution, the hardship thus is removed) . The taking away of food resp. the sale of goods mentioned above often results in considerable hardships for those left behind and has sometimes strong effects, since neither communal nor recitrocal assistance exist here.

Very depressing for the morale of the skilled workers and the population is the effect of those persons shipped back from Germany for having become disabled or not having been fit for labor commitment from the very beginning. Several times already transports of skilled workers on their way to Germany have crossed returning transports of such disabled persons and have stood on the tracks alongside of each other for a longer period of time. These returning transports are insufficiently cared for. Nothing but sick, injured or weak people , mostly 50-60 to a car, are usually escorted by 3-4 men. There is neither sufficient care or food. The returnees made frequently unfavorable-but surely exaggerated-statements relative to their treatment in Germany and on the way. As a result of all this and of what the people could see with their own eyes, a psychosis of fear was evoked among the specialist workers resp. the whole transport to Germany. Several transport leaders- of the 62nd and the 63rd in particular-reported thereto in detail. In one case the leader of the transport of skilled workers observed with own eyes how a person who died of hunger was unloaded from a returning transport on the side track. (1st Lt. Hofmann of the 63rd transport, Station Darniza). Another time it was reported that 3 dead had to be deposited by the side of the tracks on the way and had to be left behind unburied by the escort. It is also regrettable that these disabled persons arrive here without any identification . According to the reports of the transport commanders one gets the impression that these persons unable to work are assembled, penned into the wagons and are sent off provided only by a few men escort, and without special care for food and medical or other attendance. The Labor office at the place of arrival as well as the transport commanders confirm this impression.

II. Deficiencies on Transport.

During the transport to Germany provisions should be made for food, water and drinks, answering the call of nature, medical care, orderly transportation, avoidance of maltreatment, delousing according to regulation, and supervision. To take care of all this a military escort is detailed consisting of 1 car commander for each car, 1 train guard for every 6 cars, 1 supply man for every 5 cars, and 1 control staff for every 3 cars. This is the minimum strength required according to corresponding reports of all transportscommanders. With less than that orderly care and transportation of specialists is no longer secured. It has been often confirmed that insufficient and unistructed escorts caused fatal accidents, insufficient food and care, escape of hundreds of workers, most brutal maltreatment with consequent disorder and confusion. Unfortunately the escorts were depleted on the way in various manners by Army details resp. by commanders for the supervision of furloughs or after the transports were taken over by the police. This always affected the transports unfavorably. The transports commanders are instructed to secure the interests of the transports by all possible means against encroachments of all kind. They are of vital importance for the Great German Reich.

Recently the practice started of handing the transports over to new escorts in Przemysl. These escorts are under the command of a delegate of the German Labor Front or the Ministry of Labor. This practice is clearly against the regulations and rules of the Reich Marshal and the Deputy General for Labor Supply. Taking a good management of the transport by the delegates for granted, incoming reports here list the following deficiencies:

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The EThe escorts are understaffed which causes in part lack of care and food and rough treatment, Doctors and released female domestic helpers are detained in camps without authority for want of supplemantary identification papers, Social care is lacking. A verbal report at hand relates in detail and with the witnesses the irresponsibility and indecent conduct of delegate, Albert Nuessen who took over the 62nd transport. The transfer to the camp is made as fast as possible and not perfect. The railroad offices are of course directed to support the transport commanders. Unfortunately, however, some of the office chiefs of the railroad treat the transports of specialists often as very immaterial. The chief of transportation in Romodan e.g. statedd tb a transport commander that these transports are not important. Yet the Feuhrer himself ordered these transports, and the problem of work power was declared to be the most important and urgent in order to increase the potential of armament!

The food situation of the transports is now somewhat improved after giving right notice ahead of time. Previously some of the food stations failed grossly. However, it happens again and again that in spite of giving advance notice of the transports strength in time, no warm or cold food is ready or available. Sometimes this is due to military or hospital transports which passed through before. This can be easily understood. Sometimes, however, the notice was not passed on or simply nothing at all was done. In the Reich it is generally better. Of course it happens when trains are detoured a great deal of the specialists go hungry for days. The iron ration is always taken along and also used. It mostly depends on the transport commander and the office chief for socual care how unforseen food difficulties are overcome. The Army offices always greatest understanding for supplying these transports, the deputies of the labor front most of the time fulfill their oppointments well, however some of the deputies of the attendance service have completely failed in their duties. The transport commanders are instructed to give exact names and conditions in the future. The red cross which at times is overburdened helps with the supplying; unfortunately, however, the attitude and behavior of many female red cross workers toward the specialists is based often on uncomprehension of the Fuehrer's great action in regard to Eastern workers; and they treat especially the female workers in an outrageous manner. Food also has been refused at times with the reference that these were "Russian swine". Nobody pays attention to the fact that these are Ukrainians, because there is a lack of information to that effect. In reference to this , attention is called to the fact that it has happened on several occasions that people have broken out of the cars after several days of hungering, hurried into the nearby villages, sold their goods and acquired food. In such cases of course, it is not to be expected that they all come back. Such gross incidents of the transports o of the first months have not, to our knowledge been repeated in the summer. However, it has been reported that about 500 workers escaped along the route out of a transport which started from Kiev, accompanied by only a few policemen, supposedly 5 in all, (and without medical personel) and which convoy was badly supplied and taken care of.

To understand the supply problem, it is important to know that often only a short time is being alloted for the feeding of the many hundred people by the train commander or the railway station officer. Therefore all the workers can only be fed before the departure of the train if there is a sufficient amount of accompanying and attendance personnel and if the food is handed out quickly at several distrubuting points; in additiin close cooperation of the workers is needed. Because the transports must often stop 1-3 Km outside of the stations it still happens frequently that small part of the workers remain without rations because the engineers in spite of agreements, the stationmaster let the trains take off without warning. On the basis of reported incidents, attention must be called to the fact that is irresponsible to keep the workers locked in the cars for many hours so that they cannot even take care of the calls of nature. It is evident that the people of a transport must be given an opportunity from time to time in order to get drinking water, to wash, and in order to relieve themselves. Cars have been showed in which people had made holes so that they could take care of the calls of nature.

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When nearing bigger stations persons should, if possible relieve themselves far from these stations.

The following abuses were reported from the delousing stations:

In the womens and girl's shower rooms, services was partly performed by men or men would mingle around or even helped with the soaping! ; and vice versa, there was female personnel in the men's shower rooms; men also for some time were taking photographs in the women's shower rooms. Since mainly Ukrainian peasants were transported in the last months, as far as the female portion of these are concerned they are mostly of a high moral standard and used to strict decency, they must have considered such a treatment as a national degradation. The above mentioned abuses have been, according to our knowledge, settled by the intervention of the transport commanders. The reports of the photographing were made from HALLE;the reports about the former were made from Kiewerce. Such incidents in complete discard with the honor and respect of the Greater German Reich may still occur again here or there.

III. Abuses inside Germany.

Undoubtedly the higher authorities in the Reich do everything to attend · in the best manner to the workers from the East, especially from the Ukraine, who have been called to Germany. In most of the enterprises,too, in the countries and in households, one is not only satisfied most of the time with the Ukrainian women and girls as help, but they are also treated with a happy solicitude and with understanding for their position and for our relations to the Ukraine.

Here too, unfortunately voices are heard that tell of bad treatment in the collecting as well as other camps. All the time do people tell about beatings and thrashings but constantly also do they write about them. It seems that especially these men who have functions pertaining to order and security violate sometimes very much, the limits of admissability and identify the Ukrainians as Bolshevics while they have actually for decades opposed themselves to Bolshevism as its natural enemies. The camp commanders also, usually show no understanding for the Ukrainians. The treatment in the camps is described as being bad and very brutal.

With regard to food, it is being felt in Germany that in a war for life and death, it is but natural to impose harsh restrictions in the first place on foreigners who have been up to the present in the enemy's camp. No doubt the Reich and the businesses make efforts to keep the workers who were brought in, in good health and working condition. If abuses take place here, it is harmful to ourselves and should be remedied in each single case.

Disadvantageous also is the fact that a great portion of the German population considers the Ukrainian labor forces as their worst enemies and as Russian Bolshevists and treat them accordingly. A definite clarification is urgently needed here. In the face of such an attitude of the Ukraine it will be completely impossible to have for decades and centuries a successful and durable solution for the great economical and political problem of the East especially of the Southern part.

Until recently yet, the postal communication problem of the specialists with their country was not fully solved and gave cause to ill roumor and depression. At present an improvement is being planned.

Here in the Ukraine thousands of recruiting notices and placards have been put out to get cooperation from the people and urging them to report to the Reich with the assurance of best treatment. Therefore, considering this and also the above mentioned abuses, it would seem to be of interest to the Reich, and necessary for the security of our future race and to prevent a later evil, to prevent by all means an alienation of the Ukraine with its precious territories and population by settling vicious abuses and by a clarification of the situation.

Certified True Copy
C.P., 5 Oct 1942
illegible signature
Envelope
At the V.O. of the Reichs Ministry for the occupied territories of the East.
Deputy with Army, Territory B.
Official seal

----Copy of Copy----

Copy of a letter of a graduate engineer
given to the Specialist Collecting Camp.

(Translated from the orginal in the Specialist Collecting Camp.)
27 April 42
Camp Dabendorf
Berlin
Reich Railway direction.

Mister Franz H. Ergard and H. Nester!

[redacted]ood Day!

As I have told you in my letter of 20 Apr. 42, we have been transported to the GRUNEWALD Railroad car repair factories. In the first week I have worked as a manual laborer in the main warehouse of the works. I have unloaded coal, have dug the ground and have stacked lumber. This is supposed to be the "employment of Specialists" in their own line of work. The question constantly arises, why did I go to Germany, maybe that I who volunteered as a specialist (graduate engineer) for Germany, am to be transformed into a banned prisoner? I wonder why? What misdeeds have I committed against Germany? On the contrary, I have believed all those who spoke in Charkow about the workers's life in Germany. My attitude toward Germany has remained kind and friendly, I want to work, but I do not want to be led astray, to be treated as a civilian prisoner and without any care, or as a forgotten man who can find nowhere and receives from nobody, care and moral backing. I had hoped that we would be treated humanely and quite differently. It should [redacted]e clear that I did not come to Germany to beg for charity. I had a job in Charkow and a decent working place; this I have renounced [redacted]r the good of Germany and sacrificed for the improvment of the [redacted]ondition of my family. It was clear to me that I had to help that state that delivered me from the Bolshevist yoke, from this yoke under which I had to live for 24 years. Now I had expected a better future for myself. Our food ration consists of : at 4 o'clock in the morning 3/4 of a liter of tea, in the evening at 6 o'clock 3/4 of a liter of soup and 250 grams of bread a day. That is all. With such food we have to dig the ground and great requiremants are made from us just like from manual laborers. On account of the undernorishment and the heavy work I am weak and exhausted today and I don't know if I can endure and survive this much longer. To what conditions thoughtlessness can drive a man! Into a condition which will problably not be pleasant to anybody.

I beg you all, deliver me, help that I can go back to my family! If this is impossible, case my condition otherwise I may commit a stupidity, escape or suicide.

There is no possibility to continue to live like this.

Your,

Grigori.

P.S. : Expect with impatience to hear from you. What is the possibility of sending me a work suit which in my stupidity I have not taken along.

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Certified copy of Original

5 Oct. 42

Mamperl

employee

(At the V.O. of the Reich Ministry of the occupied territories of the East.
Deputy with Army , territory B.)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 054-PS

Nov 19, 1945.

I , ERNST W. COHN, Pfc, 33 92 57 38, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of document 054-PS

ERNST W. COHN,
Pfc.
33 92 57 38

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Exhibit U.S.A. 194
Filed Dec. 12, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO 084-PS
Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel.

Central Office (Zentralstelle) for Members of Eastern Nationals. In (ZO)

Berlin NW 7, The 30 Sept 1942

Hegelplatz 2

Concerning: Present Status of the question of Eastern Laborers.

The commitment and treatment of foreign laborers, who have been brought into the Reich from occupied Eastern territories, depicts a proceeding which will not only be of sifnificant importance to the German war production and the securing of food, but also for the carrying out of German administrative interests in a former Soviet area. Two large fields of action are effected by the way in which the prblems connected with the inclusion of millions of Eastern nationals in the Reich are solved:

1) Development of the war situation
2) The enforcement of the German claim to leadership in the East after the war.

When the call for labor in Germany was increased in January, 19[illegible] among the occupied Eastern territories, this set up a situation among those classes of Russian and Ukrainian civilians concerned wh[illegible] had by all means the appearance of a risk. Even if one group (the volunteers) set excessive hopes on the journey into the Reich under the impression of irresponsible promises while the other (forced laborers) left their homes reluctantly or at least with misgivings because of memories of former Bolshevist deportations as well as planted anti-German rumors, the fact remains that the trip to Germa[illegible] had to be felt as journey into the unknown not only by the two conc[illegible] ned but also by those relatives who remained behind because of the isolation of the USSR from Europe for decades. The public judgement of the Reich and its leadership would just as dependent upon the outcome of this measure taken by the German military and civilian authorities in the occupied Eastern territories. The employment in Germany offered an unusual opportunity to learn to know by personal experience, which no propaganda could replace. The greater German Reich was much slander by the Soviet press, and the National Social[illegible] tic position to the working class and thus to gain a basis of compar[illegible] ison to the corresponding Communistic doctrines and methods. This m[illegible] nt no more nor less, than that the draft of Eastern laborers would [illegible] of importance in the development of polictical opinions among the Eastern nationalst towards the power which was presently occupying the region which would aid measures taken to accomplish the recruit[illegible] the commitment, the housing etc, In the Reich, which should have be[illegible] taken into consideration from the start, since in view of the necce[illegible] ity to keep the aid of the native inhabitants in the huge areas be-hind the front, it is especially that factors which cannot be contr-olled by regulations or orders, namely the frame of mind, which is of war potential value.

Instead of taking consideration fo this, the drafting and the employment as well as the housing, treatment etc. of the so called Eastern laborers has so far been taken care of exclusively according to labor technical and the security police points of view, with the result that the headquartes responsible for this were able to report the due numerical fulfilment of the program as well as the security of the German nationality and of the busiinesses. At the s[illegible] time, however, facts had to be hushed which could have been avoided not only in the interests of German prestige and to the satisfactio[illegible] of the occupied Eastern territories but which even today cost the lives of thousands of German soldiers by their efforts. These fact[illegible] which up to the Fall of 1942, have undergone only part or incomplet[illegible] changes, among others, the following.

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 084-PS
Contd.

1) The concept of the workers from the occupied territories of the USSR was narrowed down to the labor-and social-legal term "Eastern Laborers". A labor condition among "Foreigners" was hereby created in a segregated "Employment under Special Conditions" which had to be looked upon by those effected, as degrading.

2) The drafting of Eastern workers and women workers often occurred without the necessary examination of the capabilities of those concerned, so that 5-10 out of a hundred, sick and children, were transported along. On the other hand, in those places where no volunteers were obtained, instead of using the lawful employment obligations coercive measures were used by the police(Imprisonment penal expedition, ahd similar measures.)

3) The Employment in businesses was not undertaken by considering the occupation and previous training but according to the chance assignment of the individual to the respective transports or transient camps.

4) The Lilleting did not follow the policies according to which the other foreigners are governed, but just as for civilian prisoners in camps which were fenced in with barbed wire and were heavily guarded, from which no exit twas permitted.

5) The Treatment by the guards was on the average without intelligance and cruel so that the Russian and Ukrainian workers, in enterprises with foreign laborers of different nationalities, were exposed to the scornof the Poles and the Czechs among other things.

6)The food and care was so bad and insufficient in the camps for the Eastern Laborers being employed in the industry and in the mines that the good average capability of the camp members dropped down shortly and many sicknesses and deaths took place.

7) Paymant was carried out in the form of a ruling in which the industrial worker would keep on the average 2 or 3 RM each week and the farm laborers even less, so that the transfer of pay to their homes became illusory, not to mention the fact there had been no satisfactory procedure developed for this.

8) The postal service with their families was not feasible for months because of the lack of a precautionary ruling., so that instead of factual reports, wild rumors arrived in thier countries,- among other means by means of emigration.

9) The promises which had been made time and time again in the areas of enlistment stood in contradiction with those facts mentioned under 3-8.

Apart from the natural impairment of the frame of mind and capabilities which these measures, as well as conditions, brought with them, the result was that the Soviet propaganda took over the matter and evaluated it carefully. Not only the actual conditions and the letters which reached the country, in spite of the initial blockade, as well as the stories of fugitives and such, but also the clumsy publications in the German press of the legal rulings relative to the matter gave them enough to manipulate with. Commissar for Foreign Affairs Molotov in his note to the enemy powers referred already in April 1942 to this, especially in para. III of this document in which among others it is stated:

"The German administration is treading under its feet the long recognized laws and customs governing war, in that it has given the orders to the troops to take into captivity all male civilians and in many places even the women, and to use against them those measures which the Hitlerites have introduced towards prisoners of war. This does not only mean slave labor for the captured peaceful inhabitants but in most cases it also means inescapable starvation or death through sickness, corporal punishmants, and organized mass murders."

"The deportation of peaceful inhabitants to the rear,

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which has been widely practiced by the German-Fascist army, begins to take on a mass character. It is carried out under direct rulings of the German High Command (OKW) and its effects are especially cruel in the immediate rear areas during a retreat of the German army. In a series of documents, which have been found with the staffs of destroyed German units, there is a directive to the order of the High-Command under Nr. 2974/41 of 6 Dec. 1942 which directs that all grown men are to be deported from occupied populated points into prisoner of war camps. From the order to the 37th Infantry Regiment of the 6th Division of 2 Dec., 1941 under the heading "About the deportation of the Civilian Population" it can be deduced that for the period from the 4 to the 12 Dec the capture and forceful deportation of the total population of 7 villages to the German rear areas was planned, for which a carefully worked out plan was proposed."

"Sometimes all the inhabitants were deported, sometimes the men were torn away from their families or mothers were separated from thier children. Only the smallest number of these deported people have been able to return to their home village. These returnees report terrible degradations, heaviest forced labor, abundant deaths among inhabitants because of starvation and tortures, and murder by the Fascists of all the weak, wounded, and sick."

Further, there are even today announcements in the Soviet newspapers as well as radio about the treatment of Eastern laborers which might have as an effect a strengthening of the moral power to resist in the Red Army. Further, there is mentioned the text of a letter which arrived in ORDSHONIKIDSEGRAD from a Russian girl and which was published in a "Proclamation" of the police administration of the North-Western Front of the Red army under the heading of "A Russian Girl in Cologne", attaching in connection with it an effective propaganda viewpoint about the "Fascist Forced Laborers" in Germany.

"Do you know"-, it goes on at the end of the proclamation,- "that every one of us who goes to Germany will meet the same fate as Olga Selesnewa! Do not forget that the German monster will make each and every one of you, who has remained behind, a slave on your own soil or drag you to eternal forced labor in Germany! Dear brothers and sisters... Go to the partisan detachments! Injure the German occupants at every step. Hit the Hitler thieves everywhere and continuously. The Russian soil shall become their graves!"

The effects of this large scale documentary proven radio-press-and leaflet propaganda, operating even into German administered territories, must be considered as one of the main reasons for this year's stiffening of the Soviet resistance as well as the threatening increase of guerilla bands up to the borders of the General Government.

In the meantime, after a betterment of the condition of the Eastern laborers had been insisted upon, not only by the main office for politics in the Reichs ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, which hasbeen able to find support in the repeated requests by the High Command of the Armed Forces, but also by the gentleman charged with the responsibility for all labor employment as well as the Department of Labor Employment in the German Labor Movement, which has the supervision of the Eastern Laborers--those previously existing legal and police rulings have been mitigated and the conditions in the 8-10,000 camps in the Reich have, on the whole, been improved. Thus those fixed wages, which have been determined by the tables of recompensation in a ruling of the Council of Ministers, upon which deductions were made up to 75%, have been replaced by new tariffs. The Eastern Laborers were left free of duty according to it, and the taxes were payed in a form of an Eastern Laborer Tax by the owner of the enterprise(Ruling of Council of Ministers for the Defense of the Reich of 30/6/42. Thus after many months of negotiations, with the cooperation of the Central Economic Bank in ROWNO, a salary transfer, in the form of a

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saving stamp procedure, was regulated. Thus, the ruling of the Reichs Chief of the SS of 20/2/42 prescribing barbed wire has been dropped by a supplementary ruling of 9/4/42 and at the same time, in exceptional cases, groups were permitted to go out under German guards, of late, it has even been permitted under their own supervision. The food supply was adjusted by a special delivery letter of the Reichs Food minister dated 17/4/42, to a degree where the "Soviet Civilian Laborer", as well as the prisoners of war received a uniform ration. This was still not enough compared to the normal amount of food given to those employed in the industry and in the mines, besides it was still much less and worse than that for the Poles, but it was an improvement however, compared to former conditions. Furthermore the postal communication has been adjusted for those Eastern Laborers who come from the civilian administered as well as those who are from the regions directly to the rear of the army, - at least theoretically, -. On account of the burden placed on the censorship office for foreign countries the High Command of the Armed Forces has recently asked again for a reduction of this measure.

In spite of the improvements mentioned as well as others, which in many cases can be traced back to the personal intervention of the Deputy General of Labor Employment., the total situation of the Eastern Laborer (sampling date: 1 October 1942) must still be considered unsatisfactory, namely, not only in respect to the differences in the treatment of industrial workers and farm laborers but in the differences found in the different States and enterprises. On the average there are still about 40% of the lodgings for Eastern laborers which would not meet the requirements even if all the wartime restrictions were considered. Among these are a frightening number of camps whose conditions are such as to destroy the success of the attempt of improving relationship and the corresponding radiating uplift of the morale within the Eastern territories. Not even to mention the fact that the marking OST (East) an identification ordered by the police, is being felt as degrading there remains such a quantity of grievances and problems that it would be impossible to relate them now. Only the following points are to be mentioned:

1) The Enlisting and Employing of persons of German Parentage, as Eastern laborers.

Several observations made by the commission from the central office to inspect camps, as well as petitions which have reached them, show that persons of German parentage were enlisted, - either against regulations, - as Eastern Laborers. Even if they are not recognized people of German parentage according to the RKF "Festi-gung", they are, however persons of German descent and with German names, as Mr. Middelhauve could establish in a camp near Berlin. It is to be doubted that the branch offices of the sub-office for Germans living in foreign countries had enough qualified help who could separate these persons capable of becoming Germans again.

2) Enlisting and Employing as Eastern Laborers of Tartars from the Crimea.

To increase the fighting numbers of the Tartar legions it would be indispensable to return all those Tartars, who have been employed in the Reich as Eastern Laborers, to their homes before the coming of winter; a similar report to the "GBA" is being prepared. Besides climatical reasons, the necessity for this return is to intensify the wine and tobacco growths in the Crimea by experienced help and at the same time, to prevent the invasion of Greek and Bulgarian planters and traders. To prepare this return as well as to deal with other Tartar problems a commissioner, namely a Crimean Tartar, has been installed by the "ZO". In the meantime, difficulties have arisen because of the effect of the furloughing of Tartar Eastern Laborers for participation in the Mohammedan festival during the 4th and 5/10/42 as well as the procurement of the meat and millet supply needed for this occasion. The authority in these and similar matters will have to be voiced, at the time of their return, by those White Ruthanian Tartars who

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have been selected for resettlement.

3) Enlisting and Employing as Eastern Laborers of Ukrainians from Transnistrian.

During an inspection of the camps for munition workers at Topchin (Kr.teltow) into which the Central Office was induced because an escape which became known to them, it was found that the Eastern Laborers employed there were enlisted January 1942 in Odessa. They do not come, according to para. I of the Rulings of the Council of Ministers dated 30/6/42, under the category of Eastern Laborers., but will have to be termed, because of the fact that the State of "Transnistrian" was placed in the Fall of 1941 under Rumanian sovereignty, as stateless members of the Kingdom of Rumanian. To clarify this point for all times, negotiations have been made with the GBA and the Foreign Office as well as the Feldzeuginspektion of the Office for General Affairs in the High-Command of the Army.

4) Employment of Skilled Laborers in Occupations foreign so their skills.

Up until recently petitions have continually come to the publishers of camp newspapers to the Reichs Ministry for the occupied Eastern territories, to the German Workers Front and in error also to the bureau for foreign nationals in the Reich from Eastern Laborers [illegible] who are in occupations foreign their skills or inferior to their skills, without the transfer proposals, which were approved by the central office as well as by other offices, having led to success--except in rare cases. Gauleiter Sauckel, who has repeatedly disclosed- the last time at the conference in Weimar on the 10 and 11/9/42- that the "inner arrangement" of the occupational employment would be his next point on the program, does not seem to be informed about the real conditions in which doctors, engineers, teachers, qualified skilled laborers and such are employed as unskilled workers, mechanics, as farmers, and farmers as industrial workers. In any case, one of his close associates, the Gauamtsleiter ORR ESCHER received the information about this which was given him by Dr. THILL, in accordance with instructions of the Central office, with unusual interest.

5) Separation in employment of members of one Family.

The repeated separation of family members who have come to the Reich as Eastern Laborers and Eastern Women Workers (married couples, parents , brothers and sisters, and children) seems utterly contrary to the usual customs governing other employments of foreigners. The bringing together of those relatives who have been mistakenly separated during the transport is principally desired just as much as is the employment of family members in the same location. It does however, in practice encounter some difficulties. In order to make possible at least the transfer of information from both parties , the Reichs Ministry for the occupied Eastern territories in August 1942, in conjunction with the Reich Main office and Reich Security Service has allowed the limited publication of encoded advertisements seeking information. Besides this an agreement has been made in September 1942 between the Central Office and the German Red Cross in accordance with which this organization will take over the communication between those Eastern Laborers separated in the Reich, keeping the place of employment secret however.

6) Disregarding the Nationality in Employment and Billeting.

The plan of the Herr Reichsmarshall to create special "Enterprises for the Russians" could not be accomplished as yet on account of reasons of wartime economy. The demands for a joint employment by the members of Eastern nationalities, according to their racial background could not be carried out in practice to any great degree. In addition to the reasons of business, the usual variegated composition of the transports coming from the great realms of the Reichs Commissariate Ukraine opposed it. Basically, a regrouping according to racial membership might be possible after completion of an examination of this membership

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which would have to be made in conjunction with the issuance of employment permits for Eastern Laborers, especially when a group of foremen has been found among the Eastern Laborers based on partial pre-training independently of the solution to this question, the commissions from the Central Office will be striving to effect a rough sifting of the camps according to racial membership, and to house them accordingly in special barracks. The supplying of experienced interpreters for this job and than systematic instruction has been begun.

7) Distinctive, Mostly Insufficient Food Rations.

The inadequate food ration for Eastern Laborers is important not only in the matter of performance but also politically, since the majority of the help coming from the occupied Eastern territories were previously accustomed to better rations. After using up all the food supplies which had been brought along, a general lowering of the ability to work and of the morale was noticeable. The written request to the Herr Reichs Food-Minister on the matter, to examine the food quotas in respect to the fact that the Eastern Laborer was in a worse position in the matter of nourishment than the Poles, was answered by a telephone communication from the respective Chief of Section, that to his knowledge the Russians were better off than the Poles. With this ignorance of the condition decisive measures could hardly be expected on the part of the Reichs Food Ministry. Nevertheless Gauleiter Sauckel has declared, in Weimar as a part of his program, that the feeding of the German as well as the foreign laborer inside of Germany would be shortly adapted to the requirements in accordance with their performance - here he supported his program on an utterance of the Fuehrer - . In connection with this a conference took place in the Reichs Food Ministry on [illegible] 29/9/42 in which an improved food quota of the Eastern Laborer was decided upon. The decree which is being co-signed by the High Command of the Armed Forces and the GBA (?), upon which the "Special Delivery Letter" of the 17/4/42 will be nullified, provides for laborers of all types an additional 1750 grams of potatoes, for workers in heavy industry an additional 200 grams, and for the group, to be newly instituted, of "overtime" and "night" workers a weekly 2600 grams of bread, 300 of meat, and 150 of fat. Besides this, instead of the tasteless bread made of turnips the usual kind will be delivered in the future. Even though a complete equality of food rationing with the other foreigners should be aspired to, this new measure, whose enforcement is imminent, will counteract the intestinal deseases and swelling of the stomach, as well as the sending of bread from relatives in the Ukraine, which can not be hindered on political grounds.

8) Partly insufficient, and Unjust Payment of Wages.

The wage adjustments for Eastern laborers and Eastern women workers must still be considered unsatisfactory even after the new wage scales, by the ruling of the Council of Ministers dated 30/6/42, as well as the lower evaluation of those agricultural workers who are quartered and fed free. The determining factor in keeping the net salary down is the necessity even today of maintaining the natural lower social level as compared to the German laborer, and to protect the German produce market as well as - in the case of transfer accounts - the enterprises in the domain of the Reichs Commissariate from an accumulation of surplus purchasing power. The Central Office took the viewpoint, in the conferences concerned with this matter, that it is far better to keep the wage level, as such, down than later to lower a nominally higher net salary to about half by means of the forced savings plan, repeatedly proposed by the Reichs Finance Minister. The change of the hourly pay scale, as well as pay on contracts and pay by means of premiums is therefore closely connected with the success of the voluntary stamp savings plan, which was installed in September 1942. This on the other hand will depend upon the fact that the saved amount, which has been sent to the respective home banks of the relatives on the form of savings books - a system which has finally been introduced by the Herr Reichs Commissar f the Ukraine - will at least be redeemable in cash to half of the amount shown, even if no interest is paid on it at the time. A change in

the question of wages, considering that this is the first time in bank technilogical procedure that savings and transfer accounts have been joined together would have prospects only if an eventual rearrangement does not materially raise the total wage increase of Eastern Laborers. A throttling measure would otherwise be necessary eventually which would shatter the trust in the honesty of the German social methods and would give irresponsible material to the Soviet propaganda. A way, to correctness in the matter of pay within the limitations determined by this viewpoint, could be seen in the proposal of the Reichs Trustee Dr. Kimmich, who expounded it in a short report in Weimar on 11/9/42. In accordance with this a plan for arranging salaries should be carried out by the industries by inserting increasing measures for past time, apprenticeship, and instructional work, to bring into prominence the principle of pay according to performance even in the occupied territories. The foundation for the pay scale based on this will be the evaluation according to eight categories of difficulty in the performance of work; the use of which would exclude the evaluation of previous preparatory training(in the judging of differences) in favor of the success in performance. The complete stoppage of wages would thereby be abolished with finality and the offering of work premiums be made possbile to foreign laborers. This,-as Dr. Kimmich characterises it,- "Re-establishment of a just salary and contract" will have as an effect a general increase in performance which will be advertised as "The thanks of the German laborer to the combat soldier." Should these principles shortly be made obligatory in all the states, this would also bring, in connection with the measures of the project of occupational instruction, an improvement to the former Soviet specialist without having impaired the pre-eminence of the German specialist. The safeguarding of the superiority of the latter is, in spite of the wartime needs among other things thereby guaranteed by the fact that the Herr Reichs Minister for armament and ammunition has been able to carry out throught the High Command of the Armed Forces on September 1942, that these 500.000 German war industrial workers, who are going to be inducted during the winter half year, will only recieve an eight week training, after that they will, however, be returned to their key-positions in the plants. In how far the coming change of wage structure will effect not only the leading position of the German specialist as opposed to the Eastern Laborer but also the relationship between these and the Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian workers is not to be seen in advance without further information. First of all, the Herr Reichs Minister of Finance will examine at the instigation of the Reichs Minister for the occupied Eastern Territories, if and in how far the increase of the so-called "Salary Equalizing Tax" as an addition to the Income Tax on the Lithuanian, Latvian,and Estonian in the Reich inspite of the low rate of 15% will in many cases place them worse off than comparable Eastern Laborers. This would be all the less tolerable as the employment of Eastern Laborers in the General Territory of Estonia leads up to the opposite problems.

9)<u>Insufficiant Equipping of clothes and shoes.</u>

The clothing of almost all Eastern Laborers, men and women, must be considered as insufficient. Transports were arriving even in the last days of the month of September whose occupants did not carry any winter clothing with them. The recruiting agents seem to leave the workers in the opinion that there is no winter in Germany and moreover, that the Eastern Laborers would receive everything they need. In view of the coming cold months and of the inadequacy of many quarters a catastrophe must arise on account of the existing lack of clothing and shoes, if a successful remedy is not found immediately. The main difficulties in the supplying of missing equipment, which has already led in our large industrial plant to the loss of 10% of its employees,-lies in the fact that the clothing set aside from the collection of textile goods, does not even come close to covering the demand and that the available booty as well as confiscated goods in occupied territories will not be handed out by the competent management without the delivery of the existing ration cards. Since the Eastern Laborer does not possess the latter this could then only be carried out if the enter-

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prises would requisition the needed clothing for the German workers and would offer those to the Eastern Laborers,-unfortunately however, deducting it from their wages from time to time. The sending of clothing, coats and shoes by the families of Eastern laborers by means of individual shipment can not be carried out without further directives on account of the necessity of delousing the garments at the border, wherefore a measure was proposed after previous negotiations of the Central office with the deputy of the Generalarbeitsführer KRÖSCHE at the GBA under the direction of the Reichs Ministry for the occupied Eastern territories; in accordance with this measure collective addresses will be sent to the occupied territories by the enterprises in collaboration with the censorship office and special collection offices set up there. The success of this action must remain in doubt at present. During the meeting in Weimar it was then announced that from January 1943 on, uniform work clothes will be made of cellulose material which, however, will not be of very good qualtiy and would look baggy after a short wear. Independently of this creation of work clothes, which naturally can not be considered a costume or uniform, the Central Office has made it one of its tasks to help with the action to provide clothes to help decrease to a minimum the expected lowering of performance, loss of morale, increased escapes, and cases of freezing.

10) Insufficient Supervision of the Eastern Laborers Employed in Agriculture.

According to ruling Nr. 4 of the Deputy General for Labor of 7 May 1942, the supervision of those Eastern workers and women workers employed in agriculture is delegated to the Reichs Food Administration(Reichsnährstand). Practical supervision in the rural areas by this state-regional and local authorities of the Reichs Peasant Leader must be considered as illusory with respect to the lack of knowledge and to the insufficient knowledge of these people as well as to the fact that the seizing of Eastern Laborers in the midst of all the foreign workers in the rural areas is only possible to carry out with difficulty. To inform at least the rural superintendant of the principles which govern the treatment of the Eastern laborers, the publication department of the Reichs Food Administration has, in accord with the Reichs Minister for occupied Eastern territories sent out guiding instructions for the present enlightenment campaign during the Fall quarter. No objections can so far be made against a strict observance of these guiding instructions since, on account of the shortage of labor in the rural areas during the past months, a pampering of the Eastern workers and women workers was noticed, which was not only a threat towards the temporary transfer of 200,000 agricultural workers into industry but also in respect to the damage of a lack of migration into other areas. To intensify the supervision in the rural enterprises, a policy forming meeting took place in August 1942 with the representatives of the Reichs Food Administration during which among other things the sending of interpretors by the Reichs Ministry for the occupied Eastern Territory to the Reichs Peasant leader was taken into consideration. Since the Reichs Food Administration was only willing to approve in the later part of September, the taking over of the payment of special supervision with a knowledge of the language, in spite of exemption from payment of contributions on the part of Eastern laborers, and since there is still at the present time no clear settlement of the number and conditions for this it will be necessary to balance the lack of activity of the Reichs Food Administration with an appropriate initiative action on the part of the Central Office of the Reichs Ministry for the occupied Eastern territories.

11) Insufficient Recreation

In spite of repeated efforts for a satisfactory and meaningful organization of the recreation period for the Eastern laborer the German Arbeitsfront has still not been able to create and carry out a satisfactory recreational program. While the enterprises have organized excursions in groups because of necessity, the recreational program in the camps have sofar lacked a uniform outline. The showing of moving pictures often runs into difficulties since the theaters, which have been created for this purpose, are only accessable to German workers and the Eastern laborer

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 084-PS
Contd.

H1126-0077

could not enter because of the danger of contamination of lice. The daily radio program in Russian and Ukrainian language which in the beginning was proposed by the Reichsminister of Enlightenment and Propaganda has still not been carried out because of several reasons. The performance of several artists is only possible in exceptional cases among the Eastern races because of the existing travel difficulties. What drawbacks and difficulties are connected with this can be shown in the circumstances under which a Ukrainian group of artists, who are now stationed in the Reich after an agreement was made between Gauleiter Sauckel and the Commissioner General of Kiew, are performing. After this group was barely sufficiently housed in an Eastern Labor Camp near Halle for a period of two weeks, a meeting finally took place in the RAM in which it was decided upon a suggestion by the representative of the Reichs Ministry for the occupied Eastern territories that the National Socialistic Organization should send three organizational trustees, the Reichs Ministry for Enlightenment and Propaganda three propaganda trustees, and the Reichs Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, three political trustees, to Halle. By the combined efforts of these trustees it was finally possible to employ the group of artists, who were made up of three separate groups, in several of the central German States(Gaue), during which the management, even in organizational matters, soon went to the member of the Eastern office who was sent by the Central Office of the Reichs Minister for the Occupied Eastern territory. Until 30/9/42, on which day the Central office in Berlin sponsored an afternoon reception for the 38 Ukrainian artists, the Reichs Minister for Enlightenment and Propaganda had still not decided upon the amount of wages, which had accrued because of the performances, still less who was to pay for it, so that a temporary solution by using an agent who would carry out the bare essential down payment had to be found. Because of this lack of clarity, the wish of the Deputy General for the Arbeitseinsatz to retain the group in the Reich during the winter months can not be supported.

12) <u>Return under Unworthy Conditions of Eastern laborers and women laborers who are not fit for work.</u>

The carelessness during the enlistment and reception of millions of Eastern laborers and women laborers has resulted in the fact that,-according to a careful estimate,-about five percent of the persons transported into the Reich have prove not to be capable of work. That means nothing less than that about 80 to 100,000 returnees will stream into the occupied Eastern territories in the coming days. The dangers included in this returning process can be seen in the fact, that this deals with sick, crippled, mothers-to-be, as well as such persons whom the enterprises are glad to reject and who because of that are not being taken care of. The mood of these returnees is temporarily forced to be anti-German, and nothing has been done, in spite of repeated suggestions in the Reichs Labor Ministry to reconcile the returnees with at least a few favorable impressions of Germany. During the latter part of September 1942, a collecting camp in Berlin-Blankenfelde, which was quartered with Eastern laborers who were destined for return, was inspected upon the instigation of the Central Office by a commission consisting of different authorities, at which time revolting conditions were met. Among other things a shot was fired by the guard at an Eastern laborer who was caring for his natural needs without the President of the States Employment Office who was present making any protest against it. All of the camp inmates gave an impression of neglect. Since the returning of these 1600 persons as well as a further 4400 returnees from other camps, could not be reconciled politically with respect to the danger of contaminating their native districts with reports of horror, and since the postponement of a necessary re-quartering of the collecting camps could no longer be provided (in the meantime) the chief of the branch offices of the Central

Office-Vice-counsel in retirement Miller - Dr. of Law Boywidt and Mrs. Miller were sent at the same time to Brest-Litowsk, to stop the transport at least at this point and to carry out according to the situation a quarantining of the people or, belatedly to take care of them. How necessary this interference was is shown by the fact that this train with returning laborers had stopped at the same place where a train with newly recruited Eastern laborers had stopped. Because of the corpses in the trainload of returning laborers, a catastrophe might have been precipitated had it not been for the mediation of Mrs. Miller. In this train women gave birth to babies who were thrown out of the windows during the journey, people having tuberculosis and veneral diseases rode in the same car, dying people lay in freight cares without straw, and one of the dead was thrown on the railway embankment. The same must have occurred in other returning transports. To end these terrible conditions, it is intended to create special transient camps in the Reich area for returning workers where those who contracted diseases in the Reich will be separated from the chronically sick. They will be sent to an organization caring for the sick. Those finally chosen to return would receive medical and psychological treatment for at least a week. The chief of the Reich health program and his chief of liaison with the GBA, resp., have approved this central office plan of giving aid to returning wokrers, which aid should also be extended during transport. The directorate of the German red cross wants to share in the execution of this plan by making available trained personnel, among other things. The first of these transient camps for returnees could be established at Bad Frankenhausen in Thuringia where, according to the statement of the local mayor, suitable area is available.

To solve these and numerous other problems, as well as the removal of the described difficulties and abuses, two things are advised.

I Consultation of the Reich minister with the Fuehrer with the purpose of asking him for personal energetic intervention; this conference will have to include among others the following requests as laid down in the note of 1 f 5 of 6/7/42:

1) Treatment by the police The Fuehrer should beseech the Reichs leader of the SS in a personal consultation, to repeal the General Regulations of 20/2/42 including the supplementary Decree of 9/4/42. that is Section A of the General Regualtions.

Laborers from the former Soviet Russian territory and to replace them and among other things with new regulations which are to be voted upon in conjunction with the GBA (2) and the Reichs Ministry for the occupied Eastern territory.

2) (Direction of people) The Fuehrer should direct the Chancellor of the party as well as the Reich propaganda office of NSDAP to adjust suitable urgent measures in agreement with the Reich Ministry M.G.A.B. and respectively with the Z.O. to enlighten those party members who are handling the supervision of the relations between Germans and foreigners about the scope of the employment of the Eastern laborers and furthermore to inform the entire German population of the political mission which history has bestowed upon them by the taking in of millions of former Soviet citizens.

3) (The competances of the R.M.GdBo) The Fuehrer should inform the supreme authorities of the Reich, if possible through the Reich Minister and the chief of the Reichs chancellory that not only those measures of affairs, which concern themselves with occupied Eastern territories but also those that affect the labor from these territories employed in the Reich may only be decided in every action with the Reich ministries for the occupied Eastern territories.

II Further expansion of the Central Office for member

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Races, so that an extended arm of the R.M.GdbO on the Reich and as a representative of the foreign people from the ocuupied Easterm territories living here it can quickly perceive its instructed inter ests . The following would be essential for this.

(1) Commitment of a special Commisioner. The appointment od a specia commisioner for the Reich ministeries provided with specificauthority to take care of the interests of the central office, should serve especially two purposes; to take an active influence upon the handlir of enlistments inside the occupied eastern territorie.

(2) To carry out definate aims of the central Office by cultivating a personal contact with Gauleiter Sauckel.

(2) Reinforcing of the Branch Officers.The commisions which serve under the chief of the branch officer and which are employed to inspect the camps, urgently need reinfornements, to be able to work successfully in thousands of camps for this purpose about 50 interpr eters are needed besides liaison agents to the country employment offices and those trustees of the Gau who worked in an honourary capacity, the chief of the commissions need a uniform.

(3). Reinforcing the Sections. The four sections of the Central Off: (Matters of organization legal and information service supervision aid and psychological training need to be immediately filled by at least six representatives. On occount of the avalanche of problems brought to the Central Office urgent questions remain otherwise unso lved and hundreds of transactions unsettled in spite of the twelve hour day and sometimes several hours of night work, as well. Of what far reaching importance it is to see to it that a polictical use is made of the stay of several million Eastern laborers in the Reich on 8/9/42 their mimbers already amounted to 1737000 is slower as as from many other reasons by a glance at the present condition of the German censorus figures In spite of all measures to Germanize and re Germanize people who are unfortunately confronted by increas war casulties the future of the Germ n people when measured against the breadth of age levels placed on top of eath other is charecteris by a population pyramid whose outlines deiate from the biologically normal picture of a bell, if one compares the present curve of the future professionals with the similar curves of the Eastern peoples it will be frightening apparent that especially during the decisive decades after this war the number of German people of the Harz areas in the East which will be required for a normal administrative deve lopment will not be on hand, the willingnes and cooperation of membe of the Eastern peoples is herewith an unavoidable necessity, where- fore the years of commiting an army of millions of eastern laborers in the Reich are not only seen fron the viewpoint of over coming the problems concerned but actively must be used to create a reliable propoganda army, propoganda army which after its return home will perhaps one day will be just as decisive for the German fate in the East as the victory of our weapons.

signed.
Dr Gutkelch.

CERTIFACTE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 084-PS

24 October 1945

I, WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE, LT(jg), 291590 , hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English that the above is a correct and true translation of Document 084-PS.

WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE
LT (jg) USNR
291590.

H1126 - 0079

Exhibit U.S.A. 182
Filed Dec. 12, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO 204-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

S Y N O P S I S

The City Commissioner in Kauen — Kauen, 18 February 1944

H1126 - 0080

Release of Indigenous Labor for Purposes of the Reich

I. (Translator's note: Reference numbers added) Synopsis:

a) After entry into Lithuania thousands of workers were recruited to work for a period of 6 months in Gau Ost Prussen. Contrary to all promises these laborers were not released even after twelve months, and their various connections at home received no compensations. They did not even get a short furlough home for a long time. Now it is intended to put them in the munitions industry against their will.

b) In the early part of 1942 another recruiting was made by the Wehrmacht for 7000 male transport-aides. They forced the Lithuanians to register at an office and then locked them up in barracks as they came in. Naturally they dislike the Germans almost as much as the Russians.

c) Recently the recruiting drives for new volunteers for the army, police and labor service, and for laborers in the munitions industry within the Reich have been started. However the Russians removed 40,000 professional personnel in 1941, and more than 100,000 were removed from work, so many positions cannot be filled now.

d) After the recruiting campaigns the populace did not trust any further proclamations or measures as far as working within Germany was concerned. Furthermore the Lithuanians do not feel that they have in their state a political unit. Because of previous unsettled political conditions, the Lithuanian does not think much about politics. Since he pays little attention to his own laws, he heeds ours even less. They do not attend the musterings and must be brought by the police.

e) Although the civilian administration promised to produce the labor, they were not too successful, as the following will show:

1) Seizure of the age classes of 1919/24

This was ordered by the Reichs Commissar for the East, but due to the inefficiency of the officials, it was only partially successful.

The actual seizure was done by members of the Wehrmacht, police, local administration and the labor office. Energetic propaganda campaigns were initiated to induce the male members of the age groups to register at the designated offices.

Soon however opposition arose on the part of the Lithuanian intelligentia. To counteract this the following measures were taken.

II. Translation:

Renunciation of the formation of a Lithuanian legion,

Closing of the native universities, and

Arresting of a number of members of the Lithuanian intelligentia.

III. Synopsis:

These measures were not practicable; consequently the General Commissar ordered another registering, with severe penalties for non-appearance. Although every effort was made, the results were still unsatisfactory. From an expected total enrolment of 5800 men, only 47% appeared, and among this percentage were many of no use to us for various reasons.

IV. Translation:

2. The completely unsatisfactory experience of the previous action made a further seizure of the age group 1912/18 and also of the female age group 1914/22 necessary. These two further actions also brought no satisfactory result. In a lecture which the Plenipotentiary for the Arbeitseinsatz Gauleiter

SAUCKEL made on 18 July 1943 in Kauen, and in an official conference following it, between Gauleiter SAUCKEL and the General Commissar, the pool of labor in the Reich was again brought up urgently; Gauleiter SAUCKEL again demanded that Lithuanian labor be furnished in greater volume for the purposes of the Reich. As the minutes of this conference show, the General Commissar described very forcibly the very great difficulties opposing the preparation of indigenous labor forces, and asked urgently for the preparation of a larger number of German police forces. SS-Obergruppenfuehrer von dem BACH promised explicitly at that time "a real strengthening of the police force in Lithuania". This real strengthening of the police force in Lithuania meanwhile was not carried out in the course of further actions.

V. Synopsis:

3. SAUCKEL wanted 30,000 workers. Although the civilian administration did their best, conditions were in confusion and only 8200 of the 30,000 were on hand.

4. Then SAUCKEL made a new requisition, this time for 100,000 workers. Although fulfillment of this requisition would vacate many positions in the country, the General Commissar promised to fill the order. However, many difficulties will arise. In the country it is easier to recruit labor because it is possible to study the labor situation in more detail than in a large city like Kauen. In the country the administration has a closer tie with the populace for one thing.

To fulfill the requisition of labor made on Lithuania, assistance from the German Civil Administration is a necessity. The police force will have to be increased temporarily, severe treatment in case of sabotage, a temporary increase in the allotment of motor fuel, and the use of the quartermaster facilities of the Wehrmacht; all these measures will be necessary if the required amount of labor is to be supplied.

This new action of SAUCKEL's will probably not work. The only way of gaining any successes in this matter is to have at our disposal large numbers of German police.

(signature illegible)

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 204-PS

5 October 1945

I, WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE, Lt(jg) USNR, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No 204-PS.

WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE
Lt (jg) USNR
391590

H1126 - 0081

Exhibit U.S.A. 188
Filed Dec. 12, 1945

H1126 - 0082

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 254-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Reichsminister for the occupied Eastern territories.
II Pers c - 1 - Raab

Berlin, June 29th 1944.

Secret

To the Befehlungsgruppe Pl,

Special Unit - Gotenland"

Concerning: Burning of houses in the Wassilkow district.
Reference: Your letter from May 24th 1944 - P 26 a/44 geh -.

Enclosed I am sending you a copy of the point of view of Nachwurchsführer Paul Raab.

I don't see any reasons, for taking measures of any kind against Raab.

By order:

Signed Jennes

Certified Schrader
Ada employee.

- - - - - - - - - - -

Paul Raab
Nachwuchsführer

Grambusch 7.6.44

COPY

Secret

To the Reichsminister for the occupied Eastern territories.

Berlin W 35,
Kurfürstendamm 134

Concerning: Letter from June 2nd 1944 - II- Pers c 1 - Raab

Diary # 81/44 g

According to a charge by the supreme command of the armed forces I burned down a few houses in the territory of wassilkow/Ukr. belonging to insubordinate people ordered for work-duty (Arbeitseinsatzpflichtigen). This accusation is true.

I was committed as district commissioner in the information service in the territory of Wassikow from May 5th 1942 up to December 28th 1944. Besides many work districts, I was made fully responsible by district commissioner Döhrer to completely fill the district quota of workers to be delivered to Germany. Although the task wasn't agreeable to me, I carried it out concientously, with skill, and where it was necessary with sterness. Up until the penetration of the Soviet Armies, this territory delivered more than 31,000 workers to Germany.

During the year of 1942 the conscription of workers was accomplished by way of propaganda. Only very rarely was force necessary. Only in August 1942, measures had to be taken against 2 families in the villages Glewenka and Salisny-Chutter, each of which were to supply one person for labor. Both were requested in June for the first time, but didn't obey although requested repeatedly. They had to be brought up by force, but succeeded twice to escape from the collecting camp, or when being on transport. Before the second arrest, the fathers of both of the men were taken into custody, to be kept as hostages and to be released only when their sons would show up. When, after the second escape, rearrest of both the fathers and boys was ordered, the police patrols ordered to do so, found the houses to be empty.

That time I decided to take measures to show the increasingly rebellious Ukranian youth that our orders have to be followed. I ordered the burning

down of the houses of the fugitives. The result was, that in the future people obeyed willingly, orders concerning labor obligations. However, the measure of burning houses has not become known, for the first time by my actions, but was suggested in a secret letter from the commissioner for the committment of labor as a forced measure, in case other measures should fail. This hard punishment was accepted by the population with satisfaction, previous to the measures, because both families ridiculed all the other duty anxious families, which sent their children partly voluntarily to the labor-committment.

The year 1943 brought about a new regulation concerning the committment of labor, by way of regular yearly conscription. Previous to the coming of the conscription, I trained the staff for this task. I had the collecting camp in the territory of Wassilkow fixed to the best of possibilities with clean, light bedrooms, clean sanitary installations, good food, and entertainment. First of all, everything was done away with, which could have caused the Ukranian to feel that he is being deported by force. A well meaning propaganda was put to work on all workers, right after their arrival into the camp and didn't allow a low feeling to arrise. I had reserved for myself the right of exemption on the basis of labor, political, and social reasons; it was handled as big heartedly as the task permitted. Mostly after the start of the first conscription period, the districts of Wassilkow received a local commander in the person of Count Griese. This officer, who caused already great quarrels in the district of Lodyzin and Gadjatsch on account of his arragont behaviour, also created difficulties in Wassilkow between the armed forces and the civil administration, up to then unknown. First of all he took care of the labor-committment and not only criticized measures taken by me, but received also at any time every complaining Ukranian, and promised them help against the office of the district commissioner. Up to then I didn't have to take serious measures, because the population was fairly willing. Only a few fugitives had to pay families, and until the money came in, I had secured more or less of their property according to the security of the case. The punished paid their penalties without exception and had their property returned to them. But before they got around to do so, one part complained to the local commander, who didn't by any chance reproach these people, but on the contrary, took care of all the interests of those people, in front of me, and sometimes ordered me with a commanding voice, to nullify my measures. I didn't let it scare me, but carried out the task, for which I was responsible, according to my judgement. But the job was unbearably hard now, since it became known to the population, that the local commander accepts complaints against the district commissioner. After the initial successes, a passive resistance of the population started, which finally forced me to start again on making arrests, confiscations, and transfers to labor camps. After a while a transport of people, obliged to work, overran the police on the railroad station in Wassilkow and escaped. I saw again the necessity for strict measures. A few ring leaders, which of course escaped before they were found in Blisseskoje and in Mitnitza. After repeated attempts to get a hold of them, their houses were burned down. Thereupon, military police were sent to the villages by the local commander and extensive interrogations, concerning this affair were made by him. Besides that he hired young Ukranians as voluntary helpers, which were fugitives from the transient camp. Therefore, every work was made impossible for me, in this sector.

It is not possible for me, to give the exact dates of the mentioned happenings anymore, because after I was last committed in the district of Gaissin, I got into a Soviet ambush in March 1944 near Stanislau. I could only hide my weapons and had to burn my whole baggage including my diary.

In conclusion, I want to point out the following:

1.) I had the responsibility within the territory of Wassilkow for the conscripting of the local workers for the Reich. The choice of means, which were used to execute my task, was to be left to me.

2.) I worked with the utmost patience and only reverted to stricter punishments, when the success accomplished was in no comparison to the time used.

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3.) Strict measures, like the burning down of houses, were only used in a few cases. By this means, it was accomplished - at least in 1942 - that the recruiting of workers didn't die down to many police forces, who because of other functions, couldn't be used for that purpose all the time.

4.) I was entitled to use such measures by the secret labor - directive for labor committment staff in the district of Kiew. They, therefore, don't display by any means, any individual actions.

5.) The delivery of 31.000 workers to the Reich is definitely important to the war effort. Stern measures are definitely justified in order to prevent a failure of this action.

6.) My measures were thought to be just by the biggest part of the population. They only caused displeasure with the Germans, who had only small tasks to perform in the Ukraine, and therefore had to much time for philosophy.

7.) My actions against fugitive people obliged to work (Arbeitseinsatzpflichtige), were always reported to district commissioner Römer, in office in Wassilkow, and to the general-commissioner (Generalkommissar) in Kiew. Both of them know the circumstances and agreed with my measures, because of their success.

Heil Hitler!

Signed - Paul Raab

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 254-PS

29 October 1945.

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt., Inf., 0-133 55 67, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 254-PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL,
2nd Lt., Inf.,
0-133 55 67.

H1126 - 0084

Exhibit U.S.A. 191
Filed Dec. 12, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 265-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

The Commissioner General

Shitomir, 30 June 1943

SECRET

Oral report on the situation in the general district Shitomir, by Commissioner General LEYSER, delivered at an official conference, with Reichs Minister ROSENBERG, in Winniza on 17 June 1943.

H1126-0085

Mr. Reichs Minister

The employees of the civil administration in the General District of Shitomir have, aside from their administrative work, been charged with the following special tasks:

Agricultural production and collection
Recruiting of workers for Germany and management of forests and timber.

The above-mentioned tasks became virtually a problem due to the fact that the general district of Shitomir is particularly "blessed" with bands. Regarding the agriculture, it should be primarily interesting to note that, in the year of 1942, altogether 289 establishments were declared as agricultural cooperatives. In 1943 altogether 501 establishments were, respectively will be, proclaimed agricultural cooperatives. The allotment of farmland amounted in 1942 to 18%, in 1943, so far, to 10.4% and the additional 10% are expected in the fall.

As a consequence of the strong activity of bands, only about 40% of the acreage of the general district remain, at present, for the regular production and collection; approximately 60% are under the control of the bands. These actually supply the population, in part, with seed and have the fields cultivated by their order and naturally have the intention to take possession of the crop in the fall.

In consequence of the activity of the bands we have access to only 36% of the cattle, 41% of the pigs and 28% of the sheep out of the total stock. As we have to supply particularly the front with meat, we are therefore forced to a certain waste of our cattle stocks. Due to the strong drainage on the substance, there can be no more regular breeding. And too, only 42% of the milk total and 51% of the eggs could be salvaged. The spring cultivation has been performed thoroughly. It was amazing, nonetheless, that in spite of the strong drainage of labor forces into the Reich the tilling was executed with a rapidity which could not have been taken for granted. To judge by the present condition and the weather, an average crop can be expected. However, the securing and salvage of the crop gives much reason to worry. It must be avoided under all circumstances, that the bands get hold of considerable parts of the crop, respectively destroy the farm products which have been brought to collecting points. Sufficient protection for the various collecting points is not provided, the previous experiences do not promise favorable results.

The leaders of agriculture deserve particular praise for their self-sacrificing and dangerous work. In many cases they are only able to fulfill their duties by risking their lives daily. They made numerous sacrifices in blood, in particular lately. Nonetheless, they refuse to be prevented from fulfilling their duty. The present situation is best illuminated by the fact that at this time the agricultural leaders can only work at full, or approximately full, capacity in 5 out of 18 local areas. In all the other areas, we have been forced to withdraw the leaders of the strong points, and rally them at the local or district farmers. From there, they are in most cases only able to perform their work under strong protection of the police or army.

The symptoms created by the recruiting of workers are, no doubt, well known to the Reichs Minister through reports and his own observations. Therefore, I shall not report them. It is certain that a recruitment of labor, in the sense of the word, can hardly be spoken of. In most cases, it is nowadays a matter of actual conscription by force. The population has been stirred up to a large extent and views the transports to the Reich as a

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measure which does in no way differ from the former exile to Siberia, during the Czarist and Bolshevist systems.

In the foreground stands, at the moment, the mobilization of the young classes of 1923 and 1925. To accomplish this, the active propaganda on our part was used to an extent previously unknown. Therefore, it can be stated that the action had been particularly well prepared and consolidated. In spite of that it did not lead to the desired success. It has to be added that, in the course of the action, the desired contingents had been raised by the Chief Plenipotentiary for the mobilization of labor. I could not confine myself therefore to the classes of 1923 and 1925 alone, but also called up the class of 1922. Beyond that, even other sections of the population which originally should have been spared had to be included. With this our propaganda became for the greater part illusory. But as the Chief Plenipotentiary for the mobilization of labor explained to us the gravity of the situation, we had no other device. I consequently have authorized the commissioners of the areas to apply the severest measures in order to achieve the imposed quota. The deterioration of morale in conjunction with this does not necessitate any further proof. It is nevertheless essential, to win the war on this front too! The problem of labor mobilization cannot be handled with gloves.

Up-to-date, almost 170,000 male and female workers have been sent to the Reich from the general district Shitomir. It can be taken for granted that, during the month of June, this number is going to rise to approximately 200,000.

Management of forests and timber is also one of the principal worries. The general district of Shitomir is very rich in woods. As an average, the wooded area amounts to 26% of the total acreage. In the north, large sections of the country are covered 100% with woods. But this great abundance in woods is also the cause of the many bands. About 1,400,000 hectar of wood, that is 80% of the total, are controlled by bands. Like in the agricultural sector, only a relatively small part of the wood remains for use. Our yearly production potential in timber amounts to 1,300,000 cubic meter. Presumably 1,000,000 cubic meter can be cut. The yearly potential in firewood amounts to 900,000 cubic meter. We hope to achieve this. I may point out that the supply of wood for mines, R R ties, construction and heating purposes is especially important. The activity of the bands permits us at present to cut, on a larger scale, only in the more southern scantily wooded regions. Consequently, the old stock of wood there is being consumed rapidly. The final result, if no change in the conditions occurs, will be the careless cutting down of woods, which is going to result in extensive waste land. The fact that we are cutting down wood on a larger scale only in the south, brought strong impetus to the timber industry in the region of Winniza. The time can be foreseen when this period of prosperity will end, and the timber industry in the south will succumb. Whether then a removal of the timber industry into the northern part will be possible depends on the circumstances which at present cannot completely be foreseen.

Regarding the activity of the bands I would like to refer to the numerous reports laid before the Reichs Minister. There can be said hardly anything else on this subject except that the situation is becoming more unfavorable day by day. The situation can be judged best by the fact that at present only one of the larger roads in the general district, the one leading from Shitomir to Winniza, can be used without convoy. Because the activity of the bands is now also growing daily in the south, it is not sure that we shall not be obliged to introduce, sooner or later, the convoy system here too. All other roads of the country are at present passable in convoy only when rifles or machine pistols are held ready to shoot. The sacrifices brought to date in battle with bandits are very great. In about one year's time, the losses through fighting with them in the general district of Shitomir on the German and allied side, including the natives in German service, amount up to now to 2568 persons. The number of missing could not be ascertained exactly, because among them are also people who have joined the bands voluntarily or have been recruited forcibly. Their number amounts to an estimated 2,000 persons. Experience shows that these missing persons all die miserably, so the total number of deaths in battle with the bands in the course of the year can be given as about 4,500. Opposing this is the following two demands: 1) Constant transfer of army units into those areas threatened respectively occupied by the bands; 2) Unity of command. The demand to transfer units of the armed forces into the areas controlled by

the bands, is supported by special instructions of the OKW (High Command of the Armed Forces) in order to fight the bands. It is regrettable that too frequently the opinion from the respective branches of the armed forces that this demand cannot be executed on account of technical reasons concerning training. That this objection is always and everywhere true, does not seem credible to me. Frequent violations against the unity of command have been committed. The need for prestige, the quest for power, vanity, etc. have not become extinct as yet. I have to say with regret that so far I found the least understanding for the necessity of our common struggle in the armed forces. At any rate, I have the impression that under the pressure of conditions they arrived at the conclusion, that one cannot take the responsibility anymore to lead an existence alone, but that the collection of all forces alone could only bring us victory.

The struggle which has to be carried on, is hard and full of sacrifices. But it will and must be carried through. Vast psychic forces have been awakened in the members of the civil administration anew daily. The successes, which they were able to achieve so far are impressive particularly with regard to the resistance. May I therefore be permitted at the conclusion of this report to thank all my co-workers for their excellent work. They know that they are practically on the front. I can promise your excellency, that we all shall do our duty now, and in the future, as our Fuehrer has ordered--.

signed: LEYSER

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 265-PS

24 September 1945

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt Inf, O-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 265-PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt Inf
O-1335567

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Exhibit U.S.A. 189
Filed Dec. 12, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 290-P,S
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

II Pers. c - Journal No. 322
To
Leadership Staff Politics
Unter den Linden 63

Berlin I2 Nov 1943

Secret
(pencilled nate illegible)

S E C R E T!

Chief of Leadership
staff politics
Journal No. P1755/43 g
Rel. 15.II 1943
Inclosure

Subject: Enroachment by District Commissioner Government Councillor Fritz Mueller in connection with the national campaign for the utilization of labor.

Reference: Your letter of 22 July 1943 - I I006/43 g.

In connection with my letter of 27 Sep. 1943 - II Pers, Journal No. 322 - I am sending you enclosed a copy of the teletype of RKU of 29 Oct. 1943 - I 7252 Journal No. 637/43 geh, for your information.

According to the explanations of RKU, the conduct of government Councillor Mueller, is no cause for disciplinary action against him, I therefor consider the case as closed.

Your files are herewith returned.

I) RKU wants to transfer district Commissioner Mueller for reasons which he will bring later. Await report.

By order

signed Jonnes

Rubberstamp
Ministry for occupied eastern territories

Official
Kreis
Employees

2) Suspend until 10 Jan.

Signatures illegible

COPY

SECRET

RKU Rowno 13-929 29 Oct. 1943 - 1700 -

Ministry of Eastern affairs Berlin

Subject: Alleged encroachment of district commissioner government councillor Mueller in Kremiancz in connection with the national campaign for the utilization of labor.

Reference: Decree of 27 Sep 1943 - II Pers. c Journal No. 322 -

For various reasons which I will report later, it is contemplated to replace government councillor Mueller as district commissioner in Kromianez in the near future.

The case on hand is by no means fit to be used for official actions against District Commissioner Mueller. First of all, in my opinion Mueller is not to be considered guilty in this case. It cannot be established, either by the letter from the village Bilosorka, which letter caused this investigation, nor by the conduct of district commissioner Mueller, himself, that he was present at the happenings in Bilosorka. He therefor cannot be held personally responsible. But even if Mueller

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had been present at the burning of houses in connection with the national conscription in Biloserka, this should by no means lead to the relief of Mueller from office. It is mentioned specifically in a directive of the Commissioner General in Lusk of 21 Sep 1942, refering to the extreme urgency of the national conscription.

"Estates of those who refuse to work are to be burned, their relatives are to be arrested as hostages and to be brought to forced labor camps." It is obvious that this decree was merely directive in nature and was not a binding order of the individual commissioner to decide according to his own descretion, when the interest of the conscription, such severe measures were to be applied.

I request therefor to consider the case closed.

Reich Commissioner Rowno I 7252 Journal No. 637/43 geh.

my order signed Paltzo

to P i 755/439 (in pencil)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 290-PS

13 November 1945.

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt., Inf., O-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 290-PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt., Inf.,
O-1335567.

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Exhibit U.S.a. 185

Filed Dec. 12, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 294 PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

H1126 - 0090

Copy

TOP SECRET

Handwritten:
II 1 1161/44 g

Memorandum

In the East, Germany is carrying on a threefold war: a war for the destruction of Bolshevism, a war for the destruction of the greater Russian Empire, and finally a war for the acquisition of colonial territory for colonising purposes and economic exploitation.

This threefold mission of the Eastern campaign has brought about the enormous resistance of the Eastern peoples. Were the war being conducted only for the smashing of Bolshevism, then it would have been decided long ago in our favor, for, as all experiences of this war have confirmed, Bolshevism is hated to the utmost by the Eastern peoples, above all by the great mass pf peasants. Also the dissolution of the greater Russian Empire into its national components would not have provoked the resistance which we meet now. As the numerous prisoner interrogations and other experiences show the shrewd Russians have a complete understanding that this war will end in territorial losses for them and the non-Russian peoples will break out from the confinement within which Russia has forced them. The reduction of the power of resistance of the Red Army is the major portion of the third goal of our campaign. With the inherent instinct of the Eastern peoples the primitive man soon found out also that for Germany the slogan: "Liberation from Bolshevism" was only a pretext to enslave the Eastern peoples according to her own methods. In order that there exist no doubt at all on the German war aim, however, German publicity refers openly to this intention in increasing measures. The conquered territory is claimed publicly not only for Germany as a colonisation area, but even for Germany's embittered enemies, the Dutch, Norwegians, and others. The economic exploitation is proclaimed verbally and in print, and carried out with almost elimination of the demands of the indigenous population, even with the greatest lack of consideration.

The populace has more of an understanding of the measures and duties necessitated by war than the conquered peoples of the West. But the labor and peasant, who were educated to the highest degree of self-consciousness by Bolshevism, soon perceived that Germany did not regard them as partners of equal rights, but considered them only as the objective of her political and economic aims. That disillusioned them unspeakably, all the more since they had placed colossal hopes on Germany.

The main department for politics of the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern territories claims that it has been quite aware of this situation from the beginning. It was soon apparent that the war could not be decided in a short time by arms alone, because of the vast areas and the enemy's unexhaustible reserves of manpower and material, but that as in all great wars of recent times a spiritual disintegration would have to come and the war would have to be changed at the final conclusion to a civil war, all the more since the German Wehrmacht does not intend to occupy completely the territory of the Soviet Union. The Russian collapse of 1917 and the German breakdown of 1918 were actually not brought about by weapons alone, but primarily by political disintegration. What Lenin achieved in Russia, the 14 points of Wilson and the undermining effect of Marxism accomplished in Germany. In the Soviet Union we found on our arrival a population weary of Bolshevism, which waited longingly for new slogans, holding out the prospect of a better future to them. It was Germany's duty to find such slogans, but they remained unuttered. The population greeted us with joy as liberators, and placed themselves at our disposal willingly and freely with body and life. Wherever Ukrainians, Russians, White Ruthenians and members of the Baltic peoples were enlisted in the German Wehrmacht or in the police they have proved themselves and fought excellently almost without exception. The Main Department for Politics tried every means of keeping this vast capital that had fallen into our lap, and of utilizing it for our purposes. To this purpose it was necessary that National

Soc[redacted]ism separate itself from Bolshevism with a sharp line of distinction and open to the populace prospects of a new better life. All measures which the Main Department for Politics suggested were directed toward this one goal of preserving this capital. They have been many times attacked as the expression of a weak sentimental humanitarian attitude, of a form of German sentimentalism, and they were in reality only the expression of completely coarse material politics. For nothing else was contemplated than to preserve the mass millions of the Eastern area in the adjustment to us which was encountered with, in order to draw from it the greatest possible use for Germany both militaristically, politically and economically. Should this political policy succeed, the greatest reactions on the enemy troops were to be expected. For years the masses of the S.U. (Soviet Union) were stirred up against the surrounding world by the most efficient propaganda machine that has ever existed. Until 1939 National Socialism had been the target of the most spiteful attacks. Day after day it was hammered into the laborers and peasants that the active masses in Germany were a sacrifice to the most terrible exploitation. With extreme tension workers and peasants looked forward to the German administration. To be sure they had not completely trusted the Bolshevist propaganda, but in spite of that they met the new masters with a certain feeling of doubt.

As we all know, the peoples of the S.U. (Soviet Union) have gone through the hardest times. Consequently, they are of a simplicity inconceivable to us, even in the political sphere. A form of government which was not intent only on plundering and exploitation and which put aside the Bolshevist methods, would have kindled the greatest enthusiasm and put at our disposal a mass of millions. And the enthusiasm in the occupied Eastern territories would have had its reaction on the force of resistance of the Red Army. It would have been easily attainable to have the Red Army man say to himself: "I fight for a system that is throughout worse than that which awaits me in the case of a defeat. I will be better off in every respect among the Germans than I have been until now". If the Red Army man had become convinced of his general well-being, the war would have been at an end very soon.

Knowing this the Main Department for Politics believed it to be its prime duty to assist our combat troops with all their power by a propaganda campaign aimed at crippling the power of resistance of the Red Army and to shorten the war in this way. For the attainment of this goal there are, among the measures proposed, two of the utmost importance: The Agrarian Law and Religious Freedom, which is essentially distinct from that of the Bolshevists.

Considering the exceptionally great significance which approaches the Agrarian question in the Soviet Union, the Main Department for Politics was demanding even before the beginning of the Eastern campaign, that the Kolchos be dissolved and an individual Agrarian economy be introduced again. This proposal was turned down by the Four Year Plan with the remark that organic changes were not to be considered during the war. Not until August of 1 st year was an increase of the farmland successfully put through.

Before the realization could be carried out, however, the Four Year Plan had recognized that the impetuous pressure of the whole peasant population for the dissolution of the collective would have to be reckoned with in some way in the interest of production itself. The proposal of the Main Department for Politics for the dissolution of the collective found its defeat in the new Agrarian decree. A few months had been sufficient to make clear, not only to all Wehrmacht units down to the youngest lieutenant in the line farthese forward, but also to the units in the home country and the civil administration in the occupied Eastern territories, the need of reform in the Kolchos constitution. The only exceptions in this knowledge were the two Reich Commissars, whose disagreement unfortunately caused a delay of several weeks. The new Agrarian Decree came out shortly before the spring planting and was greatly played up in the territories by the Press and Propaganda Dept. of Main Department I. Its direct success was a hitherto inconceivable piece of work of the populace in the spring planting, which was able to be carried out in spite of unfavorable preliminary conditions. In spite of this no lasting effect on the enemy has appeared so far. Naturally, the enemy propaganda countered our Agrarian Decree with every means. Their main argument was that in this it was only a matter of a promise which had as its

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purpose a momentary tactical successes, that moreover Germany intended to make use of the land later for her own purposes. This argument found support in the very slow execution of the Agrarian Decree, which is to be attributed in part to objective reasons (lack of surveyors, land registration, surveying instruments and so forth).

It has been foreseen that in 1942 in the Ukraine 20% of the general economy was to be changed to agriculture cooperatives. The increasing of the farmland, which forms the main criterion of the general economy and are carried through everywhere immediately, has still not been achieved to the extent of 10% of the general economy, although it was decreed, as has been mentioned, in August 1941. The transformation to agricultural cooperatives has generally begun only a short time ago, and according to the directives of the farmer's leader KOERNER is not to reach more than 10% by the end of August of this year. In this state of affairs it is understandable that great sections of the Ukrainian peasantry are under the control of enemy propaganda and have lost belief in the earnestness of our intentions.

The religious freedom was likewise to call forth a great propaganda effect. After months-long negotiations, it was eventually decided not to announce the freedom of religion ceremoniously, but to let it come into existence as quietly aspossible. The propaganda effect consequently slipped from the picture.

When the Main Department for Politics noticed the hesitation of decision in the church question, it searched for a substitute in another means of propaganda, in the question of returning property rights of the individual. In this the whole world could be clearly shown that National Socialism contrasts distinctly with the Bolshevist expropriation measures and a new property law would be ushered in. The first display of this slogan for propaganda use would have been the immediate raising of the expropriation measures in the Baltic states, which Bolshevism had not yet controlled for a year, and consequently it would have been possible to resume the former property situation without further ado. To the unbounded astonishment of the populace, however, the German administration marched forward to play the role of receiver of the goods stolen by the Bolshevists. The necessity for the restoration of private ownership for the psychological treatment of the populace was referred to by all the General Commissioners in the Baltic states; this population, as everybody knows, ought to be won for German patriotism. Even after the Four Year Plan gave up its old ideas in recognition that a further protraction of the restoration of private ownership would damage even the German economic interests. The fundamental profession of the re-installation of the pre-Bolshevist property law did not follow, though it was against every political judgment and based only on the unfounded opposition of the Reichs Commissar.

Again a real weapon for the disintegration of the enemy front had been twisted out of our hand, a weapon whose effect may not be undervalued. For the unrecompensed expropriation of private property by the Bolshevists had aroused at the time not only the terror of Russian bourgeois circles including the more prosperous peasants, but also of the entire civilized world. The world, including the laborers and peasants in the Soviet Union who were disillusioned by Bolshevism, awaited now a clear policy in this question on the part of Germany. This silence on the part of Germany obviously made itself of use to the enemy propaganda, which could reliable persuade the Soviet masses that Germany plans no restoration of individual ownership.

The Main Department for Politics furthermore hasalways emphasized that the Eastern peoples must be told something concrete about their future. The Department refers to the fact that in case we should not oppose the propaganda of Stalin, the peoples would have to succumb to this propaganda, that is to say, they would believe in their own enslavement by Germany. The Main Department for politics has accordingly often directed the attention of Wehrmacht units to the expediency of having the Slavic Eastern peoples receive calming assurances regarding their future from the authoritative German quarters. As the best means, the establishment of a sort of counter-regime to Stalin with a captured Red general was indicated; of, if the word government should be avoided, then just a rebellious general somewhat after the model of de Gaulle, who should become the point of crystallization

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for all the Red soldiers who are dissatisfied with Stalin. The correctness of this conception has been confirmed in the time following its inception by countless statements of prisoners of war, who have all stated independently that the silence of Germany regarding the future of Russia allows the worst to be feared. Many would like to desert, but they did not know to whom they should go. Under the banner of a recognized counter-revolutionary leader they would gladly and bravely fight against the Bolshevist regime.

All the suggestions concerning this were rejected in their essentials. Permission for front-line duty was effected only for groups of Turkish and Caucasian peoples and finally after several refusals also for the Estonians. Because of the difficulty of recruiting troops, the unit generally came to the point of impressing civilians and prisoners of war into their ranks, in the first line of rear-echelon services. But even in the foremost line they found employment and fought well. Only in the last few weeks under the pressure of danger from the partisans was the formation of native units allowed and that only for combat with the bandits. But even this measure will remain ineffective as far as propaganda is concerned if a combat unit is not activated and a personality with a resounding name is not put at its head.

The Main Department for Politics was compelled, for the sake of attaining the above-outlined goal, to rescind or at least greatly change measures from German quarters which would strengthen the enemy's power of resistance.

Of primary importance, the treatment of prisoners of war should be named. It is no longer a secret from friend or foe that hundreds of thousands of them literally have died of hunger or cold in our camps. Allegedly there were not enough food supplies on hand for them. It is especially peculiar that the food supplies are deficient only for prisoners of war from the Soviet Unions, while complaints about the treatment of other prisoners of war, Polish, Serbian, French and English, have not become loud. It is obvious that nothing is so suitable for strengthening the power of resistance of the Red Army asthe knowledge that in German captivity a slow miserable ideath is to be met. To be sure the Main Department for Politics has succeeded here by unceasing efforts in bringing about a material improvement of the fate of the prisoners of war. However this improvement is not to be ascribed to political acumen, but to the sudden realization that our labor market must be supplied with laborers at once. We now experienced the grotesque picture of having to recruit millions of laborers from the occupied Eastern territories, after prisoners of war have died of hunger like flies, in order to fill the gaps that have formed within Germany. Now the food question no longer existed. In the prevailing limitless abuse of the Slavic humanity, "recruiting" methods were used which probably have their origin only in the blackest periods of the slave trade. A regular manhunt was inaugurated. Without consideration of health or age the people were shipped to Germany, where it turned out immediately that for more than 100,000 had to be sent back because of serious illnesses and other incapabilities for work. This system in no way considered that these methods would of necessity have their effect on the power of resistance of the Red Army, since these methods were used only in the Soviet Union of course, and in no way remotely resemble this form in enemy countries like Holland or Norway. Actually we have made it quite easy for Soviet propaganda to augment the hate for Germany and the National Socialist system. The Soviet soldier fights more and more bravely in spite of the efforts of our politicians to find another name for this bravery. Valuable German blood must flow more and more, in order to break the resistance of the Red Army. Obviously the Main Department for Politics has struggled unceasingly to place the methods of acquiring workers and their treatment within Germany on a rational foundation. Originally it was thought in all earnestness to demand the utmost efforts at a minimum cost of the biological knowledge has led to an improvement. Now 400,000 female household workers from the Ukraine are to come to Germany, and already the German press announces publicly that these people have no right to free time and may not visit theaters, movies, restaurants, etc. and may leave the house at the most three hours a week apart from exception concerning duty.

In addition there is the treatment of the Ukrainians in the Reichs Commissariate itself. With a presumption unequalled we put aside all political knowledge and to the glad surprise of all the colored world treat the peoples of the occupied Eastern territories as whites of Class 2, who apparently have

only the task of serving as slaves for German and Europe. Only the most limited education is suitable for them, no solicitude can be given them. Their sustenance interests us only insofar as they are still capable of labor, and in every respect they are given to understand that we regard them as of the most minute value.

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In these circumstances the following can be determined:

1) The resistance power of the Red Army and the strength of the partisan movement has mounted in the same degree as the population realized out true enlistment for them. The feats of arms of our noble army have been neutralized exactly as in 1918 by an inadequate political policy. Our political policy has forced both Bolshevists and Russian nationals into a common front against us. The Russian fights today with exceptional bravery and self-sacrifice for nothing more or less than recognition of his human dignity.

2) Our political policy of utilizing the Ukraine as a counter-weight against mighty Russia, against Poland and the Balkans, and as a bridge to the Caucasus, has suffered complete ship-wreck. The 40 million Ukrainians who joyfully greeted us as liberators, are today indifferent to us and already begin to swing into the enemy camp. Should we not succeed in checking this situation in the last moment, then we run the danger from day to day of having a partisan movement in the Ukraine, which not only eliminates the Ukraine as a furnisher of food, but also ties up the reinforcements of the German army, endgangers its existence and accordingly involves the danger of a German defeat.

If this danger which threatens the German people is to be prevented in the last moment, then the following is necessary.

1 - For the Ukraine as absolutely positive political policy must be carried out in every respect. The Ukraine must not be merely an objective of exploitation to us, but the populace must sincerely feel that Germany is its friend and liberator. The German economic agencies must be responsible for assuring the populace a minimum on which they can exist. A compulsory conscription of labor in the occupied Eastern territories must be restrained immediately. The treatment of Ukrainians and other Eastern peoples within the Reich must be fair and human. In publicity, both oral and written, everything must be avoided that is in any way cognizant of the fact that we regard this territory as an objective of exploitation. The Russian people must be told something concrete about their future, particularly because Germany does not have the intention nor the power to occupy the whole Russian area.

2 - The policy of the officials of the Reichs Commissar for the Ukraine is in general the exponent for the above described policy, which has not recognized the role of the Ukraine in world politics, and has succeeded in throwing away the friendship of 40 million people; and which is guilty in this way of strengthening the power of resistance of the Red Army and prolonging the war with all its consequences. These officials see their only mission as the economic exploitation of the country. The longer the war lasts, however, the more political forces must be interposed. Therefore it would be opportune to place at the head of the Reich Commissariat a personality who also possesses sufficient political ability.

If we do not accomplish this change of course at once, then one can say with certainity that the power of resistance of the Red Army and of the whoe Russian people will mount still more, and Germany must continue to sacrifice her best blood. Yes, it must be openly stated that the possibility of a German defeat approaches in a tangible proximity, all the more so if the partisan movement for which Stalin is striving with every means, should spread over a greater part of the Ukraine. One should protect that in the South Ukraine such a danger does not exist because of the lack of swamps and forests. The bandit leader Machino needs to be remembered, he who for about 2 years terrorized the Ukraine and knew how to avoid all prosecutions. One should also not place his hopes on the economic collapse of the Soviet Union. Certainly the losses in fertile land, raw materials and industrial projects are very significant. On the other hand the Soviet Union still has the Ural territory, fabulously rich in raw materials of all kinds, which for

fourteen years has been industrially developed with all power, as well as rich Siberia. Finally we know that the Soviets have systematically carried on an economic policy of hoarding reserves, and we cannot completely tie up the English-American reserves.

However, if we accomplish the proposed change in policy, then it can be believed certain that the decomposition of the Red Army will also succeed. For the power of resistance of the Red Army man is broken the moment that he becomes convinced that Germany brings him a better life than he has led under the Soviets, and that Germany has a small bit of consideration for his national qualities, in other words does not intend to rob him of his soul.

The problem is too serious to be allowed to remain undecided. Here it is a question of the future of the German race, under circumstances concerning even its existence or non-existence. The permanent thesis of the Main Department for Politics has proved itself true, that a quick victory cannot be attained entirely by the aid of arms, but only in conjunction with the application of a great political offensive. That the administration of the occupied Eastern territories is composed almost entirely of personnel not acquainted with Russia is probably one of the reasons why this thesis has not been carried out. The gentlemen slowly grope their way into the problem, for which the majority still require interpreters. Nevertheless it is today already confirmed that wide circles of the lower administrative chiefs in the Ukraine are plainly frightened of the policy commanded by the higher echelon. However, they are not in a position to have their way. So much the more reason one should trust the interpretation of the Main Department for Politics based on the best technical and social knowledge; the Department is even today convinced of a speedy victorious conclusion of the war, insofar as its political directives are followed.

Berlin, 25 October 1942

signed BRAEUTIGAM

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 294 PS

24 September 1945

I, WILLARD E. SKIDMORE, Lt. (jg) USNR, 391590, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 294 PS.

WILLARD E. SKIDMORE
Lt. (jg) USNR.
391590

H1126 - 0095

Exhibit U.S.A. 226
Filed Dec. 13, 1945

H1126 - 0096

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO 407-II-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

T e l e g r a m

GBA 760/43 (in ink crossed out in red)

10 March 3.

To the
Fuehrer
Fuehrer Headquarters

With the urgent request for immediate presentation to the Fuehrer in person, and decision.

Subject: Difficulties in recruiting of workers (Arbeitsdienstverpflichtung) in the former Soviet territories.

My Fuehrer:

You can be assured that the Arbeitseinsatz is being carried out by me with fanatical determination, but also with care and consideration for the economical and technical, as well as human, necessities and occurrences.

The replacement for soldiers who are to be freed and the reinforcement of the armament program with newly needed workers can and will be supplied, in spite of great difficulties, which had to be overcome in the last two winter months. 258.000 foreign workers could be supplied during January and February to war industry, although the transports in the East were almost completely lacking. The commitment of German men and women is in full force.

Now that the difficulties of the winter months are disappearing more and more the transports from the East can be put into full operation again on account of preparations arranged by me. Although the report and commitment-results of German men and women is outstanding, in the heavy industrial labor the commitment of productive foreigners who are used to labor cannot be neglected.

Unfortunately, a few commanders in chief (Oberbefehlshaber) in the East mobilized the recruiting of men and women in the conquered Soviet territories, as I was told by Gauleiter KOCH - for political reasons.

My Fuehrer! To fulfill my task I ask you to abolish these orders. I think it impossible that the former Soviet people should experience a better consideration than our own German people, on whom I was forced to levy drastic measures. If the obligation for labor and the forced recruiting of workers in the East is not possible anymore, then the German war industry and agriculture cannot fulfill their tasks to the full extent.

I myself have the opinion that our army leaders should not give credence under any circumstances to the atrocity and propaganda campaign of the Partisans. The generals themselves are greatly interested that the support for the troops is made possible in time.

I should like to point out that hundreds of thousands of excellent workers going into the field as soldiers now, cannot possibly be substituted by German women, not used to work even if they are trying to do their best. Therefore I have to use the people of the eastern territories.

I myself report to you, that the workers belonging to all foreign nations are treated humanely, correctly and cleanly, are fed and housed well, and are even clothed. On the basis of my own services with foreign nations, I go as far as to state, that never before in the world were foreign workers treated as correctly as is now happening in the hardest of all wars by the German people.

Therefore, my Fuehrer, I ask you to abolish all orders which oppose the obligation of foreign workers for labor and to report to me kindly, whether the concept of the mission presented here is still right.

H1126 - 0097

I would ask to talk to you personally about different important points of the Arbeitseinsatz at the beginning of next week, possibly Tuesday.

Yours, always thankful,
sincere and obedient

signed: Fritz SAUCKEL

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 407-II-PS

13 October 1945

I, WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE, Lt (jg) USNR, 391590, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 407-II-PS.

WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE
Lt (jg) USNR
391590

Exhibit U.S.A. 228
Filed Dec. 13, 1945

Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel
Translation of Document 407-V-PS

Y.B.A.

Sckl./We.

April 14th, (134)3

Forwarded (illegible)
(in ink) April 15th

To the Führer

Obersalzberg.

My Führer,

As you have been told by Lt. General (Gruppenführer) Bormann already, I am going to the Eastern territories on April 15th, in order to secure in the coming months one million workers from the East.

The result of my last trip to France is that after exact fulfillment of the last program another 450,000 workers from the Western territories will come into the Reich, by the beginning of summer. With the probable use of about 150,000 workers from Poland and from the other territories it will then be possible, to put 5 - 600,000 workers at the disposal of the German agriculture again and 1,000,000 workers at the disposal of the armament and other war industries; this will be done by summer.

I ask for your approval to have the new French workers come into the Reich under conditions similar to those of the last group. I have negotiated with the High Command of the army.

Since the big majority of the Belgian civilian workers and of the prisoners of war is doing a very satisfactory job; I ask you to approve a statute for about 20,000 Belgian prisoners of war similar to the one you have granted to the French. That great concession of yours has made a big impression upon Laval and the French ministers. Laval asked me again and again to give you, my Führer, his sincerest thanks for that.

1.) After having been active as plenipotentiary for the Arbeitsensatz for one year, I have the honor to report to you that 5,638,056 (figure is not clear) new foreign workers have been added to the German war economy between April 1st of the last year and March 31st of this year.

Generally speaking these workers have done a satisfactory job. Their feeding and housing is settled and their treatment regulated in an undisputable way. In that respect, too, our national socialist Reich presents a shining example compared with the methods of the capitalist and bolshevik world. Of course, occasional mistakes and blunders cannot be avoided. I shall always try with the greatest energy to keep them at a minimum.

Besides the foreign civilian workers, another 1,622,829 prisoners of war are employed in the Germany economy.

2.) The 3,638,056 workers come under the following branches of the German war economy:

Armament	1,588,801
Mining	163,632
Construction	218,707
Transportation	199,074
Agriculture and Forestculture	1,007,544
Other branches of economy	480,298

Besides the foreign workers 5 millions male and female German workers were added to the German war economy proper. They were taken from factories unimportant for the war production, and were put into plants important for the war production by means of retraining etc.

All the efforts were necessary to take care of natural fluctuations; such changes are caused by death, illness, termination of contracts, violation of contracts, but especially by draft into the armed forces and by the moving of plants into other districts. Furthermore, these efforts were necessary to make possible the enlargement of armament plants, the starting of new factories, and the fulfillment of new programs.

H1126 - 0098

3.) The results of the general registration for both men and women were as follows by April 7:

As a result of the ordinance of January 27th, 1943 3,249,743 men and women registered.

This is not the final result.

The number of men is 553,415
The number of women is 2,696,326

About 52% (which means 1,851,771) of these registrations have been processed by the workers offices (Arbeitsamter) up till now.

Only 32.5% of the men processed at this point can be used in the Arbeitseinsatz, as most of them do not come up to the set standards, due to old age or illness.

Up to the present time, have been used. 66,006 men

Up to April 7th were employed. 732,489 women

This result must be called outstanding however, 44% of these women work less than 48 hours weekly, due to conditions at their homes.. Of these laborers the armament industry proper got 20,670 men
and 341,100 women

Some 130,000 could be put at the disposal of agriculture and the others at the disposal of the armed forces, postal system, railroads etc.

4.) The measures of the Minister for Economy in the Reich to stop certain work concerns 76,644 persons.
27,218 of them are men and 47,426 women;
most of them overage. Therefore, only one third could be put at the disposal of the economy,
namely 10,108 men
and 17,929 women.
Of these the armament industry received
5,258 men
and 8,621 women.
The rest were distributed to the other branches of war work and to the armed forces.

5.) The requests of the armament industry for male and female workers and the allotments which that industry got between December 1942 and the end of March show the following result:

Requests		Allotments	
December 1942)		250,000	
January 1943) total	335,000	172,000	
February 1943)		235,000	
		total	657,000
March 1943 -------	225,000		450,000
Replacements for draftees taken from the armament industry	240,000		
	800,000		1,107,000

The figures for March contain 320,000 men and women from the obligatory registration action.

Your faithful and obedient
signed Fritz Sauckel
(signed in ink)

H1126 - 0099

The following persons received a copy of the above letter.

Reichsmarschall Göring
Reichsleiter Bormann
Reichsminister Dr. Lammers
Reichsminister Dr. Goebbels

Additional remarks on the original letter to the Führer.

Since I will be in the Eastern territories on April 20th, I ask you, my Führer, to accept in advance my personal congratulations along with those of my family and my district.

Let me assure that the district (Gau) of Thuringia and I will serve you and our dear people with all our strength.

It is my sincerest desire that you, my Führer, will always enjoy the best of health and that we ourselves can serve you to your full satisfaction.

Your faithful and obedient
signed Fritz Sauckel

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 407-V-PS

11 Oct. 1945.

I, WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE, Lt(jg) USNR 391590, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document no. 407-V-PS.

WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE
LT(jg) USNR
391590.

H1126 -0100

H1126-0101

Exhibit U.S.A. 209
Filed Dec. 12, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 407-PS. VI
OFFICE OF US CHIEF OF COUNSEL

District Administration Thueringen of NSDAP
The Plenipotentiary for The Direction of Labour.

Weimar 15 April 1943
Nr. 435/43 10:25 o'clock

to the Fuehrer
Obersalzberg.

23 June 1943
(stamped).

My Fuehrer,

As Gruppenfuehrer Bormann has already informed you, I am betaking myself on the 15th April to the eastern areas in order to secure 1 million workers from the East for the German war economy in the coming months.

The result of my last trip to France is that, after exact fulfilment of the last programme, another 450,000 workers from the western areas too, will come into the Reich by the beginning of the summer.

Counting the manpower which comes into question from Poland and the remaining areas, and which is in the neighbourhood of about 150,000, it will become possible again to place 5 to 600000 workers at the disposal of German agriculture and 1 million workers at the disposal of the armaments industry and the rest of the war industries by the coming summer months.

I beg you to agree that the new French labor forces can also come into the Reich under conditions similar to those which applied to the last group. I have kept in touch with the High Command of the Armed Forces.

Since the largest part of the Belgian civil workers and prisoners of war perform very satisfactorily I ask you to agree that a similar statute to that which was granted to the French be made for some 20,000 Belgian prisoners of war. This very great concession by you has made a very deep impression upon Laval and the French Ministers. Laval has repeatedly asked me to transmit his sincerest thanks for this to you my Fuehrer.

1. After one year's activity as plenipotentiary for the direction of labor, I can report that 3,638,056 new foreign workers were given to the German war economy from 1 April of last year to 31 March this year.

As a whole, these forces have produced satisfactory performances. Their feeding and housing is secured, their treatment so indisputably regulated that, in this respect too, our National Socialist Reich presents a shining example to the methods of the capitalist and bolshevist world. However it is naturally inevitable that mistakes and blunders occur here and there. I will continue to endeavour with the greatest energy to reduce them to a minimum.

Besides the foreign civil workers, 1,622,829 prisoners of war will be employed in the German economy.

2. The 3,638,056 workers are distributed amongst the following branches of the German war economy :

Armament	1,568,801
Mining industry	163,632
Building	218,707
Communications	199,074
Agriculture and forestry ...	1,007,544
Other economic branches ...	480,298

H1126-0102

Besides the employment of foreign workers, 5 million German men and women workers were transferred, inside the German economic structure, to the German war economy proper by being switched from businesses unimportant to the war effort to important ones, or by retraining.

All of these efforts were necessary in order to smooth out the natural fluctuations, for example, through death, sickness, expirations or breaches of contract, but especially through drafting into the Armed Forces and the shifting of industries into other regions, and to facilitate the enlargement of the armament works, the establishment of new factories and the fulfilment of new programs.

3. The result of the registration action for men and women up to the 7 April is as follows:

On the basis of the order of 27 January 1943, 3,249,743 men and women have registered. The results are not yet final.

The number of men amounts to 553,415
that of women to 2,696,328

Up till now about 52% of these registrations (that is 1,851,771) have been definitely fixed up by the Labor Bureaux.

Up till now only 32.5% of the men come into question for the direction of labor as the majority do not fit in with the requirements as a result of old age or sickness.

Employed up to the present moment are 66,008 men. Up to 7 April 732,489 women were put to work.

This result must be designated as outstanding. 44% of these women, however, work less than 48 hours per week because of their domestic circumstances. The basic armament industry has received from the women and men employed

20,670 men
341,100 women

It was possible to make some 130,000 available to agriculture and the rest to the Armed forces, postal service, railroads, etc.

4. The result of the shutting-down measures taken by the Reich Minister for Economic Affairs includes

74,644 persons

of this group, mostly over-age and consisting of 27,218 men, 47,426 women
only a third could be directed to industry 10,108 men, 17,929 women
of these the armament industry received 5,258 men, 8,621 women

The rest were distributed to the remaining industries of war importance and to the Armed Forces.

5. The demands of the armaments industry for men and women workers and the allocations of these from December 1942 until the end of March 1943 give the following result :

H1126-0103

	Demand.		Allocation.
December 1942			250,000
January 1943.	total	335,000	172,000
February 1943.			235,000
		total =	657,000
March 1943		225,000	450,000
replacements for those drafted from the armaments industry.		240,000	
		800,000	1,107,000

In the March figures 320,000 men and women are brought into account by the registration-action.

Since I, my Fuehrer, shall be staying in the eastern provinces on the 20 April, I beg, already today, to be allowed to extend my most fervent good wishes to you, along with those of my district and my family.

You can be assured that the district of Thuæringen and I will serve you and our dear people with the employment of all strength.

The warmest desire is that you, my fuehrer, may always enjoy the best of health and that we ourselves can serve you to your complete satisfaction.

Your faithful and obedient,

signed. FRITZ SAUCKEL.

Passed on : Puttig.
Received : Weismann Oberg.
Officially received : 1130 o'clock Heinstein pkz Munich for Section Room.3.

The above telegram was also sent in letter form.(in ink) WE 15 Apl.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION.
OF DOCUMENT 407-PS. VI.

22 October 1945.

I, PETER FRASER, Capt.,K.R.R.C.,76538, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 407-PS.VI.

PETER FRASER.
Capt.,K.R.R.C.
76538.

Exhibit U.S.A 210
Filed Dec. 12, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 407-VIII-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

The Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan
The Plenipotentiary for Arbeitseinsatz

Berlin W8, 17 May 1943
Mohrenstr 65 (Thuringenhaus)
Tel: 12 65 71

To the
Telegraph Office of the Party Chancellory
Berlin W8

Gauleiter SAUCKEL requests that the following telegram be transmitted to the Fuehrer and to the Reich Marshal of the Greater German Reich.

Heil Hitler!
By direction (signature illegible)

a) To the Fuehrer, Fuehrer Headquarters
b) To the Reich Marshal for the Greater German Reich, Headquarters

to a) My Fuehrer!
to b) Most respected Reich Marshal!

In regard to the Arbeitseinsatz in connection with the Organization Todt, I request that I be permitted to submit the following figures:

In addition to the labor alloted to the total German economy by the Arbeitseinsatz since I took office, the Organization Todt was supplied with new labor continually. The total number of laborers employed by the OT amounted to

270,969 at the end of March 1942
and 696,003 at the end of March 1943

In this it is noteworthy that the Arbeitseinsatz has accelerated the OT in the West for the purpose of completing the work on the Atlantic Wall and has furnished laborers with utmost energy. This is all the more remarkable because:

1) In France, Belgium and Holland the industries work for the German war economy exclusively, and must always be supplied with labor in any case;

2) Great numbers of workers must be placed at the disposal of the German economy within the Reich itself.

In spite of the attendant difficulties the supply of the OT in the west was raised from

66,701 at the end of March 1942
to 248,200 at the end of March 1943

Thus the Arbeitseinsatz has done everything to help make possible the completion of the Atlantic Wall.

to a) Heil Hitler!
Your obedient and faithful
Fritz Sauckel

to b) Your continually obliged
Fritz Sauckel

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 407-VIII-PS

10 October 1945

I, WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE, Lt (jg) USNR, 391590, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 407-VIII-PS.

WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE
Lt (jg) USNR
391590

Exhibit U.S.A. 229
Filed Dec. 13, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 407-IX-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

The Commissioner for the Four Year Plan
The Plenipotentiary for the Arbeitseinsatz

Berlin W8, 3 June 1943

1751/43 (pencilled)
ab 6/4/43

To the Fuehrer of Greater Germany
The Fuehrer's Hq

My Fuehrer!

I beg to be permitted to report to you on the situation of the Arbeitseinsatz for the first 5 months of 1943.

For the first time the following number of new foreign laborers and Prisoners of War were employed in the German war industry:

January 1943	- 120,085
February 1943	- 138,354
March 1943	- 257,382
April 1943	- 160,535
May 1943	- 170,155
TOTAL	846,511

I may remark that this number of 850,000 was reached only after greatest difficultire were overcome which had not existed during the previous year; all those who have worked for the Arbeitseinsatz, particularly in the occupied territories, did so with the greatest fanaticism and devotion.

Unfortunately quite a number of our officials and employees were victims of murders and attacks by partisans.

Besides those labor forces recruited for work within the Reich, several hundred thousand laborers were recruited in the occupied territories through the agencies for the Arbeitseinsatz as well as through the OT and the factories working in the East and the West for the German war industry. Furthermore the Wehrmacht received a large number of laborers as well as labor volunteers.

Moreover, because of the order dated 27 January 1943 requiring everybody to register, the following numbers of men and women were made available:

	Men	Women	Total
February	14,594	163,012	177,606
March	45,606	494,931	540,537
April	19,315	269,374	288,689
May	11,485	186,683	198,168
TOTAL	91,000	1,114,000	1,205,000

Of these approximately 800,000 are available only for less than 48 hours of work per week.

Altogether, German was industry during the first 5 months of 1943 recruited more than 2,000,000 laborers.

Furthermore, negotiations resulted in agreements and regulations on the following points: Wage control and increased production in the various European territories especially in France, which enabled us to keep wages in the occupied European territories on a reasonable level, to stabilize living conditions of foreign laborers working for Germany in spite of the difficult conditions of war, to increase production by means of wage control in these territories. These measures were carried out in agreement with industrial and

H1126-0105

farming authorities as well as with the Commissioner of the Reich for the control of prices.

Heil !
Your obedient and faithful
signed: SAUCKEL

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 407-IX-PS

5 October 1945

I, WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE, Lt (jg) USNR, 391590, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 407-IX-PS.

WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE
Lt (jg) USNR
391590

H1126-0106

Part of Ex. 194

Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel
Translation of Document 556-2-PS

The Fuehrer

and Supreme Commander
of the Wehrmach

Fuehrer Hq
September 8, 1942

The extensive coastal fortifications which I have ordered to be erected in the area of Army Group West make it necessary that in the occupied territory all available workers should be committed and should give the fullest extent of their productive capacities. The previous allotment of domestic workers is insufficient. In order to increase it, I order the introduction of compulsory labor and the prohibition of changing the place of employment without permission of the authorities in the occupied territories. Furthermore the distribution of food and clothing ration cards to those subject to labor draft should in the future depend on the possession of a certificate of employment. Refusal to accept an assigned job, as well as abandoning the place of work without the consent of the authorities in charge, will result in the withdrawal of the food and clothing ration cards. The GBA (Deputy General for Arbeitseinsatz) in agreement with the military commander as well as the Reich Commissar, will issue the corresponding decrees for execution.

A Hitler

initialed K (Keitel)

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 556-2-PS

15 Oct. 1945.

I, WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE, LT(jg) USNR 391590, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document no. 556-2-PS.

WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE
LT(jg) USNR
391590.

H1126-0107

Exhibit U.S.A. 194
Filed Dec. 12, 1944

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 556-PS-P.13
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Note for the Files

1.) On 4 January 1943 at 8 P.M. Minister Speer telephones from the Fuehrer Headquarters and communicates that on the basis of the Fuehrer's decision, it is no longer necessary to give special consideration to Frenchmen in the further recruiting of specialists and helpers in France. The recruiting can proceed with emphasis and sharpened measures.

2.) Commissar-General Schmidt with the Reich Commissar in Holland just telephones on 5 January 1943 at 5:20 P.M. and explains that on the basis of Armament Action 1943 he must achieve more recruiting in Holland.

3.) He has been criticized by the armament Commissions regarding the endangering of German contracts in Holland proper due to labor shortage.

I told him that no attention would be paid these criticisms.

He has already taken the same attitude and in the future will take the appropriate action.

For information

(signed) SAUCKEL

Weimar, 5 January 1943

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 556-PS

18 October 1945

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt Inf, O-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 556-PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt Inf
O-1335567

H1126-0108

H1126-0109

Exhibit U.S.A. 218
Filed Dec. 12, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 654-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

U I b

Discussion with Reich Führer of SS Himmler on 18.9.42 in his Field Headquarters in the presence of State Secretary Dr. Rothenberger, SS Gruppenführer Streckenbach and SS Obersturmbannführer Bender.

also in cases where ? sentences ? ? (marginal note in pencil)

1. Correction (2 illegible pencilled words) by special treatment at the hands of the police in cases where judicial sentences are not severe enough. On the suggestion of Reichsleiter Bormann, the following agreement was reached between the Reich Führer of SS and myself:

a) In principle the Führer's time is no longer to be burdened with these matters.

b) The Reich Minister for Justice will decide whether and when special treatment at the hands of the police is to be applied.

c) The Reich Führer of SS will send the reports, which he sent hitherto to Reichsleiter Bormann, to the Reich Minister for Justice.

d) If the views of the Reich Führer of SS and those of the Reich Minister for Justice agree, the final decision on the case will rest with them.

e) If their views are not in agreement, the opinion of Reichsleiter Bormann will be brought to bear on the case, and he will possibly inform the Führer.

f) In cases where the Führer's decision on a mild sentence is sought through other channels (such as by a letter from a Gauleiter) Reichsleiter Bormann will forward the report to the Reich Minister for Justice. The case will then be decided as already described by the Reich Führer of SS and the Reich Minister for Justice.

2. The delivery of anti-social elements from the execution of their sentence to the Reich Führer of SS to be worked to death. Persons under protective arrest, Jews, Gypsies, Russians and Ukrainians, Poles with more than 3-year sentences, Czechs and Germans with more than 8-year sentences, according to the decision of the Reich Minister for Justice. First of all the worst anti-social elements amongst those just mentioned are to be handed over. I shall inform the Führer of this through Reichsleiter Bormann.

3. Administration of justice by the people.

This is to be carried out step by step as soon as possible, first of all in the villages and the small towns of up to about 20,000 inhabitants. It is difficult to carry it out in large towns. I shall rouse the Party particularly to cooperate in this scheme by an article in the Hoheitsträger (NSDAP publication). It is evident that jurisdiction may not lie in the hands of the Party.

according to the permanency of the courts (?) marginal note in pencil)

4. Orders regarding the police and justice are, in future, to be tempered, for example, not prosecuting unmarried mothers if they attempt to procure abortion.

H1126-0110

5. The Reich Führer of SS is agreed that the cancellation of sentence, even for members of the police, will rest, as in Article 8 of the law relating to the cancellation of sentence, with the Reich Minister for Justice.

6. The Reich Führer of SS has given full consent to the ruling I have planned on the corporal punishment ordered by the Führer.

7. I shall refer to the Common Law relating to Aliens and will give notification of the claims of Justice, e.g. in the identification of young people as anti-social elements and their arrest. Also, it seems to me that the actual circumstances which serve to stamp a person as anti-social are not laid down in the law with sufficient clarity. The Reich Führer of SS is waiting for our opinion, and until then will not carry out the text of the law.

8. The Reich Führer of SS has agreed to a clause for the Juvenile Court Law, whereby the age of discretion can be reduced to 12 years and the reduced age of discretion can be extended to over 18 years.

by which he has made clear that a reduction in the age limit of full age of discretion is meant. (Marginal note in pencil)

9. SS - Obersturmbannführer Berger, of the Staff of the Reich Führer of SS, is appointed by the Reich Führer of SS as liaison officer for matters which appear to necessitate direct liaison with the Reich Führer of SS. He can be contacted any time by teleprinter in the Field Headquarters of the Reich Führer of SS, and will come once every month to Berlin to report to me here. Hauptsturmführer Wanniger is appointed as liaison officer for other matters, and he will be at Security Headquarters (Sicherheitshauptamt).

illegible pencilled word

10. The Reich Führer of SS declared that, in the infliction of punishment, special establishments should be set up, on the principle that confirmed criminals should be confined separately and that those capable of improvement should be separated according to the nature of their crimes (e.g. impostors, thieves and those who have committed acts of violence). This was recognised as correct.

11. The Reich Führer of SS demands that the penal register should be kept by the police. Arguments against this are to be examined (cancellation and tightening up of the Penal Register Bill and additions made to it). The question is to be further discussed with Gruppenführer Streckenbach.

12. The Reich Führer of SS pointed out as reliable SS - Obersturmführer Reichsgerichtsrat Altstötter, at present on active service as a Major, and also Landgerichtspräsident Stepp; he designated as unreliable Generalstaatsanwalt Jung in Dresden.

13. Finally, the Reich Führer of SS broached the subject of the Office of the Public Prosecutor and its transference to the police. I rejected it flatly. There was no further discussion of this subject.

14. It is agreed that, in consideration of the intended aims of the Government for the clearing up of the Eastern problems, in future Jews, Pole, Gypsies, Russians and Ukrainians are no longer to be judged by the ordinary courts, so far

H1126-0111

as punishable offences are concerned, but are to be dealt with by the Reich Führer of SS. This does not apply to civil lawsuits, nor to Poles whose names are announced or entered in the German Racial Lists.

Signed Th.

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 654-PS

I, PETER FRASER, Captain, K.R.R.C., 76538, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 654-PS.

PETER FRASER
Captain, K.R.R.C.
76538

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1063-PS (PARTIAL)
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

The Chief of the Security Police
and the Security Service
B. Nr. IV* 656/42 SECRET

Berlin 17 Dec 1942

S E C R E T

Secret TO:

All commanders of the security police and the security service
All inspectors of the security police and the security service
All commandants of the security police and the security service
All chiefs of the State police headquarters

For the information of:

The chief of the SS economic and administration headquarters, SS Lt Gen POHL
All higher SS and police chiefs
The inspector of the concentration camps

For reasons of war necessity not to be discussed further here, the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police on 14 December 1942 has ordered that until the end of January 1943, at least 35,000 prisoners qualified for work, are to be sent to the concentration camps.

In order to reach this number, the following measures are required:

1) As of now (so far until 1 Feb. 1943) all eastern workers or such foreign workers who have been fugitives, or who have broken contracts, and who do not belong to allied, friendly or neutral States are to be brought by the quickest means to the nearest concentration camps. For this, the most necessary formalities, as listed under Nr. 3) must be observed.

In order to eliminate and to avoid complaints, each and every one of these measures in the individual cases must be presented to third authorities, by giving careful reasons, as being irremissible security police measures.

2) The commanders and the commandants of the security police and the security service, and the chiefs of the State police headquarters will check immediately on the basis of a close and strict ruling

a) the prisons
b) the labor reformatory camps.

All prisoners qualified for work, if it is essentially and humanly possible, will be committed at once to the nearest concentration camp, according to the following instructions, for instance also if penal procedures were to be established in the near future. Only such prisoners who in the interest of investigation procedures are to remain absolutely in solitary confinement can be left there.

Every single laborer counts!

The checking must be taken up at once. All withholding of prisoners qualified for work is prohibited. My approval is required for exceptions.

3) The prisoners who are committed to concentration camps till the 1 Feb 1943 will be seized under reference to this decree, solely according to a list (present number, first and second name, place of

with the classification.

I ask therefore, that in the future,with the arrest warrant and transfer to a concentration camp., suggestions be made as to the category of the prisoner with regard to his personality as well as the degree of his danger to the State.

I therefore order that a complete record of the political life, previous convictions for criminal offences and conduct of the prisoner since the taking over of the power be established, and that requests for assignement into category III by specifically and carefully motivated.

This decree does not apply to the district and local police authorities.

seal of the

secret state police

/s/ H E Y D R I C H

certified correct

/s/ BLEECK

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO.(part of 1063-PS)

19 September 1945

I, Fred Niebergall, 2nd Lt. Inf. 0-133 55 67 hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document(part of 1063-PS)

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt. Inf.
0-133 55 67

H1126-0113

H1126-0114

Exhibit U.S.A. 169
Filed Dec. 11, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1130-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Col. i.G. v. Altenstadt

OKH/Gen Qu Department War Administration

II/2120/43 secret

11 April 1943

Main Department I

Tgb No. I 784/43 secret
Received 6 May 1943
Encl. 1

Dear Mr. Braeutigam:

Enclosed I am sending you for your personal information a report of a speech which Gauleiter Reichskommissar Koch made in Kiew on 5 March 1943. May I ask you to regard this report as solely meant for yourself.

With best regards,

Heil Hitler!

Sincerely yours,

Altenstadt (signature)

N.R.
Obergruppenfuehrer Dr. Kinkelein (initialed) 8 May

The speech is known, isn't it? Yes.
(initials illegible)

1 enclosure.

File Koch.

Copy

High Command Army, Group B Headquarters, 1 April 1943.
O.Qu./VII (Mil. Govt.) B.B.Nr.83/43 secret.

Secret

To the
OKH/Gen Staff Army/Gen Qu
Dept. War Administration (Admin.)

Subject: Treatment of the civilian population in the Ukraine.

Reference: OKH/Gen St d H/Gen Qu Obt.Kr.Verw(Qu 4)
Nr. II/1736/43 secret of 23 March 1943.

Oberkriegsverwaltungsrat Dr. Claassen participated in the meeting of the NSDAP in Kiev on March 5, 1943 and gave a verbal report on the contents of the Reich Commissars speech. Other documents on the contents of the speech are not available here.

I.) On the treatment of the population the Reich Commissar remarked in the course of his speech in several places as follows:

1) We are the master race and must govern hard but just.....

2) I will draw the very last out of this country. I did not come to spread bliss, I have come to help the Führer. The population must work, work, and work again.....for some people are getting excited, that the population may not get enough to eat. The population cannot demand that. One has only to remember what our heroes were deprived of in Stalingrad.....We definitely did not come here to give out Manna, we have come here to create the basis for victory.

3) We are a master race, which must remember that the lowliest German worker is racially and biologically a thousand times more valuable than the population here.....

II.) Furthermore, the speech was primarily an appeal to all party members stationed in the Reich Commissariat of the Ukraine, to conduct themselves perfectly in every respect and in any situation. In this connection the Reich Commissar said the following among other things:

1) .....In the days of the crisis, one could differentiate between three groups of people:

1.) The group of those, that went about asking where one might be able to buy another suitcase;

2.) The group of slogan manufacturers with the main slogan: "One has to wait and see."

3.) The group of real National Socialists, who said: "Now of all times we will not move an inch from here!"

With this third group we say: Whoever wallows in defeatism, who gripes, will have trouble with this National Socialist community, gathered here; he will get a slap in the face.....We owe such conduct to the front, which we would prefer to join if the Führer would give us permission.....There is not a single place at the front, at which the Russians could have forced us to retreat. The Russian has not been able to force his will upon us.....

2) .....Nowdays, one often hears: "Had we", or "Were we." I only tell these people one thing: Had one had more faith in Adolf Hitler and had one taken a firmer grip at the sword, every-

H1126-0115

thing would have been different.....

3) .....We have brought you, my fellow party members to the Ukraine as personalities but not for the purpose that you should write your papers as in a paper war. I have no objection if you want to get yourselves a rubber stamp, say "Not important for the war." This stamp you can then apply to those files which you consider superfluous or unnecessary for these times. If your superiors do not understand this, tell them so. It is not the question to build up staffs, but to decrease them. I have reduced mine in Rowno from 800 to 250 staff members.

For the High Command of the Army Group B
Chief Quartermaster
Fähndrich

For correctness of copy:

Signature illegible
Lt.

CERTIFICATION OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 1130-PS

12 November 1945.

I, ERNST M. COHN, Pfc, 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 1130-PS.

ERNST M. COHN
Pfc, 33925738.

H1126-0116

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1206 PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Exhibit U.S.A. 215
Filed Dec. 12, 1945

DRAFT

Rü (IV)

Berlin, November 11 1941

TOP SECRET
6 Copies
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NOTES NOTES
on outlines layed down by the Reichsmarschall in the meeting of 7 November 1941 in the Reich Ministry for Air (RLM)

SUBJECT: Employment of laborers in war industries.

The Fuehrer's point of view as to employment of prisoners of war in war industries has changed basically. So far a total of 5 million prisoners of war -employed so far 2 million.

Directives for employment:
Frenchmen: Individual employment, transposition into armament industry (Rü-wirtschaft)
Serbs : Preferably agriculture
Poles : If feasible no individual employment achievement of Russian armament industry surpasses the German one. Assembly line-work, a great many mechanical devices with relatively few skilled workers.

Readiness of Russians in the operational area to work is strong. In the Ukraine and other areas discharged prisoners of war already work as free labor. In Krivoy Rog, large numbers of workers are available due to the destruction of the factories.

EMPLOYMENT OF RUSSIAN PW's

As a rule, employment in groups ("geschlossener Arbeitseinsatz) no individual employment, not even in agriculture. Guard personnel, not only soldiers but also foremen, at least during the working time proper. As a rule soldiers in the camp.

Employment in:

1) Operational area
2) Reich Commissariates (occupied territories in the east)
3) General Government
4) Interior and Protectorate is to be differentiated.

For 1): In the operational area take preferable into consideration:
a) Railroads
b) High way construction
Very important that in the Ukraine some roads be built with increased speed, not by German skilled labor but by Russian PW's.
c) Clearing work
d) Agriculture
The Ukraine being conquered, we now finally have to secure the feeding of the German people. If feasible, also Frenchmen and Belgians are to be used for directing the Russian farmworkers in the eastern area. If farm machinery is lacking, employ masses of workers. Transplantation of German farmers only where actual success can be expected.
e) Railroad-repair-factories etc.

Best supervision: "Field kitchen". Quick evacuation from operational area necessary. Losses during transport very heavy (Escaping and joining with partisan and robber bands).

Barbed wire hard to get. (Discarding of barbed wire fences in East Prussia desirable)

Leave Asiatic people in operational area if possible.

From construction battalions 69,000 workers have been transferred to the armament industry: replacement by prisoner of war battalions.

H1126-0117

Again and again skilled workers are being found in the construction battalions (fraisiers etc). Investigation by army desirable. Express will of the Fuehrer, that every skilled worker is used in the proper place. If necessary, repeated checking should be instituted.

For 2) The same applies to employment in Reich Commissariates.

For 3) The above is also applicable to the Government Generale
Attention is to be paid to avoiding of unnecessary transport of machinery, as thereby often the available manpower in the Gouvernemantis not fully utilized and, on the other hand, the machinery cannot be made use of for a long time in other places.

For 4) In the Interior and the Protectorate. it would be ideal if entire factories could be manned by Russian PW's except the employees necessary for direction. For employment in the Interior and the Protectorate the following are to have priority:

a) At the top coal mining industry.
Order by the Fuehrer to investigate all mines as to suitability for employment of Russian. At times manning the entire plant with Russians laborers.

b) Transportation (construction of locomotives and cars, repair-shops)
Railroad-repair and industry workers are to be sought out from the PW's. Railroad is most important means of transportation in the East.

c) Armament industries
Preferably factories of armor and guns. Possibly also construction of parts for airplane engines. Suitable complete sections of factories to be manned exclusively by Russians. For the remainder employment in columns. Use in factories of tool machinery, production of farm tractors, generators etc.
In emergency, erect in indivual places barracks for occasional workers which are used as unloading details and similar purposes. (Reich Minister of the Interior through communal authorities).

OKW/AWA is competent for transporting Russian PW's, employment through "Planning Board for Employment of all PW's" ("Planstelle für den Einsatz für alle Kriegsgefangenen"). If necessary, offices of Reich Commissariates.

No employment where danger to men or their supply exists, i.e. factories exposed to explosives, waterworks, powerworks, etc. No contact with German population, especially no "solidarity". German workers as a rule is foreman of Russians.

Food is a matter of the Four Years' Plan. Supply their own food (cats, horses etc.)

Clothes, billeting, messing somewhat better then at home where part of the people live in caverns.

Supply of shoes for Russians as a rule vooden shoes, if necessary install Russian shoe repair shops.

Examination of physical fitness, in order to avoid importation of diseases.

Clearing of mines as a rule by Russians if possible by selected Russian engineers.

Employment offices for civilian workers to be kept separate from those for PW's. In this respect the wage-problem is to be considered. Furthermore families in Russia have to share the support. As a rule employment in closed groups. (geschlossener Einsatz)

Some points as to general Arbeitseinsatz

Rather employ PW's than unsuitable foreign workers Seige Poles, Dutchmen, etc. if necessary as PW's and employ them as such, if work through free contract connot be obtained. Strong action.

H1126-0118

General employment of all German women repudiated by the Fuehrer.

Where Russians can be employed, labor service is not to be used. Labor service to be used where greatest effect is produced, even if the principle of education through labor service is curtailed thereby. War situation to be taken into consideration.

As a matter of principle central interests precede local interests, therefore no resistance from Reich commissaries and other local authorities against Arbeitseinsatz in the homeland.

Savings in wages are to be made up by compensatory contributions of the business.

Express order by the Fuehrer. Under no circumstances may the wage level in the East be raised or assimilated to the wages in western Germany. Strong action is imperative against solicitors who offer high wages.

It is intended to issue a basically new regulation of wages for foreign workers.

Foreigners not to be treated like German workers, on the other hand do no provoke inferiority complex in foreigners by posters.

The welfare installations of the Labor Front (DAF) are under no circumstances to be used for POWs or Eastern workers.

All agencies are to promote maximum utilization of Russian manpower.

Employment of Russians not to be improvised, but first to be thoroughly organized in the operational area. Speed is necessary, as the mass of manpower is decreasing daily by losses (lack of food and billets).

Make provisions to decrease the excessive number of escaping prisoners. Especially in and around Berlin strictest guard necessary.

illegible initials

Distribution:

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Rü VI-IIIa	5th Copy
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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 1206 PS

15 November 1945

I, WILLARD E. SKIDMORE, Lt (jg) USNR, 391590, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a ture and correct translation of Document No. 1206 PS.

WILLARD E. SKIDMORE
Lt. (jg) USNR
391590

H1126-0119

Exhibit U.S.A. 225
Filed Dec. 13, 1945

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 1292-PS
OFFICE OF THE US CHIEF OF COUNSEL

To Rk. 13402 c
Double

Fuhrer Headquarters, 4th Jan 1944

Ref.: Allocation of Labor 1944

1. A conference took place with the Fuhrer to-day which was attended by:
The Plenipotentiary for the Employment of Labor, Gauleiter Sauckel,
The Secretary for Armament and War Production, Speer,
The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Army, General Field Marshal Keitel,
General Field Marshal Milch,
The Acting Reich Minister for Food and Agriculture, State Secretary Backe,
The Minister of the Interior, Reich Fuhrer of the SS, Himmler,
and myself.
(The Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister of National Economy had repeatedly asked to be permitted to participate prior to the Conference, but the Fuhrer did not wish their attendance.)

The Fuhrer declared in his introductory remarks:

"I want a clear picture:
(1) How many workers are required for the maintenance of German War Economy?
(a) For the maintenance of present output?
(b) To increase its output?
(2) How many workers can be obtained from Occupied Countries, or how many can still be gained in the Reich by suitable means (increased output)?
For one thing, it is this matter of making up for losses by death, infirimity, the constant fluctuation of workers, and so forth, and further it is a matter of procuring additional workers."

The Plenipotentiary for the Employment of Labor, Sauckel, declared that, in order to maintain the present pool of workers, he would have to add at least 2½ but probably 3 Million new workers in 1944. Otherwise production would fall off. Reichminister Speer declared that he needs an additional 1,3 Million laborers. However, this would depend on whether it will be possible to increase production of Iron ore. Should this not be possible, he would need no additional workers. Procurement of additional workers from Occupied Territory would, however, be subject to the condition that these workers will not be withdrawn from armament and auxilliary indusdries already working there. For this would mean a decrease of production of these industries which he could not tolerate. Those, for instance, who are already working in France in industries mentioned above, must be protected against being sent to work in Germany by the Plenipotentiary for the Employment of Labor. The Fuhrer agreed with the opinions of Reichminister Speer and emphasized that the measures taken by the Plenipotentiary for the Employment of Labor should order no circumstances which would lead to the withdrawal of workers from Armament and auxiliary industries working in occupied territories, because such a shift of workers would only cause disturbance of production in occupied countries.

The Fuhrer further called attention to the fact that at least 250,000 laborers will be required for preparations against air attacks in the field of civilian air raid protection. For Vienna alone 2000 - 2500 are required immediately. The Plenipotentiary for the Employment of Labor must add at least 4 million workers to the manpower pool, considering that he requires 2½ million workers for maintenance of the present level, that Reich Minister Speer needs 1.3 million additional workers, and that the above-mentioned preparations for security measures against air attacks call for 0.25 million laborers.

The Plenipotentiary for Employment of Labor, Sauckel, declared that he will attempt with fanatical determination to obtain these workers. Until

H1126-0120

now, he has always kept his promises as to the number of workers to be furnished. With the best of intentions, however, he is unable to make a definite promise for 1944. He will do everything in his powers to furnish the requested manpower in 1944. Whether it will succeed depends primarily on what German enforcement agents will be made available. His project cannot be carried out with domestic enforcement agents.

The Reichfuhrer SS explained that the enforcement agents put at his disposal are extremely few, but that he would try helping the Sauckel project to succeed by increasing them and working them harder. The Reichfuhrer SS made immediately available 2000 to 2500 men from concentration camps for air raid preparations in Vienna.

Generally all participants in the conference agreed that it will be possible to treat additional manpower even at home by activation and intensification of available labor, especially the Prisoners of War, provided they are given awards in form of additional food, clothing, and so forth. State Secretary Backe will examine to which extent help can be given with additional food. Field Marshal Milch remarked that especially in agriculture, many women, who are really able to work, evade it because they receive family - allotments from their husbands who were inducted into the Armed Forces, and the wages for work done would be deducted from their family allotment. In their primitive way of thinking they therefore believe that they would have to work for nothing. Therefore on one hand, wages should not be deducted from the family allotment; on the other hand, it should be ruled that women who refuse work would, in consequence, receive no family allotment, or only a reduced family allotment.
The Fuhrer did not comment, declaring that he did not wish to go into details any longer.

Results of the Conference:

(1) The Plenipotentiary for Employment of Labor shall procure at least 4 million new workers from occupied territories.

(2) These workers may not be taken from armament and auxiliary industries in actual production in the occupied territories.

(3) It is to be examined by what means the output of workers now on hand can be increased and intensified, especially that of Prisoners of War.

(4) The Plenipotentiary for the Enployment of Labor shall get in touch with the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs before taking any action.

(signed) Dr. Lammers.

II. Reichleiter Bormann has received a copy of paragraph I.

III. To the State Secretary for cognizance.

IV. Original to Mr. C. Please return. (Arrival at Fuhrer Headquarters, 6 January 1944.)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 1292-PS

26 November, 1945

I, PAUL W. FREEDMAN, S/Sgt, 33799122, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German Languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 1292-PS.

PAUL W. FREEDMAN
S/Sgt.

H1126-0121

Exhibit USA 176
Filed Dec. 11, 1945

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1352-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Ku/Ni

Confidential!

Report

Re: Achievement of confiscations of Polish agricultural enterprises with the purpose to transfer the Poles to the Old Reich and to employ them as agricultural workers.

- - -

In the Old Reich again and again the complaint can be heard that a shortage of agricultural workers exists, and that it cannot be remedied by any means though Polish farm-workers have been placed at disposal. The employment offices have informed farmers and owners of estates who are looking for workers that it was difficult to get any workers at all from Poland, that the recruiting in the Government-General and also in the Eastern territory was initiated and the Poles who had applied were placed.

A few days ago, the Country Farmers Leader from Neutitschein called on our Office and told us that in his district many lands were still not yet tilled because there is a lack of any workers. The Reich Food Estate has decreed that everyone can procure himself Polish workers in the Eastern territory or in the Government General.

This appears preposterous if one knows that the office of the Higher SS and Police leader as deputy of the Reich commissar for the strengthening of German nationality, Land Office Silesia, cannot perform the confiscations of small and even very small agricultural enterprises for the reason that we do not know where to put the former Polish owners. Until now the work regarding the confiscation of Polish small farms has been limited to racial-German villages. I have already reported on this matter for the county of Blachownia as well as for the county of Bielitz-Biala, in connection with the institution of a concentration camp in Auschwitz.

I have made an arrangement with the Chief of an employment agency to transfer at once for employment into the Old Reich such Poles as agricultural workers who are designated by us.

It is possible without difficulty to accomplish the confiscation of small agricultural enterprises in the villages in which larger agricultural enterprises have been already confiscated and are under the management of the East German Corporation for Agricultural Development. For it is by no means difficult for the larger agricultural estate, to manage a few hundred acres, of course consistent with its own character without any particular additional expenses. It is a matter of course that above all Polish arable lands adjacent to the land of the estate should be confiscated and added to the estate for exploitation. Agricultural-technical or other difficulties by no means can occur. The former owners of Polish farms together with their families will be transferred to the Old Reich by the employment agencies for employment as farm-workers.
In this way many hundred Polish agricultural workers can be placed at the disposal of agriculture in the Old Reich in the shortest and simplest manner. This way the most pressing shortage is removed that is now in a very disagreeable manner felt especially in the root-crop districts.

Besides, the settlers who are still working in the confiscated and formerly settled enterprises and who are superfluous are to be removed into the Old Reich, for until now they were only a burden for the respective enterprise if they are too numerous. In this way, Polish agricultural workers can be made free for the Old Reich.

H1126-0122

The confiscations of small enterprises already achieved together with the following transfer of the farmer owners as agricultural workers to the larger estates already in operation have not only brought experience but have proved unequivocably that no difficulties are to be expected. The measures themselves are only a matter of organization, and the success of the measures as proposed by me is based on the good will of cooperation of the other authorities with the office of the Reich Fuehrer-SS as Reich Commissioner for the strengthening of German folkdom.

Means of transportation to the railroad can be provided

1 - by the enterprises of the East-German Corporation of Agricultural Development
2 - by the SS NCO school in Lublinitz and the Concentration Camp of Auschwitz.

These two latter places will also detail the necessary SS-men for the day of the confiscation etc. In case that a place of assembly is necessary for the Polish land-workers who are to be transported into the Reich, for there too sufficient rooms and lodgings can be provided (Kaminiek, Zator Castle, barracks in Auschwitz).

I have already reported on the accomplishment of confiscations in Bielitz county and initiated the necessary measures.

For the purpose of accomplishing further measures proposed by me which envision particularly the supplying of the farms in the Reich with Polish agricultural workers, ask that I be given your consent and the necessary full authority.

(signed) Kusche

5/22/40.

Kattowitz, 16 May 1940.

Ku/Ni.

Confidential! Report

on the accomplishment of confiscations of agricultural enterprises in Blachownia County.

With the scope of responsibility of the Higher SS - and Police leaders as the deputy of the Reichs-Commissar for the strengthening of German nationality, Land officer Silesia, a survey was made in Blachownia County since the beginning of April as to how far confiscations of agricultural enterprises in Polish ownership could be accomplished.

Before the outbreak of the war the present county of Blachownia was a part of Czestachowa County (before 1941 this territory belonged to Russian Poland). Only recently, it was decided to incorporate the present county area of Blachownia County into the district of Oppeln. Blachownia is a rather big market-place which in Polish times was even called a Spa.

As the necessary preparations can be considered closed in the following a short survey on the general conditions shall be given as far as they are at present of interest and importance.

At first, contact was made by the Chief of the local agency of the Land Office in Lublinitz, with the local authorities of the Party, the State such as the East German Corporation for Agricultural Development and the

H1126-0123

Secret State Police, and after a thorough exposition of the aims of the Land Office, excellent state of agreement was reached. Before this the Land Office of Kattowitz had discussions in the same direction regarding the Blachownia County with the higher authorities of the Party and the State District Governor (Regierungspresident), Provincial Governor (Oberpresident), Gauleitun).

The chief of the local agency at Lublinitz had found out that a number of villages exist in Blachownia County the inhabitants of which belong for the greatest part to the German nationality and that particularly in recent years the Polish nationality strongly penetrated into these small ethnic German islands.

Blachownia County comprises about 133,000 inhabitants. Of these, 2000 can be considered without further ado as ethnic Germans. The number of Jews is estimated at 6,000. 260 villages are combined in 15 greater communities. In 3 of such greater communities to which also the German villages belong, racial German mayors are in office.

1 - the greater community Lipie: Mayor Mueller, comprising the racial-German villages of Haukow, Lindow, Natalin and Rosalin,

2 - the greater community Scharny-Las: Mayor Lorenz, comprising the racial-German villages of Schwarzwald,

3 - the greater community Wrzosowa: Mayor Neugebauer, comprising the racial-German village of Alt-Hutau.

The rest of the communities are Polish throughout and have still an almost pure Polish administration.

To 1) In greater Lipie 20 of the 23 villages are destroyed up to 80%. The ethnic-German families are living in the most primitive conditions, closely compressed into the few dwelling-houses still remaining or into other poorly prepared shelters consisting of destroyed houses even in holes in the ground. The German villages mentioned were founded about 80 years ago by Germans who came mostly from Middle-Silesia (Strehlen, district of Breslau). By hard work they have cleared the woods and created farms.

To 2) The Germans of this village immigrated about 100 years ago from the region of Frankfurt or Main and have built up by their own work their economic basis of life.

To 3) In Alt-Hutau, it is a question above all, of Sudeten German-weavers, who immigrated in 1812 from Maehrisch-Truebau. Because of shortage of raw materials for several months the looms have been idle, so that, on account of the cessation of this so necessary opportunity for additional income, the economic situation of these ethnic-Germans is endangered.

In course of time, of course, the Poles also have intruded into these German settlements with the purpose at first to weaken Germanism in its economic existence and finally to drive it out. The agricultural enterprises of the racial-Germans have sizes from 1½ to 5 hectares. In all probability the enterprises have become so small due to partitioning and above all to economic pressure from the former Polish masters.

By the quick advance of the German troops a terrible massacre of the ethnic-Germans by the Poles of the Polish soldiery has been prevented. Before the outbreak of the war, the Poles in these German settlements behaved very aggressively against the German nationality and everything was made ready

H1126-0124

for its destruction during the disorders of war. Even if at the present moment the Poles have become a little more quiet it appears that it concerns only outward appearances. Therefore, it is absolutely necessary to bring about a strengthening of the German nationality in the small far advanced German linguistic islands. These ethnic-Germans make the best impression. For whole decades they have not abandoned their German national culture despite terror and so on, but have confessed firmly and resolutely. Thus for example, the present Mayor Mueller of Natalin has given to German children during the Polish times lessons in reading and writing on Saturday and Sunday because a school for the German minority did not exist. The ethnic-Germans and above all the youth knows the German language not only orally but even by the written word.

In order to break down the Polish nationality most quickly in the German villages, the Polish agricultural enterprises were confiscated. Therewith it has to be remarked further that also Polish enterprises were destroyed by warfare and the Poles too are partly in a situation which gives grounds for fear in so far that theft of German property and other encroachments on the part of the Poles may occur. The confiscation was done in accordance with the directives of Reich Fuehrer-SS as Reich Commissioner for the strengthening of German nationality, on 9 May in the villages of Natalin and Rosalin. As the Polish enterprises were from 2 to about 8 hectares in size and the arable land and the farm-buildings are dispersed within the area. The County agronomist (Kreislandwirt) of the East-German Agricultural Development Corporation thought that a centralized management of the confiscated farms by appointment of a manager was impractical. He resolved therefore to give the arable lands, livestock and other property to the trusteeship of needy racial-Germans. The agronomist who was present at the performance of the confiscation accomplished this at once on the spot. However he thought it necessary to take the former Polish owners as farm-workers to an estate in Blachownia County which is also managed by the East-German Agricultural Development Corporation, in order to enable the racial-Germans installed to run the Polish enterprises without friction. To-day in fact farm-workers are lacking here, for the former workers were Jews and are useless for such work and moreover, they would endanger an orderly management. However, if the Jews would remain on their former farms the danger of the worst sort of sabotage to the agricultural property now at the disposal of the German Reich would exist. The Poles are paid for their work. The execution of the confiscation as well as the transfer of the Polish farm-workers to the estate of the East-German Corporation for Agriculture Management was accomplished quite quietly and without friction.

In the same way as it was done until now the break-up of Polish Nationality will be shortly accomplished in the other racial-German villages as well.

Because of the extremely good cooperation with the authorities, the party offices and the East German Corporation for Agricultural Development, and above all with the Secret State Police the confiscations etc. will be accomplished absolutely without friction in the future, as well especially as preparations of greatest minuteness will secure the success from the outset.

Before the end of June the soil in the ethnic-German villages of Blachownia County will be taken entirely from Polish hands and be confiscated for the German Reich at the disposal of Reich Führer-SS as Reich Commissioner for the strengthening of German Nationality.

(signed) Kusche

H1126-0125

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CERTIFICATE OF PARTIAL TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 1352-PS

9 November 1945

I, CHARLES E. BIDWELL, S/Sgt, 13146054, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct partial translation of Document No. 1352-PS.

CHARLES E. BIDWELL
S/Sgt., 13146054.

H1126-0126

Exhibit U.S.A. 172
Filed Dec. 11, 1945

OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT PS-1375

Minister President Field Marshal Goering
Deputy for the Four-Year Plan
The Commissioner General
for the Generalgouvernement Poland

Castle Krakow
25 Jan. 1940

Strictly Confidential

S B 1/40

I To the
Director of the Service Agency
for the Four-Year Plan
Major General Buehrmann
or representative in

Krakow
Lenartovicza 13

For the execution of the task of systematically placing the economic strength of the Generalgouvernement, within the framework of the Four-Year Plan, in the service of the German defense industry, I give the following

directives:

1. In view of the present requirements of the Reich for the defense industry, it is at present fundamentally impossible to carry on a long-term economic policy in the Generalgouvernement. Rather, it is necessary so to steer the economy of the Generalgouvernement that it will, in the shortest possible time, accomplish results representing the maximum that can be gotten out of the economic strength of the Generalgouvernement for the immediate strengthening of our capacity for defense.

2. In particular the following performances are expected of the total economy of the Generalgouvernement:

a) Intensification of agricultural production esp. in the larger farms (above 100 ha.) and a planned distribution of the foodstuffs to be requisitioned in order to fill the requirements of the troops, units, and service agencies as well as of the native population, which are not yet fully covered by the present production.

b) Fullest exploitation of the forests, in temporary disregard of forest conservation principles, so as to deliver to the Reich approx. 1 million fm sawmill lumber, 1, 2 million fm of mine timbers and up to 0,4 million rm of fiber wood.

c) Stepping-up of the raw material production in the industrial sector, in particular:
in the extraction of iron ores and pyrites in order to cover the local needs of the smelting plants operated in the Generalgouvernement;
in petroleum extraction: in order to cover the militarily most important requirements of the Generalgouvernement and to export the greatest possible quantities to the

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Reich;
in the chemical industry (nitrogen, phosphate) to provide for the fertilizer requirements of agriculture in so far as they can be covered in the Generalgouvernement;

d) Exploitation, if necessary also partial expansion, of the industrial capacity existing in the Generalgouvernement, in order to execute as rapidly as possible the Wehrmacht orders to be placed by the Reich in the Generalgouvernement while maintaining production of those products which are absolutely vital for the running of the economic machinery in the Generalgouvernement even if the strictest standards are applied;

e) Maintenance of the productive capacity of those plants to which Wehrmacht orders have not yet been assigned but which are chosen as replacement plants for militarily vital factories which have been or will be evacuated in the Reich;

f) Stripping and scrapping of those plants which have neither been made into armament plants nor declared to be replacement plants, as well as of destroyed buildings;

g) Supply and transportation of at least 1 million male and female agricultural and industrial workers to the Reich - among them at least 7500 000 (sic) agricultural workers of which at least 50% must be women - in order to guarantee agricultural production in the Reich and as a replacement for industrial workers lacking in the Reich.

3. In order to attain the expected performances, precision is to be made:

a) that the organizational measures for increasing agricultural production and for the building up of the live stock, extraordinarily depleted by the war, are implemented by the insurance of the seed and fertilizer supply - if necessary by imports from the Reich - ; by sufficient supplies of agricultural machinery from local production in the Generalgouvernement; by a planned development of the water economy which should be simultaneously designed for the requirements of the waterways and of the power supply;

b) that all uneconomic consumption of wood be avoided and that the shipment of the quantities to be delivered to the Reich is insured;

c) that within the framework of the stepping-up of the industrial raw material production the following are guaranteed: financing through the most extensive possible utilization of the credit system existing in the Generalgouvernement; procurement of the necessary mining and drilling equipment, the supplying of the workers with the food and articles of clothing absolutely essential for the maintenance of their full efficiency; the shipment, especially of mineral oil, to the Reich;

d) that in engaging the industrial capacity of the Generalgouvernement with armament orders from the Reich the following be coordinated:

H1126-0129

nature and volume of the orders
location and capacity of the plants
raw material requirements and coverage -
the latter as far as possible out of
raw material stocks existing in the General-
gouvernement - ;
requirements and provisioning of workers
means of transport for delivery of materials
and dispatch of finished products;
pre-financing of wages in the Generalgouverne-
ment and transfer of the proceeds from the
Reich;

e) that exact investigations be made in order to determine the plants which are either required for filling the armament orders or continue to work for the supplying of the Generalgouvernement with absolutely vital goods, or are being maintained as replacement plants, or are to be stripped and scrapped; and that the putting into operation or continued operation of the plants be uniformly regulated and made subject to permit;

f) that in order to insure the necessary supply of Polish workers in the Reich the labor offices harmonize the recruiting with the labor requirements in the Generalgouvernement; that the shipment will take place early enough to be completed in the course of April; that the transfer of savings of those workers be regulated who came to the Reich merely as migratory workers.

4. For the uniform orientation of the total economy of the Generalgouvernement towards the tasks now to be accomplished the following additional measures are to be taken:

a) In the food supply of the population it must under all circumstances be seen to it that the persons working in plants vital to life and armaments will maintain their efficiency while the rest of the population will have to remain restricted to a minimum ration as long as the food shortage lasts.

b) Any production which, on the basis of raw materials important for armament, is directed towards objects which in the framework of the present plan are not vital, is to be ruthlessly discontinued in so far as it will not be possible to switch it over to sufficiently abundant Ersatz materials and other materials (e.g. by producing wooden shoes while simultaneously prohibiting the production of leather shoes and boots for the native population). For the rest, all raw material saving decrees prohibitions of production and shipment and orders valid in the Reich are to be carried through in the Generalgouvernement at least to the same degree as is done in the Reich.

c) The shipment of raw materials to the Reich is to be limited to those amounts not absolutely needed in the Generalgouvernement to guarantee militarily vital production. The right of disposing of the stocks of raw materials, half-finished and finished goods in the

H1126-0130

Generalgouvernement is reserved to your service agency. For the better regulation of supply small amounts of valuable raw materials will be brought into collection depots from scrapped plants and from smaller depots.

d) The supplying of militarily vital plants with coal and the filling of the most urgent coal requirements of the population are to be guaranteed by agreements with the proper Reich agencies.

e) The collection of leather and old material (Erfassung) and the gathering of scrap are to be pushed forward according to plan. In view of the special conditions in the Generalgouvernement, Jewish dealers who can be freed for this purpose from forced service etc., may also be engaged.

f) A transport plan will be drawn up in agreement with the transportation authorities with the object of bringing transport desires into line with transport possibilities and to arrive at priority scale which will then be made the basis of all further planning.

g) Price and wage regulations, currency protection and credit policy will be harmonized in closest accord between the agencies concerned with the object of creating stable conditions as an indispensable prerequisite for any economic planning.

h) In order to gain a conception of the presumable shape of the payment transactions between the Reich and the Generalgouvernement, a payment balance sheet is to be drawn up as soon as it is possible to see to what extent armament orders from the Reich can be filled in the Generalgouvernement.

5. I reserve the right to issue further basic instructions.

Copy of the present is being sent to the subordinate service agencies as well as to the Commander in Chief East, the Chief of the Armament Inspectorate Upper-East, the Military Commander in Krakow and the Bank Director of the Emission Bank in Poland with the request that the service agency for the Four-Year Plan be supported in every possible way in the execution of its tasks.

(signed) Dr. Frank

Certified

(signed) Ministerialkanzleiobersekretaer als
Kanzleivorsteher

- -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. PS-1375

26 November 1945

I, Leo Loeb, Civilian , hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. PS-1375.

LEO LOEB
Civilian

H1126-0131

Exhibit U.S.A. 216
Filed Dec. 12, 1945

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1435-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Translation of excerpt of Speech of Min. Speer on 24. Febr. 1942 to the Gauleiter meeting.

From Vol. 38 - 1

Gauleiter meeting 24 Febr. 1942. Munich.

Page 4:

I am grateful to fate that, also Party member Dr. Todt, in January, personnaly ordered the complete stoppage of work on his Reichsautobahnen as well as released all specialists and German Workers for the Railroad construction in the East and his P.W. 's for the armament industry.

Page 3:

I therefore proposed to the Fuehrer at the end of December that all my labor force, including specialists, be released for Mass employment in the East.
Subsequently the remaining P.W.'s about 10,000, were put at disposal of the armaments industry by me.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 1435 - PS

23, November 1945

I, CLARE BOULTER, P.O. WRNS., 59549, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of document 1435 - PS (Partial)

CLARE BOULTER

P.O. WRNS
59 549

Exhibit U.S.A. 178
Filed Dec. 12, 1945

Copy

Prof. Dr. Wolodymyr Kubijowytsch,
Chairman of the Ukrainian Main Committee.

Cracow, February 1943.

To the
Governor General,
Reich Minister Dr. Frank.

Your Excellency:

Complying with your wish I send you this letter, in which I should like to state critical conditions and the painful happenings, which create especially grave conditions for the Ukrainian population within the General-Government. As to the German-Ukrainian relations and the general situation of the Ukrainian people, I have included all that in my letter, known as well to you, which I addressed to the Secretary of State Dr. Buehler as far back as December 1942. In that letter I stressed mainly the alarm of the Ukrainian population in regard to the uncertainty about their national future within the New Europe. Here I would like to quote some real happenings and add my reflections on them.

The center of these is the question: Shall the Ukrainians work successfully in favor of final victory; they must be granted the security which, while absolutely necessary to them, unfortunately does not exist. For under the present conditions the Ukrainians are neither sure of their possessions nor of their lives. The matter of reprivatisation has not yet been settled. Inhuman treatment, severe pressure to forced labor, unfounded arrests, and lastly the shootings of great numbers are happenings not too infrequent these days.

1. Question of Reprivatisation.

Of primary importance for the further shaping of German-Ukrainian relations is the problem of reprivatisation. The whole Ukrainian people have connected with the German victory in the East their hope that now all remainders of the Bolshevist Regime shall be extinguished finally.

The views of the Ukrainian people are basically those of private property and economy. The Ukrainian peasant is prepared to undergo the greatest privations and sacrifices in favor of the State, if only he be allowed to work in tranquillity; this feeling of inner tranquillity he can but gain in the knowledge that the soil on which he and his ancestors have toiled, will remain his property in the future. The Ukrainian population received with gratitude the proclamation of your Excellency of 1 August 1941 in which, you Sir, have solved this problem at its roots and have stated reprivatisation to be the general rule for the economy of the State. Now, however, the attitude of some authorities looks as if the reprivatisation would be questioned still and as if in the new social order there was no place for private property. This situation is very cleverly made use of by the hostile whispering propaganda. Especially widely has the rumor been spread that private property has not yet been reintroduced for the reason that a large action of resettlement of the Ukrainians from Gallicia to the East is to be expected.

Actions, such as measures of adjusting real property at the expense of peasant property (in the districts of Tarnopol, Rawa, Ruska, Kalusch, etc.), survey of real property of peasants (in the district

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district of Czortkow) and imposing of fees for the use of land (Czortkow, Zloczow, etc.) give such rumors the appearance of probability (enclosure 1).

It is clear that for this reason there appears a great alarm and nervousness amongst the rural population which must badly influence the inclination for work and the output of agricultural production.

The uncertainty as well as all the consciously false interpretations of such measures through the whispering propaganda, could only be ended by a definite carrying out of the principle of the Proclamation mentioned.

II. Measures for finding labor.

The general nervousness is still more enhanced by the wrong methods of find labor which have been used more and more frequently in recent months. The wild and ruthless man-hunt as exercised everywhere in towns and country, in streets, squares, stations, even in churches, at night in houses, has badly shaken the feeling of security of the inhabitants. Everybody is exposed to the danger, to be seized anywhere and at any time by members of the police, suddenly and unexpectedly, and to be brought into an assembly camp. None of his relatives knows what has happened to him only months later one or the other gives news of his fate by a postcard.

I beg to mention some instances with their respective proofs:

a. During such an action a pupil in Sokol lost his life and another one was wounded (enclosure 2).

b. 19 Ukrainian workers from Galicia, all provided with identity cards, were assigned in Cracow to a transport of "Russian prisoners-of-war" and delivered into a punitive camp in Graz (enclosure 3).

c. 95 Ukrainians from Galicia, recruited for work in Germany by the labor offices in the middle of January, were sent to Pskow in Russia, via Eastern Prussia, where most of them died under distress (enclosure 4).

d. Seizure of workers under pretext of military recruitment (Zalesczyki); kidnapping schoolboys during school time (Biala Podloaska, Wlodawa, Hrubieschow) (enclosure 5).

III. Question of Personal Security.

Treatment of human beings.

Already the kind of treatment meted out to our compatriots by the lower instruments of the German authority, adds much to make the general situation more grave. The Ukrainians expected the treatment of members of those nations who fought against Germany, because they belong to a people who have never done anything against the Germans and their interests. Now every Ukrainian cannot fail to become convinced that most of the Germans do not make any distinction, and that they are accustomed to treat all peoples of the East similarily, whether friend or foe. Too often the Ukrainian is exposed to the danger, when dealing with the lower authorities, to be personally insulted, to be slandered, even to be ill-treated. Innumerable instances could be mentioned proving this sort of treatment. In the enclosure I give only a small selection of especially grave cases (enclosure 6).

Wholesale shootings.

Of much worse character are the wholesale shootings of absolutely innocent persons, such as happened in Lubycza Koroliwska and then in Lwow and Czortkow.

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In Lubycza Koroliwska, district of Rawa Ruska, 46 peasants, including 31 Ukrainians, were shot without trial (4 October 1942) (enclosure 7).

During the second half of November 1943, 28 Ukrainians were shot in Lwow, 56 in Czortkow, also without trial. (enclosure 8).

Arrests in December 1942.

In December 1942 the police undertook a cleansing action among the so-called disturbing elements, leading very soon, however, to wholesale arrests of innocent, quiet citizens. They are under arrest and in danger to lose their good health for certain, if not their life. (enclosure 9).

How acute and well founded this fear is, is proved by what happened to 6 Ukrainian girls from Kolomea, who were arrested in February 1942 and who disappeared without leaving any trace. (enclosure 10).

Revision in the St. George Cathedral, Lwow.

In connection with the cleansing action mentioned above a raid was carried out even in the St. George's cathedral in Lwow. The fact itself, especially because of the behavior of the police at this place which is sacred to the Ukrainians, produced a deep resentment and bad feelings amongst the population. This was used by hostile propaganda at once. Generally, it is pointed out that not even during the Bolshevist occupation raids took place on the hill of St. George, and that several visits by Bolshevist professors and students were always undertaken with great respect for the place and the person of the Metropolitan.

Special action against the asocial elements.

Since 15 January a special action began against the so-called asocial elements in Galicia. In the whole area about 5,000 persons were arrested. The purpose of this action was said to be the removal of those elements, who did not wish to work, were active in the black market and by so doing made the work of the authorities more difficult. This action however, did not obtain the right result, and the victims were leading personalities of the Ukrainian cultural and economic life as well as employees of several state authorities and members of the Ukrainian Aid Committee.

These wholesale arrests raised on extraordinary nervousness and anxiety among the delegates of our committee and in large spheres of the Ukrainian population.

IV. Irregular conditions and Partisan nuisance in the District of Lublin.

(This chapter deals with partisan activity and the risks to which the loyal Ukrainian population is exposed thereby. Irrevelant).

V. Collective responsibility.

General remarks.

The Ukrainian people consider as particularly painful the application of methods of collective responsibility. The large masses of the people generally have no understanding for the principle of collective responsibility; they take it as absence of justice to be punished for a deed one has neither done nor approved of. Generally, the principle of collective responsibility may be considered as justified if applied to a racial community which is homogenous. The partisan nuisance, however, is particularly spread out in the mixed Polish-Ukrainian areas, and the Ukrainian community can by no means bear any responsibility for misdeeds done by Poles. But even in areas with the almost homogenous population, as e.g. in Galicia, the Ukrainian people could only be held responsible if they were possessed of some means of executive power towards those members. To-day they have no such means.

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For the reasons stated, the application of the principle of collective responsibility against the Ukrainian people is unjust and inexpedient in its present state of organization and especially in the mixed areas. The collective responsibility often hits the leading circles in town and country whose feelings are pro-German, but who are powerless against both the Polish dissenters and against their own irresponsible hot-heads and dispairing persons.

Thus it happens that the collective responsibility which has the purpose of exterminating anti-German elements quite to the contrary annihilates or weakens positively pro-German elements and creates bad feelings and bitterness. Thus in the district of Lublin about 400 such Ukrainians perished.

We mention but some of the most convincing instances:

Wholesale shootings.

On 25 December 1942 the military police surrounded the village of Przewale, in the district of Zamose, area of Lublin, herded together a large number of Ukrainians and Poles. When the manager of the estate declared he needed the Poles for work, the Poles were set free, the Ukrainians, however, numbering 16, were shot dead; among the persons shot was a 15 years old girl, Eugenie Tybyczuk (encl. 15).

In the village of Nodosow (district of Lublin) 8 pro-German Ukrainians who had been persecuted by the Poles because of their patriotic views in pre-war time, were shot on 30 October 1942.

On 29 January 1943 in the village of Sumyn (collective community of Tarnowatka, district of Lublin) 45 Ukrainians, including 18 children between the ages of 3 and 15 were shot, and on 2 February 1943 in the villages of Pankow and Scharowola (collective community of Tarnowatka) 19 Ukrainians were shot, including 8 children, aged 1 to 13 years (encl. 16).

The greatest bitterness is created by the killing of innocent children, because the population is unable to understand that the German authorities could consent to or order such deeds.

The tragic events in Lubycza Koroliwska and Kubycza Kniazi (districts of Rawa Ruska, area of Lublin) have been mentioned above (encl. 7).

Conclusion.

The happenings in Galicia mentioned in this report have been submitted to Governor Dr. Waechter and the Department Head Dr. Bauer in writing and verbally. We repeat them herein, in order to complete the picture of the General Government.

(Rest on pages 8, 9 and 10 irrelevant.)

Cracow, 25 February 1943.

Table of Enclosures.

1. The surveying measures in the area of Czortkow.
2. The events at Sokal.
3. The behavior of the Polish employees of the labor office.
4. Minutes (fate of the Ukrainian workers in Pskow).
5. Memorandum for the files (false recruiting of workers to the Reich).
6. Memorandum for the files (ill-treatment of Ukrainians).
7. Shooting of 46 peasants in Lubycza Koroliwska, district of Rawa Ruska.
8. Shootings in Lwow and Czortkow in November 1942.
9. Arrests in Galicia in December 1942.

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10. Uncertain fate of arrested Ukrainian women students from Kolomea.
11. List of some well-known Ukrainian citizens, arrested in January 1943 in the area of Kolomea, Stryj, and Kamionka Strumilowa.
12. Arrests and shootings of persons unfit for work in the district of Sanok.
13. Anti-Ukrainian activities of persons unfit for work in the district Biljoraj.
14. Activities of partisans in the district of Biala Podlasko during the second half of the year 1942.
15. Shooting of 16 Ukrainians in the village of Przewale.
16. List of the Ukrainians shot in the village of Sumin, community of Taranwatka on 29 January 1943.

Enclosure 1.

The Surveying Measures in the District of Czortkow.

In September of last year the Chief Inspectorate of agricultural land (Hauptlandinspektion) in Czortkow was formed under the management of the former District Surveyor (Kreislandinspektor).

Employed were the engineers-surveyor Jwanenko, a Russian, and the draughtsman Sach, a Pole; further the land-surveyors from Brzezany and Tarnopol and some other German employees who were brought to Czortkow. Travelling in the district of Czortkow they drew maps showing the position of the communities with special regard to all farms and marking the better farms. About the middle of December the activities of this institution ceased, probably up till the end of April 1943. Rumor has it that German peasants to the number of 50,000 who are to be transferred from Germany into this district should be settled on these better farms.

Enclosure 2.

The Events at Sokal.

On 24 October 1942 between 13 and 14 hours, when the school boys went home from school, they were stopped by detachments of military police on the street and together with other people were formed into one unit. There was a panic as nobody knew what was going to happen to these people. People began to flee from the streets. The school boy Jaroslau MEDA who was just passing with his father, the secretary of the collective community of Parchacz also started to run. The father tried to calm him and called him back as there was no danger. A military policeman, however, saw him fleeing and shot at him wounding him fatally, so that he died in the local hospital half an hour later.

At the same time two military policemen went into the Ukrainian hostel for schoolboys and took away some boys. The others were at lunch in the dining-room and therefore remained unnoticed. In front of the schoolboys' hostel the schoolboy Wassyl KRAWTSCHUK was caught by a military policeman and wounded so seriously in the thigh by a bayonet that he had to be taken to hospital.

The student of theology Osyyp KARAWAN was severely beaten until he fainted.

The public school teacher Michael DULIBA was beaten publicly.

It is to be stressed that nobody knew that this action of collecting people was to procure workers to load carrots at the station. When the headmaster of the public school informed the manager of the local labor office by phone and asked for his help, the latter replied he had no time to spare

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for this matter at the moment. Thereafter, the headmasters of the Ukrainian schools informed the manager of the local labor office that they would put their boys at the disposal of the authorities in every case there was unforeseen and undelayable work to be done in town after having received fair warning provided no other labor was available.

Enclosure 3.

Copy

Zborow, 6 Oct. 1942

Ukrainian Aid Committee
Branch Zborow.

To the Ukrainian Main Committee in Lwow.

Department for food.

Subject: The behavior of the Polish employees of the labor office in Cracow towards our laborers.

We present the minutes prepared by our office together with Mr. Procyk LUKAS on 28 September 1942 who returned from Germany.

He reports:

Ukrainian laborers coming to Cracow, though provided with certificates and identification papers, are being transferred by the Polish employees of the labor office together with the transports of Russian civilian and brought to punitive camps.

Many Ukrainians fell victim to such Polish provocations. The situation of these people is all the more tragic, as they do not know the German language and their certificates and identification papers were destroyed by the above mentioned Polish employees.

Below we give a list of the Ukrainian laborers who are in the punitive camp in Graz as Russians and refugees:

(Follows a list of 19 names).

The situation of the above named is tragic. I was lucky to escape. With complete confidence in me and tears in their eyes they asked me to report their condition to the Committee.

signed Procyk Lukas.

Enclosure 4.

Minutes.

Michaljlo KOST, Bohdan JANIW, Iwan BARAN (son of Iwan), Iwan BARAN (son of Mykola) and Olexa CHIMJAK, all from Koniuschky, Koroliwiski, district of Komarow, were sent by the labor office for work to Germany on 12 January 1942.

They came to Pwzemysk, where they stayed for a whole week awaiting medical inspection. After the medical inspection they were joined to the transport which was to go to Germany. However, they were driven via Warsaw, East Prussia to Russia and were brought to the town of Pskow. With them were 95 Ukrainian lads from Galicia, including 18 lads from the village of Koniuschky Koroliwaki. They were accompanied by a military escort. On 28 January 1942 they arrived in Pskow. At first, they worked in the woods felling trees, later building a bath-house.

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In the beginning they received half a loaf of bread as daily ration, and later one loaf for seven persons daily, black coffee at breakfast and supper and soup at dinner time.

They never had a day off, they had to work even on Sundays. Terrible frost persisted throughout - to 58 centigrades (below zero), but the lads got no warm clothes, they worked in the clothes they had brought with them. After arriving in Pskow the workers lived in unheated huts without beds. The huts were made from wood and it was very cold there; only after two weeks were they billetted in a hall with beds, but they were unable to get warm with the blankets they had brought with them. Many of them fell ill from hunger and cold, 18 had to be taken to hospital (there was no room for several persons) where they remained for 2 to 3 weeks. The sick were refused bread, because they were said to be simulants. In the hospital the sick received 50 grammes of bread and some warm water and some soup and potatoes at about 16 hours.

Anyone unfit for work was sent away forcibly. Many escaped from the huts during the winter, one died. 13 lads from the village of Konischky Koroliwski escaped, three were arrested, and we know nothing about the others; they certainly did not return home.

5 of the above mentioned lads were declared unfit for work by a military commission and sent to Lwow and then home where they arrived completely exhausted. Of the 95 persons in the hutments in Pskow up to April, only 14 remained, 8 from the district of Jarowiw and 1 from Grodek. Those 14 persons, hungry and weak, were released to go home.

These workers received no pay.

Komarow, 22 April 1942.

Confirmed by signature: Mychajlo Kost,
Bohdan Janiw,
Iwan Baran.

Enclosure 5.

Memorandum for the files.

In November of last year a inspection of all males of the age groups 1910 to 1920 was ordered in the area of Zaleschozyki (district of Czortkow). After the men had appeared for inspection, all those who were chosen were arrested at once, loaded into trains and sent to the Reich. Such recruiting of laborers for the Reich also took place in other areas of this district. Following some interventions the action was then stopped.

The labor office in Biala Podlaska carried out the recruiting for work of the students at the commercial college. When the officials recruited more students than ordered, the main doors and doors to the class-rooms were locked; consequently a panic amongst the students broke out, and even some students fled through the windows.

Similar events occurred in Wlodawa and Hrubieschow in consequence of which the schools were closed for some time.

Enclosure 6.

Memo for the files.

Re: Ill-treatment of Ukrainians.

a. On 11 November 1942 Irene MALASCHTSCHUK, a public school girl working in a German food store in Czortkow, was, whilst working (attending to German

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customers) hit in the face several times by a Security Policeman without any reason whatsoever. When questioned why he did it, she received the answer: because you did not pay any special attention to me.

b. In September 1942 a meeting took place in Chodorow in the presence of the District Farmer of Stryj, the District Agricultural Expert, the Chairman of the Ukrainian Aid Committee, the Land Commissioner, the District Farmer, the Charman of the Delegation in Chodorow, and mayors and bailiffs of the district of Chodorow concerning the delivery quotas. During the discussion of the quota action the District Farmer said that the communities of Hranky, Kuty, and Bortniky had not delivered their ordered quota of vegetables, then he ordered the Mayor of Hranky, Kuty to come up and hit him in the face in front of the assembly.

c. The chief of the price control office in Zloczow, H. Mok, who personally controls the delivery of foodstuffs into the town, stopped a woman on the way who was carrying a few kilos of carrots. Mr. Mok ordered his interpreter, a Jew, to search the woman; the Jew did it in such a manner as to offend the dignity of a human being and of the woman.

d. The District Farmer Benzin in Biala Polaska shot at innocent Ukrainian peasants from the villages of Polenow and Nosow, whilst on duty on 30 July 1942, two of whom died. Benzin was arrested, but the event caused great indignation in the whole area.

e. On 9 August 1942 the Ukrainian student Iwan WOWTSCHYSCHYN was beaten without any reason whatsoever by a Polish railroad policeman on the station in Przemysl; when the student tried to defend himself, he was fatally wounded with the bayonet.

Generally, there are strong complaints all over the country about the way Polish members of the railroad police treated Ukrainians.

Enclosure 7.

Shooting of 46 peasants in Lubycza, district of Rawa Ruska.

In the early morning on Sunday, 4 October 1942, some groups of the Special Service detachments, stationed near Belsez, came to the village of Lubycza Koroliwska and Kubysca Kniazi and called out all male villagers. The men were convinced that it was a matter of some urgent work for the village and obligingly hurried to the place of assembly. There they were formed in rank and file and requested to name 2 saboteurs within two minutes, otherwise every fifth man would be shot. As, however, no acts of sabotage had been committed in the village, no saboteurs could be named. Then, 45 men and 1 woman were chosen from the crowd and shot dead in two groups in the presence of their relatives, viz. in Lubycza Koroliwsak and Kubycza Kniazi.

Amongst the 46 shot were 31 Ukrainians.

The pretence for these tragic mass-shootings was a fire which occurred in the stables of the said Special Service detachments near Belsez during the night of 3-4 October, when 3 horses were said to have perished. Probabl this fire was set alight by the carelessness of the stable-boys and was extinguished at once.

The community of Lubysza Koroliwska has been known as one of the most loyal of the whole district. The very same day (4 October 1942) the Governor of the province of Galicia, during a celebration in Lwow, specially mentioned the community as one conscious of their duties regarding the delivery of their quotas; this was officially published (Lwiwski Wisti) (Lemberger Nachrichten 6 October 1942).

H1126-0139

The village Kubycza is 8 km. away from the place where the fire took place. The above mentioned stable is not within the village boundaries of Lubycza Koroliwska.

It should be noted here that in spite of repeated assurances given by the District Captain (Kreishauptmann) the injured families in Lubysza Koroliwska have so far not received any compensation.

Enclosure 8.

As a reprisal for the shooting of a member of the German police in Lwow who was killed by an unknown perpetrator in the second half of November 1942, 28 Ukrainians were shot in Lwow, and 56 in Czortkow who were at the time in prison in these towns. Nobody was told the reason for the shooting, and the shootings in Czortkow were carried out in broad day-light before the eyes of the frightened population. Among the persons shot were many suffering from typhoid who were taken from the hospital whilst unconscious, loaded on to trucks, and taken to the place of execution.

These shootings were to be considered as reprisals against the so-called "Bandera" group. Among the persons shot were elderly citizens who had no connection whatever with the activities of this group, as for instance Dr. Olexa KOSSAK, lawyer from Kolomea, engineer Andrij PJASECKYJ, head-gamekeeper in Janiw near Lwow all of whom had been vouched for not only by myself and Dr. Kost PANKISKYJ, but by Reich Germans as well.

Enclosure 9.

Arrests in Galicia in December 1942.

In December 1942 the police made arrests among the so-called restless elements.

In the whole province of Galicia arrests were made, especially among the young people among whom followers of the partisans were looked for. On this occasion a number of elderly citizens were arrested, who were but vaguely connected with the suspects. Thus, for instance, the owners of houses where the suspect lived as a lodger were arrested as well as guests present in the house at the time of arrest. On interventions by the representatives of the Ukrainian Main Committee in Lwow the police answered in order to release the persons arrested by mistake. Since then 2½ months have passed and the persons arrested by mistake are still in prison. They are treated there as criminals and are not certain of their lives.

A typical example of this is the fact that 50 Ukrainians died of misery and hunger in the prison in Czortkow. The Ukrainian Aid Committee in Czortkow tried to obtain a permit to send food to the prisoners, but without success; although the commander of the police agreed, the prison-commander insisted that the command of the Lwow police had to grant permission.

Enclosure 10.

Uncertain fate of arrested Ukrainian women students.

On 5 February 1942, 6 Ukrainian women students and school girls from Kolomea were arrested and in the spring sent on to Czortkow. Since then their relatives are unable to obtain any news about their fate.

The personal date of the arrested:

(follow 6 names together with names of respective parents and date and place of birth).

H1126-0140

Enclosure 11.

List

of some well-known Ukrainian citizens, members of the Ukrainian Aid Committee and employees of the State Administration, the Self-Government and the Economic Authorities, also of the old men and students who were arrested in January 1943 in the districts of Kolomea, Stryj, and Komionka Strumilowa.:

(follows names by localities.)

Enclosure 12.

Arrests and shootings of persons unfit for work in the District of Sanok.

During the period from 18 to 24 January 1943 about 300 persons were arrested in the neighborhood of Sanok in accordance with lists compiled some time before by the local mayors on orders of the authorities. Some of them were soon set free, but the fate of the rest is unknown to us and their families. The shootings which are daily taking place on the Jewish cemetery promise no good.

On 17 and 18 January 1943 many persons from the districts Sanok and Jaslo were arrested in the station in Tarnow whilst riding in the direction of Cracow; so far their families have no news about their fate. Thus, for instance, 4 persons were arrested from the village of Losie, district Jaslo, viz.:

(follow 4 names and addresses).

One of them went to see a doctor in Cracow, the others were on business trips to Warsaw.

On 18 January 1943, 14 persons who were unfit for work were shot together with 80 Jews in Ustrzyki Dolne; they were buried together in a ditch. Among these 14 were old men and invalids, for instance from Jaćswyska: Iwan LESYK, 68-70 years old, invalid of the Austrian Army who worked as a tiler, Jurko SCHKLABAK and his wife, both about 70 years of age, and 3 other unknown persons, a female beggar from Ustrzky called "HNBAMSYMKA". We do not know the names of the other people shot. It should be pointed out that the Ukrainians celebrated a second Christmas evening on that day called "Schtschedryj Wetschir".

As this holiday is celebrated by the Ukrainians with great piety, the shootings of these innocent people on this holy day caused great indignance and embitterment. These events depress the Ukrainian population. The view is current that now the shootings of the Jews come to an end those of the Ukrainians begin. The case of Ustrzyki is commented upon as follows: The Germans do not care about any non-German sanctity and holidays, they even shoot Ukrainians on the Ukrainian "Schtschedryj Wetschir" (the case in Ustrzyki).

The Ukrainian population is suspicious of all orders given by the German authority and even keep away from the soup kitchens, for fear that those in need may be considered as beggars and shot.

Enclosure 13.

Anti-Ukrainian activities of partisans in the District of Bilgoraj.

(Irrelevant).

H1126-0141

Enclosure 14.

Activities of partisans in the district of Biala Podlaska during the second half of 1942.

(Irrelevant).

Enclosure 15.

Shooting of 16 Ukrainians in Przewala.

On 17 December 1942 the population of Zubowice, district of Tyschowce was moved away and racial Germans were settled in their place. The Polish population of Zubowice, warned the day before by a certain Kolesche of the coming evacuation fled, but the Ukrainians stayed and were evacuated to the little town of Tyszowce and its suburbs, with the help of the representatives of the Ukrainian Aid Committee. This evacuation affected 128 Ukrainian families, 486 persons in all.

Some days later a few farms in Zubowice and the surrounding country as far as the village of Przewale were burnt down. It is obvious that these fires were started by escaped Poles who hid in the forests or the neighboring Polish villages, for all farms burnt down belonged to Poles prior to the evacuation; the Ukrainians who were evacuated in an organized manner and went willingly to destinations far off, viz. Zamlynie and Dubyna, were certainly not interested in burning down farms in Zubowice, particularly not their own farms.

As reprisal the arrests in Zamlynie and the shooting of persons in the village Przewale, near Zobuwice, were carried out on 24 December 1942. This village is inhabited by 337 Poles and only 122 Ukrainians. On intervention by the Local Farm Administrator Poles have been separated and released from amongst the people arrested at random, the remaining Ukrainians, however, among them the 58 years old Ukrainian teacher and trustee of the Aid Committee in Zamosc, Banda ONOFER, and his 75 years old mother-in-law Marie REWUS were shot. The names of the other Ukrainians who were shot are: (follows a list of 10 names including one of a persons aged 80 years).

Enclosure 16.

List of the Ukrainians shot on 29 January 1943 in the village of Sumin community of Taranwatka.

(Follows a list of 45 names, giving family state, age, and remarks. Remarks to No. 16: Wounded, in hospital, to No. 19: Village Mayor, to No. 31: Wounded, in hospital, No's: 39 & 45: wounded, in hospital.)

Total 8 men, 19 women, 18 children.

The delegate: Pastor Matwijtschuk.

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List of Ukrainians shot 2 February 1943 in the villages of Pankow and Scharowola.

(Follows a list of 19 names, giving family state, age and remarks. Remarks to No's.: 4, 14, 15, 16, 17: Wounded).

Total 4 men, 7 women, 8 children. In the village Pankow 5 Poles have been shot. In the village Scharowola 6 Poles have been shot.

Delegation Ukrainian Aid Committee Tomascho Lubelsko.
Delegate: Matwijtschuk.

H1126-0142

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 1526-PS

23 November 1945.

I, J. WALTER ROTHSCHILD, 1st Lt, AUS, 0886354, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 1526-PS.

J. WALTER ROTHSCHILD
1st Lt., 0886354.

H1126-0143

Exhibit U.S.A. 221
Filed Dec. 12, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 1584-PS I
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Partial Translation of 1584-PS, part I, teletype Goering to Himmler, dated 14 February 1944.

CHIEF REICH SECURITY OFFICE
Teletype Section

Received					Transmitted
Hour	Day	Month	Year		
2400	15	2	44		
from	by			TOP SECRET	by
E2	(Initials)				(Initials)

URGENT

FS - No. 24411

t-KR-RM Asien Nr. 0170 14/2 2030 - QEM--GKDOL--to Reichsfuehrer-SS Reichs Minister Himmler, Berlin SW 11-Reference: Letter Journal No. 72/44.- Subject: Formation of the 7th Airforce group squadron for special purposes 7 (Z.B.V.7)

I received your request to form another squadron of airforce group for special purposes 7(Z.B.V.7) and ordered examination by the air force operational staff (Luftwaffenfuehrungsstab). At the same time I ask you to put at my disposal as great a number of Concentration Camp (K Z-) convicts as possible for air armament, as this kind of manpower proved to be very useful according to previous experience. The situation of the air war makes subterranean transfer of industry necessary. For work of this kind Concentration Camp (K Z-) convicts can be especially well concentrated at work and in the camp. Such installations are necessary in order to secure production of the now fully developed most modern airplanes. The Fuehrer upon his visit in Insterbrug has attached great value to these airplanes. Intermediate negotiations have already been held between my and your departments. I would be especially grateful for your support in carrying out this task.

Heil Hitler - Yours Goering, Reich Marshal of Greater Germany. ADF 391/44 GKDOS.+

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 1584-PS

16 November 1945

I, WILLARD E. SKIDMORE, Lt(jg), USNR, 391590, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 1584-PS.

WILLARD E. SKIDMORE,
Lt(jg), USNR, 391590.

H1126-0144

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1666-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Exhibit U.S.a. 208

Filed Dec. 12, 1945

1942 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 179

Decree by the Fuehrer concerning a Plenipotentiary General for the Utilization of Labor of 21 March 1942

Erlass des Führers über einen Generalbevollmächtigten für den Arbeitseinsatz vom 21. März 1942

In order to secure the manpower requisite for the war industries as a whole, and particularly for armaments, it is necessary that the utilization of all available manpower, including that of workers recruited (angeworbenen) abroad and of prisoners of war, should be subject to a uniform control, directed in a manner appropriate to the requirements of war industry, and further that all still incompletely utilized manpower in the Great German Reich, including the Protectorate, and in the General Gouvernement and in the Occupied Territories, should be mobilized.

Reichsstatthalter and Gauleiter Fritz SAUCKEL will carry out this task within the framework of the Four Years Plan, as Plenipotentiary General for the utilization of labor. In that capacity he will be directly responsible to the Commissioner for the Four Years Plan.

Section III (wages) and Section V (utilization of labor) of the Reich Labor Ministry, together with their subordinate authorities, will be placed at the disposal of the Plenipotentiary General for the accomplishment of his task.

Fuehrer-Headquarters, 21 March 1942

The Fuehrer
Adolf Hitler
The Reich Minister and Head of the Reich Chancellery
Dr Lammers
The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces
Keitel

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 1666-PS

19 October 1945

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt Inf, O-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 1666-PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt Inf
O-1335567

H1126-0145

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1666-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

1942 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 180

Ordinance for the Execution of the Fuehrer's Decree concerning a Plenipotentiary General for Arbeitseinsatz of 27 March 1942

Anordnung zur Durchführung des Erlasses des Führers über einen Generalbevollmächtigten für den Arbeitseinsatz vom 27. März 1942

In pursuance of the Führer's Decree of 21 March 1942 (RGBl I, 179), I decree as follows:

1. My manpower sections (Geschäftsgruppen Arbeitseinsatz) are hereby abolished (Circular letter of 22 Oct 1936/St. M. Dev. 265). Their duties (recruitment and allocation of manpower, regulations for labor conditions (Arbeitsbedingungen)) are taken over by the Plenipotentiary General for Arbeitseinsatz, who is directly under me.

2. The Plenipotentiary General for Arbeitseinsatz will be responsible for regulating the conditions of labor (wage policy) employed in the Reich territory, having regard to the requirements of Arbeitseinsatz.

3. The Plenipotentiary General for Arbeitseinsatz is part of the Four Year Plan. In cases where new legislation is required, or existing laws require to be modified, he will submit appropriate proposals to me.

4. The Plenipotentiary General for Arbeitseinsatz will have at his disposal for the performance of his task the right delegated to me by the Fuehrer for issuing instructions to the higher Reich authorities, their branches and the Party offices, and their associated organisms and also the Reich Protector, the General-Governor, the Commander-in-Chief, and heads of the civil administrations.

In the case of ordinances and instructions of fundamental importance report is to be submitted to me, in advance.

Berlin, 27 March 1942

The Deputy for the Four Year Plan
Goering
Reich Marshal

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 1666-PS

22 October 1945

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt Inf, O-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 1666-PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt Inf
O-1335567

H1126-0146

Exhibit U.S.A. 193
Filed Dec. 12, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 1702PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

1025/44g
Rec'd: 1 Aug. 44
encl:

COPY SECRET

II 1C

EVACUATION REPORT
OF DISTRICT COMMISSARIAT OF KASATIN

(Illegible notes)

REPORTER: District Commissar STEUDEL, Kasatin

Time of report: 8 November to 28 December 1943

1. The military situation in November/December 1943.

Immediately following the capture of Kiev by the Soviets on 7 November, the district town of WASSILKOW as well as the important railroad center FASTOW, belonging to the district of Wassilkow, fell into enemy hands, (8-9 November). The following day, the Soviets attempted to advance farther along the rail line FASTOW - KASATIN. They succeeded in capturing with weak armored and infantry spearheads in one move, the stations of KOZANKA, POPILNVA and BROWKI, situated along this line, and to execute further sudden advances past the station of CZERNORUDKA. For this reason the district of WTSCHERAISCHE had to be evacuated on 15 November. I withdrew the Germans committed there to the district of RUSHIN situated 20 kilometers to the South. The withdrawal was affected according to plan and without friction, with all implements, after all camps had been evacuated previously: the cattle - above all the valuable breeds (Oxen and colt stables) led back. German tractors and farm machines transported away and all businesses had been crippled. (Fundamentally, the chief command of the 4th Armored Army, in whose zone these battles took place, had ordered that in the district West of the DNJEPR, in contrast to the ones to the East, no destructions of farm goods or businesses should take place).

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2. The results of the hereby described military events between 8 November and 20 December were as follows:

In a conference, called by me, of the authoritative leaders of all offices of the civilian sector on 8 November, I ordered the immediate start of, and discussed in detail, measures for the most far-reaching decentralization. At the same time, the leaders of all vital, above all of the economic food industry, were informed to effect, in case of an evacuation, the crippling of factories (by taking away important and hard-to-replace machine parts, belts, etc), and to prepare this already now. Up till then, however, all factories had to be kept running at full capacity. It should be emphasized here, praisingly, that all measures ordered by me in strictest accordance with the army economic leader (A.W.F.) of the chief command of the 4th Armored Army, were executed by the responsible parties and their staff in an exemplary manner, and with the greatest conscientiousness. Although the delivery of cars, for conceivable reasons, did meet with considerable difficulties, we succeeded, due to the splendid cooperation of the authoritative Reich German organizations of military and civil government, in transporting to the West approximately 80% of the most vital goods (grain, cattle, sugar, etc), or in making them available for the armed forces for immediate use as provisions for the fighting troops.

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H1126-0147

5. In the midst of the conditions, almost restored to normal, I received a call on the eve of the 25th of December from the Army according to which the Soviets with superior forces of tanks and motorized troops, had exerted a strong renewed pressure on the line of KOTSCHEROWO - BRUSILOW - FASTOW and along the street KIEV - SHITOMIR with the main advance in a South West direction. Shortly afterwards, the long distance call, as per attached inclosure number 2, was put through according to which the able-bodied male population in the ages between 15 and 65 as well as the cattle had to be led back in the direction East of the line BILILOWKA - BERKITSCHEW - SHITOMIR. The transporting of the able-bodied population was charged to the military authorities by the chief quartermaster of the army, while beginning with the morning of 26 December. I discussed and ordered in detail, during an immediate conference for the whole district the shipment of all the cattle. This action started successfully on that day according to plan, while the discussions over the seizure of the male population were not yet concluded in the afternoon hours of the 26th of December and no positive measures of any kind were taken.

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H1126-0148

H1126-0149

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No.1702 PS
CONTD.
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Enclosure II

COPY

SECRET

Kdt. rückw. A. Geb. 585
Abt. Qu. Nr. 452/43 geh.

In the field
25 December 1943

To the
District Commissar KASATIN

1. The able-bodied male population between 15 and 65 years of age and the cattle are to be shipped back from the district East of the line BELILOWKA - BERDITSCHEN - SHITOMIR (places excluded).

- - - - - - - - - - -

4. Destruction of farm goods and factories in all places must not take place, only a crippling of the factories for several weeks will be executed by army economic leader (A.Wi.Fü.).

- - - - - - - - - - -

In charge
signed (signature)
Lt General (General major)

Distribution:
See original.

ENCLOSURE III

COPY

SECRET

High Command of the 4th Armored Army
O.Qu/Qu 2 Nr. 1662/43/ secret

Army Headquarters,

26 December 1943

Re: Evacuation measures.

1. The city of BERDITSCHEW is to be evacuated of Reich Germans, Germans (Volksdeutschen) agencies of the civil government, government of the country, able-bodied population. The cattle is to be taken away. Execution of evacuation measures is charged to the civil government.

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4. No destructions are to take place as far as they are not expressly ordered by the armored army. All factories are to be prepared for crippling so that this can be accomplished in the shortest possible time. The electricity and water plants are to be taken over by the technical troops.

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6. The same measures are to be prepared for KASATIN in such a way that they can be started at once at the command of the armored army.

For the High Command of the
Armored Army
The Chief of the General Staff

In charge
Original signed MULLER
Colonel, General Staff

Correct:
signed signature
Lt Colonel, General Staff.

15 November 1945

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO.1702PS

I, Pfc ERNST M. COHN, 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the indicated excerpt from Document Number 1702-PS.

ERNST M. COHN
Pfc, 33925738

H1126-0150

Exhibit U.S.A. 195
Filed Dec. 12, 1945

STATEMENT OF THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT
IN VIEW OF THE PROSECUTION AND PUNISHMENT
OF THE GERMAN MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS
(Identified as Document 1726 PS)

Enclosure "h" entitled
Central Bureau for Statistics
The deportation of Netherlands workmen to Germany.

Page 1, paragraphs 4,5 and 6, Page 2, Paragraphs 1,2,3 and 4:

"The enlistment of working labourers took quite a different course.

"Many big and reasonably large business concerns, especially in the metal industry, were visited by German commissions who appointed workmen for deportation. This combing out of the concerns was called the "Sauckel-action", so named after its leader, who was charged with the appointment of foreign workmen in Germany.

"The employers had to cancel the contracts with the appointed workmen temporarily, and the latter were forced to register at the labour offices, which then took care of the deportation under supervision of German "Fachberater".

"Workmen who refused (relatively few) were prosecuted by the "Sicherheitsdienst"(SD). If captured by this service, they were mostly lodged for some time in one of the infamous prisoners camps in the Netherlands and eventually put to work in Germany.

"In this prosecution the "Sicherheitsdienst" was supported by the German Police Service, which was connected with the labour offices, and was composed of members of the N.S.B. and the like.

"At the end of April 1942 the deportation of working labourers started on a grand scale. Consequently in the months of May and Junethe number of deportees amounted to not less than 22.000, resp. 24,000 of which many were metal workers.

"After that the action slackened somewhat, but in October 1942 another top was reached (2.600). After the big concerns, the smaller ones had, in their turn, to give up their personnel."

Page 3, paragraph 7, page 4, paragraphs 1,2 and 3. also, paragr.6:

"This changed in November 1944. The Germans then started a ruthless campaign for man-power, passing by the labour offices. Without warning, they lined off whole quarters of the towns, seized people in the streets or in the houses and deported them.

"In Rotterdam and Schiedam where these raids (razzia's) took place on 10 and 11 November, the amount of people thus deported was estimated at 50.000 and 5,000 respectively.

"In other places where the raids were held later, the numbers were much lower, because one was forwarned by the events. The exact figures are not known as they have never been published by the occupants.

"The people thus seized were put to work partly in the Netherlands, partly in Germany. ...

***

"The events of the war then took such a turn that further deportations did not take place. But still in the North and East of the country, many men, up to 60 years, were seized and forced to build defence works in the neighbourhood of their homes."

H1126-0151

Ex. 206

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 1903 PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Excerpt from: " Decrees, Directives, Announcements " (Verfuegungen/Anordnungen, Bekanntgaben"), Vol. II. Edited by the Party-Chancellory. Published by: Zentralverlag der NSDAP, Frz.Eher Nachf. GmbH., Muenchen - page 510.

Decree of the Fuehrer on the execution of the decree concerning the Deputy General for the mobilization of labor (Arbeitseinsatz).

In the following the Fuehrers' decree on the extension of the authority of the Deputy General for the Arbeitseinsatz is made public:

"Decree of the Fuehrer on the execution of the decree concerning the Deputy General for the Arbeitsdienst of 30 September 1942.

I herewith authorize the Deputy General for the Arbeitseinsatz, Reich-governor and district-leader (Gauleiter) Fritz Sauckel to take all necessary measures for the enforcement of my decree referring to a Deputy General for the Arbeitseinsatz of 21 March 1942 (Reichsgesetzblatt I, Page 179) according to his own judgment in the Greater German Reich, in the Protectorat, and in the Government General (Generalgouvernement) as well as in the occupied territories, measures which will safeguard under all circumstances the regulated deployment of labor (geordneter Arbeitseinsatz) for the German war - economy. For this purpose he may appoint commissioners (Beauftragte) to with the bureaux of the military and civilian administration. These are subordinated directly to Deputy General for the Arbeitseinsatz. In order to carry out their tasks, they are entitled to issue directives to the competent military and civilian authorities in charge of the Arbeitseinsatz and of wage-policy.

More detailed directives will be issued by the Deputy General for the Arbeitseinsatz.

Fuehrer-Headquarter 30 Sept 1942

The Fuehrer
sign. Adolf Hitler

The Reichminister and Chief of the Reich-Chancery
sign. Dr.Lammers

The chief of the German High Command
sign. Keitel."

H1126-0152

H1126-0153

Con'd

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 1903 PS

15.11.45

I, GOETZ MAYER, T/5 33812169 hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 1903 PS.

GOETZ MAYER
T/5 33812169

Exhibit U.S.A. 227
Filed Dec. 13, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1913-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

[illegible], [illegible], [illegible]

1943 REICHSARBEITSBLATT, PART I, PAGE 588

Agreement between the Plenipotentiary General for the Arbeitseinsatz and the German Labor Front Governing the care of non-German workers

Vereinbarung zwischen dem Generalbevollmächtigten für den Arbeitseinsatz und der Deutschen Arbeitsfront über die Betreuung der fremdvölkischen Arbeitskräfte

The Commissioner for the
Four Year Plan

[illegible], 20 Sept
Berlin, 20 Sept. 1943

The Plenipotentiary General
for the Arbeitseinsatz
VIc 5783/291

To the presidents of the Gau employment offices and
to the Reich Trustees of Labor
as well as to the directors of the employment offices.

Agreement between the Plenipotentiary General for the Arbeitseinsatz and the German Labor Front concerning the case of non-German workers

Agreement

The following agreement has been concluded between the Plenipotentiary General for the Arbeitseinsatz, Gauleiter and Reich Governor (Reichstatthalter) SAUCKEL and the Reichsleiter of the German Labor Front, Reichsorganisation leader Dr. LEY:

1. The German Labor Front, on the basis of decree Nr 4 of the Plenipotentiary General for the Arbeitseinsatz of 7 May 1942 - GBl 405/42 (Nr 2b) has the sole and exclusive mission of caring for all foreign workers employed within the Reich. Excluded are the farm workers employed in the Reich food administration.

2. The Reichsleiter of the German Labor Front, Reichsorganisationleiter Dr LEY, in collaboration with the Plenipotentiary General for the Arbeitseinsatz, Gauleiter SAUCKEL, will establish a "central inspection" for the continuous supervision of all measures concerning the care of the foreign workers mentioned under 1. This will have the designation:

"Central inspection for the care of foreign workers".

The central inspection for the care of foreign workers exercises its functions upon directives and in the name of the Plenipotentiary General for the Arbeitseinsatz and of the Reichsleiter of the German Labor Front. In order to avoid all duplication of work, it will be its sole responsibility, to scrutinize all measures taken for the care of foreign workers employed in the factories and camps, also to remove immediately all defects discovered - as far as possible - on the spot and to issue the necessary instructions for this.

The authority of the Plenipotentiary General for the Arbeitseinsatz to empower the members of his staff and the presidents of the state employment offices to get direct information on the conditions regarding the employment of foreigners in the factories and camps, will remain untouched.

3. The central inspection for the care of foreign workers will be continuously in touch with the main office VI of the Plenipotentiary General for the Arbeitseinsatz. It will instruct the office on the general observations made and will make suggestions for changes, if that should become necessary.

H1126-0154

4. The offices of the administration of the Arbeitseinsatz will be constantly informed by the "central inspection for the care of foreign workers" of its observations, in particular immediately in each case in which action of State organizations seems to be necessary.

This agreement becomes effective on the day of its signing.

Berlin, 2 June 1943

Dr Robert LEY Fritz SAUCKEL

For the carrying out of this agreement I order the following:

1. The supervision of all welfare measures in the realm of the employment of foreign workers is the sole responsibility of the central inspection for the care of foreign workers. Complaints about bad quarters, food, deficient provision of free time activities and cultural and propagandistic care will in the future be directed by me to the central inspection for investigation and elimination of possible deficiencies. The labor offices and Gau labor offices must direct complaints and protests coming to them to the locally competent office of the German Labor Front.

The central inspection will inform the Plenipotentiary General for Arbeitseinsatz regarding its decisions and the measures instituted by it and their completion.

2. The employment of foreign workers, their identification, equalization between the plants, transfers, supervision of practical and vocationally correct employment in the plant, the promotion of instructional measures to increase production, as well as drafting of the labor-contract regulations, the carrying out of pay regulation measures, and the supervision of the orderly paying of foreign workers, remain as formerly the task of the competent offices of the administration of the Arbeitseinsatz and Reich trusteeship.

3. The directives for the employment of eastern and western laborers given in Va 5780,28/90 of 9 January and Va 5780/196 of 4 February 1943 remain in force with the provision that the labor offices and Gau labor offices and the specialists employed with them for the inspection of camps for eastern laborers need only undertake the tasks mentioned under No 2.

4. The close interrelationship of the tasks of the Arbeitseinsatz and the care of foreign labor demands, independently of the measures to be effected, for the execution of the above agreement, a constant and close cooperation between the offices of the administration of the Arbeitseinsatz and the offices of the German labor front. If, for example, it is determined in the execution of Arbeitseinsatz measures, that an insufficient labor performance on the part of foreign labor results from absence of welfare work, then the competent agencies of the German Labor Front are to be informed of this without delay, so that the latter may effect the correction of existing deficiencies. On the other hand the offices of the German labor Front will bring to the attention of the competent agencies of the Arbeitseinsatz administration findings made in the course of their welfare work which require an evaluation from the point of view of the Arbeitseinsatz.

For the adjustment of individual questions of cooperation between the offices concerned and the creation of a permanent exchange of findings the Gau labor offices will enter into negotiations with the appropriate administration (Gauwaltungen) of the German Labor Front and will inform the labor offices on the rulings effected for the districts.

By order
Dr BEISIEGEL

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 1913-PS

26 October 1945

I, WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE, Lt (jg) USNR, 391590, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 1913-PS.

WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE
Lt (jg) USNR
391590

H1126-0156

Exhibit U.S.A. 170
Filed Dec. 11, 1945

H1126-0157

TRANSLATION OF EXTRACTS OF DOCUMENT 1919-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Speech of the Reichsführer - SS
at the meeting of SS Major-Generals
(SS-Gruppenführer) at Posen
October 4th, 1943

"The 1941 attack (p. 3)

In 1941 the Führer attacked Russia. That was, as we can well see now, shortly, - perhaps 3 to 6 months - before Stalin prepared to embark on his great penetration into Central and Western Europe. I can give a picture of this first year in a few words. The attacking forces cut their way through. The Russian Army was herded together in great pockets, ground down, taken prisoner. At that time we did not value the mass of humanity as we value it today, as raw material, as labour. What after all, thinking in terms of generations, is not to be regretted, but is now deplorable by reason of the loss of labour, is that the prisoners died in tens and hundreds of thousands of exhaustion and hunger."

(p. 22)

"it is basically wrong for us to infuse all our inoffensive soul and spirit, our good-nature, and our idealism into foreign peoples. This is true since the time of HERDER who clearly wrote "Voices of the Nations" ("Stimmen der Völker"), in a state of drunkenness, thereby bringing (p. 23) on us, who come after him, such immeasurable sorrow and misery. This is true for instance, of the Czechs and the Slovenes to whom we gave their consciousness of nationality. They were just not capable of it themselves; we had to discover it for them.

One basic principle must be the absolute rule for the SS man: we must be honest, decent, loyal, and comradely to members of our own blood and to nobody else. What happens to a Russian, to a Czech does not interest me in the slightest. What the nations can offer in the way of good blood of our type, we will take, if necessary by kidnapping their children and raising them here with us. Whether nations live in prosperity or starve to death* interests me only in so far as we need them as slaves for our Kultur; otherwise, it is of no interest to me. Whether 10,000 Russian females fall down from exhaustion while digging an anti-tank ditch interests me only in so far as the anti-tank ditch for Germany is finished. We shall never be rough and heartless when it is not necessary, that is clear. We Germans, who (p. 24) are the only people in the world who have a decent attitude towards animals, will also assume a decent attitude towards these human animals. But it is a crime against our own blood to worry about them and give them ideals, thus causing our sons and grandsons to have a more difficult time with them. When somebody comes to me and says, "I cannot dig the anti-tank ditch with women and children, it is inhuman, for it would kill them," then I have to say, "You are a murderer of your own blood because if the anti-tank ditch is not dug, German soldiers will die, and they are sons of German mothers. They are our own blood." That is what I want to instil into this SS and what I believe have instilled into them as one of the most sacred laws of the future. Our concern, our duty is our people and our blood. It is for them that we must provide and plan, work and fight, nothing else. We can be indifferent to everything else. I wish the SS to adopt this attitude to the problem of all foreign, non-Germanic peoples, especially Russians. All else is vain, fraud against our own nation and an obstacle to the early winning of the war."

"Foreigners in the Reich (p. 43)

We must also realise that we have 6 to 7 million foreigners in Germany. Perhaps it is even 8 million now. We have prisoners in Germany. They are

* i.e. Verrecken = to die (used of cattle) - Translator's note.

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none of them dangerous so long as we take severe measures at the merest trifle. It is a mere nothing today to shoot 10 Poles, compared with the fact that we might later have to shoot tens of thousands in their place, and compared to the fact that the shooting of these tens of thousands would then be carried out even at the cost of German blood. Every little fire will immediately be stamped out and quenched, and extinguished, - otherwise - as in the case of a real fire - a political and psychological surface-fire may spring up among the people.

The Communists in the Reich

I don't believe the Communists could attempt any action, for their leading elements, like most criminals, are in our concentration camps. And here I must say this - that we shall be able to see after the war what a blessing it was for Germany that, in spite all the silly talk about humanitarianism, we imprisoned all this criminal sub-stratum of the German people in concentration camps: I'll answer for that. If they were going about free, we should be worse off. For then the sub-humans would have (p. 44) their NCOs and Commanding Officers, then they would have their councils of workers and military. As it is, however, they are locked up, and are making shells or projectile cases or other important things, and are very useful members of human society."

"The SS in war-time (p. 51)

Now I come to our own development, to that of the SS in the past months. Looking back on the whole war, this development was fantastic. It took place at an absolutely terrific speed. Let us look back a little to 1939. At that time we were a few regiments, guard units (Wachverbände) 8 to 9,000 strong, - that is, not even a division, all in all 25 to 28,000 men at the outside. True, we were armed, but really only got our artillery regiment as our heavy arm two months before the war began. We will recapitulate which tasks, which duties, and which assignments we have been given in the last 4½ years. But first I would like to enumerate and make known once more some outward changes.

Changes in Personnel

The following changes have taken place at the Main Offices:

Our comrade, SS Lieutenant General (Obergruppenführer) Kaltenbrunner has succeeded our fallen friend Heydrich. Unfortunately he is ill today. He has phlebitis, but it is, I am glad to say, not dangerous. That (p. 52) is why he could not come.

Our old friend Daluege has such severe heart trouble that he has to undergo courses of treatment and now has to retire from active service for 1½ to 2 years. - I would like this evening to send our two friends, Daluege especially, and Kaltenbrunner too, a teleprint or a telegram in the name of all of us. As I have said, we may hope that Daluege will have recovered in about two years, and can then return to the front and get into harness.

SS-Obergruppenführer Wünnenberg is in charge as his deputy. He has been in charge of the police division up till now, and was then appointed to be Officer Commanding IVth SS armoured corps. He is General of the Waffen-SS and the police, and is in charge of the uniformed regular police (Ordnungspolizei) as their Head.

SS-Gruppenführer Breithaupt has succeeded our old comrade and friend Scharfe as Chief of the SS - court of justice.

SS-Obergruppenführer Hofmann has made a change. He has given up the Main office for race and settlement (Rasse - u. Siedlungshauptamt) and has

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Senior
become/ Executive SS and Police Officer (Höhere SS - und Polizeiführer) for the South-West.

(p. 53)

SS-Obergruppenführer Hildebrandt has left Oberabschnitt# Weichsel, and has become Chief of the Main Office for race and settlement.

SS-Obergruppenführer Schmidt has left the Head Office for Personnel at his own request and has joined my personal staff for special duties. He is succeeded by SS-Gruppenführer von Herff.

One of my closest and most long-standing colleagues, SS-Obergruppenführer Wolff, has now, I am glad to say, recovered completely from a severe illness which greatly endangered his life - (it was an operation for removing stones from the kidney) - and is now, - this is a new appointment - Supreme Executive SS and Police Officer (Höchste SS - und Polizeiführer) for the whole of occupied Italy. He therefore has charge of 25 to 30 million people. Under him he has SS-Gruppenführer Globocnik as Senior Executive SS and Police Officer for the coastal area. He too could not come today.

Senior Executive SS and Police Officers have since been appointed as follows: for Croatia - Kammerhofer, who on account of the Croatians is not called Senior Executive SS and Police Officer, but Commissioner of the Reichsführer SS; for Serbia Meyszner was appointed earlier, for Greece - (p. 54) Stroob at the moment but - I would like to tell you this now - I am transferring him from there to Schimana. Officials/ in Greece will become Senior Executive SS and Police Officers, and thus not command the Galician SS - Volunteer Division. SS-Gruppenführer Panke is to become Senior Executive SS and Police Officer for Denmark."

"Chief of the Anti-partisan Units (Bandenkampf-Verbände) (p. 57)

In the meantime I have also set up the department of Chief of the anti-partisan units. Our comrade SS-Obergruppenführer von den Bach is Chief of the anti-partisan units. I considered it necessary for the Reichsführer SS to be in authoritative command in all these battles, for I am convinced that we are best in a position to take action against this enemy struggle, which is a decidedly political one. Except where the units which had been supplied and which we had formed for this purpose were taken from us to fill in gaps at the front, we have been very successful.

It is notable that, by setting up this department we have gained (p. 58) for the SS in turn a division, a corps, an army, and the next step, which is the High Command of an army or even of a group - if you wish to call it that.

Regular uniformed Police and the Sipo

Now to deal briefly with the tasks of the regular uniformed police and the Sipo. They still cover the same field. I can see that great things have been acheived. We have formed roughly 30 police regiments from police reservists and former members of the police - police officials, as they used to be called. The average age in our police battalions is not lower than that of the Security battalions of the Armed Forces. Their achievements are beyond all praise. In addition, we have formed Police Rifle Regiments by merging the police battalions of the "savage peoples" (der "wilden Völker"). Thus we did not leave these police battalions untouched but blended them in the ratio of about 1 : 3. That is why we have, at the present moment of crisis, a far greater stability than could be seen among the other units made up of natives or local inhabitants. - - - - - -"

"SS-industrial concerns (p. 63)

I now come to other individual great spheres of activity, of which it is

Largest regional sub-division of the SS - Translator's note.
/ Obscure sentence - Translator's note.

important for you all to know. We have huge armament works in the concentration camps. This is the sphere of activity of our friend SS-Obergruppenführer Pohl. Every month we put in many millions of hours of work for armaments. We tackle the most thankless tasks and - I must give this its (p. 64) due - whether in the concentration camps, in Pohl's industrial works, or outside at the offices of the Senior Executive SS and Police Officers or in the workshops of the Head Office of SS administration (SS-Führungshauptamt), one thing is obvious: wherever we are, we are SS-men. Where things are in a bad way, we act. I want every subordinate trained to this end. We want to help, unhampered by quibbles regarding authority, (Kompetenzen) for we want to win the war. What we are doing, we are doing for Germany. Whether it is a question of building a road, if a tunnel is not going ahead somewhere, or if it is an invention which for sheer red-tape does not come to fruition, or anything else; where we can get to work, we get to work. What we are doing in our armament works will be a remarkable and noteworthy achievement, even if we can only assess it and prove it when the war is ended.

The Clearing out of the Jews

I also want to talk to you, quite frankly, on a very grave matter. Among ourselves it should be mentioned quite frankly, and yet we will never speak of it publicly. Just as we did not hesitate on June 30th, 1934 to do the duty we were bidden, and stand comrades who had lapsed, up against the wall and shoot them, so we have never spoken about it and will never (p. 65) speak of it. It was that tact which is a matter of course and which I am glad to say, is inherent in us, that made us never discuss it among ourselves, never speak of it. It appalled everyone, and yet everyone was certain that he would do it the next time if such orders are issued and if it is necessary.

I mean the clearing out of the Jews, the extermination of the Jewish race. It's one of those things it is easy to talk about - "The Jewish race is being exterminated", says one party member, "that's quite clear, it's in our program - elimination of the Jews, and we're doing it, exterminating them." And then they come, 80 million worthy Germans, and each one has his decent Jew. Of course the others are vermin, but this one is an A 1 Jew. Not one of all those who talk this way has witnessed it, not one of them has been through it. Most of <u>you</u> must know what it means when 100 corpsss are lying side by side, or 500 or 1000. To have stuck it out and at the same time - apart from exceptions caused by human weakness - to have remained decent fellows, that is what has made us hard. This is a page of glory in our history which has never been written and is never to be (p. 66) written, for we know how difficult we should have made it for ourselves, if - with the bombing raids, the burdens and the deprivations of war - we still had Jews today in every town as secret saboteurs, agitators and troublemongers. We would now probably have reached the 1916/17 stage when the Jews were still in the German national body.

We have taken from them what wealth they had. I have issued a strict order, which SS-Obergruppenführer Pohl has carried out, that this wealth should, as a matter of course, be handed over to the Reich without reserve. We have taken none of it for ourselves. Individual men who have lapsed will be punished in accordance with an order I issued at the beginning, which gave this warning; Whoever takes so much as a mark of it, is a dead man. A number of SS men - there are not very many of them - have fallen short, and they will die, without mercy. We had the moral right, we had the duty to our people, to destroy this people which wanted to destroy us. But we have not the right to enrich ourselves with so much as a fur, a watch, a mark, or a cigarette or anything else. Because we have exterminated a bacterium we do not want, in the end, to be infected by the bacterium and die of it. I will not see so much as a small area of sepsis appear here or gain a (p. 67) hold. Wherever it may form, we will cauterize it. Altogether however, we can say, that we have fulfilled this most difficult duty for the love of our people. And our spirit, our soul, our character has not suffered injury from it.

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The bearing of the SS-man

If I make a statement for us all and in the presence of all of us of all that we have done this year in the form of - I would almost say - a statement of accounts, then there is one thing that I must not overlook and pass over: the significance of the bearing of the SS-man. - - - - - -."

"The Principle of Selection (p. 70)

We are a product of the law of selection. We have made our choice from a cross-section of our people. This people came into being aeons ago, through generations and centuries, by the throw of the dice of fate and of history. Alien peoples have swept over this people and left their heritage behind them. Alien blood-streams have flowed into this people, but it has, nevertheless in spite of terrible hardships and terrible blows of fate, still had strength in the very essence of its blood to win through. Thus this whole people is saturated with, and held together by Nordic-Phalian-Germanic blood, so that after all one could, and can, still speak of a German people. From this people, of such varied hereditary tendencies, as it emerged from the collapse after the years of the battle of liberation, we have now consciously tried to select the Nordo-Germanic blood, for we could best expect this section of our blood to contain the creative, heroic and life-preserving qualities of our people. We have gone partly by outward appearances, and for the rest have kept these outward appearances in review by making constantly new demands, and by repeated tests both physical and mental, both of the character and the soul. Again and again we have sifted out and cast aside what was (p. 71) worthless, what did not suit us. Just as long as we have strength to do this will this organisation (Orden) remain healthy. The moment we forget the law which is the foundation of our race, and the law of selection and austerity towards ourselves, we shall have the germ of death in us, and will perish, just as every human organisation, every blosson in this world does some time perish. It must be our endeavour, our inner law, to make this blossoming and fructifying last for our people as long as possible, bringing as much prosperity as possible, and - don't be alarmed - if possible for thousands of years. That is why, whenever we meet and whatever we do, we must be mindful of our principle: blood, selection, and austerity. The law of nature is just this: What is hard is good; what is virgourous is good; whatever wins through in the battle of life, physically, purposefully and spiritually, that is what is good - always taking the long view. Of (p. 72) course sometime - and this has happened often in history - someone can get to the top by deceit and cheating. That makes no difference to nature, to the fate of the earth, to the fate of the world. Reality, that is, Nature, Fate, removes the impostor after a time - time not reckoned in generations of man but in historical periods. It must be our endeavour never to deceive ourselves, but always to remain genuine, that is what we must continually preach and instil into ourselves, and into every boy and each one of our subordinates.

The SS after the war

One thing must be clear, one thing I would like to say to you today: the moment the war is over, we will really begin to weld together our organisation, this organisation which we have built up for 10 years, which we imbued and indoctrinated with the first most important principles during the 10 years before the war. We must continue to do this - we, - if I may say so, we older men - for twenty years full of toil and work, so that a tradition 30, 35, 40 years, a generation, may be created. Then this organisation will march forward into the future young and strong, revolutionary and efficient to fulfil the task of giving the German people, the Germanic people the super-stratum of society which will combine and hold together this Germanic people and this Europe, and from which the brains which the people needs for industry, farming, politics, and as soldiers, statesman and technicians, will emerge. In addition this super-stratum must be so strong and vital that every generation can unreservedly sacrifice two or three sons from every family on the battle-field, and that nevertheless the continued flowing of

the bloodstream is assured.

The Virtues of the SS-Man

I will speak now of the most important virtues which I began years ago to preach and to impress on this organisation, on this whole General-SS (Allgemeine-SS) - for that is the basis of this organisation - and which are just now in the 5th year of war of such decisive significance and importance.

1). Loyalty

We have, I am glad to say, not had a single case among our ranks so far, of an SS-Man being disloyal. Let this one thing be our guiding principle: If within the sphere of your knowledge there is ever anyone who is disloyal to the Führer or to the Reich, even if it is only in thought, you must see to it that this man is thrown out of the organisation and we will see to it that he departs this life. (p. 74) For everything, - I have said this once already and repeat it today, - everything can be forgiven in this world, but one thing cannot be forgiven among us Teutons: that is disloyalty. It would be unforgivable and is unforgivable. Downfalls, like the downfall of Badoglio in Italy must not and will not happen in Germany. The name Badoglio will in future be the name for bad dogs, the name of abuse for four-legged mongrel curs, just as in the olden days the name Thersites was the name of abuse for traitors. - We can only say one thing and preach it constantly: Let the German people show, by unparalleled and wholehearted loyalty on the part of each one of its men and each one of its women that it is worthy of being permitted to live at the time of an Adolf Hitler, and worthy of this leader having arisen for it, who has dedicated his life full of care, full of responsibility, full of work, to our German Teutonic people.

2). Obedience

Obedience is demanded and given in the soldier's life morning, noon, and night. And the little man always obeys or usually does. If he does not, he is put in prison. The question of obedience in (p. 75) the case of senior officials in the state, party and the army, and even here and there in the SS, is more difficult. I would like here to state something clearly and unequivocally: It is a matter of course that the little man must obey. It is even more a matter of course that all the senior leaders of the SS, that is, the whole corps of Gruppenführer, are a model of blind obedience. If anyone thinks that an order is based on a misunderstanding on the part of the superior or on a false basis it goes without saying that it is his duty and responsibility - that is, the duty and responsibility of every one of you - to say so, and also to state his reasons truthfully like a man if he is convinced that they deprecate the order. But the moment the superior concerned or the Reichführer-SS - that applies to the Corps of Gruppenführer in most cases - or even the Führer has made the decision and given the order, it must be carried out, not only in word and letter, but also in spirit. Whoever carries out the order must do so as a good steward, as a true representative of the authority giving the command. If you thought at first that this would be right and that that would not be right or even wrong, then there are two alternatives. Thus if a man thinks that he cannot be answerable for obeying an order, then he should say quite honest-(p. 76) ly: I cannot be answerable for it. I beg you to excuse me from it. Then the order will usually be: You must still carry it out. Or you think: his nerve has gone, he's weak. Then you can say: Good, retire on a pension. But orders must be sacred. If the Generals obey, then the armies obey automatically. The more our territory grows, the more does this sacredness of orders apply. It was not all difficult to enforce an order in our little Germany. But to enforce an order

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once we - and I am convinced of this - have garrisons in the Urals, - that is more difficult. Here it will not always be possible to make sure that the order is carried out. Our controlling authority may not, may never be, - as in Russia - the Commissar. The only Commissar we have must be our own conscience, devotion to duty, loyalty, obedience. If you lead the way with this example, gentlemen, every subordinate will follow this example. But you will never be able to demand obedience of your men, if you do not give the same obedience to authority over you, and give it blindly and without reserve.

3). Bravery (p. 77)

To bravery, I think we need least to exhort ourselves, for our leaders and men are brave. - - - - - -."

"4). Truthfulness (p. 80)

I now come to a fourth virtue which is very rare in Germany, to truthfulness. One of the greatest evils which has spread during the war is the lack of truthfulness in messages, reports, and statements which subordinate departments in civil life, in the state, the party and the Services send in to the departments over them. The message, the report is the basis of every decision. It is actually the fact that one can now in many spheres assume in war-time that 95 out of 100 messages are untrue or only half true or semi-correct. - - - - - -."

"While on the subject of truthfulness I now come to another (p. 83) matter. It must so come about in war and in peace - in peace this will be above all a training task - that we SS-men no longer conclude written agreements, but that among us, as used to be the case formerly, the giving of one's word and the hand-shake signify the contract, and that the hand-shake of one SS-man is - if necessary - certainty for 1 million or more. It must so happen that the hand-shake or the promise of an SS-man is more proverbially reliable than mortgage upon the greatest value of anybody else's. It must be so!

If we conclude agreements, we must keep them. If I make a contract with an agent, even with a blackguard, I keep the contract. I take my stand unreservedly on this point of view. If I announce in the General-gouvernement, that anyone who informs against a Jew who has sought shelter and gone into hiding, shall have a third of the Jew's property, then it often happens that Secretary Huber or Second Lt. (SA) (Untersturmführer) Huber who - when he can - makes illegal trips, or does not hesitate (p. 84) to order a new telephone or new pencils, who, that is, never saves, - suddenly begins to save for the German Reich. He says for instance: This Jew has 12000RM. What, that means I would have to pay out to the Pole who denounced him 4000 RM. No, I'll save that for Germany. The Pole shall only get 400 RM. So a little man goes and breaks the promise of a whole organisation. That sort of thing should be impossible.

If we make a promise, it must be kept. If the Reichsführer-SS pledges to anyone support for his organisation - as may very often be the case now in the Balkans - this pledge must be kept. We must acquire such a reputation for the keeping of contracts in the whole world, we in the SS, that we thereby gain for Germany advantages of the greatest value, namely faith through confidence. Many will come to us, who will not approach official departments. The Balkans are always in a state of confusion. That is a blessing. If they were united it would be terrible. Things are chaotic in the Caucasus and in Russia. We can only see to it - this is also a (p. 85) precept, - that the territories we have occupied and the peoples we rule over never become united, that they always remain disunited. For they would only be united against us. If therefore we pledge our protection to a party (Splittergruppe) who approaches us, it must be quite out of the question for any member of the SS or the police, any member of the whole organisation to go and break the promise. This promise must be sacred.
- - - - -."

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TRANSLATION OF EXTRACTS OF DOCUMENT 1919-PS
(cont.)

"Practical Tasks" (p. 102)

"In the way of practical duties for the Senior SS executive and (p. 103) Police Officers I see above all one task, which applies at the same time to the Heads of the Main Offices as well. For me the Senior SS Executive and Police Officer is the representative of the Reichsführer-SS in his area. It would be an evil day if the SS and police fell out. It would be an evil day if the Main Offices, performing their tasks well meaningly but mistakenly made themselves independent by each having a downward chain of command. I really think that, the day of my overthrow would be the end of the SS. It must be, and so come about, that this SS organisation with all its branches - the General-SS which is the common basis of all of them, the Waffen-SS, the regular uniformed police (Ordnungspolizei), the SIPO, (with the whole economic administration, schooling, ideological training, the whole question of kindred), is, even under the tenth Reichsführer-SS one bloc, one body, one organisation. Alas if we do not bring them together. Alas if the individual main offices, the individual chiefs had a false conception of their duty here, if they believed they were doing a good thing, whereas in fact they were taking the first step towards the end. We have come a long way on the road to amalgamation. In the hard battles of this year the Waffen-SS has been welded together in the bitterest hours from the most varied divisions and sections, and from these it formed: body-guard units (Leibstandarte), military SS (Verfügungstruppe), Death's head units, and then the Germanic SS. Now when our "Reich", Death's Head Cavalry Divisions and "Viking" Divisions were there, everyone knew in these last weeks: "Viking" is at my side, "Reich" is at my side, "Death's Head" is at my side, - "Thank God", now nothing can happen to us. - The regular uniformed police and Sipo, General-SS and Waffen-SS must now gradually amalgamate too, just as this is and (p. 105) must be the case within the Waffen-SS. This applies to matters concerning filling of posts, recruiting, schooling, economic organisation, and medical services. I am always doing something towards this end, a bond is constantly being cast around these sections of the whole to cause them to grow together. Alas, if these bonds should ever be loosened, - then everything - you may be sure of this - would sink back into its old insignificance in one generation, and in a short space of time. It could then be said that that would be no pity; if it wasn't worth keeping alive, it should come to an end. That is right. I would not hear of anything being kept, even if it is my, our SS which is so dear to us, if it was not worth keeping alive.

Only I think that we could not be answerable for it to Germany, and to Germania, for this Germanic Reich needs the SS organisation. She needs it at least for the next few centuries. Then, in a hundred, a thousand, or two thousand years another form will surely be found. When we are dead and gone, some remnant of us with a few of our fundamental ideas will pull through and carry on. Out of this will grow something new again, just as here and there we took over, and now bear, a torch from the time of the Teutons, from the age of chivalry, from the Vehmic organisation, and from the (p. 106) Prussian army, in order to light a great light from it. It will be just like that later on. I believe that today we could not afford to let anything happen to this SS. That is why I urge one thing on all of you, on you, my heads of the main offices, my Senior Executive SS and Police Officers, and on this whole corps of Gruppenführers, the highest gradation in this hierarchy of the SS organisation: Always see the whole, always look at the whole organisation, never at your branch of it only, or only your Oberabschnitt but always see the SS, and above it the Germanic Reich, and above that our Führer who has created and is still creating this Reich."

"The Future" (p. 110)

"When the war is won, - then, as I have already told you, our (p. 112) work will start. We do not know when the war will end. It may be sudden, or it may be long delayed. We shall see. But I say to you now, if an armistice and peace comes suddenly, let no-one think that he can then sleep the

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sleep of the just. Get all your Commanders, Chiefs and SS-Führers attuned to this; only then, gentlemen, shall we be awake, for then, so many others will fall into this sleep. I am going so to rouse the whole SS, and keep it so wide awake that we can tackle reconstruction in Germany immediately. Then Germanic work will be begun immediately in the General-SS, for then the harvest will be ripe to be taken into the granary. We shall then call up age-groups there by law. We shall then immediately put all our Waffen-SS units into excellent form, both as regards equipment and training. We shall go on working in this first 6 months after the war, as though the big offensive were starting on the next day. It will make all the differ- (p. 113) ence, if Germany has an operative reserve, an operative backing, at the peace or armistice negotiations, of 20, 25 or 30 SS-divisions intact.

If the peace is a final one, we shall be able to tackle our great work of the future. We shall colonize. We shall indoctrinate our boys with the laws of the SS-organisation. I consider it to be absolutely necessary to the life of our peoples, that we should not only impart the meaning of ancestry, grandchildren and future, but feel these to be a part of our being. Without there being any talk about it, without our needing to make use of rewards and similar material things, it must be a matter of course that we have children. It must be a matter of course that the most copious breeding should be from this racial super-stratum of the Germanic people. In 20 to 30 years we must really be able to present the whole of Europe with its leading class. If the SS, together with the farmers, - we together with our friend Backe, then run the colony in the East on a grand scale, without any restraint, without any question about any kind of tradition but with nerve and revolutionary impetus, we shall in 20 years push the national boundary (Volkstumsgrenze) 500 kilometers Eastwards.

(p. 115)

I requested of the Führer today, that the SS - if we have fulfilled our task and our duty by the end of the war - should have the privilege of holding Germany's most Easterly frontier as a defence frontier. I believe this is the only privilege for which we have no competitors. I believe not one person will dispute our claim to this privilege. We shall be in a position there to exercise every young age-group in the use of arms. We shall impose our laws on the East. We will charge ahead and push our way forward little by little to the Urals. I hope that our generation will successfully bring it about that every age-group has fought in the East, and that every one of our divisions spends a winter in the East every second or third year. Then we shall never grow soft, then we shall never get SS members who only come to us because it is distinguished or because the black coat will naturally be very attractive in peace-time. Everyone will know that: "if I join the SS, there is the possibility that I might be killed." He has contracted in writing that every second year he will not dance in Berlin or attend the carnival in Munich, but that he will be posted to the Eastern frontier in an ice- cold winter. Then we will have a healthy élite for all time. Thus we will create the necessary conditions for the whole Germanic people and (p. 115) the whole of Europe, controlled, ordered and led by us, the Germanic people, to be able, in generations, to stand the test in her battles of destiny against Asia, who will certainly break out again. We do not know when that will be. Then, when the mass of humanity of 1 to 1½ milliards lines up against us, the Germanic people, numbering, I hope, 250 to 300 millions, and the other European peoples, making a total of 600 to 700 millions -(and with an outpost area stretching as far as the Urals, or, a hundred years, beyond the Urals) - must stand the test in its vital struggle against Asia. It would be an evil day if the Germanic people did not survive it. It would be the end of beauty and "Kultur", of the creative power of this earth. That is the distant future. It is for that that we are fighting, pledged to hand down the heritage of our ancestors.

We see into the distant future, because we know what it will be. That is why we are doing our duty more fanatically than ever, more devoutly than ever, more bravely, more obediently and more thoroughly than ever. We want to be worthy of being permitted to be the first SS-men of the Führer, Adolf Hitler, in the long history of the Germanic people, which stretches before us.

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Now let us remember the Führer, Adolf Hitler, who will create (p. 116)
the Germanic Reich and will lead us into the Germanic future.

Our Führer Adolf Hitler

Sieg Heil!

Sieg Heil!

Sieg Heil!"

"Speech of Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler at Kharkow April 1943

My SS-Führer, (p. 1)

It is perhaps very strange, that we should meet in a university of the Russian State, here at Kharkow, - at this Kharkow, which has played so great a part, and really will play a still bigger part in the history of the war. Until last year it was of no very great significance. This year it has become, like Stalingrad, but in the reverse sense, a city of destiny in German war history, in German history. I have asked you, the Commanding Officers of the three SS-Divisions, who took part in this campaign from the Dnjepor to Kharkow and carried out this campaign practically alone and forced a decision, to come together here in order, as has been the custom for many many years, as long as there has been an SS, to meet each other again, and in order once more to establish a few facts about the past and the future.

I would like, in a few words, to outline the whole position and situation with regard to the war.

Today, Germany is on the borders of Europe everywhere. These European frontiers stretch up as far as the North Cape, down the Norwegian coast, through Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium and France and jump over to Africa, continue to Tunis to form a bridgehead, run across as far as the frontiers formed by the sea, then from Greece and Crete up to the borders of the neutral states of Turkey and Bulgaria, to join hands again here in the East. I would like to give it a name: it is the great fortress of Europe.

It will undoubtedly happen, that the enemy will make the attempt, today, tomorrow or the next day, at some time, to break into this fortress of Europe at one point or another. That will undoubtedly be the case. Possibly he will be able to force an entry for a shorter or longer period at one point or another in places which we do not have in our personal and responsible control, or which we are not defending with our arms. (p. 2) One thing is certain: wherever the enemy lands, if once we can get to grips with him on the Continent, where we are not dependent on supplies from overseas, that ought to be, and will be, all right with us. On the whole, however, it is here in the East that the decision lies. The fortress of Europe with its frontiers, must be held and will be held too, as long as is necessary. The decision, therefore, lies here in the East; here must the Russian enemy, this people numbering two hundred million Russians, be destroyed on the battle field and person by person, and made to bleed to death."

"It is my opinion - and here, I believe, I am speaking to men (p. 3) who already understand this - that we must conduct the war and our campaign on these lines: - how can we take the most men from the Russians - dead or alive? We shall do it by killing them or taking them prisoner and (p. 4) really putting them to work, by endeavouring to gain as much control as possible over any territory we occupy, and by leaving empty of people any territory we dispose of, any area we make over to the enemy. Either they must be deported and will be used as labour in Germany for Germany, or they will just die in battle. To hand people back again, giving the enemy workers once more and enabling him to recruit again, - that I think, taking the broad view, would be absolutely wrong. That could not be advocated."

"On the other side, one thing goes on the same as ever, the U- (p. 5) boat war, this dreadful stranglehold on the throat of the enemy. I have good reason to be convinced that this stranglehold will never be relaxed, but will tighten. I cannot help feeling that things are beginning to go worse with England these last few months in matters of supply. That by no means indicates that England will collapse today, tomorrow or the next day, but it does mean that we will just be approaching the time when one or other of our opponents, once Russia is conquered and eliminated as a factor, will

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come to the conclusion that it is not worth carrying on the war. The result - and I am convinced of this, I believe it and I know it - the result, the end of this war, regardless of however many months or even years it lasts, will be this: that the Reich, the German Reich or the Germanic Reich of the German nation, will with just title find confirmation of its evolution, that we have an outlet and a way open to us in the East, and that then, centuries later, a politically Germany- a Germanic World Empire will be formed. That will be the result, that will be the fruit of all the many, many sacrifices, which have been made and which must still be made."

"We have, - I would say, as very consistent National Socialists, (p. 7) taken the question of blood is our starting point. We were the first really to solve the problem of blood by action, and in this connection, by problem of blood, we of course do not mean anti-semitism. Anti-Semitism is exactly the same as delousing. Getting rid of lice is not a question of ideology. It is a matter of cleanliness. In just the same way, antisemitism, for us, has not been a question of ideology, but a matter of cleanliness, which now will soon have been dealt with. We shall soon be deloused. We have only 20,000 lice left, and then the matter is finished with in the whole of Germany. But for us the question of blood was a reminder of our own worth, a reminder of what is actually the basis holding this German people together. Just as is the case in the years between 1938 and 1943, in exactly the same way as now, the same ill-founded reproaches were made then: well, if you bring the Nordic man so much to the fore, you're creating a new split, a new class-distinction, - it's a new class hatred. We're overcoming the social barriers, so I've been told by important party members, and now you're setting up racial ones. My reply to these people has always been: If you want to look at things in a negative way, there is nothing in the world which you cannot see in a negative way. From the negative angle, of course, you can argue that way. I see it differently, for I see it on this plane: What is the binding factor which holds the man in East Prussia and the man in the Black Forest together, the man in Schleswig - Holstein and in Hamburg and the man in Munich, in Graz, in Pomerania, in Berlin (p. 8) and in the Rhineland? What is then the factor or the element which contains all that is dear and precious and valuable to us? It is in fact what we Germans call inherent Kultur, it is this Germanic, this Nordic component of our blood."

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"In one operation those peoples must and will be incorporated in the Germanic Reich which, at one time, were part of Germany, part of the German Empire (the Roman Empire and the German nation) and belonged to us up to 1806 or only till 1648, - that is Flanders, Wallonia, and the Netherlands. They were a part of the Reich. Over and above this, we must have the power to bring into the fold, and make a part of our community in a second operation, those Germanic peoples and states too, which have never been part and parcel of the German Reich, - I mean Denmark and Norway, the Danish and Norwegian people."

(p. 11)

"I very soon formed a Germanic SS in the various countries. We very soon got Germanic volunteers from them. It has not always been liked and is still not liked today by many of the political leaders in these countries. From the beginning, I have said to them, "You can do what you like and leave what you like. I leave everything entirely to you, but you may be sure, that an SS will be set up in your country, and there is but one SS in Europe, and that is the Germanic SS, led by the Reichsführer-SS. You can resist, or you can offer no resistance, it's all the same to me. We shall do it in any case!" We have told them that curtly and plainly and clearly from the beginning.

I have said to the SS-men from the beginning too: We do not expect you to renounce your nation, or do anything which a proud and self-respecting fellow who loves his nation cannot do. We do not expect you to become German out of opportunism. But we do expect you to subordinate your national ideal to the greater racial and historical ideal, to the Germanic Reich.

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TRANSLATION OF EXTRACTS OF DOCUMENT 1919-PS
(cont.)

In addition, one thing is quite obvious. All of us, who are members of the Germanic peoples, can be happy and thankful that once in thousands of years fate has given us, from among the Germanic peoples, such a genius, a leader, our Führer Adolf Hitler, and you should be happy to be allowed to work with us.

Although I do not wish to discuss any individual official matters here, I would still like to mention in a slightly official way, in my capacity as a military man, what I said before about racial Germans, I beg you never to commit the psychological error of speaking of Germans who came from Roumania or Hungary or Croatia, as Croats, Roumanians or Hungarians. I also beg you never to make the mistake of letting a man who speaks (p. 12) German badly or cannot speak and read German, sense this, or let him sense the thought: "You are a second-rate German, for you can't read or write German properly." I beg you rather, (and here too I am stating a very sober opinion), to think in this case of these Germans in the whole of the Balkans, still more of those overseas, in America, when one day we must fetch over here in millions, - and we shall succeed in doing so - who have held out for centuries. I am certainly of the opinion that if a mighty German Reich with an incredible upward urge in its very being and a great German Führer had not now come into being at this time and in the last few decades, it would have been the end of these Germans (Deutschtum). A person with a very strong character can personally rise above his surroundings for years and perhaps for decades. A race, if it is in small groups, cannot in the long run hold out against its surroundings. And we must never forget this: these Germans do not usually live together in hundreds of thousands, but a thousand here in a few villages, and two thousand there, and 20 thousand at the most somewhere else. But they do not live together in large numbers. So they are always encircled by a foreign nation (Volkstum), and surrounded by its influence, but are above all surrounded by the influence of the people of the country. They are not the people of the country, those are the others. They are subjects of a state of foreign nationality, which, in any moment of doubt, is their enemy, or at the very best, as, shall we say, Roumania, a tolerably neutral and impartial observer. But on the whole these Germans have lived, throughout the centuries of German weakness, from the Thirty Years' War up till now, in surroundings calculated not to strengthen their consciousness of German race (Deutschtum) but to destroy it.

There was something else besides this. If one of these Germans wanted to get anywhere he could only do so by entering the state system of the foreign people as an official or an officer. It is no mere chance - (p. 13) I am not making spiteful assertions now but merely stating the facts - that, for instance, among Hungarian generals there is such a considerable percentage of men of German origin, who of course had, in most cases, to alter their names if they wanted to get anywhere. In many cases, if they did not do so, and remained obdurate about it, they were subsequently removed from office. I quote here as an example the present Chief of the Hungarian General Staff, General Sombaché, who in his youth at the Austrian Military Academy still had the thoroughly good German name of Knaus. May I remind you of Feldmarschall or Feldmarschall-Leutnant Raab, who as we all know, has now retired. Both are of German descent, and one could name countless hundreds of leading men in these South-Eastern States who are all of German origin, had to become part of the alien nation (Volkstum), and were then drained (eine Auslaugung bildeten) of their own most valuable national characteristics.

If, then, we get sons of these racial Germans (Volks-deutschtum) who have still survived there - (some are genuine volunteers, and others come as a result of a levy, for we have organised the racial groups from within the Reich through the SS, so that without possessing political power we have in fact, morally such strength and power among these people (Volkstum) that we can compel a man, compel him morally, to serve with us in Germany,

due entirely to the power of the whole German national community) - if we therefore get these men, you must not make it difficult for them to enter our community by calling him by the name which you judge he will not wish to hear. A Saxon from Siebenburg will never let it be said that he is a Roumanian. It's just against that that he and his fathers have fought for 700 years. And a German from Hungary will never let it be said that he is a Hungarian. If you know how he has been thrashed by many a Hungarian gendarme, before he came to us, how his Mother was thrashed, and his parents driven from hearth and home, you can imagine how bitter it is for him if he now joins German service-men and they say: here comes a Hungarian. Or you can imagine how bitter it is for him when he is reproached for something which he cannot help. If we had not been to a German school we should not be able to read and write German either. If we had been forced, shall we say, to go to a Polish school, we should write Polish too, although we profess to be Germans. And that is often the case with these men. I must therefore expect of you understanding and human sympathy in this matter, and must expect. that the leaders in addition to their many other duties, will undertake to see that additional German instruction in reading, speaking and writing, be given to these men at every opportunity that is offered. I lay special emphasis on this matter, because by negotiations, we have now managed to make an arrangement enabling us in future to enlist even those Germans who up to now have been serving in the Roumanian army. So we can expect a great influx from the Germans of the South-East."

"We know that these clashes with Asia and Jewry are necessary (p. 16) for evolution. They give the cue (Auftakt) for the European Continent to unite. These clashes are the only evolutionary possibility which will enable us one day, now that Fate has given us the Führer Adolf Hitler, to create the Germanic Reich. They are the necessary condition, for our race, and our blood to create for itself and put under cultivation, in the years of peace, (during which we must live and work austerely, frugally and like Spartans), that settlement area in which new blood can breed, as in a botanical garden so to speak. /Sic/ Only by this means can the Continent become a Germanic Continent, capable of daring to embark, in one or (p. 17) two or three or five or ten generations, on the conflict with this Continent of Asia which spews out hordes of humanity. Perhaps we shall also have to hold in check other coloured peoples who will soon be in their certain prime, and thus preserve the world, which is the world of our blood, of our children and of our grandchildren. Now it is just this world we like the best, the Germanic world, the world of Nordic life. We know that this conflict with the advancing pressure from Asia, with the 200 million Russians, is necessary. And we shall win as sure as I am speaking here in the University of Kharkow. We shall have to pass through many a valley, many a narrow defile. Many will grow tired on the way. Of course they will mostly be those who have no reason to do so. To put it vulgarly, many will do something in their trousers. Many people will get shaky at the knees. The only thing that matters is that we stand firm. This is what is important for us as SS-men, for our province of duty and our mission (it is a task additional to those of the whole German Armed Forces and the whole German people): That is what I would like to impress upon you, this is what I beg you, as Commanding Officers, as Chiefs, and as leaders to teach the young men again and again in their ideological instruction. That is what I demand and exact of you, - that you really concern yourselves with the man, the young fellow of 17 to 18 who comes to us, and with many who are in our ranks not as volunteers but as conscripts. I ask you to look after them, and guide them, and not let them go before they are really saturated with our spirit and are fighting as the old guard fought before us - that is what I request and demand of you.

We have only one task, to stand firm and carry on the racial struggle without mercy. I will now say again something which I have already today said to the men elsewhere: we will never let that excellent weapon, the dread and terrible reputation which preceded us in the battles for (p. 18)

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for Kharkow fade, but will constantly add new meaning to it. They can call us what they like in the world, the main thing is that we are the eternally loyal, obedient, steadfast and unconquerable fighting men of the Germanic people and of the Führer, the SS of the Germanic Reich."

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF EXTRACTS OF DOCUMENT
NO 1919-PS

13 November 1945

I, ESME SHERRIFF, 2/O, W.R.N.S., 36482, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Extracts of Document 1919-PS.

ESME SHERRIFF
2/O, W.R.N.S.
36482

Exhibit U.S.A. 175
Filed Dec. 11, 1945

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PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2220-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL.

Letterhead

THE REICH Minister and Chief
of the Reich Chancellory
RK.318D g III

Berlin W8, April 17th, 1943.
Vosstrasse 6, at present: FIELD-quarters. Mail must exclusively be directed to Berlin address.

SECRET

To
the /Reichsfuehrer-SS/ and Chief of the German Police.
Herrn Himmler

Ref: The situation in the GOVERNMENT General.

Dear Mr. REICHLEADER,

We had agreed at our conference on March 27th of this year that written texts should be worked out about the situation in the Government General, on which our intended, mutual report to the Führer, could be based.

The material gathered for this purpose by /SS/- SS Lieutenant General Krueger was submitted to you immediately. Based on this material, I have had a sketch prepared, which sums up the most important points of this material, sub-divides them in a way quickly to grasp, and finally points out the kind of measurements to be taken.

The memorandum was checked together with SS Lieutenant General Krueger who agrees with it in full. Part of it I herewith submit to you.

(Signed) Dr. Lammer.

Copy to RK. 318 D g III.

F.Q. April 12th, 1943.

SECRET!

Ref: The situation in the Government General.

A. The task of the German Administration in the Government General.

The German Administration in the Government General has to fulfil the following tasks:

1) For the purpose of securing food for the German people, to increase agricultural production and utilise it to the fullest extent, to allot sufficient rations to the native population occupied with work essential for the war effort and to deliver the rest to the armed forces and the homeland.

2) To employ the manpower of the native population in the Government General itself only for war important purposes, and to put at the homeland's disposal such manpower which is not needed for the purpose mentioned above.

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3) To consolidate German folk-dom in the Government General and by means of inland settlement in particular to create a stronghold of German folk-dom in the eastern border districts also by means of colonization with racial Germans, transferred from other places, thus safeguarding these very border districts.

4) To safeguard the Government General as a transit zone for replacements and supplies to the East front.

5) To obtain troops as far as possible out of the native population for the fight against Bolshevism.

B. Wrong ways chosen for the fulfilment of these tasks.

The German administration in the Government General has failed by a wide margin in achieving the tasks listed under A. Although, in the year of 1942, one succeeded in meeting the delivery quota of agrarian products for the armed forces and the homeland at a relatively high percentage, namely over 90% and also met the demands of the homeland concerning the conscription of labor in general, one has to consider two things on the other hand: First, these accomplishments in the year of 1942 were achieved for the first time, prior, f.i. only 40,000 German tons (Translator's remark: 2206 lbs. avoir p. make ton) in bread grain had been delivered to the Armed Forces. Secondly and above all one had failed to create for the bringing about of such achievements the necessary organisatoric economic and political basis, which is absolutely required, if such achievements shall not strongly affect the entire situation, may eventually cause chaotic conditions in the future. This failure of the German administration can for one thing be explained by the system of the German administrative and governmental activity in the Government General personally represented by the Governor General, and secondly, by the wrong basic principles of policy in all those questions, which were decisive for conditions in the Government General.

II. The failure basic principles of policy.

1) The realization of the task, listed in A 1) necessitates in the first place a strict and clear-cut structure of economics, as well as a disciplined and clear-cut official economic policy, accompanied by an elimination as total as possible of clandestine trading and black markets. This stipulates above all the fullest utilization of the harvest and its public management, the stopping of all trade enterprises, which are not essential to the war and the care to be taken for a clear-cut management in war essential enterprises.

The German administration was in no respect capable of living up to these requirements. In the matter of raising food it took a request of a delivery contingent for the Reich and the Armed Forces amounting to 750,000 metric tons of bread grain in the summer of 1942, in order to have the attempt made, of drawing up an inventory of food products. For this purpose a census was taken. The result however turned out to be unreliable. The utilization of harvest (Ernte-erfassung) did not even permit the full delivery of the contingent for the Reich and the Armed Forces (instead of 750,000 metric tons only 690,000 tons) let alone the ample feeding of the native population working for German interests. While 1,4 million metric tons were demanded, only 1,2 million metric tons of bread grain could be taken hold of, of which 690,000 m.t. were delivered to the Reich and the Armed Forces, so that for roughly 16 million natives only 510,000 m.t. were left. Accordingly, the weekly bread rations for the normal consumer had to be cut down to only 1050 g, compared with 1675 g in the Protectorate and 2600 g in the annexed Eastern

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territories. To make supplies available for the native population black markets and clandestine trading were tolerated to the greatest extent, resulting in prices entirely unattainable for the population, working for German interests. A married Polish official, without children, with High school education f.i. has a net income of 234,27 Zloty per month. Compared with this the prices in the clandestine trade are:

1 kg.	rye bread	11.00 Zloty
1 "	potatoes	2.40 "
1 "	pork	80.00 "
1 "	bacon	160.00 "
1 "	butter	170.00 "

under such conditions the foreign worker remains at his place of work for about 4 to 5 days per week only in order to purchase the missing provisions for himself and his family on the remaining other days. Daily ransackings, robberies, murders and other crimes are the further consequences of these conditions.

The farmer received, as an incitement for delivery of his agrar products, premium certificates for the obtaining of commodities, (articles needed for farming, household necessities, salt, cigarettes, brandy, etc.). These commodities very often could not be had however, despite the fact that they were obtainable in any desired quantity in the clandestine trade but at exorbitant prices.

(1 bricklayer's brush = 1 cow
1 dz. (Drusch) coal = 30.00 Zloty
1 pair of boots = 1500.00 "
1 horse shoe nail = 3.00 "
1 pair of wooden slippers = 2 calves
1 dress = 1 cow)

The consequence of this situation naturally leads to a severe curbing of the farmer's willingness to produce. Instead of reducing prices in the trade section by means of taking the necessary measures in regard to the management a decree of the Governor General recommended, to adjust the prices of agrar-products to the prices of commodities, which were as much 300 to 4000 % higher.

The trade economics are entirely built up according to capitalistic viewpoints, with the aim of earning quickly and much and any planned leadership, which might take war requirements into consideration, is lacking. There is a lack of state supervision and of guidance in the line of production and in the line of trade. The German individual business man as a "trustee" on his own of enterprises personally directed by him, is given a free hand to do what he wants, in the unrestricted play of powers. These trustees very often make use of former Polish and Jewish owners of enterprises as agents empowered to sign in their names. These trustees make tremendous profits in clandestine trading, tolerated by the Government and make them within the shortest time. Prohibition of production and control of individual management, as requested by the Armament Inspection (Lt. Gen. Schindler), were not carried out. Part of the trade production is directed only at putting at the disposal of the native population objects for the trade-in of food, metals, materials for spinning, leather, etc., are thus being drained off from war economy.

2. The utilization of manpower.

The most important presupposition for a proper and relatively frictionless regulation to utilize manpower taken from the native population within the government general itself, as well as within the Reich, are normal conditions in the sphere of economics. Lack of this coordination influences the stearing of labor employments unfavorably in many respects. If it would be possible to provide the population, working in the interest of Germany, with the minimum of food needed and everyday objects, and to render impossible the access to other items by way of black market channels and clandestine trade, then the reserves of manpower at hand would volunteer for employment as planned out of their own volition. This would mean a basis for a sensible shaping of agrarian property-units. It is necessary in this respect that parts of the population thus available may then be employed in such work which will guarantee them a satisfactory standard of living. After the failure of having created the necessary supposition for a well-planned and well-steered employment of manpower, the utilization of manpower is confronted with the greatest difficulties. It is clear that these difficulties have been increased by the elimination of Jewish manpower. But it is incorrect to consider this elimination as the cause of difficulties. If the necessary basis for proper management of manpower had been given the elimination of the Jewish manpower would not have caused any difficulties worth mentioning. As things were, the utilization of manpower had to be enforced by means of more or less forceful methods, such as the instances when certain groups appointed by the Labor Offices, caught Church and Movie-goers here and there and transported them into the Reich. That such methods not only undermine the people's willingness to work and the people's confidence to such a degree that it cannot be checked even with terror, is just as clear as the consequences brought about by a strengthening of the political resistance movement.

3. The treatment of the native populations.

Can only be lead into the right channels based on a foundation of a clear-cut and well-organized administration and management. Only such a foundation permits that the native population may be handled strictly if necessary, even severely. On the other hand it can be dealt with in a big-hearted manner and may be granted certain liberties, especially in cultural respect, causing a certain amount of contentment. Without such a foundation, severity would only strengthen the resistance movement and meeting the native population half way would only undermine the German reputation. That this foundation is missing can be concluded from the facts mentioned above. Instead of trying to create this basis, the Governor General inaugurates a promotion of cultural life on the part of the Polish population, which knows no bounds in itself. Under prevailing circumstances however and last, but not least, in connection with our military situation last winter, this could only be explained as a weakness and thus had to bring about exactly the opposite results of the aspired aim.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT No. 2220-PS

I, Margot Boatwright, X046273, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of (the indicated excerpt from) Document No. 2220-PS.

Margot Boatwright
X046273

H1126-0175

Exhibit USA 174
Filed Dec. 11, 1945

H1126-0176

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT PS-2233 - A 73
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF COUNSEL

DIARY 1940

First volume

January to March 1940

Tagebuch 1940

Erster Band

Januar bis Maerz 1940

H1126-0177

TRAN SLATION OF DOCUMENT PS 2233 B 8
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF COUNSEL
continued

Page 171, 1st paragraph

Cracaw

Wednesday, 6 March 1940

10 00 Conference with MINISTERIALDIREKTOR DR. BUEHLER

10 50 Conference with BANKDIREKTOR DR. PAERSCH

11 00 Conference with REICHSHAUPTAMTSLEITLR DR. FRAUENDORFER

REICHSHAUPTAMTSLEITLR DR. FRAUENDORFER reports that 73 000 Polish workers have now been sent to the Reich. At present, one still has a daily rate of transfer of 4000 men. DR. FRAUENDORFER reports further about the organisations in factories. It is as simple as possible. He inspected on Monday several factories in Warsaw, and he could only confirm that they perform excellently, even where technical installations are concerned. By now, kitchens have been installed every where. Further one has cared for the necessary portions of soap. 5000 sets of under clothes and linen, 32000 kilograms of flour, 4000 kilograms beef and pork and other goods were distributed.

Saturday, 16 March 1940

Page 216 12th line from bottom to end of page 218

18 30 Conference with Ambassador von WUEHLISCH

Ambassador von WUEHLISCH reports that the work for the removal of the VEIT-STOSS-ALTAR to NUERNBERG has now been concluded. Actually the church has received by that a better appearance, considering space.

Ambassador von WUEHLISCH reports further that the former Ambassador WYSOCKI has requested, to be received again by the Governor General. - The acting (z.D.) Ambassador von Ruemelin was requested, to submit a request for his transfer into the service of the General Gouvernement.

In the question of the Polish aid committee for the needy, it was written by the Security Service (S.D.) to Mr. ARLT and also pointed out that the leader of this organization, Prince RADZIWILL, participated in the Silesian uprising at the time that he supported KORFANTY, and made disparaging remarks about the Reich. He, Ambassador von WUEHLISCH, has requested Mr. ARLT, to be very careful in this affair, before one removes Prince RADZIWILL from the aid committee, because such an action could under certain circumstandes have unpleasant consequences. Here, in any case, the permission of the Governor General is needed.

The so called Polish Government in ANGERS, has worked out a WhiteBook about the archdioceses of POSEN and GNESEN.

H1126-0178

The Governor General remarks that he talked in Berlin with the papal NUNCIO about this question. He got the impression from the conversation that much is said about the treatment of the churches, and apparently one tries to push off much to the General Gouvernement, for which the latter does not have to take the blame.

Ambassador von WUEHLISCH considers it appropriate that these and similar questions should be discussed in Berlin. Such negotiations should go via the foreign office.

The Governor General remarks that he had long negotiations in Berlin with the representatives of the Reichsministry for Finance and the Reichsministry for Food. One has made the urgent demand there that Polish farm workers should be sent to the Reich in greater numbers. He has made the statement in Berlin that he, if it is demanded from him, could naturally exercise force in such a manner, that he has the police surround a village and get the men and women, in question, out by force, and then send them to Germany. But one can also work differently, besides these police measures, by retaining the unemployment compensation of those workers in question.

Ambassador von WUEHLISCH then comes to talk about a certain border violation at the Soviet border. Requested by the Reichsministry of Finance and the OKW, representations have been made in Moskow, apparently for the reason that the Soviet border guards always use firearms immidiately. It has been suggested, to take care of such incidents at once locally. The deputy Foreign Kommissar POTEMKIN has made the suggestion, to appoint liaison officers from both sides for this work. The liaison staff Russia (VERBINDUNGSSTAB RUSSLAND) is to function as central agency. The Governor General does not consider this method appropriate and believes that the General Gouvernement should also be included. He requests Ambassador von WUEHLISCH to get in touch with state secretary Dr. BUEHLER about this question. This question does not only affect the armed forces, b ut also for instance the custom administration; therefore for instance representatives of the Ministry of Finance must also participate.

Ambassador von WUEHLISCH reminds that the customs officials are subordinated to the armed forces.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT PS 2233 15 November 1945

I, WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE, Lt. (jg) USNR 391590, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document PS 2233.

WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE
Lt. (jg) USNR
391590

Exhibit USA 173
Filed Dec. 11, 1945

PARTIAL-TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2233 PS OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

FRANK's DIARY - Abteilungsleitersitzungen 1939/40
(Meetings of Departmental Chiefs in 1939/40)

Minutes of the 1st conference of the Departmental Chiefs on the 2nd December 1939.

Page 3,
line 4-13

The condemning to death of an archbishop and bishop gives cause to the fundamental observation that a total war against any kind of resistance is being waged in the Government General. The two bishops have been condemned quite rightly, because arms were found in their possession. If, despite that they were pardoned to hard labor, then certain other considerations were the cause for that. Reports by the press concerning the shooting of Jews are not desirable because such reports would intimidate the Jews.

Minutes of the 2nd conference of the Departmental Chiefs on the 8th December 1939.

Page 4,
par. 1 and 2.

The question of forced labor for the Jews could not be solved satisfactorily from one day to the other. Prerequisite for this would be the card indexing of the male Jews from 14 to 50 years of age. In this it had to be ascertained which trade the Jews had so far carried on, because just in those territories the Jews had had various skilled trades, and it would be a loss if this manpower would not be usefully exploited. To do this, sweeping planning is necessary. For the time being the Jews had to be gathered in columns and had to be employed wherever there was a pressing need. It is the task of the chief of the district to determine these needs.

The police was beeing reenforced by 4 police batallions. The commitment would be such that each government section was to receive one batallion. Moreover, it was ordered that the police batallions in the Gouvernment General would be relieved and interchanged from time to time with batallions from home. Already before Xmas the relief of 4 batallions would take place. No insecurity would result.

Page 7,

2 last paragraphs.

Govenor DR. LASCH called attention to the fact that the order of the Govenor General regarding the institution of compulsory work provided that

H1126-0179

H1126-0180

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT
NO. 2233 PS. A
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL.
(continued).

Poles from their 18th year upward were to be conscripted for compulsory labor. A regulation of the age groups from 14 to 18 would also be desirable. One should not neglect the danger that particularly the youth of this age group in high schools could become a source of national resistance.

Governor General Reich Minister DR. FRANK orders the preparation of a supplementary decree, according to which the compulsory labor was to be extended to the age groups from 14 to 18.

Meeting of Departmental Chiefs at the
Bergakademie (Academy for mines).
Friday, 10th May 1940.

Page 23.
par.1

Then the Governor General deals with the problem of the Compulsory Labor Service of the Poles. Upon the demands from the Reich it has now been decreed that compulsion may be exercised in view of the fact that sufficient manpower was not voluntarily available for service inside the German Reich. This compulsion means the possibility of arrest of male and female Poles. Because of these measures a certain disquietude had developed which, according to individual reports, was spreading very much, and which might produce difficulties everywhere. General Fieldmarshal GOERING some time ago pointed out in a long speech the necessity to deport into the Reich a million workers. The supply so far was 160,000. However, great difficulties had to be overcome. Therefore it would be advisable to consult the district and town chiefs in the execution of the compulsion, so that one could be sure from the start that this action would be reasonably successful. The arrest of young Poles when leaving church service or the cinema would bring about an increasing nervousness of the Poles. Generally speaking, he had no objections at all if the rubbish, capable of work yet often loitering about, would be snatched from the streets. The best method for this, however, would be the organization of a raid, and it would be absolutely justifiable to stop a Pole in the street and to question him what he was doing, where he was working etc.

H1126-0181

PARTIAL-TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2233 PS OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

(cont.)

CERTIFICATE OF PARTIAL-TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2233 PS

25 November 1945

I, ERNST M. COHN Pfc. 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct partial-translation of Document Nr. 2233 PS.

ERNST M. COHN
Pfc. 33925738

H1126-0182

Exhibit U.S.A. 200
Filed Dec 12, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2241-PS. 3.
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL.

The employment of foreign labor forces
in Germany.

Die Beschäftigung von ausländischen
Arbeitskräften in Deutschland.

PAGE 48e Bia

Decree of the Plenipotentiary General for Manpower on the execution of the transportation of workers, in this case: damage to and soiling of passenger coaches of the German Railways and their fittings.

20 July 1942.

Erlass des Generalbevollmächtigten von Arbeitertransporten; hier : Beschaedigungen und Verunreinigungen der Personenwagen der Deutschen Reichsbahn und ihrer Einrichtungen.

Vom 20. Juli 1942.

In his letter of 10 August 1940 - 21 Bafr 106 - the Reich Minister of Transport laid down that the managements of the German Railway be directed that the costs of the repair of damage caused to railway coaches and their fittings by the careless or malicious behaviour of foreign workers in special labour trains be charged to the guilty persons and, where these are not determined, to the authorities responsible for the transportation. After the German Railway claimed again last winter considerable damage to and extraordinary soiling of railway coaches, it proposed to the management of the German Railway the demand of the costs of the repair of the damage and soiling from the Manpower Authorities. In this respect I direct, that it must definitely be left to the German Railway to pull up the guilty transport users. The writing off of the costs on the budget of the Reich stocks (Reichsstocks) can only be considered exceptionally in the event of special circumstances. All cases are particularly to be refused in which the workers used normal trains or in which the damage was caused by deficiencies in the special trains provided.

According to reports of transportation commanders (Transportleiters) presented to me, the special trains provided by the German Railway have frequently been in a really deficient condition. Numerous windowpanes have been missing in the coaches. Old French coaches without lavatories have been partly employed, so that the workers had to fit up an emptied compartment as a lavatory. In other cases the coaches were not heated in winter so that the lavatories quickly became unusable because the water system was frozen and the flushing apparatus was therefore without water.

In order to obtain reliable records of the condition of special trains at the time of provision, in agreement with the Reich Minister of Transport, I beg to direct the transportation commanders, together with a representative of the station of departure, to determine in writing before the departure of a special train the deficiencies existing in the interior fittings of the railway coaches. The records are to be given up after completion of the transport operation to the labour reception office which has to present them to the competent state labour office. The transportation commanders will have to contact the office director

of the station at least 1 to 2 hours before the departure of the train.

Simultaneously I beg to direct the transportation commanders to give particular attention during the journey to the exclusion of damage and soiling of the railway carriages.

In view of the further tasks, involved in the winding up of the transport operation, incumbent on the transportation commander he will have to be relieved of the further mutual determination of the condition of railway carriages at the end of the journey.

I transfer the discharge of claims of the German Railway in respect of repairs to the state labour offices in whose area the special train was dispersed.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO.2241-PS.3.

I, PETER FRASER, Capt.,K.R.R.C., 76538, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document 2241-PS.3.

PETER FRASER.
Capt.,K.R.R.C.
76538.

H1126-0183

Exhibit U.S.A. 183
Filed Dec. 12, 1945

H1126-0184

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2280-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Riga, 3 May 1943

The Reich Commissioner for the Eastern territories
(Ostland)
Dept. III, Labor policy and
social administration

To the:
Commissioner General in Riga
(stamp : Commissioner General Dept.
Social Administration 8 May 1943
in Riga 2)

Labor Group Labor Mobilization
2 F 1/4 b. 1 (O) Kue/Ty

Re: Recruiting of Manpower from the Eastern territories for the Reich territories; here: New quotas based upon the agreement with GBA Gauleiter Sauckel on 21 April 1943.

Following the basic statements of the Plenipotentiary General for manpower, Gauleiter Sauckel, on the occasion of his visit to Riga on 21 April 1943, it was decided in view of the critical situation and in disregard of all adverse considerations, that a total of 183,000 workers have to be supplied from the Eastern territories for the Reich territory. This task must absolutely be accomplished within the next four months and at the latest must be completed by the end of August. The following sub - quotas have been established:

White Ruthenia: 30,000 adolescent workers and
100,000 workers including families.

Of the families only members capable of productive work will be counted. All persons 10 years old and up are considered as productive manpower.

Lithuania: 15,000 female workers
15.000 male workers
10,000 productive workers from about
2 to 3000 families

Latvia: 10.000 female workers no male workers

Estonia: 3,000 female workers no male workers

With the exception of the volunteers (Hilfswilligen) no male manpower will be recruited in Latvia and Estonia. The same applies to Estonia with the exception of volunteers of the Legion.

All permissible means shall be used to obtain manpower from White Ruthenia. Do not hesitate to apply extraordinary measures, be here [illegible].

The 15000 men to be recruited in Lithuenia are to be taken from the current draft of men born between 1919 and 1924.

Two quarters shall be recruited from volunteers (Hilfswillige) One quarter of these shall be assigned to the Eastern territories for their own requirements, and one quarter shall be assigned to the Reich. Should it develop that the number of 15000 workers can not be obtained in this way, then it should be resorted to the draft of men born between 1912 - 1918 until the quota is filled.

The 15000 female workers shall be obtained from those age groups who were born between 1920 and 1925. For this purpose a release of 10% of the women from factories which can afford this -even outside of the fixed age limit - is to be contemplated.

The recruitment and draft of females born between 1920 to 1925 will be effected after the draft of all men born between 1919 to 1924.

Further more the draft of about 2 to 3000 families from Lithuania, the majority of which should be from the neighborhood of Wilna, is countemplated and should provide a total of 10000 able workers, including all persons 10 years of age and up.

From Latvia the draft of male workers will be abandoned in consideration of the recruiting for the Legion and for volunteers which was already taken place there and in consideration of the volunteers yet to be recruited according to the revised draft of men born between 1919 and 1924. The procurement of the 10000 female workers will accomplished by falling back to the age brackets of 1920 - 1925. Here also is to revert to the release of 10 % from factories, if these age backets do not provide sufficcint workers.

Estonia will provide 3000 women, who are likewise to be procured from the age brackets 1920-1925 or by release from factories. Otherwise, the same applies as for Latvia.

The Plenipotentiary General for the Mobilization of Labor, Gauleiter Sauckel, and his deputies have made special provisions for the social arrengements of the workers from the Baltic area i.e.

1) a time limit for the engagements of generally two years.
2) Granting of furloughs and return of families in accordance with the general regulations for foreigners in the Reich (ARG - Decree 21/43 and tarif regulation for the control of family trips to home station during the time of war as applied to foreign labor in the German Reich, dated 27 August 1941)
3) The appointment of special trustees of the same nationality for the female workers.
4) Issuance of special diplomas for services rendered to the war effort in the Reich.

Further instructions concerning the recruiting and mobilization of additional male and female workers of other age brackets within the frame work of the total war mobilization will be forthcoming. Already now I request to consider all possibilities which willllead to the accomplishments of the assigned task.

By order: (signed)

M. MATTHIESSEN

1) copy for HA III
Mr. OAR Frhr. v. Borcke

note in pencil

2) illegible

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 2280-PS

I, WALTER R. SELIGSON, 1st Lt O-558904, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 2280-PS

WALTER R. SELIGSON
1st Lt
O-558904

H1126-0185

Exhibit U.S.A. 197
Filed Dec. 12, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2520-PS
OFFICE OF US CHIEF OF COUNSEL

APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF FOREIGNERS PUT TO WORK

FOR THE GERMAN WAR EFFORT IN THE OLD REICH
(Status January 1945)

Nationality	Workers	P/W's	Politicals	TOTAL
Russians	1, 900,000	600,000	11,000	2,500,000
French	764,000	750,000		1,525,000
Poles	851,000	60,000		911,000
Italians	227,000	400,000		627,000
Dutch	274,000		2,300	277,000
Belgians	183,000	63,000	8,900	254,000
Yugoslavs	230,000			230,000
Czechoslovaks	140,000			140,000
Balts	130,000			130,000
Greeks	15,000			15,000
Luxembourgers	14,000		1,000	15,000
Hungarians	10,000			10,000
Rumanians	5,000			5,000
Bulgarians	2,000			2,000
Others	50,000			50,000
Totals	4,795,000	1,873,000	23,200	6,691,000

Note: Of the estimated 6,691,000 approximately 2,000,000 civilian foreigners and 245,000 prisoners of war were employed directly in themanufacture of armaments and munitions (end products or components) on the 31 December 1944, according to Speer Ministry tabulations. The highest number of prisoners of war so employed was 400,000 in June 1944, the decrease to December 1944 being accounted for in part by a change in status from prisoners to civilian workers. A figure of 2,070,000 Russians uncovered in the American, British and French zones, given in "Displaced Persons Report No. 43", of the Combined Displaced Persons' Executive, c/o G-5 Division, Usfet, 30 September 1945, was increased by 430,000 to allow for Russians estimated to have been found on German territory conquered by the Red Army.

I, Edward L. Deuss, for three years employed by the Foreign Economic Administration, Washington, as an economics analyst in London, Paris and Germany, specializing in labor and population problems of Germany during the war, do hereby certify that the figures of foreign labor employed in the Old Reich have been compiled on the basis of the best available German and Allied source material. The accompanying table represents a combination of German official estimates of foreigners working in Germany in January 1945 and of American, British and French Figures of the number of foreigners actually uncovered in the Old Reich since 10 May 1945. Among the documents consulted were:

"Displaced Persons Report No. 43" of the Combined Displaced Persons' Executive, c/o G-5 Division, Usfet, 30 September 1945.

Tabulations made by and for the labor officials in the Speer Ministry, found in the Speer documents collection at Dustbin detention camp, Kransberg, Hessen-Nassau.

H1126-0186

Reports of Fritz Sauckel to the Central Planning Board and the Speer Ministry.

The designation "Politicals" at the head of the third column in the table should be taken to mean persons who upon being uncovered in Germany by the Allied forces asserted that they were arrested in their native countri native countries for subversive activities against the Nazis, and were transported to Germany for incarceration. The figures do not include racial or religious deportees, nor persons imprisoned for crimes allegedly committed in Germany.

Sworn to before me this
1st Day of November, 1945

Edward L. Deuss

Winthrop S. Emmet
Lt. Comdr. USNR
J.A.G. Office of the Navy

23 November 1945

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2520-PS

I, GOETZ MAYER, T/5, 33812169, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of document No. 2520-PS.

GOETZ MAYER
T/5, 33812169

H1126-0187

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2974-PS
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Date 17 November 1945
Nürnberg, Germany

CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that the following positions in Industry, National Socialist German Workers Party and German or Thuringian Governments were held by Fritz Sauckel at or between the times stated for each position, or, if no time is stated, at some point between 1925 and 1945:

1. Member of Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen Arbeiterpartei (1925-1945). (Member of National Socialist German Workers Party. Member No. 1395.
2. Member of Reichstag (Mitglied des Reichstags) (1933-1945).
3. Gauleiter of Thuringia (1927-1945).
4. Member of Thuringian legislature (Landtag) (1927-33/34).
5. Minister of Interior and head of Thuringian State Ministry (May 1933).
6. Reichsstatthalter for Thuringia (1933-1945).
7. SA Obergruppenfuehrer (November 1937-1945). Does not recall date of appointment.
8. SS Obergruppenfuehrer (January 1942-1945). Does not recall date of appointment.
9. Administrator Berlin-Suhler Waffen & Fahrzeugwerke (1935).
10. Head of Gustloff-Werke Nationalsozialistische Industrie-Stiftung (1936). Honorary Head of Foundation.
11. General Plenipotentiary for Labor Allocation (General-bevellmaechtigter Fuer den Arbeitseinsatz) (21 March 1942-1945).

/s/ Dr. Servatius
Counsel for Fritz Sauckel

/s/ Fritz Sauckel
Fritz Sauckel

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2974-PS

19 November 1945

I, JAMES H. MATHIAS, Capt., JAGD, O-2052475, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 2974-PS.

JAMES H. MATHIAS
Capt., JAGD
O-2052475

H1126-0188

H1126-0189

DOCUMENT NO. 2980-PS
OFFICE U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Date
Nurnberg, Germany

CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that the following positions in the National-ozialistischen Deutschen Arbeiterpartei and German Government were eld by Albert Speer at or between the time stated for each position, r, if no time is stated, at some point between 1932 and 1945. There re also listed certain organizations established by Albert Speer and honors conferred upon him:

1. Member of Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen Arbeiter-partei (1932-1945).

2. Appointed Hitler's architect on the death of Ludwig Troost (1934).

3. General Inspector of Buildings for the Reich capitol. Awarded golden badge of honor of party (1937).

4. Organized/Baustab Speer for the construction of German armament works.. Formed the Transportflote Speer within the ranks of NSKK (1939). after September 1939

5. Appointed to Dr. Todt's post as Reichsminister for Armaments and Munitions and also of Party office held by Dr. Todt. Became head of Organization Todt, (February 1942).

6. Appointed General Plenipotentiary for Armaments within the Four-Year Plan Ministry, (March 1942).

7. Took charge of Armaments Office of the German High Command, (May 1942).

8. Entrusted with entire German war production for duration of hostilities, and given title of Reichsminister for Armaments and War Production (1943).

9. Member of German Reichstag (1941-1945).

10. Member of Central Planning Board (1943-1945).

/s/ Dr. Flaechsner
Counsel for Albert Speer

/s/ Speer
Albert Speer

Exhibit U.S.A. 192
Filed Dec. 12, 1945

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3000-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Freitag
Chief of Main Office III
with the High Command in Minsk

Minsk, 28 June 1943

S E C R E T !

stamp:
Main Group
Food and Agriculture
Rec'd. 14 July 1943; no encl.
III E 733/43 Secret

To
Ministerialdirektor Riecke
in Berlin

Subject: Report on experiences in political and economic problems in the East, particularly White Ruthenia.

* * * * * * * *

The task of the military offices, and later of the German administration, is:

"Exploitation of the region for the German war economy",

and the motto:

"Everything you do for Germany is right, everything else is wrong!"

Page 4: The recruitment of labor for the Reich, however necessary, had disastrous effects. The recruitment measures in the last months and weeks were absolute manhunts, which have an irreparable political and economic effect. From White Ruthenia, approx. 50,000 people have been obtained for the Reich so far. Another 130,000 are to be obtained. Considering the 2.4 million total population these figures are impossible"....

Page 5: - next to the last paragraph:

"Due to the sweeping drives (Grossaktionen) of the SS and police in November 1942, about 115,000 hectar farmland is not used, as the population is not there and the villages have been razed...."

CERTIFICATE OF PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No.3000-PS

I, ERNST M. COHN, Pfc, 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the indicated excerpts from Document No. 3000-PS.

Ernst M. Cohn
Pfc, 33925738.

H1126-0190

Exhibit U.S.A. 196
Filed Dec. 12, 1945

EXERPTS OF TRANSLATION OF 3003-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

LECTURE BY LT. HAUPT.

The situation of the War economy in the Netherlands

1. Description of territory.....

.....

page 2. .....

Cooperation between civilian and military agencies so far has been thoroughly satisfactory. The commander of the Fwi O who had been active for many years in Holland, was able to eliminate through personal contact any difficulties [illegible] There had been some difficulties with the ARBEITSEINSATZ ie. during the man catching action (MENSCHENFANG AKTION) which became very notisable because it was unorganized and unprepared. People were arrested in the streets and taken out of their homes. It had been impossible to carry out a unified release procedure in advance, because for security reasons, the time for the action had not been previously announced. Certificates of release, furthermore, were to some extent not recognized by the officeals who carried out the action. Not only workers who bhad become available through the stoppage of industry, but also those who were employed in our installations producing things for our immediate dneed. They were apprehended or did not dare to go into the streets. In any case it proved to be a great loss to us.....

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 3003-PS

Nov 23, 1945

I, WOLFGANG E. THORMANN, M/SGT. 33 77 94 26, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages; and that the abovedis a true and correct translation of Doc. No. 3003-PS

WOLFGANG E. THORMANN
M/SGT.
33 77 94 26

H1126-0191

Exhibit U.S.A. 213
Filed Dec. 12, 1945

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS OF DOCUMENT 3005-PS
OFFICE OF US. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Vol 78-L

Annex 1 to the Decree of
the Minister for Ordnance

THE REICH MINISTER OF LABOR

Nr. 371-4770/41 secret
216/985

Va 5135/1277

Special Delivery!

To the
Presidents of Regional Labor Exchange Offices
(including Nuernberg Branch Office)

SUBJECT: Use of Russian PWs

REFERENCE: Circular of 14 August 1941 - Va 5135/1189 -.

Upon personal order of the Reich Marshal, 100,000 men are to be taken from among the French PWs not yet employed in armament industry, and are to be assigned to the armament industry (airplane industry). Gaps in manpower supply resulting therefrom will be filled by Soviet PWs. The transfer of the above-named French PWs is to be accomplished by 1 October.

Russian PWs can be utilized only in quite lqrge, concentrated groups under the well-known, tougher employment conditions. In the civilian field, the Regional Labor Exchange Offices will have to determine immediately those work projects where French prisoners of war can be withdrawn and replaced by Soviet groups. For the time being, mo addtitional assignment of Soviet prisoners of war can be considered. Initially all replacement possibilities must be completely exhausted. Similarly, all French PWs no longer needed are not to be channeled into agriculture and forestry any more, but exclusively into armament industry (aircraft industry).

All branches of economic life employing French PWs, with the exception of armament industry and mining, are to be concompassed in determining those work projects where exchanges are feasible. The absolute necessity that Soviet PW replacements be employed in larger concentrated groups, requires, among other things, special checking of all larger construction projects of any kind (including construction of the Reich Railroads, navigational and cultivication projects). Reich Minister Dr. Todt has already consented to the exchange of French PWs employed by the Reich Super-Highways (Reichsautobahnen). In agriculture the exchange can naturally be effected only in the case of large estates (especially estates with outlying farms). Exchange of PWs will frequently encounter resistence. The factories concerned will be reluctant to exchange the trained and proven French PWs for Soviet PWs. In

H1126-0192

such cases the Labor Exchange Offices have to draw the factories attention to the necessities of state, and to the directive of the Reich Marshal.

As soon as the Regional Labor Exchange Offices have determined the work projects affected by the exchange, they will inform the Service Command Headquarters, indicating how many French PWs are being made available and how many Soviet PWs will be needed to replace the French PWs. Without my express consent, not more than 120 Soviet PWs may be requested for each 100 French PWs made available. Since the determining factor in the allocation of Soviet PWs are military and counter-intelligence considerations, final decision about the exchange rests with Service Command Headquarters.

.....

The first 100,000 French prisoners of war shall be channeled into the aircraft industry. .....

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS OF DOCUMENT 3005-PS

24 November 1945

I, PAUL W. FREEDMAN, S/SGT., 33799122, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of excerpts of Document 3005-PS.

PAUL W. FREEDMAN
S/SGT.
33799122

H1126-0193

From Volume 102 - i

OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT PS-3010

Translation from:
Economy Inspection South
- the Inspector -

Exhibit U.S.A. 184
Filed Dec. 12, 1945

St. Q., 17 Aug. 1943

Br. B. No: I/1949/43 geh.

Secret!

Secret!

Organization Order No. 35/43

Par. 6 pages 3-4

6. Recruitment of Workers for the Reich;
here: Enlistment of the years 1926 and 1927

The plenipotentiary General for Labor Employment ordered the recruitment and employment of all born during two years for the whole, newly occupied Eastern territory in Decree Az. VI A 5780.28 (Inclosure I), copy of which is inclosed. The Reich Minister for Armament and Munition approved this order.

According to this order by the Plenipotentiary General for Labor Employment (GBA) you have to recruit and to transport to the Reich immediately all labor force in your territory born during 1926 and 1927. The decree relative labor duty and labor employment in the theater of operations of the newly occupied Eastern territory of the 6th February 43 and the executive orders therefore are the authority for the execution of this measure. Enlistment must be completed by 30 Sept. 43 at the latest.

The inclosed orders (Inclosure II) of the Supreme Headquarters of the Army Group South of 28 July 1943, O.Q./HE Wi Fue/Qu.2/1852/43 geh., is the authority for the native labor forces employed by the Armed Forces in the region of Army Group South and by the native administrative offices. This order has already been forwarded to the Armies.

It was agreed upon with the Work Group Russia-South of the Organization Todt that the Offices of the Organization Todt will place all labor forces born during 1926 and 1927 at the disposal of the labor authorities without receiving replacement therefore. But in special cases where a high percentage of labor forces of 1926 and 1927 will have to be recalled from the same place, the competent labor authorities will have to arrange the recall of the forces according to a sliding scale or provide immediate replacement upon request of the local Offices of the Organization Todt.

Regardless of this, enlistment even from the Organization Todt will have to be completed by 30 Sept. 43 at the latest, if less than 10% of the native labor force is taken from individual offices of the Organization Todt for employment in the Reich. There will be no replacements even later on. If more than 10% of employees is recalled, replacements will follow as far as is possible and necessary.

Recall and enlistment of labor force born during 1926 and 1927 will also be effected at Reich Rail Road Offices without exception. Recall of labor forces from Rail Road Operation Units (BBW) and Railroad Repair Units (EAW) is also to be arranged on a sliding scale and replacement should follow immediately if possible. Recruitment should be terminated here also by 30 Sept. 43.

H1126-0194

For the organization of the Bergbau and Huettenwerks-gesellschaft m.b.H. (BHO), Dept. Donez Coal, special orders are issued as well as for armament plants (Establishments of the Iwan Program and of the Gen. Qu. Program.)

For the servide units of the air corps special orders will be issued.

Service is to extend over a period of two years. Compare to II order of the GBA (Inclosure III) dated of 23 July 1943 regarding the limitation of work obligation for Eastern workers as well as regarding the granting of extra payment and vacations.

Above orders have already been sent to the economy commandos. (Wi Kdos) (without Wi Kdo 13 and 105), to the Army Economic Management/South (He Wi Fue/Sued) and all Army Economy Managers (A Wi Fue) under Br. B. No. 873/43 geh. as of 3 August 43. The following amendment is made to the above orders:

1. For the territory in the charge of the Wi Kdo 104 (Tschernogow) recruitment and enlistment of labor forces suited for Germany without consideration of age is to be effected upon suggestion of the agent of the GBA instead of the enlistment of those born during 1926 and 1927. Orders given so far are the authority for this enlistment for the Reich. Enlistment is to be speeded up so that most of the labor force suited for work in Germany has been enlisted and transported by 30 Sept. 43.

2. Recruitment and enlistment of those born during 1926 and 1927 is to be prepared in the territory of the Wi Kdo 103 (ss umy) in the pacts of the Oblastes Ssumy. Enlistment starts on 1 Sept. 1943 and will have to be terminated by 30 Sept. 1943. Recruitment and enlistment of all labor forces suited for Germany will have to start immediately in the territory of the Oblastes Orel. The general orders are authority for this enlistment.

3. In the organization of the BHO, Dept. Donez Coal, as well as the armament plants (establishment of the Iwan-Program and of the Gen. Qu. Program.) the orders of 3 August 43 are used with the amendment that recruitment has to start immediately. Further orders regarding enlistment will follow. Recruitment and enlistment are to be started immediately, effected speedily and through any suitable means.

- -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. PS-3010.

26 November 1945

I, Leo Loeb, Civilian, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with theEnglish and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. PS-3010.

LEO LOEB
Civilian

H1126-0195

Exhibit U.S.a. 190
Filed Dec. 12, 1945

H1126-0196

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPT OF DOCUMENT PS 3012
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Copy of Copy

/ 173

SPECIAL GROUP 4a

19 March 1943

SECRET

Personal

To all group leaders of the Security Service (SD)-Auxiliary groups.

It is the task of the Security Police and of the Security Service (SD) to discover all enemies of the Reich and fight against them in the interest of security, and in the zone of operations especially to guarantee the security of the army. Besides the annihilation of active opponents, all other elements who, by virtue of their opinions or their past, may appear active as enemies under favorable conditions, are to be eliminated (sind.. auszumerzen) through preventive measures. The Security Police carries out this task according to the general directives of the Führer with all the required toughness. Energetic measures are especially necessary in territories endangered by the activity of hostile gangs. The competence of the Security Police within the zone of operations is based on the Barbarossa-decrees. I deem the measures of the Security Police, carried out on a considerable scale during recent times, necessary for the two following reasons:

1) The situation at the front in my sector had become so serious that the population, partly influenced by Hungarians and Italians, who streamed back in chaotic condition, took openly position against us.

2) The strong expeditions of hostile gangs, who came especially from the forest of Bryansk, were another reason. Besides that, other revolutionary groups, formed by the population, appeared suddenly in all districts. The providing of arms evidently provided no difficulties at all. It would have been irresponsible, if we had observed this whole activity without acting against it. It is obvious that all such measures bring about some harshness. I want to take up the significant points of harsh measures:

1) The shooting of Hungarian Jews

2) The shooting of Agronoms

3) The shooting of children

4) The total burning down of villages

5) The "shooting, while trying to escape," (?) (Flüchten) of Security Service (SD) prisoners

Chief of Committment Group C confirmed once more the correctness of the measures taken, and expressed his recognition for the energetic actions.

With regard to the current political situation, especially in the armament industry in the fatherland, the measures of the Security Police have to be subordinated to the greatest extent to the recruiting of labor for Germany. In the shortest possible time, the Ukraine has to put at the disposal of the armament industry 1 million workers, 500 of whom have to be sent from our territory daily.

The work of the field groups has therefore to be changed as of

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPT OF DOCUMENT PS 3012
Continued

low. The following orders are given:

1) Special treatment is to be limited to a minimum

2) The listing of communist functionaries, activists and so on, is to take place by roster only for the time being, without arresting anybody. It is, for instance, no longer feasible to arrest all the close relatives of a member of the communist party. Although, members of the Komsomolz are to be arrested only, if they were active in a leading position.

3) The activity of the labor offices, respective of recruiting commissions, is to be supported to the greatest extent possible. It will not be possible always to refrain from using force. During a conference with the Chief of the Labor Commitment Staffs, an agreement was reached stating that wherever prisoners can be released, they should be put at the disposal of the Commissioner of the Labor Office. When searching (Uberholung) villages, resp. when it has become necessary to burn down a village, the whole population will be put at the disposal of the Commissioner by force.

4) As a rule, no more children will be shot.

5) The reporting of hostile gangs as well as drives against them is not affected hereby. All drives against these hostile gangs can only take place after my approval has been obtained.

6) The prisons have to be kept empty, as a rule. We have to be aware of the fact, that the Slavs will interpret all soft treatment on our part as weakness and that they will act accordingly right away. If we limit our harsh measures of security police through above orders for the time being, that is only done for the following reason. The most important thing is the recruiting of workers. No check of persons to be sent into the Reich will be made. No written certificates of political reliability check or similar things will be issued.

[redacted]ue copy
[redacted]igned): Bender
KVR

(signed): Christiansen
SS Major and C.O.

- -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF EXCERPT OF DOCUMENT NO. PS 3012

I, S/Sgt Paul W. Freedman, 33799122, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German Languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. PS 3012.

S/Sgt Paul W. Freedman
33799122

H1126-0197

Ex. 190

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3012-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Copy

Telephone conversation of the Chief of the W$_1$ staff
East, Br. B. No 3663/43

To Inspector Wi Jn South
General Nagel

The pleni-potentiary for the Arbeitseinsatz, Gauleiter Sauckel, points out to me in an urgent teletype, that the Arbeitseinsatz in German agriculture as well as all the most urgent armament programs, ordered by the Fuehrer, make the most rapid procurement of approx. 1 million women and men from the newly occupied territories an imperative necessity. For this purpose, Gauleiter Saucker demands the shipment of 5000 workers daily beginning 15 March, 10,000 workers, male and female beginning 1 April from the newly occupied territories.

The daily quota of 5000 (10,000) workers was distributed with the consent of the GBA as follows:

Reich Commissioner Ukraine	daily	3,000 (6,000)	workers
Wi Jn South	"	1,000 (2,000)	"
Wi Jn Center	"	500 (1,000)	"
Commissioner General White Ruthenia	"	500 (1,000)	"

In consideration of the extraordinary losses of workers, which occurred in German war industry because of the developments of the past months, it is now necessary, that the recruiting of workers be taken up again everywhere with all emphasis. The tendency, momentarily noticeable in that territory, to limit and/or entirely stop the Reich recruiting program is absolutely not bearable in view of this state of affairs. Gauleiter Sauckel, who is informed about these events, has because of this, turned immediately to General Feldmarschall Keitel on 10 March 1943 in a teletype, and has emphasized on this occasion, that, as in all other occupied territories, there, where all other methods fail, by order of the Fuehrer a certain pressure must be used.

I therefore order, that in the individual territories, quotas are set up, which are to be fulfilled with the consent of the native administrative agencies and in the rural areas with the competent LA-leaders pursuant to the service obligation. As far as the quotas cannot be filled by voluntary enlistments, they are to be filled by conscription. For the realization of the service obligation, in the individual case, compulsion may be used if necessary. However, it is not permitted, that the workers are procured by collective measures.

I request, to direct at once with the consent of the competent headquarters, that disturbance of the Reich recruiting program is stopped, and that the latter is assisted in every respect by the military agencies.

/s/ Stapf
Lieutenant General
(General der Infanterie)

Received 11 March 43 2245 hours
Forwarded

O.v.D.
/s/ Dr. Bachmann
KVR
KVSbGoth

F.d.R.d.A.
(illegible)
KVR

H1126-0198

H1126-0199

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3012-PS
Continued

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 3012-PS

27 November 1945

I, WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE, Lt.(jg) USNR, 391590, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct partial translation of Document No. 3012-PS.

WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE
Lt.(jg) USNR
391590

Exhibit U.S.a. 207
Filed Dec. 12, 1945

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3040 PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

General Decree Collection (Allgemeine Erlassammlung-AES)

2nd Part

SECRET

Published by RSHA I Org.

Section 2 A III f
pp. 15-24

Commitment of Manpower from the East. Circular Decree of the Reich Fuehrer SS and Chief of German Police in the Reich Ministry of the Interior dated 20 February 1942 - S IV No. 208/42 (foreign owrkers)

Enclosed I am sending you general regulations about recruiting and committing man power from the East for your information and careful attention.

I have the following additional directives of the security service (SD):

A. Manpower from the original Soviet-Russian territory.
I. General Security measures.

(1) The commitment of manpower in the Reich from the original Soviet-Rus Russian territory results in greater dangers than any other employment of foreigners inspite of the special standards of their way of living, since a complete separation from the German and other foreign laborers and a strict supervision will frequently, in practice and especially at the place of work, scarcely be effected. The Security police is charged with the responsibility for preventing the danger and it must do everything to accomplish its tasks; that is, to diminish the possibilities of danger to a mimimum. Since enforcements cannot be counted on, it is the special task of the inspectors and state police administrative offices to urge the other administrative offices, charged with the commitment of the manpower, to take over the affairs of the security police within the sphere of their jurisdiction.

(2) The tasks resulting from the commitment of Russians are to be summarized by the state police administrative offices in a periodic report and to be recorded therein by a responsible executive official of the criminal police under constant personal supervision of the chiefs of the state police office.

(3) Whenever possible, an official is to be appointed for a certain number of plants, employing manpower from the original Soviet Russian territory, who in connection with the counter-oxpionage officials, directs the supervision of this manpower at the place of and in the quarters.

(4) As far as these plants with manpower from the original Soviet Russian territory do not yet have commissioners for political counter-intelligence, such men are to be appointed.

(5) Lacking further possibilities of supervision, it is absolutely necessary to establish an especially intensively active intelligence service among the laborers, whereby special attention is to be given to the dissemination of communist ideology and the danger of sabotage acts.

IIII. Placement and Supervision.

(1) The provision of separate and supervised placement of manpower from the original Soviet Russian territory, as provided for under number AV of enclosure 1, must not be disregarded with the singular exception of the individually employed female laborers on the farms.

(2) 1). Special attention must be given to the prompt procurement of guards for the plants mentioned under number AV 1b) and c) of the enclosure.

Even though the plants and the Reich employment administration are obliged to assist intensively in accomplishing this task, the responsibility is nevertheless that of the administrative offices of the security police.

2) Therefore, the following procedure is intended:

a) The state employment offices have orders to plan continously for several weeks in advance, to which plants of their district andin what numerical strength the manpower from the original Soviet Russian territory, due to arrive with the next transport, will be distributed. They shall immediately, after drawing up respectively completing the plan, imform the inspectors of the security police and of the SD about that they, in turn, have to take care that they are constantly kept informed and in communication with the district leader (Bezirdsobmann) of the guild of protective trade (Fachgruppe Bewachungsgewerbe).

b) The inspector of the security police and of the SD of the district in which the manpower from the original Soviet Russian territory is newly committed, receives information promptly, before the arrival of each transport, from section IV E 1b of the Reich security main office (RSHA).

He informs:

The state employment office - section manpower commitment - which, if necessary, has to inform about changes of the arrangements; the inspector of manpower is made in such plants which need officers from the regular police for the guards; the district leader of the guild of protective trade with the task of furnishing the guards for and to establish communication, himself or through the agency with the state police administration office, locally competent for the individual plant; the locally competent state police administration office.

c) The state police office then must examine or must have examined the quarters arranged by the plants. It shall be ascertained whether plant protection exists in the plant, and whether it is sufficient numerically for the guarding of the manpower from the original Soviet Russian territory. If this is not the case, the state police office has to provide for the increase of the plant protection by the protective trade. In the plants where no plant protection exists, it has to supervise the guards made available by the protective agency and to examine whether they fulfill the requirements as to number and qualification.

3) The commitment of the protective trade in protected plants has been discussed with the high command of the armed forces. The administrative group "work commitment" in the Four Year Plan will inform the central offices who have state plants with own guard service subordinated to them, that they can receive manpower from the original Soviet Russian territory only if they guarantee the supervision of manpower by the guard service provided for these plants. Since a poor supervision of the manpower in these plants endangers the general security, the state police administration offices will also have to keep an eye on the guarding of these plants and to report difficulties to the RSHA.

4) Inspite of all precautions, numerous difficulties will arise especially in making available the required guard personnel. These are to be overcome locally as well as possible and in case of failure, to be reported by teletype.

(3) When supervising the guarding of this manpower, the state police administration offices will, above all, have the following duties:

a) Confirmation of the leader of the guard as well as his duty.

In plants with plant protection the leader of the guard is usually the leader of plant protection. In the plants in which are or will be exclusively men of the protective trade, the official furnished by the regular uniformed police - in the county usually the rural police official - is to be appointed leader of the guard. Leaders and deputies should be auxiliary police officials if regular police officials are not available. In larger camps additional capable men may possibly have to be appointed as auxiliary police officials since an auxiliary police official must be at hand at all times. However, attention has to be paid to the fact that guard officials will be appointed as auxiliary police officials only to the absolute necessary extent.

H1126-0201

b) Instructions for the plant protection and the guard personnel.
The guards must keep strictly away from the Soviet Russian manpower and must not speak with them except in line of duty. They have to treat the camp inhabitants strictly but must not commit any injustices against them.

c) The conduct of the guards is to be checked constantly. Violations against discipline by the men of the plant protection and the protective trade are to be punished by the state police.

d) Selection of those German men of the administration personnel who are to be given additional duties of special plant protection against the Russians.
Since but a few men of the guards can be used at the working place, the necessary number of German foremen and masters is to be entrusted with these plant protection functions. The men selected for this purpose must be politically dependable, their character unobjectionable, and capable of acting energetically. In plants with a main office plant protection, the subordinate office plant protection men are to be subordinated to the plant protection leader. In plants without a main office plant protection, an subordinate office plant protection leader is to be appointed from among them; he is charged with the supervision of the subordinate office plant protection men. The plant protection men are responsible, in the sense of the aforesaid, for the constant orientation of the guards. The state police offices have to convince themselve about the through spot checks and, if necessary, have to order additional training under consideration of the given situations.

e) General instructions to the guards according to the attached sample (see enclosure No. 2)

f) Special instructions to the guards in individual cases or in special local questions.
The task of the guards is solely the guarding and maintaining of discipline of the manpower from the original Soviet Russian territory. Special problems of administration are not to be given to them. The administration of the camps is, rather, a special affair of the plant; that includes also the keeping of a camp diary resp. of camp index. Of course, this does not exclude the fact that the leader of the guard can make complaints when maladministration endanger the execution of tasks of the security police.

II. Combatting violations against discipline.

(1) According to the equal status of the manpower from the original Soviet Russian territory with prisoners of war, a strict discipline must be exercised in the quarters and at the working place. Violations against discipline, incl. work refusal and loafing at work, will be fought exclusively by the secret state police. The smaller cases will be settled by the leader of the guard according to instruction of the state police administration offices with measures as provided for in the enclosure. To break acute resistance, the guards shall be permitted to use also physical power against the manpower. But this may be done only for a cogent cause. The manpower should always be informed about the fact that they will be treated decently when conducting themselves with discipline and accomplishing good work.

(2) In severe cases, that is in such cases where the measures at the disposal of the leader of the guard do not suffice, the state police office has to act with its means. Accordingly, they will be treated, as a rule, only with strict measures, that is with transfer to a concentration camp or with special treatment.

(3) The transfer to a concentration camp is done in the usual manner.

(4) In especially severe cases special treatment is to be requested at the Reich security main office, stating personnel data and the exact history of the act.

H1126-0202

(5) Special treatment is hanging. It should not take place in the immediate vicinity of the camp. A certain number of the manpower from the original Soviet Russian territory should attend the special treatment; at that time they are warned about the circumstances which led to this special treatment.

(6) Should special treatment be required within the camp for exceptional reasons of camp discipline, this is also to be requested.

IV Anti-Reich activities (Reichsfeindliche Bestrebungen).

Anti- Reich activities, especially dissemination of communist ideology, propaganda of disunity, sabotage acts, are to be fought against with the strictest measures. The care in obtaining information shall not suffer through quick arrests, in order to catch the whole group of perpetrators. Anti-Reich conduct is, as a rule, to be punished by special treatment, in slighter cases a transfer to a concentration camp may be considered.

V. Criminal Violations.

(1) Criminal violations will fundamentally - regardless whether committed inside or outside of the camp - be punished by state police measures. The inquiries, as far as necessary, are to be made by criminal police offices. The county police offices are instructed to submit results of inquiries to the competent state police administration office before sending them to the public prosecutor.

(2) Criminal delicts are generally to be punished as violations against discipline, that is, against smaller violations the state police measures, against crimes like murder, deadly assault, robbery special treatment will be used.

(3) When committing captial crimes against German persons, a legal judgment may,, however, in an individual case, appear suitable. If the state police office considers this necessary, it can transfer the case to the prosecuting attorney under the provision that, according to the criminal laws, one can safely count on the death penalty for the perpetrator.

VI. Sexual Intercourse

Sexual intercourse is forbidden to the manpower of the original Soviet Russian territory. By means of their closely confined quarters they have no opportunity for it. Should sexual intercourse be exercised nevertheless - especially among,the individually employed manpower on the farms - the following is directed:

1. For every case of sexual intercourse with German countrymen or women, special treatment is to be requested for male manpower from the original Soviet Russian territory, transfer to a concentration camp for female manpower.

2. When exercising sexual intercourse with other foreign workers, the conduct of the manpower from the original Soviet Russian territory is to be punished as severe violation of discipline with transfer to a concentration camp.

VII. Measures against fraternziation with manpower from the original Soviet Russian territory.

(1) Special attention is to be paid to the fundamental segregation of manpower from the original Soviet Russian territory from the German population. It is important to prevent a penetration of communistic ideology into the German population by cutting off every contact not directly pertaining to the work and , if possible, to avoid every solidarity between German people and the manpower from the original Soviet Russian territory. Against Germans who act to the contrary, steps are to be taken by the state police according to the situation of the individual case.

(2) If German countrymen or women should exercise sexual intercourse

or commit indecent acts with manpower from the original Soviet Russian territory, transfer to a concentration camp is to be requested.

(3) The intercourse between other foreign workers employed in the Reich and the manpower from the original Soviet Russian territory also brings great dangers to be dealt with by the security police, therefore, it should also be fought with measures against the foreign workers. As a rule, the transfer into a correction camp (deportation for Italians) will be considered; this is also valid for cases of sexual intercourse.

VIII. Search.

(1) Fugitive workers from the original Soviet Russian territory are to be announced principally in the German search book (Fahndungsbuch). Furthermore, search measures are to be decreed locally.

(2) When caught, the fugitive must receive special treatment



IX. Handling in the Reich security main office.

(1) Requests, reports, inquiries resulting from the treatment of the manpower from the original Soviet Russian territory according to the existing directives, are to be transferred to section IV A 1 of the Reich security main office, competent for the handling of Soviet Russian affairs.

(2) Only inquiries and reports, especially pertaining to the guarding of this manpower, are to be addressed to section IV E 1b of the Reich security main office.

B. Manpower from the Baltic states and foreign manpower , not of Polish origin, from the Government General and from the annexed Eastern territories.

I. General.

(1) This manpower is to be treated uniformly in the Reich by the state police. On the basis of the political view of these nations resp. tribes (Volksstaemme) toward the Reich on the one hand and their position in the East on the other hand, they are to be governed by the general regulations valid for foreign manpower, but are subject to special limitations in their way of living.

(2) These limitations consist essentially in a conspicuous separation of this manpower from the German people. Since the employment and housing of this manpower is not closely confined and guarded, it is the task of the secret police to be especially watchful about the obedience to the mentioned principle. The secret police has to inform the offices charged with the employment of foreigners through constant communication, that this principle will be considered in all measures of work employment. Settlement of these persons in the Reich, individual billeting inspite of existing collective quarters, a position superior to that of a German worker, etc. must not be tolerated. As far as these people themselves violate the established principle, and act unlawfully against Germans by insubordination and acts of violence, such a conduct will be met with state police measures.

(3) This manpower must, under no instance, be put on the same level as the Poles or the manpower of the original Soviet Russian territory, on account of their nations' fundamental antagouism toward the Polish people and Bolshevism. Nevertheless, special attention should be paid to them - especially by the establishment of an active intelligence service among this manpower - since their good conduct toward the German nation might change into the opposite, but at least could stiffen, because too high political expectations are not fulfilled.

II. Anti-German activities.

Anti-German activities like sabotage acts, communist-marxist agitation, anti-German statements, strike instigation, are, under consideration of the aforesaid, to be met with all strictness, applying the usual state police

measures.

III. Fighting against the breach of work contract.

(1) The fighting against the breach of work contract of this manpower is principally the duty of the secret state police.

(2) This does not mean, of course, an interference with the activity of the Reich arbitrator of work with the means at his disposal in the regulation and settlement of industrial difficulties as long as no active intervention is necessary. If more stringent measures are necessary, the arbitrator will transfer the proceedings to the secret state police.

(3) In every case, however, it is the task of the state police administration office to check whether the violation of the work duty by this manpower is not caused by the plant by breach of contract as well as general bad treatment. If the conduct of the concerned manpower appears justified through the fault on the part of this plant, the state police is not to interfere, since this is free manpower.

(4) In any other case, however, immediate action is necessary and, in case of a breach of contract on part of this manpower, the transfer to a correction camp is to be ordered, as a rule. In cases of severe repitition the transfer to a concentration camp can also be requested. In the cases of breach of contracts handled by the state police, the arbitrator has to be informed each time about the decision.

IV. Criminal violations.

(1) The inquiry proceedings of all criminal violations committed by the named manpower are to be submitted by the local police offices, rural police offices resp. criminal police offices, after conclusion of the inquiries, to the state police administration offices.

(2) The county police offices have received instructions accordingly. The intervention of the state police administration offices serves the purpose to give them a clear view of the crimes of the Eastern workers in their districts and, besides, to punish especially objectionable criminal acts by state police measures.

(3) The inquiry proceedings presented to them are to be punished as follows:

Crimes against decency, acts of violence, and acts of sabotage are to be punished fundamentally by state police measures (Special treatment); however, I have no objection against a transfer of the inquiry proceedings to the competent public prosecutor if, according to the penal laws, one can safely count on the death sentence against the perpetrator. In these cases the result of the trial is to be ascertained; should a death sentence not be passed, against expectations, a report has to be made to me attaching a copy of the sentence.

Inquiry proceedings resulting from other cats are, as a rule, to be transferred to the competent public prosecutor. If a strong increase of crimes is noted in certain spheres, then there are no objections at all to punish purely criminal acts, as a deterrent example, by state police measures.

V. Searching for fugitive workers.

As far as the proceedings for searching for fugitive persons are concerned, the directives valid for Polish civil workers are to be applied in the same sense.

VI. Sexual intercourse with Germans.

(1) The sexual intercourse of the manpower from the Baltic states as well as of the foreign manpower of non-Polish origin from the Government General and from the annexed Eastern territories with Germans is punishable by severest penalties. (Changed by Circular decree dated 23 October 1943)

The workers will be instructed thoroughly by using the attached orientation sheet (enclo. 3) and foreign languages text when reporting at the local police offices. An instruction of the German population will be effected through the party administration offices.

(2) The county police offices have received instructions to arrest without delay workers who violate this regulation and to report them to the competent state police administration office.

(3) For male manpower who had sexual intercourse with German, special treatment is to be requested, for female manpower, transfer into a concentration camp. The directives issued for the special treatment of Polish civil workers are valid correspondingly; this is also applicalbe for the treatment of the involved German persons.

VII. Handling by the Reich main office.

Requests, reports and inquiries resulting from the treatment, according to the existing directives, of the manpower from the Baltic states as well as of the foreign manpower of non-Polish origin from the Government General and the annexed Eastern territories, (changed by circular decree dated 7 December 1942, section VII) of the Reich security main office, competent for the handling of these persons.

C. Manpower of Polish nationality from the Government General and the annexed Eastern territories.

The valid regulations for manpower of Polish nationality are listed in enclosure 1 under C. When Polish civil workers commit punishable acts, and if the state police office is to act after submittal of the inquiry proceedings, the directives issued under B IV of this decree are to be applied.

Now as before, the section IV D 2 in the Reich security main office is competent for the treatment of civil workers of Polish nationality. To the inspectors of the security police (IdS), the districts of the security police (BdS.) in Prague, all state police administration offices, criminal police administration offices, security service (main) offices (SD-(L)A).

For information:

To the higher SS and police officers, (HSSuPF.), districts of security police (BdS.), commandant of the security police (KdS.) in the Government General

- Not published -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 3040 PS

25 November 1945

I PFC ERNST M. COHN, 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct partial translation of Document No. 3040 PS.

ERNST M. COHN
PFC ,33925738

H1126-0206

Exhibit U.S.A. 206
Filed Dec. 12, 1944

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO 3044-PS
OFFICE OF U.S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

H1126-0207

From: Verfeugungen/ Anordnungen Bekanntgaben, 2nd vol edited by the party chancellery, publ Zentralverlag der NSDP

Regulation no 4 of the Plenipotentiary- General for the mobilization of labor on the recruiting , care, lodging, feeding, and treatmentof foreign workers of both sexes of 7 May 1942.

In the tremendous struggle of fate of Europe, the Greater German Reich is constrained to import a tremendous number of non-German (foriegn) workers of both sexes into the Reich to secure its armament and food supply. All these working people, prisoners of war included, will be treated, according to the oldest traditions of the German people and of our race, correctly, decently, and humanely.

The recruitment of foreign labor will be done on the fundamental basis of volunteering. Where, however, in the occupied territories the appeal for volunteers does not suffice, obligatory service and drafting must be under all circumstances be resorted. This is an indisputable requirement of our labor situation.

Recruitment must be made as befits the prestige of the Greater German Reich and the will of the Fuehrers. Irresponsible promises regarding pay, contracts, housing, freetime etc.must not be made. Living conditions in Germany itself, which are better that any where else in Europe can and should be emphasized. without exaggeration being necessary. Jewish methods of catching people such as they customary in the democratic states of the capitalistic age are unworthy of the Greater German Reich. With the above principles as a basis I order the following:

I. General.

1. The recruitment of foreign labor in the areas occupied by Germany in allied, friendly, or neutral states will be carried out exclusively by my commissioners, or by the competent German military or civil agencies for the tasks of labor mobilization.

Other agencies, organizations or persons are not allowed to recruit foreign labor. Any exceptions need my express approval. I will also determine whether, in what way, an to what extent enterprises (organizations bisiness, administrations) are to take part in the recruitment of foreign labor. Those taking part in the recruitment are subordinate during the carrying out of recruiting to my commissioners or the competent military or civil agencies.

My commissioners in allied, friendly, or nuetral foreign countries are the former foreign agencies of chief divisionVV of the Reich Labor Ministry. They will bear from now on the official name:

The commissioner for the 4 year plan
The Plenipttentiaru General for Mobilization
of Labor Office.
(for example Italy, etc.

I reserve for myself the installation of commissioners in other countries.

2. The care of foreign labor will be carried out.

a) up to the Reichs border
by my commissioners or -----in the occupied areas
by the competent military or civil labor mobilization
agencies. Care of the labor will be carried out
in cooperation with the respective competent foreign organizatior

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b) Within the area of the Reich:

1) By the German Labor Front in the cases of non-agricultural workers.
2) By the Reich Food administration in the case of agricultural workers.

b The German Labor Front and the German Food administration are bound by my directives in the carrying out of their tasks of caring for the workers.

The agencies of the labor mobilization administration are to give far-reaching support to the German Labor Front and the German Food Administration in the fulfillment of their assigned tasks.

My competence for the execution of the care for foreign labor is not prejudiced by the assignement of these tasks to the German Labor Front and the Reichs Food Administration.

II Carrying out of Recruitment

1a For the carrying out of recruitment in allied, friendly, or neutral foreign counries, my commissioners are solely responsible. They must, in all cases of political importance, come to an agreement with the chief of the respective German diplomatic missions and to this extent are bound by the directives of the chief of the mission or his deputy. The missions chiefs are to be informed of all basic questions of mobilization of labor. Negotiations with foreign agencies and organizations in foreign land which are of basic importance are to be carried out in agreement with respective the Reich representative or on the basis of their arrangements. Conversations with foreign agencies and organizations on questions of technical execution of recruitment can be carried on by my representatives directly.

The foreign office has informed the leaders of the German diplomatic and consular missions abroad to give far-reaching support to my representatives in their work especially within the framework of existing polictical possibility to make sure that my representatives can carry out their tasks free from groundless interference by foreign offices, organization, or other agencies or persons. In cases ethnic Germans (Volksdeutsche) are settled in the recruiting areas, close touch with the leaders of the respective German ethnic group is to be kept by my representatives insofar as the political conditions permit and if it is approved by the le leader of the German diplomatic mission concerned.

b. For the respective recruitment of labor in the areas occupied by the German agencies for the mobilization of the labor of the German military or civil administration installed in these areas are exclusively responsible. I retain for myself to send special representatives to these agencies from time to time. My representatives must cooperate closely in the carrying out of their task. With the foreign agencies and organization competent for recruitment in allied, friendly, or nuetral foriegn countries, especially these agencies specified in the international agreement. In this connection, it is to be noted that the leadership of the recruitment insofar as it can be accomplished will always be German, furthermore, my deputies must always be conscious of the fact that in their work, as well as in their non-official appearances they are looked upon by the foreigners with whom they come in contact as representatives of the national socialist of greater Germany.

2. In recruiting the following points are to be observed.

a. Preparation for recruiting (propaganda)
Before taking up recruiting, complete understanding must be given to the population, through the press of the landwhere recruiting take place or through other means of the publicity, for what vocation for what work to be done, and for what type of work the workers are needed.

The execution of the recruiting propaganda is to be done in agreement with the competent Reich representation.

b. Publication of work and pay conditions as well as of regulations on transferring pay.

1. Foreign workers are to be informedin detail at the time of recruiting on the basis of therecruiting orders about the pay and work conditions of the firm in the German Reich, insofar as this is at all possible. In this regard information on the approximate amount of pay deductions should be given, so that persons recruited receive as clear picture as possible in their actual earning in the Reich. In no case may the persons recruited be given promises which are false or impossible to fulfill.

2. The persons recruited are to be informed exactly on the possibilties existing for the transferrof saving from pay.

c. Information of the General living conditions in the Reich.

The foreign workers are to be informed at the time of recruiting that the living conditions in the German Reich are better than in the rest of Europe. In this connection, however, in order to avoid any misunderstanding it must be pointed out that in Germany just as at home, the persons recruited are subject to limitations in housing , food, and other living conditions brought about by war.

d. Vocational Suitability.
It must be assured that specialist workers and trained workers are recruited principally for an activity in their professional field. If, as an exception, only employment outside of their profession is possible, the persons affected are to be informed.

The recruiting official must first test the professional suitability. In this connection vocational certificates which may be at h hand are to be evaluated, if necessary experts from the country whe where recruiting is taking place are to take part. In special cases, German Experts will be placed at disposal.

e. Physical Examination.

The foreign workers are to be medically examined (individual examinations) in im ediate conjuction with the vocational testing, by offcially engaged physicians of the country where the recruiting takes place according to official German guiding principals. In the interest of all concerned strict standard in this matter is to be applied. If the occasion arises, German physicians will be placed at the disposal for medical examinations. Non-German physicians can also be engaged.

F. Conclusion of labor contracts, issuance of recruitment certificates

Written labor contracts are to be concluded as a matter of principle according to the international labor agrrements. Where no interenational aggreement exist a written certificate of recruitment which contains the pay and work conditions , in every case to be drawn up for the persons recruited. A copy of the labor contract or a certificate of recruitment in his mother tongue is to be given at the time of recruitment to every worker Insofar as the conclusion of collective contracts for work are planned (e,g. in agriculure) a copy of the contract in the workers mother tongue is to be given to the leader of the group.

I reserve for myself the right to make respective deviations from the above ruling from case to case.

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G. Clothing, Footwear.
The conditions in the German Reich caused by war make it necessary that foreign workers bring with them clothing suitable for their work, including footwear. Insofar as supply of work clothing and footwear is not already by international agreement, the responsibility of the country where recruitment takes place, the recruiting agency must devote particular care to this question. Also other clothing, laundry and footwear must be brought by the workers from their homeland, since it is at this time not possible for them to obtain things of this nature in the Reich.

h. Personal Indentification Papers.
The foreign workers must posses, on crossing the German border and during their stay in the territory of the Reich, a valid passport from their homeland or a official substitue document recognized in Germany in place of a passport. The passport or subsitute document must bear an official German visa of the competent German diplomatic mission. In the case of collective transports collective visas, affixed to the transports lists, suffice.

j. General Information Pamphlet.
Already at the time of recruiting if provided for a short informational pamphlet on the pay and work conditions, is to be ditributed to the foreign workers, which in a general outline, gives a general explanation on , working hours, social insurance, tax work clothes transfer of pay, vacations, visits home to the family, passport matters, and other work conditions (rights and duties) under which the workers male and female, have to work in the Reich.

III. Carrying out of the Transports into the Reich.

a. Basic Principles.
After recruitment and during the transport in-to the Reich a correct, faultless, treatment of the workers, male and female is to be striven for in order that willingness to work and the trust of those recruited may not be destroyed perhaps already during transport.

The workers recruited are as a rule to be taken in collective transports with special trains, or if necessary in group transports with regular trains.

b. Composition and operation of the transports.
The composition and operations of the transports up to the place of work is the task of my representatives, in the occupied territories of the labor mobilization agencies of the military and civil administarion, In the countries in which foreign representatives are to direct the transports up to the frontier, the German recruiting agency msut take part in the supervision and care of the transports.

The chief of the transport must take care that during the transport

1. Inconditional order and cleanliness prevail. The necessary hygenic precautions must be assured under all circumstances in each transport and if temporary lodging in a collection camp takes place in every collection camp.

2. An overloading of the cars will not take place.

3. A sufficient number of toilets--also at stops and in the collection camps (or perhaps latrines) must be at hand.

4. Masculine and feminine members of the transport will be separated.

5. Ethnic Germans, as far as possible, will be separated from the foreign members of the transport.

6. Prevent friction amongst the various foreign elements of the transport through suitable sheltering. Furthermore it is the duty of those who compose the leadership and who bear the responsibility of the tranport, through their proficiency and ingenuity to organize the transport in such a manner, under all circumstances, so that no member of the transport will suffer injuries, that will render them useless from the start for complete committal to work for the Reich.

c. Supply for the Transport.
The food supply for the industrial workers in-transit within the Reich, is the duty of the (DAF) German workers front, office for labor mobilization. For the rest, my offices effect the supply for the transport. Attention is directed here to the fact that the individual foreign countries are obliged by interstate agreements to supply the transports up to the borders.

The assurance of a sufficient and substantial supply of the members of the transport within the sphere of war-conditioned possibilities is of special importance. Special care must there fore be devoted to that question.

d. Decontamination.
As far as the foreign workers originate from areas whence the introduction of contagious disease must be feared, they must if necessary, be decontaminated several times. The second decontamination is to be combined with a repeated medical check-up. This must take place within the borders of the Reich in transient camps specifically provided for this purpose. Also, during their stay in the decontamination stations a correct and unobjectionale treatment of the workers and women workers is under all circumstances necessary.

IV. The Care for the Workers.
The care for the foreign workers employed in the Reich will be carried out:
a) by the German Reich Food Administration in case of agrarian workers.
b) by the German Workers Front in the case of non-farm laborers.
The overwhelming camp type sheltering of non-agrarian foreign workers and female workers requires a specially rigid concentration and execution of the methods of care.

I therefore decree the following:
I. All camps with foreign non-agrarian workers, regardless of who furnished or maintains the camps, will be cared for by the German Workers Front(Office of Work Mobilization).

The camp personnel may, in accordance with that, be employed only in agreement with the German workers front (Office of Work Mobilization). The camp leaders needs in each case the sanction of the German Workers Front (Office of Work Mobilization) for the execution of his task.

The German Workers Front (Office of Work Mobilization) is responsible for the uniform performance and continous schooling of the camp personnel. The requisitioning of guards and caretakers in the camps with Soviet Russian workers is reserved for special supercision on the basis of an agreement between the Reichsfuehrer SS and the Chief of the German Workers Front.

2. The care for the foreign workers by national organizations (caretakers) is allowed only if those are set up and active within the framework of the German Workers Front organization.

3. In the camps, only those camp orders set up by the German workers Front in agreement with me and the other competent offices are binding.

For the execution of the Workers CareIIset up the following principles:

a) Sheltering
The accomodations for foreign workers and women workers, must be models of order, cleanliness and hygiene and must be provided with all necessities. All work-mobilization offices, the offices of the German Workers Front, the Reich Food Administration and the work managers must all strive in mutual competition, that all foreign workers and women workers may be convinced.

1. Of German superiority, German skill and of German organizations as well as
2. Of German justice, integrity and cleanliness in public life, regardless of what peoples may be involved, peoples of related blood or peoples from the Soviet areas.

Specifically the following must be noted:

The foreign industrial workers will on principle be lodged in community camps. As far as it is at all possible, separate camps are to be provided for the various nations. In all cases, separate barracks must be provided for the members of different nations Definite consideration must be given to the mutual political adjustments between the nations.

The quartering in private houses is considered only in special cases (e.g. offcie workers).

H1126-0212

The camps must be absolutely unobjectionable from a medical point of view. The equipment must be suited for its purpose, nevertheless limited by war-conditions. For example, the issuing of bed linnen is regulated according to the stocks of the factories.

New bed linnen can be ordered by the factories only in exceptional cases and then only for women workers.

The quartering of the foreign farm workers follows the same priciples, corresponding to the existing special conditions in German agriculture.

Special care should be taken that the sheltering of the foreign workers and women workers is as nearly according to the national customs as war conditions permit.

b) Feeding

The foreign workers receive provisions fixed by the Reichsminister for food and agriculture: it is fundamentally the normal provisions for the German civilians. During sheltering in camps, community feeding throughout will be guaranteed. Here consideration must be given to the native customs of the foreign workers insofar as war conditions allow. Employment of native cooks is encouraged.

c) Free Conditions.

Use of the freetime of the foreign workers and women workers within and outside of the camps is to be made within the framework of the given war-limited possibilities and according to the pecuiar qualities of the workers. Extensive regard must be given to the national customs of the foreign workers and women workers.

The planning and execution of the mental and cultural treatment for the foreign workers is to proceed in agreement with the Organization of the foreign workers, Which are represented by the German workers front, and must be handled in accordance with the guiding priciples which are suggested by the foreign office for the respective individual nationalities.

The German workers front and the Reich (Food administration) will use the existing, officially recognized, interstate societies in Germany in the execution of this assignment.

d) Transfer of Savings.

The workers may in accordance with the regulations existing for this purpose, send their earned savings totally or partially to their families. The amounts vary for the individual countries as well as for agrarian and non-agrarian workers and is available from the information leaflets, which are received by the managers and the workers from the offices which execute the transfer of the savings.

e) Mail and Parcel Exchange

Exchange of letters and parcels of the foreign workers to their native countries must be assured.

H1126-0213

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3044-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL
(cont.)

f) Furloughs

The regulating and the carrying out of the furlough trips of the foreign workers is the duty of the German Workers Front, in collaboration with other competent offices.

V. Special treatment of individual foreign worker groups.

The special regulations concerning the treatment of individual groups of foreign workers will remain unchanged.

VI. Supervision and Review of Regulations

In the German Gaus the GAULEITERS will have the rights of inspections and controls of the execution of these orders.

signed: SAUCKEL

November 24 1945

CERTIFICATE OF PARTIAL TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 3044-PS

I, ERNST M COHN, Pfc. 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct partial translation of Document 3044-PS.

ERNST M COHN
Pfc
33925738

H1126-0214

Ex. 206

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3044(a)
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

From: Verfuegungen/Anordnungen Bekanntgaben, 2nd vol. edited by: party chancellory, publ. Zentralverlag der NSDAP. p. 532

"3. The resources of manpower that are available in the occupied territories are to be employed primarily to satisfy the requirements of importance for the war, in Germany itself. In allocating the said labor resources in the Occupied Territories, the following order of priority will be observed:

(a) Labor required for the troops, the occupation authorities, and the civil authorities;

(b) Labor required for the German armaments (Ruestungen)

(c) Labor required for food and agriculture;

(d) Labor required for industrial work other than armaments, which is in the interest of Germany;

(e) Labor required for industrial work in the interests of the population of the territory in question. "

CERTIFICATE OF PARTIAL TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 3044(a) 26 Nov 1945

I, ERNST M. COHN, Pfc 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct partial translation of Document 3044(a).

ERNST M. COHN
Pfc, 33925738

H1126-0215

Exhibit U.S.A. 206
Filed Dec. 12, 1945

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3044(b)-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

from: Verfuegungen/Anordnungen Bekanntgaben
2nd volume
edited by the party chancellory
published by Zentralverlag der NSDAP
pp. 592-593

9. Free Time.

There is no claim for free time.

Female domestic workers from the East may, on principle, leave the household only to take care of domestic tasks. As a reward for good work, however, they may be given the opportunity to stay outside the home without work for 3 hours once a week. This leave must end with the onset of darkness, at the latest at 2000 hours. It is prohibited to enter restaurants, movies, or other theaters and similar establishments provided for Germans or foreign workers. Attending church is also prohibited. Special events may be arranged for Eastern domestics in urban homes by the German Workers Front, for Eastern domestics in rural homes by the Reich Food Administration with the German Women's League (Deutsches Frauenwerk).

Outside the home, the Eastern domestic must always carry her work card as a personal pass.

10. Vacations, Return to Homes

Vacations are not granted as yet.

The recruiting of Eastern domestics is for an indefinite period.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 3044(b)-PS

25 November 1945

I, ERNST M. COHN, Pfc., 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true partial translation of Document No. 3044(C)-PS.

ERNST M. COHN
Pfc.
33925738

H1126-0216

Not offered

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3057-PS
OFFICE U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES FORCES EUROPEAN THEATER
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE CENTER
APO 757

5 Sep 1945

I, Fritz Sauckel, Gauleiter and Reichstatthalter in Thuringia in charge of labor procurement in Germany make in lieu of oath voluntarily and under no compulsion the following statements:

1) Since 1921 I was a convinced National Socialist and agreed 100% with Adolf Hitler's program. I have worked actively in this sense and in the period from 1921 up to the 1933 assumption of power delivered approximately five hundred speeches, which represented as to sense and contents the national socialist point of view. It was a particular satisfaction to me to have brought the Gau Thuringia to a leading position as to its National Socialistic standing and idealogy. There was no doubt in my mind as I never questioned Adolf Hitler's leadership up till the time of the collapse but obeyed blindly his orders.

2) After the introduction of the Nurenburg law I saw to it, in line with my convictions, that the provisions of these laws were fully carried out in the Gau Thuringia.

3) It was known to me that the majority of the components of which the Gustloffwerke consisted were Jewish property which were dispossessed under pressure.

4) As far as foreign politics are concerned I was of the opinion that the German people had a right to living room "Lebensraum" in Europe and had to take a leading position on the basis of their racially superior level. With reference to the means and measures to be applied in order to attain this end I agreed to all decisions of Hitler and the NSDAP and cooperated actively in the execution of these plans.

5) I had the mission of bringing foreign laborers to Germany and I did my utmost to fulfill this task. I was well aware that this would provoke resistance in the foreign countries but everything had to be done to bring laborers to Germany. Police measures were applied to bring laborers to the Reich from territories occupied by German troops. When the labor procurement from France met with ever increasing difficulties I insisted upon the introduction of a labor draft law according to which French laborers were forcibly imported into Germany. I have also insisted that wages in France should be frozen in order that their relationship with German wages should be maintained. The care, housing, feeding and transport of the foreign workers were under my authority and I was competent and responsible for these matters as the highest level authority. I do not want to mitigate or excuse the performance of my mission.

I, E.G. SZANTO, 1st Lt. AC, do hereby certify that I am a qualified translator of the German language; that the above English translation is a true and correct translation of the statement of Fritz Sauckel, made at Oberursel, Germany, on 4 Sep 1945.

/S/ E.G. SZANTO
1st Lt AC

H1126-0217

Pg 43

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
Continued

The Commissioner for the 4 Years Plan, Berlin 31st October 1942

SECRET

Central Planning
Z.P.10

Results of the 21st session of the Central Planning (board) on the 30th Oct. 1942

Labor Allocation November 1942

p. 3017, line 13:

2. Supply

The October program including 300,000 men has been carried out; during November 400,000 have to be provided. The transfer from agriculture involving 200,000 is excluded, so that altogether 600,000 will be available (the transfer from agriculture to forestry (50,000) and the assignment of domestic personnel (140,000) will be separately accounted for).

Concerning the position of Prisoners of war, it was decided that the army is not to dispose of units of prisoners of war, which were put into the Todt Organization as whole units. In future, the GBA (Generalbevollmaechtigte für den Arbeitseinsatz - Commissioner General for Labor Control) will take care of the prisoners of war from the moment they enter a stalag. The co-operation between the GBA and the Todt Organization is to be organized by discussions between TIMM - Dr. Fraenck-Schmelter-Brugmann. The prohibition concerning recruiting of manpower in the area to the left bank of the river Don is to be applied less vigorously (Staatssekretaer Koerner). The Fuehrer's decree concerning the prohibition in force in the Cauacasus area is to be taken to mean that Gauleiter Sauckel has the order to ensure priority of the man power claim of agriculture and the crude oil exploitation in this region.

Finally, the GBA (Commissioner General for Labor Control) points out that large man power reserves still exist in France, in the General Government and in the Protectorate, which must be utilized before more stringent measures are taken inside the Reich itself. An energetic combing out process will be carried out inside these regions. A further important reserve exists in the possibility of increasing the capacity for work, which may be expected particularly as a result of a better treatment of the Russians. The successes (Gau) as well, especially in the Gau of Berlin. For this purpose the Central Planning Board has the support of the GBA (Commissioner General for Labor Control) against the managers (Betriebsfuehrer) of the various.

Dr. Steffler

p. 3018

present:

Secretary of State Speer
General Field Marshal Milch
Secretary of State Koerner

Gauleiter Sauckel GBA
Ministerialdirigent Timm GBA
Ministerialrat Letsch GBA
Ober-Regierungsrat Hildebrant GBA
Staatsrat Schiber-Reichs Ministry for Armament and Munitions
Major Gen Waeger " " " " " "
Lt. Col. von Nicolai " " " " " "
Dr. Ing. Goerner " " " " " "
Dr. Mommsen " " " " " "
Dipl. Kfm. Teuscher " " " " " "
Ministerial Director Grammsch V.P. (Voraus Personal) - Advance Echelon)
Ministerial Rat Steffler "
Colonel Engineer Sellschopp RIM (Reich Air Ministry)
Colonel Rueckner " " "
Lt. Col. Betz " " "

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OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Shorthand Minutes
of the
54th Conference of the C e n t r a l P l a n n i n g B o a r d

re : Labor Supply
on Wednesday, March 1st, 1944, 10 o'clock
at the Ministry for Air Transport

1767 S a u c k e l: Field Marshal, Gentlemen, it goes without saying that we shall satisfy as far as possible the demands agreed upon by the Central Planning Board. In this connection I wish to state that I call such deliveries as can be made by the Plenipotentiary for Labor "possible" by stressing every nerve of his organisation. Already on January 4th I had to report to the Fuehrer with the greatest regret that for the first time I was not in a position to guarantee delivery of the grand total of 4,050,000 men then calculated in the Fuehrer's Headquarters for the year 1944. In the presence of the Fuehrer I emphasized this several times. In the previous years I was able to satisfy the demands, at least
1768 with regard to the number of laborers, but this year I am no longer able to guarantee them in advance. In case I can deliver only a small number, I should be glad if those arriving would be distributed by percentage within the framework of your program. Of course I shall readily agree if I am now told by the Board: Now we have to change the program; now this or that is more urgent. It goes without saying that we will satisfy the demands whatever they may be, to the best of our ability, with due regard to the war situation. So much about figures!

We have no reason to contest the figures as such, for we ask nothing for ourselves. We are not even able to do anything with the laborers we collect; we only put them at the disposal of industry. I only wish to make some general statements and ask for your indulgence.

In autumn of last year the supply program, inasmuch as it concerns supply from abroad was frustrated to a very great extent; I need not give the reasons in this circle; we have talked enough about them, but I have to state: the program has been smashed. People in France, Belgium, and Holland thought that labor was no longer to be directed from these countries to Germany because the work now had to be done within these countries themselves. For months - sometimes I visited these countries twice within a month - I have been called a fool who against all reason travelled around in these countries in order to extract labor. This went so far, I assure you, that all prefectures in France had general orders not to satisfy my demands since even the German authorities quarreled over whether or not Sauckel was a fool.

1769 If one's work is smashed in such a way, repair is very very difficult. Now for the first time I have been reproached by officers stationed in the East, which was very hard on me, that it was the Plenipotentiary for Labor who did not extract enough men from the East during the last year and thus was responsible if now our soldiers had to fight against the same men whom I should have taken away; for these had become an essential part of the Russian divisions. Thus I have been reproached several times by front officers; and I wish to protest here and now. For the East last year was barred to me. In large areas I was forbidden to take anything from agriculture. I was told: You don't get any men since we have to organize agriculture here, the Donets area too was barred to me, and I was not allowed to extract anything. I

Had to struggle hard for every individual man whom I wished to extract from the East. Therefore I wish to state expressly here and now that the reproaches made by the front that the men who I did not extract now fight on the side of the enemy are unjust, since I was entirely kept out of these areas. Such was the situation at the end of the year.

At that time I was very much concerned: we discovered a decrease in the amount of labor employed. Today I am able to report that we stopped that decrease. According to most accurate statistics, which I had ordered, we have today again including foreign workers and prisoners of war, the same number of 29.1 millions which we had in September. But we have added nothing since that time. Thus we dispatched
1770 to the Reich in those two months no more than 4,500 Frenchmen which amounts to nothing. From Italy only 7,000 civilians arrived. This, although from 1.12 until today I have had no hour, no Sunday, and no night for myself. I have visited all these countries and travelled through the whole Reich. My work was terribly difficult, but not for the reason that no more workers are to be found. I wish to state expressly, in France and in Italy there are still men galore. The situation in Italy is nothing but a European scandal, the same applies to a certain extent to France. Gentlemen, the French work badly and support themselves at the expense of the work done by the German soldier and laborer, even at the expense of the German food supply, and the same applies to Italy. I found out during my last stay that the food supply of the northern Italians cannot suffer any comparison with that of the southern Italians. The northern Italians, viz. as far to the south as Rome are so well nourished that they need not work; they are nourished quite differently from the German nation by their Father in Heaven without having to work for their bread. The labor reserves exist but the means of touching them have been smashed.

The most abominable point made by my adversaries is their claim that no executive had been provided within these areas in order to recruit in a sensible manner the Frenchmen, Belgians, and Italians and to dispatch them to work. Thereupon I even proceeded to employ and train a whole batch of French male and female agents who for good pay just as was done in olden times for "shanghaiing" went hunting for men and made them drunk by using liquor as well as words, in order to dispatch them to Germany. Moreover I charged some able men with founding a special labor supply executive of our own, and this they did by training and arming with the help of the Higher SS & Police Fuehrer a number
1771 of natives, but I still have to ask the Munitions Ministry for arms for the use of these men. For during last year alone several dozens of very able labor executive officers have been shot dead. All these means I have to apply, grotesque as it sounds, to refute the allegation there was no executive to bring labor to Germany from these countries.

I have to tell you, Field Marshal, after repeated inquiry: there is no longer a <u>genuine</u> German direction of labo. I have just issued the well known proclamation which the Fuehrer himself had inspired, corrected, and adapted concerning voluntary honorary service. What success this step will have, I don't know yet; it will be very little. But I shall enlarge this voluntary honorary service. The Fuehrer wishes it to be administered exclusively by the Women's Service. Therefore I shall go tomorrow and see the Women's Service and the Women District Leaders of the Women's Service of Germany, in order to insist on the most extensive recruitment by the Women's Service of women above the ages

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of 45 and 50 years. Something will be attained in that way. There are quite good beginnings in some of the districts. But recruitment must be continuous and uninterrupted, and such things need some time before they run smoothly. Out of the German labor reservoir, however, 60,000 new laborers have been found in the first two months of the year, and the start as a whole has functioned better than I expected. The grand total so far is 262,000. Of these from the East alone there are 112,000. Thus the satisfactory statement can be made that the authorities in charge of what remains of the occupied areas have acknowledged the fact that better results are expected if the available labor is used in Germany than if it is used abroad. The supply of these 112,000 new Eastern workers, mainly men, has made it possible for us to hope for the arrival within the first two
1772 months of 262.000 workers.

Then some words about the question of women's labor. I have asked one of my assistants to give you later a survey comparing the English regulations on the national service of women with the German ones. It is perfectly correct to state that England, even if we take into account the difference in the total number available, does not use as many of her women as we do. One ought to abstain therefore from the reproach which is still made against me, that we didn't do enough with regard to the use of women's labor. On January 4th I told the Fuehrer expressly and repeatedly; if he gave me the power to recruit laborers a la Stalin, I should be able to put at his disposal perhaps a million more women. The Fuehrer brusquely and repeatedly refused this. He used the expression that our German long-legged slender women could not be compared with the "kurz-stampfeten" (Austrian dialect term for short-legged, used in a derogatory sense) and healthy Russian women. I for my part also wish to warn against setting too much hope on the usefulness of these women. But I wish to ask you to be sure that I am doing everything in order to put to work everybody who is fit for work, as far as I am able to do within the framework of the Fuehrer's permission, and this by exercising some soft moral pressure as well. In the same way I have directed all my assistants to examine continuously the results of the action of January of last year concerning the duty to register and to make sure that the labor exchanges continuously find out and call up the women whose children grow beyond the age in question, and the girls who reach the age groups in question. Thus we do everything possible.

* * * *

1774 In order to enable me to reach these numbers, two conditions must be fulfilled. First it is indispensable that all authorities which administer the occupied countries must recognize the necessity of fulfilling the demand for labor in the Reich. This so far is not the case everywhere. Especially the protected factories in the occupied countries make my work very difficult. According to reports received within the last days these protected factories are to a great part filled to capacity, and still labor is sucked up into these areas. This strong suction very much obstructs our desire to dispatch labor to the Reich. I wish to emphasize that I never opposed the use of French labor in factories which had been transferred from Germany to France. I am still sound of mind, and as recently as last summer I charged Mr. Hildebrandt with an inquiry in France which had the following result: It would be easy to extract from French medium and small factories (80% of all French factories are small enterprises with only 36 - 40 working hours)- 1 million laborers for use in the transferred factories, and 1 million more for dispatch to Germany. To use 1 million

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within France should be quite possible unless the protected factories in France artificially suck up the labor completely and unless their number is continually increased, as happens according to my reports especially in Belgium, and unless new categories of works are continually declared protected, so that finally no labor is left which I may use in Germany. I wish here and now to repeat my thesis; A French workman, if treated in the right way, does double the amount of work in Germany that he would do in France, and he has here twice the value he has in France.

1775 I want to state clearly and fearlessly: the exaggerated use of the idea of protected factories in connection with the labor supply from France in my submission implies a grave danger for the German labor supply. If we cannot come to the decision that my assistants, together with the armament authorities, are to comb-out every factory, this fountain of labor too in the future will remain blocked for the use of Germany, and in this case the program prescribed to me by the Fuehrer may well be frustrated. The same applies to Italy. In either country there are enough laborers, even enough skilled workers; only we must have enough courage to step into the French plants. What really happens in France, I do not know. That a smaller amount of work is done during enemy operations in France, like in every occupied country, than is done in Germany seems to me evident. If I am to fulfil the demands which you present to me, you must be prepared to agree with me and my assistants, that the term "protected factory" is to be restricted in France to what is really necessary and feasible by reasonable men, and the protected factories are not, as the Frenchmen think, protected against any extraction of labor from them for use in Germany. It is indeed very difficult for me to be presented to French eyes as a German of whom they may say: Sauckel is here stopped from acting for German armament! The term "protected factory" means in France nothing but that the factory is protected against Sauckel! This is what the Frenchmen think, and they cannot be blamed for it; for they
1776 are Frenchmen and before their eyes the Germans disagree in their opinions and actions. To what degree the creation of protected works is expedient and necessary at all is not for me to decide. I can only state how the effect of creating them touches the work expected to be done by me. On the other hand, I have grounds for hoping that I shall be just able to wriggle through, first by using my old corps of agents and my labor executive, and secondly by relying upon the measures which I was lucky enough to succeed in obtaining from the French Government. In a discussion lasting 5-6 hours I have exerted from M. Laval the concession that the death penalty will be threatened for officials endeavoring to sabotage the flow of labor supply and certain other measures. Believe me, this was very difficult. It required a hard struggle to get this through. But I succeeded and now in France Germans ought to take really severe measures, in case the French Government does not do so. Don't take it amiss, I and my assistants in fact have sometimes seen things happen in France that I was forced to ask, Is there no respect any more in France for the German lieutenant with his 10 men. For months every word I spoke was countered by the answer: But what do you mean, Mr. Gauleiter, you know there is no executive at our disposal; we are not able to take action in France! This I have been answered over and over again. How, then, am I to regulate the labor supply with regard to France. There is only one solution: the German authorities have to cooperate with each other, and if the Frenchmen despite all their promises do not act, then we Germans must make an example of one case, and by reason of this law if necessary put Prefect or Burgomaster against the wall, if he does not

1777 comply with the rules; otherwise no Frenchman at all will be dispatched to Germany. During the last quarter the belief in a German victory and in all propaganda statements which we were still able to make, has sunk below zero, and today it is still the same. I rather expect the new French ministers, especially Henriot, will act ruthlessly; they are very willing and I have a good impression of them. The question is only how far they will be able to impress their will on the subordinated authorities. Such is the situation in France. In Italy the situation is exactly the same, perhaps rather worse. We have no executive, we are told, and the Italian nation is morally so hopelessly corrupted that only pure force gives any hope for success.

Moreover, I am insulted, and this grieves me most, by the statement that I was responsible for the European partisan nuisance. Even German authorities reproached me thus, although they were the last ones who have the right to make such statements. I wish to protest against this slander, and I can prove that it is not I who is responsible. From the General District of Kiev, and this from the town itself and the near surroundings I extracted 100,000 men for labor, and in Kiev there were no partisans. The Kiev district was the quietest of all. In 1942 and 1943 I hardly extracted one man from the Minsk District, and was not able to do so, since I was to a great extent barred from this district. The Minsk district, however, was the chief partisan area, and even a Gauleiter has been murdered there. If there had been no measures of labor supply, many more partisans would be in action than there are now; for there
1778 would be many more unemployed among the foreign nations. These countries are indeed not able to exist unless they produce the things which Europe wants from them, and since the planning of production for the whole of Europe is done exclusively and solely by Germany, all these nations are indebted to Germany alone and to nobody else for the fact that they have bread and work. The measures increasing the labor supply for Germany and the occupied countries therefore has the effect of giving useful work to gangs of unemployed men. If this had not been done, the gangs would have become partisans. Furthermore, partisan warfare has appeared in every Eastern revolution for centuries and Stalin did nothing but incorporate into his strategic plans in a masterly way the assistance offered by partisans of the Polish, Ukrainian, and other areas known from history. Similar considerations apply to France. I have been answered that such things never had happened in France, that it was nothing but a consequence of German labor measures that these bands made their appearance there. To which I can only reply that those who say so obviously forget the whole of France's history, e.g. what happened in the 1870-71 war. Then too franc-tireurs operated in France. Even if there were no labor measures, the English would drop arms from their planes and would certainly find unemployed willing to pick them up.

Indeed, we too commit mistakes, this is only human. I only intended to acquaint you, Air Marshal, with the actual difficulties used by enemy and German authorities alike to oppose the German labor measures. It goes without saying that the ideal solution would consist in transferring the whole of manufacturing in these countries, and, as the saying goes, in bringing the work to the workers.

1779 Numerous German authorities, even such as had no connections with economics and labor supply, inquired of me, Why do you fetch these people to Germany at all? You make troubl

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for this area and render our existence there more difficult. To which I can only reply, It is my duty to insist on it that labor supply comes from abroad. There is no longer a German labor supply. That the latter is exhausted I already proved by my ill-famed manifesto of April of last year. But I am not able to transfer the German soil to France. Nor can I transfer the German traffic to France nor the German mines. Nor can I transfer German armament works which still have to release part of their workers, if fit for war service, nor their machines. Here alone 2,500,000 men are in question as has been calculated in the Fuehrer conference. This is the flower of German workers who go to the front and must go there. I have always been one of those who sya: if only energetic measures are applied in fetching labor from abroad, then we want to release in God's name everybody from armaments work whom we can, in order to strengthen our companies. The 1st and 7th Armored Divisions are frequently mentioned in the War Report. I can only tell you that the number of soldiers killed in battle in some Thuringian villages has surpassed for some time already the number of soldiers killed in the World War, by twice that amount. This I mention in my capacity as Gauleiter. It is for this reason that we have to do our duty. The best kind of German men, and men in the prime of life, have to go to the front, and German women of more than 50 years of age cannot replace them. Therefore I have to continue to go to France, Belgium, Holland and Italy, and there will be a time again when I shall go to Poland and extract workers there as fit and as many of them as I can
1780 get. In this circle I only wish to urge that you spread it around that I am not quite the insane fellow I have been said to be during the last quarter of a year. Even the Fuehrer has been told so. It goes without saying that just this slander has had the effect that I was unable to deliver in the last quarter at least 1 1/2 million workers whom I would have been able to deliver as long ago as last year, had the atmospheric conditions been better. It was due to that "artificial atmospheric screen", that they did not arrive. I am aware that they simply have to arrive this year. My duty to the Fuehrer, the Reich Marshal, Minister Speer, and towards you, gentlemen, and to agriculture is apparent, and I shall fulfil it. A start has been made, and as many as 262,000 new workers have arrived, and I hope and am convinced to be able to deliver the bulk of the order. How the labor is to be distributed will then have to be decided according to the needs of the whole of German industry, and I shall always be prepared to keep the closest contact with you, Gentlemen, and to charge the labor exchanges and the district labor exchanges with intimately collaborating with you. Everything is functioning if such collaboration exists.

1798 M i l c h: I now proceed to the important question where we will still be able to get greater amounts of laborers from you, and without a doubt the answer is, from abroad. I have asked Mr. Schieber to make a short appearance here in order to give his opinion on Italy. I agree with your statement, Gauleiter, that it is only the bad organization of our work abroad which is responsible for the fact that you can't do your job. Too many people meddle in your work. If someone tells you, there is no executive in France and Italy, I consider it an impudence, a foolish and stupid lie uttered by people who either are unable to think or consciously state an untruth. This kind of person is not interested in giving a clear lead in this respect and in analyzing the situation, probably because they are not smart enough. In this way, however, your work is rendered more difficult or frustrated, and all armament work at the same time. For we

have it before our eyes what close relations exist between the situation in the occupied countries and that in the armaments industry. A more foolish policy can hardly be conceived. In case the invasion of France begins and succeeds only to a certain degree, then we shall experience a rising by partisans such as we have never experienced either in the Balkans or in the East, not because this would have happened in any case, but only because we made it possible by not dealing with them in the right manner. Four whole age groups have grown up in France, men between 18 and 23 years of age, who are therefore at that age when young people moved by patriotism or seduced by other people are ready to do anything which satisfies their personal hatred against us - and of course they hate us. These men ought to have been called up in age groups and dispatched to Germany; for they present the greatest danger which threatens us in case of invasion. I am firmly convinced and have said so several times; if invasion starts, sabotage of all railways, works, and supply bases will be a daily occurrence, and then it will be really the case that our forces are no longer available to survey the execution of our orders within the country, but they will have to fight at the front, thereby leaving in their rear the much more dangerous enemy who destroys their communications, etc.

If one had shown the mailed fist and a clear executive intention, a churchyard peace would reign in the rear of the front at the moment the uproar starts. This I have emphasized so frequently, but still nothing is happening, I am afraid. For if one intends to start to shoot at that moment, it will be too late for it; then we have no longer the men at our disposal to kill off the partisans. In the same way, we are aware of the fact that their supply of arms in the west is rather ample since the English are dropping them from planes. I consider it an idictic statement if you, Gauleiter, are accused of having made these men into partisans. As soon as you arrive, the men run away to protect themselves from being sent to Germany. Then they are away, and since they do not know how to exist, they automatically fall into the hands of the partisan leaders; but this is not the consequence of the fact that you wish to fetch them, but of the fact that your opposite number, the executive, is not able to prevent their escape. You simply cannot act differently. The main crux of the problem is the fact that your work is made so extremely difficult, and this is why you cannot deliver the 4,050,000 workers. As long as it is feasible for these men to get away and not be caught by the executive, as long as the men are able not to return from leave and not to be found out on the other side, I do not think Party Comrade Sauckel, that you will have a decisive success through employing your special corps. The men even then will be whisked away unless quite another authority and power is on the watch, and this can only be the army itself. The army alone can exercise effective executive. If some say they cannot do this kind of work, this is incorrect for within France there are Training Forces stationed in every hole and corner town and every place which could all be used for this work. If this would be done in time, the partisan nuisance would not emerge, just as it would not have done in the East if one had only acted in time. Once I had this task at Stalingrad. At Taganrog there were then 65,000 men of the Army, and at the front one lieutenant and 6 men were actually available for each km, and they would have been only too glad if they had 20-30 for their assistance. In the rear there were a great mass of men who had retreated in time and squatted down in the villages, and who now were available neither for fighting at the front nor for fighting the partisans. I am

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aware that I am placing myself in opposition to my own side, but I have seen such things happen everywhere, and can find no remedy but that the army should assert itself ruthlessly. You, Gauleiter Sauckel, the Reich Marshal, and the Central Planning Board ought to report on this question to the Fuehrer, and then he ought to decide at the same time on the duties of the Military Commanders. There ought to be orders of such lucidity that they could not be misunderstood, and it is then that things will be in order. It never can be too late to do so, but these duties and this work will be more difficult to perform with every passing day. The same applies to Italy as well.

1808 S c h i e b e r: The Gauleiter some time ago discussed this question in detail with General Leiers, and they succeeded in reaching quite a comprehensive agreement. In my opinion there are still a considerable number of people in Italy who could be extracted there, especially if it is possible, which is not for me to decide, to increase vastly the method, so much recommended by your collaborators of transferring whole firms. It was only a few days ago that 200 to 400 men were transferred together with very little difficulty. I am favoring this method especially for the reason that in my opinion it will nip in the bud any tendency to take to the woods and to become partisans. Where the Plenipotentiary for Labor transfers the entire personnel of a firm, this personnel is being transferred as an entity; this also presupposes the existence of some human solidarity between the members of that entity. The Gauleiter will meet even more difficulties in the transfer of these Italians than he has to overcome in France because the Italians have extraordinarily strong family ties. We notice this fact more all the time. One has to meet these difficulties half-way. On the whole we of the production branch in Italy are quite agreeable to extract laborers from Italy. Our collaboration with your offices is functioning without friction. We attach special importance to our desire that these workers for whom we no longer have work in Italy, ought not to be left to loaf about for too long, but ought to be caught and sent to Germany. Outside the protected factories, too, there still remains in Italy a relatively vast reservoir of labor, and if this reservoir is drawn upon in the way arranged by the Plenipotentiary for Labor by the people form the armaments authority, and by our special commissioner, if especially the problem of transfer of wages is solved, I consider the transfer of a nice amount of labor from Italy as being quite possible. I should be glad, however, if right from the beginning any discussion by offices concerned or not concerned with it, about the possible consequences of the action should be prohibited; such a discussion could only disturb the peaceful development of production in Italy."

1811 S a u c k e l: I wish to insist on combing out the protected factories in the future also for the protected factories are working like a suction pump; and since it is known everywhere in Italy and France that every worker if he works in a protected factories are working like a suction pump; and since it is known everywhere in Italy and France t that every worker if he works in a protected factory is protected against any attempt of mine to extract him, it is only too natural that the men are pouring into these factories. How difficult my task becomes thereby is proved by the following fact. I intended to extract from Italy a million workers within the quarter ending May 30th. Hardly 7,000 arrived in the two months which expired so far. This is indeed the difficulty. The bulk enters the protected factories, and only the chaff remains for my purpose to send them to Germany.

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At least I hope to accomplish that with regard to larger enterprises as the number of protected factories is restricted in Italy, i.e. the number of protected factories. will not be further increased.

1813 S a u c k e l: This indeed is the decisive question, the one we are dealing with now. If half of the program for 4 million workers to be brought to Germany (this means 2 million) cannot be fulfilled, the employment of labor in Germany will fall off this year. The more useful workers, however, are in France, and of course in Italy too, employed in the protected factories. Therefore if I am not to touch the protected factories which are situated in these countries, this will have the effect that the less valuable workers instead of the more valuable type will arrive in Germany. And here we have to ponder about what is in fact more important and expedient. If we give up using these people in Germany, where we effectively rule the factories, where moreover we keep to a different labor discipline and reach better labor results than in France proper, then we give up the valuable kind, and then I shall only be able to transport to Germany the less valuable kind of people who still can be found on the streets of France or Italy, or people like waiters, hairdressers, small folk from tailor shops etc.

M i l c h: What is the percentage of protected factories in Italy compared with the whole of Italian labor?

S c h i e b e r: I think, 14% but I have not got the figures here.

M i l c h: Would not the following method be better? We could take under German administration the entire food supply for the Italians and tell them: only he get any food who either works in a protected factory or goes to Germany?

S a u c k e l: True, the French worker in France is better nourished than the German worker is in Germany: and the Italian worker too, even if he does not work at all, is better nourished in the part of Italy occupied by us than if he works in Germany. This is why I asked the German food authorities over and over again to improve also the food of the German worker introducing the "factory sandwich". When I am in Paris of course I go to Maxim's. There one can experience miracles of nourishment. He still thinks that in these countries only very rich men, who can go to Maxim's, are well provided with food. Thereupon I sent my assistants to the Paris suburbs, to the estaminets and lunch restaurants and was told that the Frenchmen who eat there did not feel the shortage caused by the war to any degree comparable with what our nation has to experience. The average French citizen too can still buy everything he wishes.

(Interruption: This is still more so in small places!)

Yes. Moreover, the Frenchman can pay for what he can get. Therefore he has no reason for wishing to go to Germany in order to get better food.

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This unfortunately is the case.

Milch: Is there nothing we can do? True, we might not be able to control the distribution to the customer, but we ought to be able to intervene at an earlier stage of distrubution.

Koerner: We have requested from France really immense amounts of food; these requests have always been fulfilled; often after some pressure, but they have been fulfilled.

Milch: But there is a simple remedy: let us cease supplying the troops from Germany, but tell them to provide the food for themselves from France. Then in a few weeks they will have everything eaten up, and then we can start distributing the food to the Frenchmen.

1816

Korner: In France there still is for the time being a rationing system. The Frenchman had his ration card on which he receives the minimum. The rest he provides in other ways, partly by receiving food parcels which we cannot touch at all. Every year we increased our food demands to the French Government who always satisfied them, though very frequently yielding to pressure, and in proportion to the harvest results, were they good or bad. In Italy the situation is that food is not rationed at all. The Italians can buy and eat what he wants, and since an Italian has always money and deals in the black market, he is in a much better situation than our German workers who practically has nothing but what he gets on his card.

Milch: But don't we even send food to Italy?

Kierner: We are exchanging certain goods.

Sauckel: Moreover we are now at the point that the families of French and Italian workers are no longer in a better position owing to the money transfer if their bread-winning members are working in Germany than if they remain abroad; now nothing remains to induce them to go to Germany.

1824

Milch: And the second question is this: Will it be possible at all to catch and transfer the 80% who are not employed in protected factories considering the lack of a so-called executive and divergence of opinions with regard to that problem,. Wouldn(t you be in a position with the political and organization conditions in France being what they are to transfer as much as about 10-15 % who are the most valuable out of this 80%

Sauckel: I simply have to extract them

1825

Milch: But are you able to?

Sauckel: Today I can't promise anything. Today I can only to my duty.

Milch: What I mean is, whether or not all your attempts to get this 80% must necessarily fail, by reason of the several adverse facts: first that there is nothing which could induce the men to go to Germany; secondly, that the men expect Germany to be defeated within a measurable space of time; thirdly, that they cling to their family and country; forth, that they are work-shy anyway, since they are able to exist without working for their bread and anyway look upon this time as a transitional stage which they will be able to survive. And on our side the fact that the Army does not assist you, and that the German authorities disagree with each other, which fact the Frenchmen ably use for their advantage.

Sauckel: This is no longer correct since my last visit. All German authorities, the Military Commander, Field Marshal Rundstedt, Field Marshal Sperrle assisted in my task with fervor.

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Kehrl: May I explain in bried the opinion of my Minister? Otherwise the impression might be created that the measures taken by Minister Speer had been umclear or unreasonable, and I do wish to prevent this from Happening. Seen from our viewpoint the situation is as follows: Up to the beginning of 1943 manufacturing for the use of Germany was done in France only to a relatively modest extent, since generally only such work was transferred for which German capacity did not suffice; these were some few individual products, and moreover some basic industries. During all this time a great number of Frenchmen were recruited and voluntarily went to Germany.

(Sauckel: Not only voluntarily, some were recruited forcibly.)

The calling-up started after the recruitment did no longer yield enough results.

Sauckel: Out of the 5 million foreign workers who arrived in Germany, not even 200,000 came voluntarily.

Lehrl: Let us forget for the moment whether or not some slight pressure was used. Formally, at least, they were volunteers. After this recruitment did no longer yield satisfactory results, we started calling-up according to age groups, and with regard to the first age group the success was rather good. Up to 80% of the age group were caught and sent to Germany. This started about June of last year. Following developments in the Russial war and the hopes raised thereby in the Western nations, the results of this calling-up of age groups became considerably worse, as can be proved by the figures noted; viz. the men tried to dodge this call-up for transport to Germany, partly by simply not registering at all, partly by not arriving for the transport or by leaving the transport on its way. When they found out through these first attempts that the German executiv either was not able, or was not willing to catch these shirkers and either to imprison them or to take them forcibly to Germany, the readiness to obey the call-ups sank to a minimum: Therefore relativ ly small percentages were caught in the individual countries. On the other hand, these men moved by the fear the German executive might after all be able to catch them, did not enter French, Belgian, or Dutch factories, but took to the mountains where they found company and assistance from the samll partisian groups existing there.

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
Cont'd.

Secret

Stenographic report of the

58th discussion

of the

Central Planning

Subject: coal

on Thursday, 25 May 1944, 1600 hours
Berlin, Pariser Platz 4

Dr. Koppert/Lm.
25.5.44.

Extract from page 1465, line 19:

Pleiger: Will you please look at the diagram no. 3, it shows the whole personnel in the pit-coal mines. There you can see at what time we began using foreign labor. That was at the end of 1941. Furthermore, you can see how, consequently, the use of German labor declined and the share of the eastern workers and the Russian Ps/W rose. On the top is added a further large proportion of Italians. But if you take the next diagram on the number of scheduled personnel and the number of actual personnel you can see clearly how steeply the curve drops; the same with lignite. It would be necessary to find here some means of improvement. If you note that 800,000 Russians Ps/W are working at places in Germany where Italians could be used just as well, it would be possible to transfer from among those 800,000 Ps/W about 150-320,000 people to the mines. Italians are of no use in the mines; the Italians cannot stand it, they are physically not strong enough, it won't even work if strong arm methods are used. The Russians, however, are developing excellently, particularly if they are fed in a way. In any case such a solution should be tried. If the situation in the West deteriorates, if we can do no more in Belgium and the North of France we shall be able to come over the difficulties in Lorraine and Luxembourg only by a very big increase in the direction of labor to the Ruhr region.

Kehrl: I believe there are 2 possibilities to solve the difficulties. Contrary to Pleiger, I believe that we cannot do entirely without the Italians, and especially because we can procure trained Italian miners. We have stopped practically all mining in central Italy because we have no transportation for the material anyhow. As far as the Italians there who worked as miners are concerned, they should be transferred and used sensibly in our mining industry, because the physical strain in Germany is not substantially different from that in Italy. We could free at least 20,000 miners. Perhaps one could adjust the proportion between lignite and pit-coal by transferring miners accordingly. Of course, we would then have to x-ray the Ps/W. By an exchange system something could be achieved.

Page 1468, line 4:

Kehrl: Will you please look at page 29 of the report. You can see from it how the reduction which represents a considerable amount, has been worked out. The reductions are: among the Germans 4½%, among the foreigners 5%, and among the recruited.

Pleiger: Those are Bulgarians, Hungarians, Belgians, etc. They do not stay put as a matter of course. It is impossible to make them stay.

Kehrl: They go away their time expires. Among the eastern Ps/W workers one reckons with a loss of 20% of the total, among Immi (?) with a 40% loss.

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Pleiger: Among the eastern workers the loss has increased so much because we received these people from the land. They were with farmers before they were sent to the mines. When they came from the farmers each of them had a package containing sausage, bacon and bread, etc. In this way the farmers thought they would return to them. In fact, the result was staggering in favor of agriculture. The people simply cannot be kept in the mines in the long run. If they have once been on the land, they leave us again. This tendency is to be noted all along the line, in the Ruhr even worse than in the Upper Silesian region.

Rohland: Is there no possibility of sending all foreign fugitives to educational camps for 2-3 months? About 30 to 40,000 people per month would be involved. These are quite considerable figures. The result of the education is phantastic. I have the firm conviction that these people could be used in the mines.

Speer: We shall consider that later.

Page 1481, line 13:

Speer: Now, the labor problem in Germany. I believe it is still possible to transfer some from the western territories. The Fuehrer stated only recently he wishes to dissolve these foreign volunteers as he had the impression that the army groups were carting around with them a lot of ballast. Therefore, if we cannot settle this matter ourselves, we shall have to call a meeting with the Fuehrer to clear up the coal situation. Keitel and Zeitzler will be invited to attend in order to determine the number of Russians from the rear army territories who can be sent to us. However, I see another possibility; we might organize another drive to screen out workers for the mines from the Russian Ps/W in the Reich. But this possibility is none too promising.

Page 1483, line 20:

Speer: We have to come to an arrangement with the Reichsfuehrer SS as soon as possible so that Ps/W he picks up are made available for our purposes. The Reichsfuehrer SS gets from 30 to 40,000 men per month. First of all, they have to be divided up. From what classes do these people come, anyhow? There certainly is a certain percentage of miners among these people who are picked up. These few thousand men have to go to the mines automatically. Certainly, some educational work has to be done. The men should be put into the factories as convicts. But they have to return to the factories where they were before. Furthermore, we could perhaps bring the people from agriculture to the mines. A great number leave, and the people do not go to the mines, but go home.

Dr. Jaenicke/

Secret

State Secret

36th Conference

of the

Central Planning

concerning: Plan for 1943/44 regarding coal economy.
on Thursday, 22 April 1943, 1550 hours at the Festival Hall at the Zoo, Jebenstr.

Page 2106, line 15:

Speer: Throughout the winter we have seen that in the last instance it is

coal which provides the basis for all plans we wish to execute in other respects, and most of you are also aware of our intention to increase the manufacture of iron. Here also it will again be coal which in the last instance will tip the scales, whether or not we shall be able to accomplish this increase of iron production. Seen from the Central planning, we are of the opinion that the demand for coal as well as the demand for iron ought to be coordinated in a separate plan, and that this plan ought to receive about the same degree of urgency as the Krauch-plan, and that with regard to labor, the conditions required for the execution of that plan must be established. Perhaps Mr. Timm will be able to state how he expects the question of the miners to be developed; unfortunately the miners cannot be taken from the German reservoir, in their place we shall have to use very strong foreigners.

Page 2107.

Timm: At the moment, 69,000 men are needed for hauling that coal. We want to cover this by finding within the Reich 23,000 men, viz. healthy prisoners of war, etc. who are especially suitable for mining - and by dispatching 50,000 Poles from the General Government. Out os these about 30,000 men have been supplied up to April 24th, so that about 39,000 men are still outstanding for January to April. The demand for May has been reported to us as being 35,700. The difficulties existed especially with regard to recruitment in the General Government, since in every district surrounding Germany there is an extraordinary resistance to recruitment. In all countries we have to change over more or less to registering the men by age groups and to conscripting them in age groups. They do appear for registering as such, but as soon as transport is available, they do not come back so that the dispatch of the men has become more or less a question for the police. Especially in Poland the situation at the moment is extraordinarily serious. It is well known that vehement battles occurred just because of these actions. The resistance against the administration established by us, is very strong. Quite a number of our men have been exposed to increased dangers, and it was just in the last two or three weeks that some of them were shot dead, e.g. the Head of the Labor Office at Warsaw who was shot in his office, and yesterday another man again. This is how matters stand presently, and the recruiting itself even if done with the best will remains extremely difficult unless police reinforcements are at hand.

Page 2108.

It was expected that at the end of the month 50,000 men should have arrived from the General Government. Unfortunately this could not be done. Only 3 - 4,000 men of them have arrived, and 8,000 more are on the way, so that the gap is rather considerable.

Speer: Of those men one can indeed only absorb a portion each month.

Sogemeier: We have provided a plan for stages: April 26,000, May 30,000, June 30,000, July 50,000, and September 56,000. If the men arrive in these stages and numbers, we should be able to reach the 290 millions of tons, provided that no miners are otherwise called up.

Speer: Are this additional labor supplies? Are these numbers which you wish to build up?

Timm: Yes, they include the losses which we expect!

(Milch: Yes, including the 70,000!)

Speer: I take it that the losses are included in these numbers?

Timm: Yes, this is not building-up, but distribution, if I understand rightly. As said before, we hope to dispatch within the next month 50,000 men from the General Government. Including the men shifted from other districts there will be 73,000 which should cover the first two months. It would be very

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difficult for us to increase the number in the next two months, since we have to provide agriculture with the remaining requirements which are due within the next two months, whereas in the months beginning with June the need of agricultural labor can be satisfied much easier by measures taken inside Germany. In the harvest months German labor can be called up for assistance. Only during the season for the harvesting of root vegetables is the situation difficult.

After what General Commissioner Sauckel found out in the East during his now completed tour of inspection, it would be possible to dispose of more Russian labor again in the ensuing months. How many of them will be men, can at the moment hardly be guessed, since it is the army especially who wish to release from the East women, but to keep the men there, because they are needed for all kinds of urgent work.

Speer: May I propose an inquiry on the question as to what Russian laborers are used at the moment as auxiliary laborers in the armament factories, in essential war business or otherwise; this should be done separately from these who in the meantime have learned a trade. We can indirectly exchange auxiliary industry workers with Russian women, and we will be able in this way to provide the mining industry with Russian prisoners of war who now do clearing up labor in the court-yards.

Timm: I would also propose such indirect exchange for the essential industry as well.

Speer: The towns also were provided some time ago with Russian Ps/W for sweeping roads, etc.

Timm: Not many will be found there. If we look for greater numbers of Ps/W, we shall find them repairing tracks at the railways, and it will not be easy to extract them there, since they need grown-up and vigorous men.



(Speer: But the Russian women do that kind of work!)

Ganzenmueller: We need the men, and it is out of the question to extract men from there. We use them now as railway guards also, and we have to do this, since no other people are available.

Timm: Then we are going to draw up a statement showing where Russian prisoners of war and civilians are still used anywhere in the industry, except those who are employed after having gone through training.

Speer: Including also the agriculture. Trained people cannot be extracted. I should object at once in my capacity as General Commissioner for Armaments, if now trained men would be extracted again from the armament factories. The works manager will go slowly mad if he has to train new people over and over again. But to extract in order to send them to the mines. But their employers must receive other laborers in exchange.

Rohland: This would be impossible for the foundries. We need 35,000 additional women, whom we could employ at once, but we do not get them. We have already assented to the exchange of 35,000 eastern laborers, but we must get them as soon as the mining industry gets its men. This is understood.

Page 2111.

Sogemeier: This labor demand applies solely to pit-coal. As to lignite, we need an additional 25,000 men in the course of the next months.

Speer: This is exactly the same in the other mining industries including ore.

Kehrl: 85% are needed for coal pits, the remaining mining industry ought to get additions in proportion.

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Speer: You should add up the numbers. We cannot approach the Reich Marshal with numbers for a single industry.

Timm: Altogether it amounts to 70,000 for coal and 14,000 for the remaining mines, potassium included.

Speer: We do it that way: Kehrl collects the demands for labor necessary to complete the coal-and-iron-plan and communicates the numbers to Sauckel. Probably there will be a conference at the Reich Marshal's in the next week, and an answer from Sauckel should have arrived by the. The question of recruitment for the armaments industry will be solved together with Weger.

Kehrl: I wish to urge that the allotments to the mines should not be made dependent on the recruitment of men abroad. We were completely frustrated these last three months because this principle had been applied. We ended December with a deficit of 25,000, and we never get replacements. The number must be made up by men from Germany.

Page 2112.

Speer: No, nothing doing!

Kehrl: We are completely stuck. I wish to point out that for a year now we feed the mining industry with promises only, and always are we pressed by the pits. They have received only half of the amount they were promised last year.

Speer: That they were only put off is not true. It was something too which they got in the meantime. Let us not hide our candle under the bushel!

Kehrl: If all is said and done, we are in such a precarious situation that trouble is certain if one considers the ever increased program of the armaments industry. No we have drawn the plan for May. This plan cannot in fact be executed, since the 1st of May is a holiday. The other day already we did not know how we could make it right. 800,000 T of coal fall out by reason of observing the 1st May. Compared with such numbers we are not served by a slow increase in haulage. The mines must receive their allotment in one stroke.

Speer: Out of the question! If Sauckel is able to promise the amount which he tries to get, ...

Timm: He quite expressly stated he cannot promise to dispatch 50,000 men from the General Government.

Speer: But Russia has to be added to it!

Timm: Owing to the military events the influx which we had up to December has stopped at once. We received formerly 10 - 12,000 men in the three last months 60,000 altogether. This is how the number has gone down.

Kehrl: We now have to touch the reserve which we cannot miss on the other side. Pleiger some time ago wired Sauckel, and reports like that from the Foundry East also came from other works.

Speer: This has been clarified already by an ordinance and a letter from me to Sauckel; from the coal pits, the foundries and the Ivan-program as such no labor will be extracted, and from the age groups only the auxiliary laborers who can be taken at the spot from the 3 - 4 age groups in question.

Kehrl: In this case the labor again will be taken from agriculture.

Speer: In relation to the whole of the population the number employed by the "Mountain Foundry East" is immaterial.

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Timm: The Gauleiter returned this morning after he spent 7 days on the other side, and told me on the telephone he had spoken there with all competent authorities and they promised him to deliver until August a number not far below 1 million, consisting of men and women. Nobody can predict how many will be men.

Kehrl: The far greater number will be women.

Speer: These women we can use in the Reich. There are a great number of Russian Ps/W and laborers who are employed at places where they need not be employed. There can be an exchange. The only thing is to do this with unskilled workers, and not to take the workers from the industry where they were trained with difficulty.

Page 2114.

Kehrl: Where we are late in completion of a task, or where we lose an opportunity, we can make up for it. But any coal which we cannot haul at once, is definitely lost for use in this war. This is why we cannot do enough to force the allotment to the pits.

Speer: But not by forcible actions in smashing what we toilsomely built.

(Kehrl: We need not do that!) You ought to add the conscripted labor.

Timm: We must endeavour to get German men for working at the coal-face.

Kehrl: We subsist on foreigners who live in Germany.

Timm: These men are concentrated within a very small area. Otherwise there might be trouble in this sector.

Speer: There is a specified statement showing in what sectors the Russian Ps/W have been distributed, and this statement is quite interesting. It shows that the armaments industry only received 30%. I always complained about this.

Timm: The highest percentage of Ps/W are Frenchmen, and one ought not to forget, that it is difficult to employ them at the coal face. The number of Russians living within the Reich is small.

Rohland: In the mines one should exclusively use eastern people, not western ones.

Speer: The western men collapse!

Sogemeier: May I point out how much we are on the way down? In comparison with the end of February, before the start of the SE-action, we lost every day 40,000 T of pit-coal, only because we did not get replacements for the allotment promised to us; we were supposed to have our losses replaced in the proportion of 2 for 0. The proportion is still 1 for 1.

Page 2115.

Speer: I have been given a note according to which the mines received in the first quarter of 1943, therefore at the same time when the call-ups took place, an additional 18,000 men.

Sogemeier: At the beginning of the year we had still to receive out of earlier demands about 26,000 men. To that number there are to be added 26,000 men owing to the SE-action, if we take a proportion of 1 for 1. The Central Planning had promised us in March 15,000 men for use in a planned increase of haulage. Altogether we received only 18,000 men. This means that in fact we had not even the remainder of the request for the preceding year, and

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moreover that we had not yet received replacements for the SE-action in proportion of 1 for 1. Now Field Marshal Keitel wants to know whether the mining industry was in a position to release another 14,000 men. In our present situation this is entirely out of the question. If we lose another 14,000 men they could be taken only from the most vigourous age groups of the coal face workers. It is easy to calculate to what extent the haulage would go down in such a case. We urgently ask to protect us from further calling-up in the mining industry.

Speer: At least it cannot be undertaken until replacement labor is available in such a way that they all have been trained. It cannot be done at a moment's notice.

Kehrl: Before August we cannot discuss such a thing. A decrease of 40,000 tons a day means a yearly deficit of 14 million tons.

Page 2116.

Speer: Timm will find out in collaboration with Weger and the District Economy Office ("Landeswirtschaftsaemter") where Russians suitable for mining are still employed as auxiliary laborers. They will be exchanged man for man against Russian women or other replacements received by us and suitable for their work, and the Russians will be turned over to the mining industry. I would only be preferable to make a preliminary examination of these men, since of the people engaged we always found only one half of them to be really suitable. The pre-examination of these men in the factories should set a stricter standard. After the final numbers have been found out and discussed with Timm, a detailed statement has to be prepared for use in the Reich Marshal's conference.

Sogemeier: May I put a question connected with this matter? Russians are still being combed-out from the mining industry who had been more or less trained metal-workers. This leads to difficulties, since Russian prisoners of war, when they learn of this fact, come forward at once and state they had been metal workers.

Speer: The intention was to comb out these Russians solely for use in the industry which services the needs of the mining industry. This is clearly stated with regard to the mines. In that case you surely have no objections?

Sogemeier: No, if the industry which serves the mines, is receiving them, I do not object.

Kehrl: In case of doubt the serving industry is not getting them! As soon as they are discovered, the Russians are snatched away for more urgent work. For instance, we have experienced that people while being on their way to us, have been redirected when they had arrived in Cologne. Only a certain percentage of them arrives as a rule, a rather high percentage is taken away for different use.

Page 2117.

Speer: But the number of men released as metal workers is established. Therefore, it must be possible to find out how many of these men have arrived at the serving industry. You are able to find that out, Mr. Sogemeier. We on our part had agreed with Sauckel that they are to be extracted solely for the serving industry. This was in compliance with Pleiger's express request to that effect.

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Page 2122, line 17.

Speer: In any case we ought to force the coal production with all our power.

H1126-0236

Speer (Cont'd).

I now have here a statement on the distribution of the Soviet prisoners. There are 368,000 altogether. Of these are: 101,000 in agriculture, 94,000 in the mining industry - who are not available in any case, - 15,000 in the building materials industry, 26,000 in iron and metal production where they cannot be estracted either, 29,000 in the manufacture of

H1126-0237

iron, stell, and metal goods, 63,000 in the manufacture of machines, boilers, and cars, and similar appliances, which means in armaments industry and 10,000 in the chemical industry. Agriculture this has received by far the most of them, and the men employed ttere could in the course of time be exchanged for women. The 90,000 Russian P/W's employed in the whole of the armaments industry are for the greatest part skilled men, if you can extract 8 - 10,000 men from there, it would already be the limit.

Kehrl: Would it not be possible to add Serbians, etc.?

Sogemeier: We ought not to mix too much.

Rohland: For God's sake, no Serbians! We had very bad experiences with mixing.

Speer: We distribute by starting from a production of 290 million tons which is quite considerable. If the conditions on which such a production can be reached cannot be fulfilled this will influence the supply of household coal to a very great extent. This we ought to point out to Sauckel, viz. that the paychological effect on the population will be a considerable one in case he cannot provide the necessary labor.

Meinberg: Especially since the transports of laborers always arrive 1½ months later than promised; for this means a loss of 10% production intended to be accomplished by the additional laborers. In that case the 290 million tons can never be reached, but 280 million at the most. The delay alone in supplying the lavor has that effect.

Speer: What are your proposals for our further action, Kehr.?

Kehrl: If the labor supply is secured by appropiate measures we have no problem as to its distribution. This problem fo distribution, however, is insulable, if we have to distribute the labor for a production of less than 295 million tons, i. e. , if we produce less than 282 million tons. According to what Timm just said and what we have discussed, we shall not reach our goal. He wants to take 22,000 men from inner Germany, moreover 10,000 Russians P/Ws, altogether 32 000. To supply the rest, we wait for God in Heaven and the General Government. Judging by our earlier EXperiance we shall not get them. The gentlemen of the General had to cancel the recruitment owing to the danger for their lives, since they were unable to recruit at all in certain areas. The least we have to reckon with are therefore great delays, and each delay means great loss of prodduction because there is less hauling.

Timm: All these numbers are estimates, and nobody can guarantee their correctness. I made a point of mentioning the difficulties. But I am enough of an optimist to believe that we shall be able to attain these numbers. I also said we hope to supply in May the outstanding labor from the General Government despite all the difficulties. If one estimates pessimistically one never arrives at a conclusion.

H1126-0238

Kehrl: Our risk with regard to coal, however, is too great. All honor to the optimist, but it seems out of the question that we could get as much as we need. We cannot afford to take a risk in this matter.

Speer: Who is in a position to give you a guarantee for a 100% certainty?

Kehrl: We have to employ the men who are already in this country. This is the only possible guarantee.

(Speer: Absolutely out of the question)

In relation to the number of men already working for us the 20 000 to 30 000 men whom we wish to extract are a very small number. They are of decisive importance for the entire industry. We employ altogether 24 million men. If we extract 25 000 directly from our people, this does mean nothing for the manufactures, but would decisively benefit the whole of industry.

Page 2125

Speer: Out of the question!

Schieber: In my opinion the General Commissioner for Labor ought to proceed in the following manner: action to bring about the immediate release of at least 30 000 laborers from agriculture who will be supplied to the coal mines. In exchange, agriculture which is anyway in urgent need of additional female labor, receives any female labor who arrive. In my opinion the mines today can be supplied only from the sole real reserve of vigorous foreign men which we still have, viz. from agriculture. These men are also well fed and able to do real work.

Speer: Everything depends on the amount of the influx from abroad.

Schieber: If anyway nothing arrives, the mines certainly will get nothing.

Timm: Gauleiter Sauckel is perfectly convinced that the transports will be on their way within a short time. Now the front has been consolidated at last.

Schieber: We ought to be grateful that the weather has allowed the farmer to keep things going in some way despite the little labor being available to him. For the farmer, the coal supply is just as important as for the whole of the armaments industry. When we discuss tomorrow the nitrogen problem we shall see the same: our first need is coal.

Koerner: On the 1st of April we had in agriculture a deficit of about 600 000 laborers. It had been planned to cover it by supplying labor from the east, mainly women. These laborers will first have to be supplied until other laborers are released from agriculture. We are

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just entering the season where the heaviest work in the fields has to be done, for which many laborers are necessary. Much labor is needed for the hoeing of the fruits, and it is to be hoped that this year the harvest can be started early which would be rendered much more difficult if an exchange of labor would have to take place.

Kehrl: Relatively considered, agriculture is much better provided with labor than the mines. They are still able to undertake improvements which they could not have undertaken in peace-time. We of the mines, on the other hand, have to fight for 20 to 30 000 men. It should not be possible to raise this number out of the 24 millions? The mines are in a bad position because they can use only certain categories of workers. They are fed with hopes of the men promised from the General Government or of Russians. But if these men do not arrive?

Sogemeier: The 30 000 men are but replacements for the men extracted by the SE-action. If we get them we can just haul 260 million tons, in

the best possible case, 275 tons. Therefore, we need more men than the 30 000.

Kehrl: I meant this number in an additional sense: added 30 000 men to those expected from the General Government.

Speer: How is the situation in the Protectorate, Mr. Timm? Can we not extract anything from there?

Timm: Discussions on this question had been planned, but were cancelled because of the intended shifting of orders for manufacture in the Protectorate.

Page 2127

Speer: Despite this shifting, the manpower reservoir is still of such size that some could be extracted. Apart from this, we are not in a position to shift orders at wish, but we are already hampered by the power question.

Timm: This is exactly what we expected. But the discussions planned to take place in Prague, have been cancelled.

Speer: The local authorities always maintain that nothing can be released.

Timm: We wanted the discussions in Prague, since we had examined the position and found out that there are far too many skilled workers in some places and that many workers could be extracted. But subsequently we were told by the Ministry, the conference was cancelled because the shifting made it necessary to employ all available labor.

Weger: General Daluege and Gauleiter Sauckel especially wished that you, Mr. Minister, took part in the conference. I

H1126-0240

H1126-0241

agree with Timm, and told Hoersekamp that I do not doubt he could release labor from the General Government despite the shifting, because the power question will not be solved in the Protectorate until next year and the year after. Until that time he cannot even use so much labor. Therefore he ought to release some in any case.

Milch: We ought to except certain areas of the Protectorate to which the orders are being directed, and nothing extract there until a surplus is found out subsequently. For the time being it cannot be ascertained. There are enough other areas of the Protectorate which are not affected by the industry plan and some labor could be extracted from them at once. We ought to name the places which are excepted from our action.

Timm: In this the authorities on the other side ought to participate; they are in the best position to tell the places from where nothing must be extracted.

Milch: If one proceeds as I proposed, and Timm agreed to it, no damage can be done. This ought to be done in any case. For the rest I completely agree: we must now supply the mines with labor. The greatest part of labor which we can supply from the East will indeed be women. But the eastern women are quite accustomed to agricultural work, and especially to the type of work which has to be done these coming weeks, the hoeing and transplanting of turnips etc. The women are quite suitable for this. One thing has to be considered: first you must supply agriculture with the women, then you can extract the men, laborer for laborer. It is not the right thing if first the men are taken away and the farmers are left without labor for 4 to6 weeks. If the women arrive after such time they arrive too late.

Speer: Beyond this we are prepared to release from all parts of the war economy, in exchange for women, any Russian Ps/W or other Russian who is employed as auxiliary laborer.

no signature.

H1126-0242

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
OFFICE OF US CHIEF OF COUNSEL
(cont.)

The Commissioner for the Four Year Plan
Central Planning

Berlin W 8, 24th Une 1943
3, Leipziger Strasse

Z.P.148

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State Top Secret

Results of the 42nd session of the Central Planning Board, on the 23rd June 143. 16 hrs.

Coal situation

The man-power situation in the coal mining industry, particularly in the hard coal mining industry, is still unsatisfactory, and necessitates an extension of the measures decided upon at the 36th session of the Central Planning Board, held on the 22nd April 1943.

The intensive discussion yielded as the most expedient solution the use of Russian prisoners of war to fill the existing vacancies. The more homogeneous character of the shifts will bring about the necessary higher output resulting both from an increased capacity of such shifts and particularly from a restriction of fluctuations.

1. The present drve, which is to be carried out throughout the German economy proper, aims both at freeing Russian labor, fit for work in the mining industry and actually not employed as semi-skilled workmen, and at replacing it by additionally imported labor consisting of Eastern workers, Poles, etc. Thus, about 50,000 workmen are expected to be made available up to the end of July 1943. This drive is to be accelerated.

Furthermore as an immediate measure it should be suggested to the Fuehrer -- RVK (Reichvereinigung Kohle, Reich Coal Association) and GBA (Generalbevollmaechtigter fuer den Arbeitseinsatz, General Commissioner for Labor) submitting the necessary figures for the statement to the Fuehrer, that 200,000 Russian prisoners fit for the heaviest work be made available from the Wehrmacht and Waffen SS through the intermediary of the Chiefs of the Army Groups (Heeresgruppenchefts). The prisoners will be selected on the spot by medical officers of the mining industry and officials of the office of the Commissioner General for Labor Control (GBA) will take charge of them there and tehn. Provisions are to be made for an extension of this program in order to satisfy any demand for man power, which will have accumulated up to the end of the year 1943.

The man power needed by the mining transport industry (Berbau-Zubringer-Industrie) and by the iron-producing industry (Eisenschaffende Industrie) may be supplied from that same source provided that the necessities of the coal mining industry have previously been adjusted.

The performance of the Soviet Russians so employed is to be raised by a premium system (Praemien-system). For this purpose, the ban on pay restrictions is to be lifted and the manager (Betriebsfuehrer) be allowed to distribute amongst the workmen, according to his duty and discretion, RM1. - per head per day as premium for particular services renderd.

Furthermore, care will be taken, that workmen can exchange these preimiums, which will be paid out in camp money (Lagergeld) for goods. It is intended to put at their disposal various provisions (e.g. sunflower seeds, etc.) beer, tobacco, cigarettes and cigars, small items for daily use, etc.

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
OFFICE OF US CHIEF OF COUNSEL
(cont.)

The Reich Ministry of Food (Rem - Reichs-Ernaehrungs-Ministrium) in conjunction with the Reich Associaton "Coal" (RV "Kohle") and the Reich Ministry of Economic Affairs (RWM - Reichs*Wirtschafts-Ministerium) will clarify the question whether further improvement can be granted as far as rations are concerned.

2. Equally in occupied countries, labor is to be tied more sucurely to the various factories by means of the distribution of additional ration cards as premium for good services. This refers in particular to the Government General (Generalgouvernment) and the occupied territories in the east (Ostgebiete). The output demanded of the Government General is to be fixed at t the proposed amount, and the additional rations for armament workers may then b be rated accordingly.

Dr. Gramsch
(typewritten signature)

Present:

Reichsminister Speer	
Generalfeldmarschall Milch	
Staatsrat Schieber	Reich Ministry for Armament and Ammuition
Oberburgmeister Liebel	"
Major General Waeger	"
Dr. Ing. Groener	"
Praesident Kehrl	Reich Ministry of Economic Affairs
Min.Dir. Gramsch	Four Year Plan
Min. Dirig.Timm	Commissioner General's Office for Labor Control (GBA)
Staatsrat Pleiger	Reich Association "Coal" (RVK)
Dr. Sogemeier	"
Dr. Rosenkranz	"

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Stenographic Transcript
of the
53rd C o n f e r e n c e of the
Central Planning

Concerning Supply of Labor
on Fegruary 16, 1944 10 o'clock
in the Reich Air Ministry

1863 (Present : Milch (for Central Planning), Dehrle, Berk, etc.)

Milch:

The armament industry employs foreign workmen to a large extent: according to the latest figures - 40%. The new directions by the Plenipotentiary General for Manpower are mostly foreigners and we lost a lot of German personnel which was called up. Specially the air industry being a young industry employs a great many young people who should be called up. This will be very difficult as is easily seen if one deducts those working for experimental stations. In mass production the foreign workers by far prevail. It is about 95% and higher. Our best new engine is made 88% by Russian prisoners of war and the other 12% by German men and women. 50 - 60 Ju 52's which we now regard only as transport planes are made per month. Only 6 - 8 German men are working on this machine: The rest are Ukrainian women who have beaten all the records of trained workers.

.....,.....
.....,.....

1873 Milch: The list of the shirkers should be entrusted to Himmler's trustworthy hands who will make them work alright. This is very important for educating people and has also a deterrent effect on such others who would likewise feel inclined to shirk.

.....
.....

1913 Milch: .....
.....It is, therefore not possible to exploit fully all the foreigners unless we compell them by piece work or we have the possibility of taking measures against foreigners who arenot doing their bit. But if the foreman lays hands on a prisoner of war or smacks him there is at once a terrible row, the man is put into prison etc. There are sufficient officials in Germany who think it their most important duty to stand up for human rights instead of war production. I am also for human rights. But if a Frenchman says: "You fellows will all be hanged and the chief of the factory will be beheaded first" and if then the chief says "I am going to hit him" then he is in a mess. He is not protected, but the "poor fellow" who said that to him is protected. I have told my engineers "I am going to punish you if you don't hit such a man; the more you do in this respect the more I shall praise you. I shall see to it that nothing happens to you" This is not yet sufficiently known. I cannot talk to all factory-leaders. I should like to see the man who stays my
1914 arm because I can settle accounts with everybody who stays my arm. If the little factory-leader does that he is put into a concentration camp and runs the risk of losing the prisoners of war. In one case two Russian officers took off with an airplane but crashed. I ordered that these two men be hanged at once. They were hanged or shot yesterday. I left that to the SS. I expressed the wish to have them hanged in the factory for the others to see.

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title page

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. R-124
CONTINUED
State Top Secret

Stenographic Notes
of the
22nd Conference
of the
Central Planning

Concerning the Direction of Labor on Monday 2 November 1942 at 1200 hours in the Air Ministry

Page 1042, line 24:

"Milch:, I believe that agriculture must get its labor quota. Assuming we could have given agriculture 100,000 more men; we would now have 100,000more men who would be more or less well fed, while actually the human material which we receive generally —above all the Ps/W—are not in good enough condition for work"

Secret

Stenographic Transcript of the
23rd Conference of the
Central Planning
concerning Iron Quotas

Held on 3 November 1942, 1600hours in the Reich Ministry for Armament and Munitions , Berlin, Pariser Platz 3

Extract from page 1024, line 10:

(
Speer: Well, through the industry, we could deceive the French by telling them that we would release for their use all prisoners of war who are rolling mill worders and smelters if they would only give us the names.
Rohland: We have established our own office in Paris. I see, you mean, the French should report the smelters who are prisoners of war in Germany.
Milch: I would simply say you get two men in exchange for one of these.
Speer: The French firms know exactly which prisoners of war are smelters. Unofficially, you should create the impression that they would be releases. They give the names and then we hat a hold of them. Do that.
Rohland: That is an idea!

1928

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124 (Cont'd)

Secret.

Top State Secret!

Shorthand Minutes of the

33rd C o n f e r e n c e of the

C e n t r a l P l a n n i n g B o a r d

concerning: Labor Supply
on February 16th, 1943 at 16 hrs.
at the Reich Ministry for Armament and Munitions.
s, Pariser Platz, B e r l i n

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pages
2278-2281

T h i m m: I should like to say something about the labor supply possibilities. Perhaps you will permit me to emphasize the negative side a little. The greatest difficulties result from the fact that the supply of labor outstanding could not be fully dispatched from the East, but came in in ever diminishing numbers. One may say that they have almost become completely exhausted. Eastern laborers during the last six weeks arrived only in smaller numbers than in former times, so that they can hardly be included to an appreciable amount on the credit side of the supply account. In any case their numbers are small. The foremost reason is that in former months most transports were dispatched from the Ukraine while the main recruitment areas were those which in the meantime had become operational areas, or even were no longer in our hands. The forecasts we made applied to a large extent to the transport of people from the Caucasus district, the Juban, from areas like Stalingrad etc. These possibilities no longer exist. We have prepared measures which should enable us to draw more Eastern workers again during the following months. I venture to think that we should be able, on a conservative calculation, to transfer during the month of March between 150 000 and 200 000 laborers from the East to the West.

(S p e e r: Including or excluding those needed for agriculture?)

Including those needed for agriculture. But in my opinion it will be necessary to apply much pressure, since just those districts are concerned which have been pacified to a certain extent, and for the same reason will not be very much inclined to release labor. This is calculated on the assumption that some labor has to be released also from the eastern and northern parts of the East.

The second area, capable of releasing a considerable amount of labor is the General Government, and that for the January estimate which has been drawn up with particular caution as I again wish to emphasize. We expect that the figures will rather be surpassed than not reached. I think we can expect a number of 40,000, of which, it is true, a part will have to be given to agriculture, if we intend no more than to cover the losses which we had to inflict last autumn.

Beyond this it ought to be possible in my opinion, to employ within the Reich, and especially for the mining industry, part of the Polish Building Service. I venture to think one ought to enlarge this organization in such a way that more age groups than so far are called up for it, since this procedure is functioning. The younger age groups which in fact are especially suited for mining could be dispatched to the Reich. In this case the supervisors who are provided for the greatest part by the Building Service, will be needed only in very small numbers in the Reich.

H1126-0246

H1126-0247

The next area would be the Protectorate on which I cannot make a final statement today. We have been promised for the month of March about 10,000 laborers. But I am of the opinion that some loosening-up is possible. The Commissioner will soon in a personal visit take in hand the possibility of this loosening-up.

France is included in the account with 100 000 laborers for March. Messages which I received permit us to hope that this number will be increased in the middle of March. Belgium is included with 40,000, Holland with 30,000, Slovakia with 20,000, who, it is true, are exclusively suited for agriculture, since their share of individual workers has been completely delivered. This item consists exclusively of agricultural laborers, owing to a State treaty. For the remaining part of the foreign areas I included another 10,000. This amounts altogether to 400,000 laborers who should arrive in March. One might be entitled to add for the last month altogether 10,000 prisoners of war. These are men to be drawn from the East. It can be expected that this number might under certain conditions be surpassed, since the High Command intends especially for operational reasons, to take the prisoners of war back to the Reich, particularly from the areas threatened by the enemy. A former item concerns the fluctuation of labor which certainly amounts to about 100,000 laborers. Then there are items which at the moment cannot be estimated: the yield from the threatened areas and from the "Stoppage-action". Here I cannot venture to name final figures, but I hope to be able to do so next month.

S a u c k e l: Of course we regret very much that last autumn we were unable to recruit as much as we would have liked in the areas which now are again in enemy hands. This is partly due to the fact that we were not assisted in the degree we had expected. Moreover we were not able to effect the removal of the civil population which had been planned. These events are an urgent reminder of the fact that it is necessary to employ foreign laborers at once and in great numbers in Germany proper and in the actual armaments industry. You may be certain that we wish to achive this. We have not the slightest interest in creating difficulties for an armaments office, even for those working for German interest abroad, by taking labor away from them to an unreasonable extent. But on this occasion I should like to ask you to try and understand our procedure. We Germans surely have sent to the front between 50 and 75% of our skilled workers. A part of them has been killed while the nations subjugated by us need no longer shed their blood. Thus they can preserve their entire capacity with regard to skilled workers, inasmuch as they have not been transferred to Germany which is the case only for a much smaller percentage than all of us supposed, and in fact they do use them partly for manufacturing things which are not in the least important for the German war economy. If we proceed energetically against this abuse, I ask you to give me credit for so much reason that I do not intend to damage the foreign interests of the German armaments industry. The quality of the foreign worker is such that it cannot be compared with that of the German worker. But even then I intend to create a similar proportion between skilled and workers trained for their job, as it exists in Germany by force of tradition, since it has come about that we had to send men to the front in much larger numbers than we requested France or any other country to do. Moreover we shall endeavour increasingly to bring about on a generous scale the adaptation of the French, Polish, and Czech workers. I do not see for the moment any necessity for limiting the use of foreign labor. The only thing I ask for is that we understand each other, so that the immense difficulties and friction between the respective authorities disappear and the program drawn up by us will by no means be frustrated by such things.

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Pg 30

2283 There are without a doubt still enough men in France, Holland, Belgium, the Protectorate, and the General Government to meet our labor demands for the next months. I confess that I expect more success from such a procedure with respect to heavier work or for work where shifts of 10 or more hours are customary, than from relying on the use of German women and men exclusively. We shall have better success by proceeding this way provided the foreign workers still obey, which remains a risk we always run, than by using weaker German women and girls as labor in places of very important armament work, where foreigners may be used for security reasons. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .

2284 The situation in France is this; after I and my assistants had succeeded after difficult discussions in inducing Laval to introduce the Service Act this act has now been enlarged, owing to ourpressure so that already yesterday three French age groups have been called up. We are now therefore legally and with the assistance of the French government entitled torecruit laborers in France from three age groups, whom we can use in French factories in the future, but of whom we may choose some for our use in Germany and send them to Germany. I think in France the ice is now broken. According to reports received they now have begun to think about a possible
2285 breakthrough by the Bolscheviks and the dangers which thereby threaten Europe. The resistance which the French Government has hitherto shown, is diminishing. Within the next days I shall go to France in order to set the whole thing into motion, so that the losses the East may be somewhat balanced by increasing recruitment and calling-up in France.

If we receive comprehensive lists in time, we shall, I think, be able to cover all demands by dispatching in March 800,000 laborers.

S p e e r: Recruitment abroad as such is supported by us. We only fear very much that the skilled workers extracted from the occupied countries do not always reach the appropriate factories in Germany. It might certainly be better if we acted in such a way that the parent firms of Germany which work with the French and Czech factories would comb out the foreign works more than before for their own use.

S a u c k e l: We made an agreement with Field Marshal Milch. You will get the factories which are urgently needed for your airplane motors, etc.; these will be completely safeguarded. In the same way I promised Admiral of the Fleet Doneitz today that the U-Boat repair firms proper are absolutely safeguarded. We shall even be able to provide our own armament factories on French soil with labor extracted from French factories, in the main from the unoccupied territory where there still are metal works which have their full complement of skilled workers without even having been touched so far.

2286 H i l d e b r a n d t: May I point out at this point that we have to put up with the loss of the Italian workers this year. This, according to present discussions, concerns 300,000 men altogether, or 15 to 20,000 a month. If we deduct the first installment, the remaining ones to a great part are just highly skilled metal workers.

S a u c k e l: This is a request of the Fuehrer, but he has not yet finally decided.

H i l d e b r a n d t: But we have been told to be prepared to lose these men.

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S p e e r: We ourselves quite support the combing-out abroad. On the other hand we must be entitled - and this was agreed - to exclude or prefer particular kinds of work, e.g. the armour factories. In France we are more and more turning towards giving up finishing processes, and stressing the sub-contracting. It is the foundries and similar works, e.g. for the use of the aluminum industry, which we wish to use to capacity. We could force the production of Opel, so that in this case Peugeot who manufacture the forged parts for Opel, the parent firm, might demand more labor for this while the rest of their workers would be taken over by Opel

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2292 M i l c h: With regard to France there is in France an industry which manufactures complete aeroplane motors and spare parts. We have transferred to France the manufacture of everything which can be made there without impairing secrecy. These are training planes, transport planes, etc. However since we wish to make better
2293 use of these possibilities we have transferred to a great extent the manufacturing of parts. The complete product must be kept secret from the French; but in every secret appliance there are only a few parts which in fact are to be kept secret. The bulk is made up of the other parts; their manufacture has been transferred to France to a great extent, in the same manner we have started the employment of many construction engineers there. Today there is continuous work in France for several thousand construction engineers. The industry which works in France for our benefit, needs today 20,000 men who must be provided by us, in order to fulfill the program. The production lags far behind the program agreed upon. While we fulfill in Germany the whole of the program, it is being met in France by only 30%. True, it is now on the increase since we intervened during the last weeks and months. On principle we have kept the State out of this collaboration with French industry, and have had the German firms deal with the French (firms). They are called sponsor firms so that now this system works. This system has not been completed everywhere, but it is on the way all over, and we have had rather good results. We are often told we have almost the whole of Europe at our disposal. But the production which we receive from France is insignificant, except for army cars. The whole potential French production is not used by us so far, but only a small percentage. If we were not forced to produce in France, since many facilities, rooms, machines, etc, cannot be transferred to Germany, if the housing of workers were not so difficult, etc.,
2294 then we might prefer to transfer everything to Germany and let all work be done here. But we would have too great losses in production apart from the restiveness of the men. Yesterday we made an agreement. I am very grateful that this matter will now be put right on the spot by you, Gauleiter Sauckel, together with General Von Der Heyde and Colonel Brueckner. It is most difficult to get French laborers to Germany. These things cannot be decided or regulated by authorities, but only a sponsor firm has the necessary means of finding out about it. I therefore propose to make use of sponsor firms, especially since in France the system of sub-contracting is very much developed. Behind a factory which organises the whole business, as far as is known from the outside, there are in fact other factories employed in preparation and semi-fabrication. But our sponsor firms would be able to comb-out these sub-contractors as well. We ought to charge our people with combing out all these firms and to find out what men work for our program. Who does not will be snatched by us.

2297 Of course a front exists somewhere in the East. This front will be held for a certain time. The only thing which the Russians inherit, if we evacuate an area is the population. The question is whether we had not better make it a rule to take the population back first as far as 100 km. to the rear of the front. All the civil

H1126-0250

population will be taken back 100 km behind the front. There are no trenches now for which labor would be needed.

T i m m: We tried to take the population of Cherkow back. But the officer commanding the fortress of Charkow requested 90 - 120,000 people only for the construction of field works so that we had to provide even complete railway trains.

W e g e r: They were even undertaking demolitions.

M i l c h: But this is done by the Engineers. Any hope of getting prisoners of war from the East, hardly exists today.

S a u c k e l: If any prisoners are taken there, they will be needed.

2298

M i l c h: We have made a request for an order that a certain percentage of men in the A.A. Artillery must be Russians. 50,000 will be taken altogether; 30,000 are already employed as gunners. This is an amusing thing that Russians must work the guns. The last 20,000 are still outstanding. Yesterday I received a letter from the Army High Command, in which they say they could release not a single man, they themselves have not enough. Thus this measure will not be successful for us.

Pg 33

EXTRACTS

on the subject of

DEPORTATIONS and FORCED LABOR

FROM SPEER'S

MINUTES

ON HIS MEETINGS WITH HITLER

H1126-0251

Pg 34

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
Continued

Fuehrer-Protokolle 1942

19th August 1942.

P. 514

Record of conferences with the
Fuehrer on 10, 11 and 12 August 1942

42.)

Gauleiter Saukel promises to make Russian labor available for the fulfillment of the iron and coal program and reports that -- if required -- he can supply a further million Russian laborers for the German armament industry up to and including Oct. 1942. So far, he has already supplied 1 million for industry and 700,000 for agriculture. In this connection the Fuehrer states that the problem of providing labor can be solved in all cases and to any extent; he authorizes Gauleiter Saukel to take all measures required.

He would agree to any necessary compulsion (Zwangsmassnahmen) in the East as well as in the West if this question could not be solved on a voluntary basis.

signed Speer

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Fuehrer-Protokolle 1942
pp. 477-478

Berlin, 29 Sept. 1942

Minutes of conferences with
the Fuehrer on September 20th, 21st and 22 1942

13-14

36) I pointed out to the Fuehrer that, apart from an insignificant amount of work, no possibility exists of organizing armament-production in the concentration camps, because

1) the machine tools required are missing

2) there are no suitable premises.

Both these assets would be available in the armaments industry, if use ould be made of them by a second shift.

The Fuehrer agrees to my proposal, that the numerous factories set up outside towns for ARP reasons, should release their workers for supplementing the second shift in town factories and should in return be supplied with labor from the concentration camps - also two shifts.

I pointed out to the Fuehrer the difficulties which I expect to encounter if Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler should be able, as he requests, to exercise authoritative influence over these factories. - The Fuehrer, too, does not consider such an influence necessary.

The Fuehrer however agrees that Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler should draw advantages from making his prisonners available; he should get equipment for his division.

I suggest to give him a share in kind (war equipment) in ratio to the working-hours done by his prisoners. A 3-5% share is discussed, the equipment also being calculated according to working hours. The Fuehrer would agree to such a solution.

The Fuehrer is prepared to order the additional delivery of this equipment and weapons to the SS, according to a list submitted to him.

signed Speer

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
Continued

H1126-0253

STATE TOP SECRET

Berlin 10 July 1943

pp 252-253

Discussion with the Fuehrer
8 July 1943

17) The Fuehrer laid down in the coal discussion that 70,000 Russian prisoners of war fit for mining work should be sent each month to the mines. He also pointed out that an approximate minimum of 150,000 - 200,000 fit Russian prisoners of war must be earmarked for the mines in order to obtain the required number of men suitable for this work.

If the Russian prisoners of war cannot be released by the Army, the male population in the partisan infested areas should without distinction be proclaimed prisoners of war and sent off to the mines.

The Fuehrer ordered at the same time that these prisoners of war who are not fit for the mines should immediately be placed in the iron industry, in manufacturing and supply industries and in the armament industry.

The Fuehrer further ordered that he should receive a monthly report giving

A) the total number of Russian prisoners of war.

B) the number of Russian prisoners of war fit for mining,

who have been made available for the mines and a report addressed to Field Marshal Keitel as to why the remainder could not be used.

The joint report of Sauckel and Pleiger is also to be sent to me.

signed Speer

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p. 168

Ministeramt (Minister's Office)

Records of the discussions
in the Fuehrer Head Quarters
on the 6th and 7th December 1943

22) Reported to the Fuehrer on a proposal worked out by Dr. Carl, relating to "Aktion Russland" (Action Russia) and left detailed data to him for examination. The Fuehrer points out again that my suggestion was good, that only a surprise-action is worthwhile and that subdivision into three separate actions, as proposed by the Luftwaffe, does not appear suitable.

signed Speer

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p. 139

State Top Secret

Points from the Conference (Saur) with
the Fuehrer on the 5th March 1944, jointly
with General Field Marschall Milch, General
der Flieger Bodenschatz, Oberst Von Below Berlin, 6th March 1944

18) "Told the Fuehrer of the Reich Marshal's wish for the further untilisation of the production power of prisoners of way by giving the direction of the Stalag to the S.S. with the exception of the English and Americans. The Fuehrer considers the proposal good and has asked Colonel Von Below to arrange matters accordingly."

Prepared by Saur
Seen by Speer

H1126-0254

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p. 132

Minutes of Discussions with
the Fuehrer
on 6th and 7th April 1944

State Secret

The Director of the
Technical Office
TA Ch S/Kr.

Berlin, 9th April 1944.

17) "Suggested to the Fuehrer that, due to lack of builders and equipment, the second big building project should not be set up in German territory, but in close vicinity to the border on suitable soil (preferable on gravel base and with transport facilities) on French, Belgian or Dutch territory. The Fuehrer agrees to this suggestion if the works could be set up behind a fortified zone. For the suggestion of setting this plant up in French territory speaks mainly the fact that it would be much easier to procure the necessary workers. Nevertheless, the Fuehrer asks an attempt be made to set up the second works in a safer area, namely in the Protectorate. If it should prove impossible there too, to get hold of the necessary workers, the Fuehrer himself will contact the Reichsfuehrer 'SS' and will give an order that the required 100,000 men are to be made available by bringing in Jews from Hungary. Stressing the fact that the building organization of the (Industriegemeinschaft Schlesien Silesia) was a failure, the Fuehrer demands that these works must be built by the O.T. exclusively and that the workers should be made available by the Reichsfuehrer 'SS'. He wants to hold a meeting shortly in order to discuss details with all the men concerned.

signed Speer

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H1126-0255

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
Continued

R37

EXTRACTS

on the subject of

DEPORTATIONS AND FORCED LABOR

FROM SPEER'S MINUTES

on

MEETINGS OF "CENTRAL PLANNING"

Pg 38

Reichsminister Speer
Minister's Office

Berlin 24 July 1942
Dr. Goe/W

SECRET

3059 Report on the 11. Conference of the "Central Planning" on the 22nd July 1942

H1126-0256

Present:

Reichsminister Speer	
General Field Marshal Milch	
State Secretary Koerner.	
Commercial Advisor Roechling	Reich Iron
Dr. Rohland	Association
Dr. Von Bohlenu. Halbach	"
Dr. Langen	"
Bergass A.D. Sohl	"
Gauleiter Sauckel	Commissioner for Labor Control
State Secretary Backe	Reich Food Ministry
General Director Pleiger	Reich Coal Association
Dr. Fischer	" "
Major General V. Gablenz.	Reich Air Ministry
Herr Kranefuss	" " "
Ministerial Director Gramsch	4 Yours Plan
Ministerial Advisor V. Normann	" " "
Dr. Schieber	Reich Ministry for Armaments
Dr. Stellwaag	& Munitions
Major Wagner	" " "
Major General Becht	" " "
Lieutenant Colonel V. Nicolai	" " "
Ministerial Advisor Dr. Wissmann	" " "
Herr Schlieker	" " "
Dr. Goerner	" " "

At the conference following on the 10th meeting - the provisions for the increased iron production were discussed.

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Assurance of Food Supplies.

A net influx of one million foreign workers is estimated. This figure has not been achieved in the previous months. Even with an intake of more than one million in the coming months the million-boundary willnot 6 3060 be overstepped in view of current departures. For this the food supply is assured. How far an improvement of the food supplies positions can be made possible through sharper grasp of the production outside Germany ------

(Page 3061 missing).

(Page 3062 commences in the middle of a word i.e. ten Tag -----)

(every?) day a train load of the forces working in the east (will be) directed to the coal mines until the figure of 6,000 is achieved. Prisoners of war are being obtained, at present, from camps in the General Government. 51,000 prisoners of war in the Senne-Camp. In the district east of the General Government there are 74,000 prisoners of war available. Up till now an elimination quota of 50% of unemployable people has been reckoned with in the allocations to coal mining. It is considered necessary that not

too high demands should be placed on the choice of prisoners of war. The Miners' Union Doctors (Knappschats Arzte) are to be informed that a different standard is to be laid down for the prisoners of war than for German miners.

For the consecutive order in which the prisoners of war are to be put to work, it will be laid down, that before the metal workers are chosen, the coal mining in the first place and requirements for the loading and unloading-commands in the second place are to be considered.

General Field Marshal Milch undertakes to accelerate the procuring of the Russian prisoners of war from the camps.

Signed: Dr. Eng. Goerner
(Typewritten)

* * * * * * * * * * *

The Trustee for the Four Years Plan — Berlin 30th October 1942.

Central Planning — SECRET

Z.P. 6.

Results of the 17th meeting of Central Planning on October 28, 1942, 9.30 a.m.

Increase of Coal Production

3033 1. Allocation of Labor.

Coal production in the Ruhr district has increased to 390,000 tons per day. Any further increase depends on whether the requirements for labor are being met. About 104,000 men are required. Furthermore, 7,800 men - originally 16-17,000, requirements having been brought down by rationalisation - are needed for the supplying industry, 6,800 of these for the machine industry. 5,000 more unskilled workers are furthermore required to secure the transport of mine-timber which is essential for reason of variety (Sortimmentsgruenden).

The intake capacity of the mining industry for the month of November is 44,000 prisoners of war of which 25,000 are for the Ruhr district, and 12,600 Eastern workers, 7,500 of whom are for the Ruhr district. Total requirements so far amount to 191,000 laborers of whom 90,700 were wanted by the Ruhr district. Up to October 24th a total of 123,000 was allocated. These numbers are still to be checked up by the Transport Committee (R(eichs) V(erkehrs) K(ommission)) and Mr. Sauckel.

According to the Commissioner of Labor (G(eneral) B(eauftragter der) A(rbeit)) the following number of prisoners of war is at present at hand.

Within the Reich (on the way and in camp)	30,000
Remainder of prisoners of war (outstanding from a total of 150,000 and promised up to the beginning of December).	60,000
At camps in the General Government	15,000

Of these up to December 1st the following can be regarded as available:

Within the Reich	15,000
Of the remainder of prisoners of war	10,000
From the General Government	7,500
total about	32,000

H1126-0257

3034 Therefore, as compared to the required 44,000 there is a deficit of about 12,000. Moreover, 10,000 civilians laborers from the East can be put up by exchanges from the agricultural sector which is 2,000 less than required so that the November deficit amounts to 14,000 and, in comparison with the total requirements of the mining industry of 104,000, there is a deficit of 62,000. The deficit increases by theloss figures of prisoners of war the number of which is still to be ascertained by the Commissioner of Labor.

The mining industry is in a position to use any amount of Eastern labor instead of prisoners of war. Therefore, it is to get preference at the combing out of the agricultural sector. There is no objection to a temporary accommodation of Eastern labor at prisoner of war camps (without barbed wire, etc.).

The requirements of the supply industry are to be met by the Red Label method (Rotzettelverfahren). Constructors (Konstrukteure) are to be provided by canvassing at the French prisoner of war camps for officers.

(typed signature) Dr. Steffler

* * * * * * * *

3036

Anwesend:

Reichsminister Speer	
Generalfeldmarschall Milch	
Staatssekretaer Koerner	
Staatsrat Schieber	RM. f.B.u.Mun.
Gen. Maj. Becht	"
Oberstltn. v. Nichoai	"
Herr Schlieker	"
Obergerghauptmann Gabel	R W M
Oberst Dr. Krull	"
Oberbergrat Otto	"
Staatssekretaer Ganzenmueller	RVM
Staatsrat Meinberg	"
Min. Dir. Gramsch	V.P.
Min. Rat Steffler	"
Min. Dirig. Timm	G B A
Oberreg. Rat Hildebrant	"
Gen. Dir. Pleiger	RV Kohle
Dr. Sogemeier	"
Dr. Fischer	"
Dir. Winkaus	Beauftr.f.d. Bergbaubedarf.

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(Title Page)

TRANSLATION

State Secret

Stenographic Transcript

of the

17th Conference

of the

Central Planning

concerning: Requirements for the increase of Coal Production held on 28 October 1942, 0930 hours at the Reich Ministry for Armament and Munitions, Berlin, Pariser Platz 3

H1126-0258

Dr. Eggeling/Sgt.

p. 1232-1233

Hildebrand: Our promises were made on the basis of the 150 000 prisoners of war whom Fieldmarshall Keitel had promised us for this purpose. Of these 60,000 are still missing. Several departments are passing the buck in this matter. General Wagner, the chief of supply, called on me and told me they could not supply them now and wanted time until January. They are now promised for the beginning of December.

As for the quality of the now incoming transports, apparently a weeding out takes already place in the East. The good workers amoung the prisoners of war are kept back and only those of inferior quality are passed on so that I cannot estimate the value of these 60,000 as high. I think we shall be able to use hardly 60% in mining.

There are, furthermore, 15,000 men in the P/W camps in the General Government. They are alright and will come as soon as the 30,000 have been expedited. Gauleiter Sauckel promised Mr. Pleigel for the coal-industry 10,000 civilian Russians who would be freed by re-directions of labor in agriculture. This was discussed yesterday with Dr. Fischer. There 10,000 men, we think, will be at the disposal of the coal industry in a bout a fortnight. The total will, therefore , be 115,000. We have however, to allow for certain reductions according to the physical conditions of the men.

The recruiting of suitable civilian workers over there is very much hampered because we were repeatedly told that our recruiting personnel should give up the whole department Stalino or the Don-Donetz area because the men there were all needed. Than a small number of workers from the East would remain because , at present, most of the civilian workers come just from these districts, few only from others. In the new territories, among these the Caucasus district, it is still very difficult to come near but the first transports are arriving already.

p, 1235

Pleiger: I have seen that with my own eyes. I have seen the new prisoners building the briquette-factory near Stalino. I have noticed that those from the Stalino district are first of all deprived of their greatcoats and clothing by the Rumanians and Italians. And if one sees these figures - they are too weak to pass even a brick. They are completely down. It can serve no purpose if we have to send them to a resthome even before we can employ them on the coal surface.

Speer: You must not complain that the Fuehrer has taken away the grain basis from these districts.

Pleiger: No, I state only facts. They demand from us the coal ...

p.1238 Speer: In any case, it is quite possible to replace those prisoners of war who do not come by civilian workers from the East.

Winkhaus: At once, provided that they do not exceed 12,600. If they should be more we would have to prepare camps, remove the barbed wire, etc.

Speer: What about the mixed working. You cannot let Russian prisoners of war let work side by side with civilian workers.

Winkhaus: We need not keep them so separate any more to-day.

Fischer: Thereis still this question. Yesterday we had a call from Austria: they could, of course, adapt Ps/W camps to civilian camps. The coal industry could overcome this question. The workers, however, make difficulties when we put the workers from the East in stables. But if Central Planning sponsors the use of civilian workers from the East then I think we could solve this problem.

H1126-0259

Pg 42

Speer: Temporarily, in the long run we must find for thme better accommodation that for Ps/W.

We can, therefore, espect 32,560 Ps/W. Then we have a need of 12,000 civilian workers from the East as mentioned bofore and 12,000 mentioned now, i.e. a total of 24,000 for the mine proper in Novemberless 10,000 from agriculture. That is a deficit of 14,000 plus 7,500 for industry. p. 1239

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State Secret

Stenographic Transcript

of the

21st Conference

of the

Central Planning

concerning Supply and Direction of Labor
held on 30 October 1942, afternoon at the Reich Ministry of Armament and Munition, Berlin, Pariser Platz 3

Dr. Doerr Bucholz/C

(In the discussion of the labor situation in which Speer, Sauckel, Milch and Thimm participated):

p. 1059, line 22:
Speer: We must also discuss the slackers. Ley has ascertained that the sicklist decreased to one fourth or one fifth in factories where doctors are on the staff who are examining the sick men. There is nothing to be said against SS and Police taking drastic steps and putting those known as slackers into concentration camps. There is no alternative. Let it happen several times and the newswill soon go around

p. 1062 line (:

Sauckel: We talked of taking the waiters out of the restaurants in Germany. But in this respect we have absolutely an abundance in France, the General Government and the Protectorate. As long as we have not skimmed that off, we could not take the reponsibility towards the German people for such a measure. Again a calbe of the Foreign Minister has burst into my recent negotiations in France stating that under no circumstances should the Ministry Laval be put into peril. The Fuehrer has said: If the French show no good will, then I shall re-take the 800,000 French Ps/W. If they show good will, then the French wives can follow their husbands to Germany and work there. Of course, he said, I have an interest thatLaval remains in power. The Ministry Laval will remain, it depends only on us. And Laval cannot go back after he has reproduced in his speech and spoken before the French passages which he has taken verbally out of my appeal. Only Petain could bring him to fall. I wish to draw your attention to the fact, however, that in France there is a surplus of youg men all of whom we could use in Germany. If we expect of our people to accept severest restrictions then we cannot admit such luxuries in Paris as e.g. small restaurants with bands of 25 musicians and two waiters per table. I am firmly convinced: If we brutal also against the others then we can extract quite a considerable number of men out of the General Government - I sent as efficient man, President Struwe, over there - and of the Protectorate. This need not interfere with the armament industry over there. Thereis , therefore, no fear that the demand could not be met.

H1126-0260

Pg 44

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO.R-124

23 November 1945

I, WALTER ROTHSCHILD,1st Lt., USA, 0-886354, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. R-124.

WALTER ROTHSCHILD
1st Lt., U.S.A.
0-886354

H1126-0261

Exhibit USA 217
Filed Dec. 12, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-129
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Stamp: Personal Staff Reichsfuehrer
SS Document Administration
File No. AR 1/24

Translation

The Chief of
the SS-Main-Office Economics and Administration

Ch.Po/Ha
2192/42 g.

Berlin, 30 April 1942

Re: Attachment of the Inspectorate of the Concentration Camps to the SS-Main-Office Economics and Administration.

The Reichsfuehrer-SS
Berlin, W 11.
Prinz Albrechtstr 8

pencilled note: education and supervision remain the same (initials) HH (?)

Reichsfuehrer!

Stamp: Secret

Today I report about the present situation of the concentration camps and about measures I have taken in order to carry out your order of the 3rd March 1942.

I

1.) At the outbreak of war there existed the following concentration camps:

a)	Dachau	1939	4,000	prisoners,	today	8,000
b)	Sachsenhausen	"	6,500	"	"	10,000
c)	Buchenwald	"	5,300	"	"	9,000
d)	Mauthausen	"	1,500	"	"	5,500
e)	Flossenburg	"	1,600	"	"	4,700
f)	Ravensbrueck	"	2,500	"	"	7,500

2.) In the years 1940 to 1942 nine further camps were erected, viz:

a) Auschwitz
b) Neuengamme
c) Gusen
d) Natzweiler
e) Gross-Rosen
f) Lublin
g) Niederhagen
h) Stutthof
i) Arbeitsdorf

3.) These 15 camps conformed to the organization of the old concentration camps in regard to duties, work, composition of the commanding staffs, and discipline of camps for protective custody. Besides these 15 camps the following special duties have been assigned:

a) to SS-Special Camp Hinzert: Commanding staff and guards are under my orders. The camps for protective custody is attached to the Reich-Main-Office-Security. No work-shops, no opportunity.

b) Camp for the protection of youth - Moringen: No workshops.

c) Camp for the protection of youth - Uckermark: Is being erected.

H1126-0262

d) Camp for the protection of youth Litzmannstadt: is planned.

4.) In the last weeks the Reich-Main-Office-Security and the Command-Authority of the Waffen-SS have applied for SS-Commanders for the Camps planned by these authorities in Riga, Kiew, and Bobruisk.

I think it right to submit such plans to the SS-Main-Office-Economics and Administration, so that they may be planned and carried out uniformly by one authority for SS and Police, so as it is now. There may easily be lack of collaboration and consequently ensuing muddle.

II.

1.) The war has brought about a marked change in the structure of the concentration camps and has changed their duties with regard to the employment of the prisoners. The custody of prisoners for the sole reasons of security, education, or prevention is no longer the main consideration. The mobilization of all prisoners who are fit for work, for purposes of the war now, and for purposes of construction in the forthcoming peace, come to the foreground more and more.

2.) From this knowledge some necessary measures result with the aim to transform the concentration camps into organizations more suitable for the economic tasks, whilst they were formerly merely politically interested.

3.) For this reason I have gathered together all the leaders of the former inspectorate of Concentration camps, all Camp-Commanders, and all managers and supervisors) of work on the 23rd and 24th April 1942, I have explained personally to them this new development. I have compiled in the order attached the main essentials which have to be brought into effect with the utmost urgency if the commencement of work for purposes of the armament industry is not to be delayed.

4.) The transfer of the Inspectorate of the Concentration Camps to the Main-Office Economics and Administration has been carried out under full agreemtnt of all Main-Offices concerned. The collaboration of all authorities goes on without any friction, the abolishment of lack of coordination in the concentration camps is hailed everywhere as the shedding of the fetters hindering progress.

Heil Hitler!

Signed: POHL

SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and General of the Waffen-SS.

1 enclosure.

H1126-0263

Stamp: Personal Staff Reichsfuehrer SS
Document Administration
File No. AR/1/24

Translation

The Chief of
the SS-Main-Office-Economics and Administration

Ch. Po/Ha. Berlin, 30th April 1942

Distribution: Chief Department D
all Camp-Commanders
all work-managers
all authorities economics

pencilled note:
agreed
(initials) HH(?)

Order

The instructions and advices given to the camp-commanders and work managers at the occasion of the discussions of 24th and 25th April 1942, are herewith issued as an order to become applicable as from the 1st May 1942.

1.) The management of a concentration camp and of all the economic enterprises of the SS within its sphere of organization is in the hands of the camp-commander. He alone is therefore responsible that the economic enterprises are as productive as possible.

2.) For the management of the economic enterprises the camp-commander agails himself of the services of the work-manager. The work-manager is bound to report to the camp-commander whether he expects any risks or disadvantages in carrying out an order of the camp-commander with to the work or the economic results.

3.) By this duty the work-manager becomes jointly responsible if any damages of failures ensue with regard to the work or the economic results.

4.) The camp-commanders alone is responsible for the employment of the labor available. This employment must be, in the true meaning of the word, exhaustive, in order to obtain the greatest measure of performance.

Work is allotted by the Chief of the Department D centrally and alone. The camp-commanders themselves may not accept on their own initiative work offered by third parties and may not negotiate about it.

5.) There is no limit to working hours. Their duration depends on the kind of working establishments in the camps and the kind of work to be done. They are fixed by the camp-commanders alone.

6.) Any circumstances which may result is a shortening of work hours (e.g.g. meals, roll-calls) have therefore to be restricted to the minimum which cannot be condensed any more. It is forbidden to allow long walks to the place of working and noon intervals only for eating purposes.

7.) Guard-duties have to be freed from their traditional rigidity and to be made more flexible having regard to the coming tasks of peace.

H1126-0264

Sentries on horseback, watchdogs, movable watch towers and movable obstacles are to be developed.

8.) Much more than before is required from each and every camp-commander if they carry out his order correctly. Hardly any camp is like any other one, therefore no uniform instructions shall be issued. But the whole responsibility is shifted on to the initiative of the camp-commander. He needs a clear professional knowledge of matters military and economic and he must be a clever and wise leader of men, whom he has to weld into a big potential of performance.

Signed: POHL

SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and General of the Waffen-SS

For correct copy: Schiller

SS-Obersturmfuehrer and Adjutant

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. R-129

10 November 1945.

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt., Inf., O-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. R-129.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt., Inf.,
O-1335567.

H1126-0265

Exhibit U.S.A. 187
Filed Dec. 12, 1945

EXCERPTS
Testimony of: ALFRED ROSENBERG
Taken at: Nurnberg, Germany,
1500-1700, 6 October 1945
By: Lt. Col. Thomas S. Hinkel,
IGD, OUSCC. Also Present:
Interpreter: 1st Lt. Joachim Stenzel
Reporter: Pvt. Clair A. VanVleck

Page 3

Q. Isn't it a fact, that Sauckel would allocate to the various areas under your jurisdiction, the number of persons to be obtained for labor purposes?

A. Yes.

Q. And that thereafter, your agents would obtain that labor, in order to meet the quota which had been given; isn't that right?

A. Sauckel, normally, had very far-reaching desires, which one couldn't fulfill unless one looked very closely into the matter.

Q. Never mind about Sauckel's desires being far-reaching or not being far-reaching. That has nothing to do with it. You were given quotas for the areas over which you had jurisdiction, and it was up to you to meet that quota?

A. Yes; it was the responsibility of the administrative officials to receive this quota and to distribute the allotments over the districts in such a way, according to number and according to the age groups, so they would be most reasonably met.

Q. These administrative officials were part of your organization; isn't that right?

A. They were functionaries or officials of the Reichskommissar for the Ukraine, but, as such, they were placed in their office by the Ministry for the Eastern Occupied Territories.

Q. You recognized, did you not, that the quotas set by Sauckel could not be filled by voluntary labor, and you didn't disapprove of the impressment of forced labor; isn't that right?

A. I regretted that the demands of Sauckel were so urgent that they could not be met by a continuation of voluntary recruitments and thus I submitted to the necessity of forced impressment.

Q. Did you ever argue with Sauckel, that perhaps, in view of the fact that the quotas could not be met by voluntary labor, the labor recruiting program be abandoned except for what recruits could be voluntarily enrolled?

A. I couldn't do that, because the numbers or allotments that Sauckel had received from the Fuehrer to meet, were absolutely binding for him, and I couldn't do anything about that.

Page 5.

Q. The letters that we have already seen between you and Sauckel, do not indicate, do they, any disagreement on your part with the principle of recruiting labor against their will; they indicate, as I remember, that you were opposed to the treatment that was later accorded these workers; that you did not oppose their initial impressment.

A. That is right. In those letters I mostly discussed the possibility of finding the least harsh methods of handling the matter; whereas, in no way, I placed myself in opposition to the orders that he was carrying out for the Fuehrer.

H1126-0266

H1126-0267

Q. Do you recall receiving a letter from Sauckel in March, 1943, wherein he stated that approximately 1,000,000 foreign workers would be needed from the East, and that this 1,000,000 had to be transported within the space of four months from the date of the letter?

A. That is perfectly possible. Sauckel, in the course of his activities, as being specially charged by the Fuehrer, has at several times transmitted to the ministry quotas of the men that had to be furnished.

Q. When these quotas were transmitted by Sauckel, did your organization then parcel the quotas out in the various places over which you had jurisdiction?

A. Normally, when such a request for a quota came in, there would be meetings between representatives of Sauckel's staff and of my staff and, occasionally, of the staff of the commissars, in which these matters were hashed over, and, normally, I would say that, in view of the particular situation, it would be absolutely impossible to meet that particular number, but that we would try to see what could be done and never would we meet the entire quota that was given to us.

Q. But you did your best to meet it, didn't you?

A. It was their duty to do whatever they could.

Exhibit U.S.A. 220
Filed Dec. 12, 1945

Testimony of Albert Speer, taken at Nurnberg, Germany, 18 October 1945, 1430-1700, by Lt.Col. M. I. Gurfein, AUS, OUSCC.
Also present: Pfc. Sonnenfeld, Interpreter and Miss Evelyn Low, Reporter.

- - - - - - - -

Q. You have already been sworn I take it?

A. Yes.

Lt. Col. Gurfein to Interpreter:

Q. Do you solemnly swear that you will truthfully, completely and accurately translate from English to German the questions and from German to English the responses of the witness given here today to the best of your ability, so help you God?

A. I do.

- - - - - - - - - -

Q. I wanted to ask you today about the Central Planning Board?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you the chairman of that office?

A. The Central Planning Board was no office as such, it was a place where decisions were made. The Central Planning Board was not led by me but the decisions were made by three men in common - by Milch, Koerner and myself. After we took over the production department from the Ministry of Economics the fourth man, Funk, was added.

Q. And did you attend all the meetings of this Central Planning Board yourself?

A. I took part in all sessions except from February until May, when I was sick.

Q. In what year?

A. 1944.

Q. And while you were away, during February to May 1944, did you receive reports of the proceedings so as to be in touch with the situation?

A. I was kept informed of all current events by the chief of my ministry. The exact minutes of the sessions of the Central Planning Board I only read later.

Q. So that when you returned to work in May 1944 you went over all the minutes of the decisions and discussions of the Central Planning Board, I take it?

A. I don't remember this exactly but you must remember that when I returned after my sickness I came into the middle of much work and the plane attacks were going on at that time. I more or less tried to catch up with the information that I had missed with the use of certain key words in order to denote what had happened in my absence. But I will say now, frankly, that if a decision has been made, no matter what its nature, that I will tell you about it if I know about it now, even if I did not know about it at the time it was made.

Q. Who was your representative in the Central Planning Board at the time of your illness?

A. In the case of absence of one of the members of the Central Planning Board no deputy was chosen but one of the other members took over the function of the absentee.

H1126-0268

H1126-0269

Q. Who was it?

A. I believe that it was Milch in this case.

Q. You mean that you were acting as the Chairman of the Central Planning Boa before you became ill and that Milch took your place as Chairman?

A. There was no Chairman in the Central Planning Board as such, the three members had equal jurisdiction and powers, thus Milch was not Chairman when I was absent. In practice, however, it happened that Milch and I would usually agree upon what to do and Koerner played a subordinate part more or less.

Q. But to represent the production office of yours you must have had a man t to represent your interests during the time of your illness?

A. May I say the following here. We agreed that in the Central Planning Boa Milch and I would not represent special interests. If that had been so there would have had to be other representatives besides us. For inst there should have been one for the Navy and also somebody to represent other main factors. We agreed that we would be impartial in represent on the Board and that we would not be there as representatives of our representative Ministries.

Q. To put it clearly to you, did Kehrl work for you?

A. Kehrl was in charge of the Planning Board in 1944 and this Planning Board made a draft for the sessions of the Central Planning Board.

Q. Was Kehrl your deputy?

A. No. Well Kehrl as such had a very difficult position. He had a double position. He was in charge of the Planning Board of the Production Ministry and as such was reponsible for the plans of this Ministry.

Q. To whom, to you?

A. Yes, he was my subordinate.

Q. So that you were his Minister?

A. Yes. His second function was in connection with the Planning Board of th Plenipotentiary General for Armaments. In this capacity he was responsible for the total planning which was outside the proper competence of my Ministry.

Q. And who, at that time, was the Plenipotentiary?

A. I was that and I also was the Chief of Kehrl.

Q. So that in both capacities in which Kehrl worked you were his chief, is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. When did you take over your position as chief of the Armaments Office?

A. You must differentiate here between different phases. On 8 February 1942 I took over the Army Office for Armaments, that is, I was the successor of Dr. Todt. In July 1943 I took over the Armament Office of the Navy. In September 1943 I took over the Production Office of the Ministry of Economics. And in August 1944 I took over the Armament Office of the Air Force. That was after an interim stage had been created after March of 1944 by the Jaegerstab.

H1126-0270

Q. The Jaegerstab was a branch dealing with fighter planes, was it not, in connection with aeroplane production?

A. Yes.

Q. And you had a co-ordinate jurisdiction with Goering or Milch at that time, in the spring of 1944?

A. Yes, the Jaegerstab tried to get out of the way of any jurisdictional disputes because it could not prevent it that Goering would not give over to me completely the manufacture of air planes, even of fighter planes alone.

Q. That means that during your career in charge of armaments you went from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and from responsibility to responsibility, always taking on more responsibilities?

A. Yes.

Q. So that each time that you took on a new jurisdiction you were cognisant already of the many and different problems that you were multiplying by taking on the new jurisdictions?

A. Partly this made things more difficult and partly this facilitated things. When I took over the Production Department of the Ministry of Economics this had the purpose of giving a total and more comprehensive jurisdiction over all these matters of production. Looked at as a whole, the overall control that was vested in me over production facilitated things rather than making them more difficult because it eliminated the brakes that were naturally put on it before, through control by the three separate branches of the Armed Services with their own separate Supreme Commander.

Q. That means that you were able in the first place, as you increased your jurisdiction, to get a better overall view of what resources you had at your disposal. Is that correct?

A. Yes, of course I had better possibilities of co-ordination by that and thus could better meet the problems created by attacks.

Q. Your basic problems were, first, the obtaining of raw materials needed for your armaments production, is that correct?

A. This is a very complicated subject and it depends really at which phase you are looking. However, if you take a rough cross section of the whole problem then it is right to say that the raw materials created the greatest difficulties and among them certain products of the steel industry.

Q. Secondly, you also had the problem as a result of the bombing of where to locate factories and indeed the whole question of having adequate factory facilities?

A. This is a question that is extremely difficult to answer. It was my position that we should repair existing factories by committing everything we had at our disposal for this purpose. Others took the position that those factories should be relocated. I could not afford the change over to new localities from old localities because such a move always entails the loss of at least a half year's production. For instance, the aircraft industry after the intensive attacks on the fighter plane industry of February 1944 received the order from the Air Force to shift these factories and to cease all production in the present location.

Q. But in general the question of factory facilities, together with the question of raw materials were two of the larger problems that you had to meet?

A. Yes.

H1126-0271

Q. There was always a third, was there not, and that was the question of obtaining a sufficient supply of labour?

A. Yes.

Q. In connection with the obtaining of a sufficient labour supply, what were the alternatives that you had before you? I am now talking of the sources of labour supply?

A. To the first degree the manpower which I should receive from the employment offices, that is through Sauckel's department. Do you want me to mention all the details?

Q. Yes.

A. So far as Sauckel is concerned, the manpower we received from him was that which was made available by the shifting of German industry and we knew these under the heading of "Fluctuation". Then German manpower that could be naturally mobilised. Then the foreign manpower that was made available by Sauckel from abroad. Then a great source was also the prisoners of war, that is for total production. However, most of these were already distributed before my time. That is so because there were almost no prisoners of war coming in after 1942. The next were the workers that came from concentration camps.

Q. And this now represented all the sources of labour that you had at your disposal?

A. In the great outline, yes.

Q. Without pausing to discuss the various types of German labour that were available because that is fairly obvious, what types of foreign labour did you have available?

A. When you talk of foreign workers you cannot look at it in that way that they were directly available to me. It was handled in such a manner that the employment offices would assign German and foreign workers and then I would be informed about the total numbers of workers that were available.

Q. Obviously, the number of workers that were available or were to be supplied fluctuated, did it not?

A. Yes, they fluctuated.

Q. So that when you say that before you took office the foreign workers had already been distributed or allocated, naturally after you took office there had to be constant additions to the numbers?

A. There is a mistake. Only the prisoners of war were distributed before I entered my office, not the foreign workers. That is so because the bulk of the prisoners of war were taken in 1940 and 1941 and were then distributed.

Q. Do you mean by that that up to the time when you took office foreign workers were not being used in Germany?

A. Yes, I believe they were already there but I cannot say exactly in what numbers.

Q. When you took over your office for the first time you must have made a survey of the available manpower for the armaments industry generally, did you not?

A. When I took over my office for the first time you must remember that I was an architect and not an expert in these matters. In other words I had to get familiar with the job first and I did not find any exact information

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about it. To this must be added that I received intensive programs for armaments from the Army Armament office. These had already been given to Todt who was my predecessor but for the realisation of these plans, this department (the Armament ffice of the Army) calculated the necessary supply of materials and manpower.

Q. When for the first time did you make a survey of what the available manpower was in Germany to meet your tasks?

A. I never made any such investigation because it was not my task to ascertain what the total manpower was in Germany that would be available.

Q. I didn't mean for you to make the survey directly but you could have asked somebody for it, as for example, Sauckel?

A. I made a survey at that time how much manpower I could obtain from the building program, that is, if building was to be interrupted for an extended period of time. This survey showed that approximately one and a half million labourers or workers could be drawn from the building program if drastic reductions were effected. If I remember correctly this calculation was not precise but merely estimated. It did not only include the workers who worked directly in the building industries but those who gave material assistance to the building industry.

Q. Did there come a time when you had to estimate the needs for foreign workers in Germany?

A. I never estimated it in this manner.

Q. In what manner did you estimate the needs for foreign workers for the German armaments industries?

A. It was not my task to estimate how many or how much manpower I needed from abroad but rather I had to rely upon the amount of foreign and German workers that Sauckel could make available to me. I want to say the following here. I do not wish to give the impression that I want to deny the fact that I demanded manpower and foreign manpower from Sauckel very energetically.

Q. With respect to this foreign manpower that you were requesting from Sauckel, what means did you discuss as to how these foreign workers could be brought into Germany?

A. I believe that regarding the first phase and I think that we are talking about that right now, Sauckel emphasized the fact that the foreign manpower was coming voluntarily into Germany. As far as I remember the voluntary manpower at that time was the manpower originating in the Ukraine.

Q. What period are you talking about now when you discuss this voluntary coming of workers, especially from the Ukraine?

A. I don't know how long the manpower from the Ukraine actually came voluntarily.

Q. When did you first find out then that some of the manpower from the Ukraine was not coming voluntarily?

A. It is rather difficult to answer this here, that is, to name a certain date to you. However, it is certain that I knew that at some particular point of time that the manpower from the Ukraine did not come voluntarily.

Q. And does that apply also to the manpower from other occupied countries, that is, did there come a time when you knew that they were not coming voluntarily?

A. Yes.

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Q. When, in general, would you say that time was, without placing a particular month of the year?

A. As far as the Ukraine situation goes I believe that they did not come voluntarily any more after a few months because immense mistakes were made in their treatment by us. I should say offhand that this time was either in July, August or September of 1942.

Q. And as to the other occupied countries, for example Poland, when did you find out that foreign workers were being brought in against their will?

A. I believe that I received almost no manpower from Poland. That was because Polish manpower usually was allocated into agriculture, that was an old tradition or old practice with us.

Q. Just by the way, you used Polish workers in the mines didn't you?

A. Yes, but they lived there. That was in the Polish part of Upper Silesia. In the Ruhr coal mines Russian prisoners of war were used in the main. And by the way I only took over this aspect of production in September 1943.

Q. With respect to the Czechs, when did you first find out that Czech workers were being sent into Germany against their will?

A. As far as the Czech workers are concerned, I believe that only on one occasion was a recruitment program carried out there and that was done by the Air Force. If I remember correctly 80,000 Czech workers were recruited to be taught certain techniques in Germany and then returned to their homes. The Governor Frank of the Protectorate had a hard fight against this taking away of manpower from his area and in exchange he always offered an increase of production in his area.

Q. With respect to Dutch workers for example, when did you first find out that Dutch workers that were not volunteers were being brought into the Reich for work?

A. With the best intentions I cannot make a differentiation here between the different nations because, as such, I was not interested in the distribution of manpower that came from the west.

Q. But many workers actually did come from the west did they not, to Germany?

A. Yes.

Q. That means then that the great majority of the workers that came from the western countries, the western occupied countries, came against their will to Germany?

A. Yes.

Q. Who made the decision to take these foreign workers against their will into Germany?

A. It was the task of Sauckel to make decisions like that.

Q. But surely Sauckel by himself could not make a decision of as far-reaching international importance as that?

A. Sauckel as Gauleiter stood in immediate connection with Bormann and Bormann, if asked by Sauckel, would report on this to Hitler. It was necessary to give the competent military commanders the decisions that had been reached in this matter and I believe that nobody outside of Goering or Hitler would have been able to so instruct the military commanders and as far as I remember the Foreign Minister of the Reich had to be consulted several times in order to come to some agreement with the French Government.

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Q. That is Herr von Ribbentrop you mean?

A. Yes.

Q. Personally?

A. I cannot say this exactly because I was not present but I do believe that Bormann instructed Ribbentrop personally about the wishes of the Führer.

Q. At any rate, it is clear is it not, that you understood at the time that you were requesting labour through Sauckel that a good part of this labour was coming from foreign workers who were being involuntarily brought to the Reich?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you personally present at any discussions concerning the advisability or the necessity of obtaining foreign workers by coercive means?

A. Sauckel usually effected his discussions with the Führer alone. I was present at one discussion which took place in January 1944 and I mentioned it to you the other day. That is one where I was present.

Q. Would you mind repeating the substance of that very briefly?

A. This already belongs to a period where I had differences with Sauckel about the exploitation of the occupied areas of the west and I think it would be going too far if I was to go into all the details all over - it appears in a previous interrogation. At that time I tried to increase the productive output of the western countries and thus exploit their industrial potential and I was very much against the coercive measures used by Sauckel. Thus it was difficult for me not only to find manpower there but they also fled the factories where they had worked.

Q. That relates to 1944. Let us go back to as early as 1942. Did you ever have any conferences with the Führer concerning the necessity or the desirability of using means of coercion?

A. I have handed over all the minutes of the conferences which I had with the Führer. In itself the commitment of labour may be a very important thing. However, it was only a small part of my total activity. If there is any reference made in those minutes then I might be able to tell you more about it when I read it again.

Q. Without looking at the Minutes to start with, were you in general in agreement with the policy of forcing civilian labour from the occupied territories to come to the Reich against their will?

A. Yes, I concurred in that because it was my opinion that this was done in an orderly and legal manner. I believe that I didn't have to go into all the details but I think that you may be well familiar with all the reasons why one could concur in such a policy. The last analysis of this ends in the legality of the French Government.

Q. How about the workers from the Ukraine, will you please state what reasons you had for concurring with that policy?

A. No, there are no reasons.

Q. How about with the Dutch?

A. There are no reasons there either. In the last analysis the individual responsibility for the manpower being deported out of the country was the competent deputy of Adolf Hitler in that country. I believe that I could not have refused to use the manpower that came from abroad any more than a factory manager can have done that.

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Q. Leaving out the question of your own responsibility for the moment, is it your view then that the deputy of the Führer in Holland, for example, was guilty of a crime in forcing these Dutch people to come into the Reich against their will?

A. I cannot answer that question.

Q. Before, you started to say that there was no legal reason, as I understood it, why it was possible to bring in foreign workers against their will and you stated that in the case of France it depended upon the recognition of an independent French Government but that in the case of Dutch workers for example there was no reason that you could give?

A. Yes.

Q. I ask you, then, when you state that there were no grounds to offer, I understood you to mean that there were no grounds legally which could be offered to support or defend the bringing in of Dutch workers against their will into Germany?

A. No, I cannot defend that and it was not my task either to investigate these things or to defend them.

Q. But I ask you now as you sit here whether there is any argument or ground that you can advance to justify legally the deportation into Germany of these Dutch workers against their will?

A. You mean on legal grounds?

Q. Or a moral one?

A. I had a correspondence with Sauckel in the Spring of 1944 and in a letter he accused me that I was calling the foreign workers in Germany deported workers. He stated that those foreign workers had been legally taken to Germany and there could be no talk of deportation.

Q. But when you wrote to Sauckel in the spring of 1944 you believed, did you as you state, that these workers had in fact been deported from Holland?

A. Yes, it was my opinion that they had been forced to come to Germany.

Q. And that opinion you held for a considerable period of time before you wrote the letter to Sauckel?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you ever object to anybody about this policy of bringing labour from the occupied countries into Germany against their will?

A. Yes, I did that at the moment when the transport of foreign workers did great damage to me as far as the production in the occupied areas is concerned.

Q. But I mean on moral or legal grounds, did you ever object?

A. I cannot remember that but I will think about it.

Q. So that during the period when you were asking for labour it seems clear, does it not, that you knew that you were obtaining foreign labour as well as domestic labour in response to your requests and that a large part of the foreign labour was forced labour?

A. Yes.

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Q. So that, simply by way of illustration, suppose that on January 1, 1944, you required 50,000 workers for a given purpose would you put in a requisition for 50,000 workers, knowing that in that 50,000 there would be forced foreign workers?

A. Yes.

Q. One of the other categories that you mentioned at the beginning was labo from the concentration camps. Do you recall that?

A. Yes.

Q. This labour that was in the concentration camps, did you requisition that as you did other labour?

A. As far as I know, the allocation of manpower from concentration camps was directly negotiated between the Commandants of the concentration camps and the factory managers without consultation of my department for the commitment of labour but not of Sauckels. Sauckel knows exactly what I thought about it but I cannot say with certainty just how this was.

Q. So that I take it that in the case of the concentration camp labour your office was in even more direct relation to it than in the case of the foreign workers because Sauckel did not have to intervene in the matter?

A. I believe yes but I cannot say exactly but this can be ascertained. At any rate Sauckel was excluded from this matter. I cannot say whether this would be applicable in every case, Sauckel could tell you, I don't know whether the employment office was excluded in every such case because th had to ascertain the needs.

Q. But, in general, the use of concentration camp labour was known to you and approved by you as a source of labour?

A. Yes.

Q. And you knew also, I take it, that among the inmates of the concentration camps there were both Germans and foreigners?

A. I didn't think about it at that time.

Q. As a matter of fact you visited the Austrian concentration camp personall did you not?

A. I didn't - well I was in Mauthaussen once but at that time I was not told just to what categories the inmates of the concentration camps belonged.

Q. But in general everybody knew, did they not, that foreigners who were take away by the Gestapo, or arrested by the Gestapo, as well as Germans, fou their way into the concentration camps?

A. Of course, yes. I didn't mean to imply anything like that.

Q. Were there any other special categories of foreign workers that were separately treated as, for example, Jews?

A. In 1942 for instance we used Jews in German factories.

Q. Foreign Jews or German Jews?

A. I believe German Jews.

Q. Put your mind on foreign Jews. Did you use those for forced labour in Germany?

A. As far as foreign Jews are concerned, Hungarian Jews were used in the building program.

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Q. And when was that - in 1944?

A. Yes that was in 1944.

Q. Who made the decision to use the Hungarian Jews for this building work?

A. There is a history to that. Do you want me to tell you about it?

Q. Yes please, briefly?

A. Hitler had the intention to build great underground aeroplane factories in the fall of 1943. He gave an order to that effect. However, I did not concur in that and therefore I did not execute the order in all its strictness. In March of 1944 the director of the Central Organization Todt office submitted plans for those to Hitler. This was during the period of my illness. In this connection he stated that the building should be finished within six months. Hitler gave Dosch a direct order build these six factories outside the normal competence of my Ministry. There were several big differences in this question between Goering and myself and also between Hitler and myself. As a result of these differences I received a written order from Hitler that Dosch was to build the six factories. The order should still be there. As far as I know the Hungarian Jews were made available for the building of these six factor by direct negotiations that Dosch carried out.

Q. Carried out with whom?

A. I don't know exactly and I cannot say this because all this took place dur ing the period of my illness but I believe there is a note about that wi the official papers that are in your possession.

A. When did you recover from your illness?

A. In the middle of May 1944.

Q. Did you transact any business during April 1944 before you were completely recovered?

A. Of course I always had to do a few things in spite of my illness.

Q. Where were you actually while you were ill?

A. At first I was in Hohenlychen, that was because I had an infection of the knee, from there I went to Klessheim, near Saltzburg and from there to Merano.

Q. And where were you in April 1944?

A. In Merano.

Q. Did you transact business from Merano?

A. Yes, I did this in a restricted measure. I was there to recover but every three or four days something came up.

Q. And did your people bring you papers to sign also?

A. Yes, I believe, yes.

Q. I want to ask you again, did you not personally order the arrangements to be made for the deportation of 100,000 Hungarian Jews for the project you have described?

A. No, I did not order that personally.

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Q. I want to show you a letter of 17 April 1944 (1584 PS Document V) a photo and ask you to read it through and tell me whether you wrote that letter dictated it?

A. As is apparent from the two letters TAE and the No. 474-44 it is evident this originated in the Technical Department. The minutes of the discuss with the Führer were always published under my name in order to give them the greatest possible authority. This is the result of such a discussion which took place during my illness. I did not write this. Sauer was the author of this document.

Q. And before this document was written you already knew and participated in the discussions as you have previously told us, about the obtaining of 100,000 Hungarian Jews for this Dosch project?

A. I believe that this is the same but it is out of the question that I participated in it because I was sick at the time.

Q. But you did tell us the history of the thing a little while ago concerning the requirements for the Dosch project and as I understood it you said that you knew that the Hungarian Jews were to be brought into Germany for purposes of this project. Is this correct?

A. I only didn't know the date any more. I didn't know whether this was before or after. At any rate it was not before the discussion that took place with Hitler at that time.

Q. What was not before, the letter or the knowledge?

A. What I mean to say is that I didn't know about the coming of these 100,000 Hungarian Jews to Germany before this letter was written or before the discussion took place with Hitler.

Q. But when you recovered and before the Hungarian Jews actually came, you know about it, is that what you mean?

A. When I recovered of course I knew that these Hungarian Jews were coming to Germany. I didn't know at this time they actually were in Germany and had been obtained for this program.

Q. Did you object in any way to the use or to the transport of these Hungarian Jews by force?

A. No.

Q. I just wanted to ask you with respect to the coal miners, did you ever issue instructions to the effect that foreign workers to be used as coal miners should not be given the same medical examination as German miners?

. No. As far as I know the right society for coal and coal products determined the foreign workers in the camps and determined whether they were to be used as miners.

. Do you remember being at a meeting of the Central Planning Board on the 22 July 1942?

. I cannot say it just like that but it must be so.

. I want to show you a copy of the minutes of the meeting and ask you whether you recognize that you were present at the meeting?

. Do you want me to read all of it?

. Yes?

. I believe that the verbatim report of this should still be in existence and from that it could be determined who made the suggestion that the

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"Knappschaft doctors should be informed that prisoners of war should be judged differently from German miners". I could not give directives of any kind to the Knappschaft doctors, not even in my capacity as being a member of the Central Planning Board.

Q. Well Germany was an authoritarian state at the time. Somebody could give orders to the coal miners doctors as to the physical standard they should apply, could they not?

A. Yes, but I didn't know who that was and in my opinion it was the Ministry of Labour who was competent in any social questions. Or the trade supervisers which were in the Labour Ministry.

Q. At any rate you do not deny that you were present at the meeting at which the suggestion was made and you did not take exception to it?

A. I cannot remember it any more but I certainly did not object to it.

Q. I asked you towards the beginning whether you ever had any conversations with Hitler concerning the policy decision of employing compulsion with respect to the obtaining of foreign labour. Do you remember that?

A. Yes I remember it and I repeat my answer that I could find out from the minutes whether such discussions took place.

Q. I will show you a protocol of the conferences with the Führer on the 10th, 11th and 12th August 1942, written up by you and call your attention particularly to what is recorded as Page 16 and ask you to read it and see if it refreshes your recollection?

A. It is certain that the conference took place, otherwise it would not have been contained here.

Q. Does that, after looking at it and after thinking about it, refresh your recollection a little as to the circumstances of the meeting and the discussion?

A. May I have the night to think about it and I am sure that I will remember something about it then. You must take into account that during a conversation with the Führer thirty or forty different points were brought up and that such discussions took place almost every three weeks. You must furthermore take into account the fact that all these documents that you show me now, you received from me, so then you can believe me that I am not trying to hide anything.

Q. The question I want to ask you is not so much whether you remember this particular conference as whether it does not remind you that you did discuss at some time or other with Hitler the question of compulsion of foreign labour?

A. That was certainly the case and it is apparent from this note. To this I must add that Hitler would rather see foreign workers in Germany than in production in the foreign countries. I further wish to add that if you go through the minutes of the conferences with Hitler you will find that the commitment of labour was frequently discussed in the beginning, that is in August and September 1942 and that from there on there are no further points on this subject contained therein. This is due to the fact that at that time the differences between me and Sauckel already existed in that Sauckel discussed his problems either directly with Hitler or Bormann.

Q. But is it clear to you, Mr. Speer, that in 1942 when the decisions were being taken concerning the use of forced foreign labour that you participated in the discussions yourself?

A. Yes.

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Q. So that I take it that the execution of the program of bringing foreign workers into Germany by compulsion under Sauckel was based on earlier decisions that had been taken with your agreement?

A. Yes, but I must point out that only a very small part of the manpower that Sauckel brought into Germany was made available to me, a far larger part of it was allocated to other departments that demanded them.

Q. A certain number of these foreign workers were used specifically for the armament industries under your control, were they not?

A. I don't quite understand the question that you are putting to me. It goes without saying that a certain amount of the workers were employed by me it was no specific part of the workers.

Q. So that some of the workers at least who were brought in to Germany agai their will from the occupied countries were used for the manufacture o munitions of war and weapons?

A. Not just some of them, a great part of them.

Q. Did you ever, in connection with the obtaining of foreign civilian labour from the occupied countries, participate in any discussions about makin them prisoners of war and then taking them into Germany?

A. I remember that something similar to that was discussed. I remember that this question came up in connection with Russia and when we retired from there. The soldiers said that the male population was used to fill the Russian ranks and they were being armed and it was discussed whether it would not be better to make them prisoners of war and take them to Germa instead of having them fight against us.

Q. In other words, you say that you were present at a discussion where it was proposed that ordinary civilians who were not bearing arms or in uniform were to be arrested and made prisoners of war as if they had been combatants?

A. I cannot say it in just this manner but I suppose you have a document which makes this apparent.

Q. No, but I would like you to rely on your own recollection too, if you were present as you said you were. But please tell us from your own memory?

A. Look here, you really must not expect too much from my memory. I had a gr number of worries but rest assured I would say so if I remembered that a discussion had taken place. As far as I know it was not only a questi of committing manpower but also a military question. With the best intentions I could not swear to it.

Q. I want to show you then a minute of a conference with the Führer which you signed, dated 8 July 1943 with a No. 17 on it and ask you please to read it through?

A. This is quite so as Hitler said that in these cases very determined action had to be taken.

Q. And you did not object to it, I take it?

A. No, I did not object.

Q. I would like to call your attention, if I may, to the fact that the reason given is that Russian prisoners of war are needed in the amount of approximately 150,000 to 200,000 for the mines and that if these prisoners could not be released by the Army then action would be taken against the civili population.

A. That is what the document says, yes.

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Q. So that the basis of the decision, as explained in the document, was not to protect the military interests but for the purpose of obtaining needed labour. Is not that correct?

A. I don't know this exactly but it is a fact that in July 1943 I was not responsible for coal; as the document sets forth Sauckel and Pleiger were responsible to execute these orders and that they were to report to Hitler. As the document furthermore states, I remerely requested a copy of this report for myself.

Q. So that, as I understand it, these Russian civilians that were to be brought in were not to be used only for the coal mines but also for the armament industry as well?

A. No, I believe that coal in the first degree. It should also be investigated whether this was ever carried out. You cannot say that every order that was given by Hitler was always carried out. And I believe that at this time the Supreme Commanders of the Army Groups had different worries than just to carry out such measures.

Q. What interests me was that you said that you wanted a copy to be sent to you and you also state that you did not have coal mines in your jurisdiction but in fact you did have the armament industry in your jurisdiction and I ask you whether those workers that were not suitable for coal mines were not to be put under your supervision for armament work?

A. There are two reasons why I was interested in a copy of this. The reason you gave is undoubtedly correct. It is evident that only a part, say about half those workers, were suitable to work in coal mines. The other half was available for other purposes. In the Central Planning Board Pleiger was responsible for the handling of the coal production and then as a member of the Central Planning Board I was interested whether the manpower that was promised by Sauckel would be actually available. This was because coal production was the base of the total production.

Q. Let me ask you another thing with respect to this memorandum of the 8 July meeting 1943; it is stated in that - and I will read it in German and then translate it:

"The Führer ordered at the same time that these prisoners of war who are not fit for the mines should immediately be placed in the Iron industry in the manufacturing and supply industry and in the armament industry".

Was that the general policy with respect to the use of prisoners of war?

A. No. The fact was that the remainder of the workers that could not be used in coal mining were free for other uses. It was my purpose in this conference to secure at the same time those workers for other purposes that could not be used in the coal mines. It was the general line that Sauckel was responsible for the distribution and allocation of manpower. I want to add here that it is not certain that Sauckel actually carried out such a plan.

Q. What I meant to ask you generally is, was it the policy to employ prisoners of war in the armaments factories?

A. Not only the armament industry came under my jurisdiction but also the subsidiary industry of the Iron Products industries. And my total competence was not defined as that of a Minister for Production, as is done in other countries, but as a Minister for Armaments.

Q. But regardless of your competence or jurisdiction, was it a general practice to employ prisoners of war in the making of munitions?

A. I believe that prisoners of war were employed in armament factories but I did not pay any attention to this fact.

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Q. Did they include only Russian prisoners of war or did that also include British, American, French, Polish, Dutch, Belgian, Norwegian prisoners of war?

A. That includes all prisoners of war. It was not my opinion that I had any obligation to pay attention to this, and I don't know whether the conditions which I found in 1942 as far as it concerns prisoners of war were ever changed during my time.

Q. Let me understand; when you wanted labour from prisoners of war did you requisition prisoners of war separately or did you ask for a total number of workers?

A. Only Schmelter can answer that exactly. As far as the commitment of prisoners of war labour goes it was effected through employment officers of the Stalags. I tried several times to increase the total number of prisoners of war that were occupied in the production at the expense of the other demand factors.

Q. Will you explain that a little more?

A. In the last phase of production, that is in the year 1944 when everything collapsed, I had 40% of all prisoners of war employed in the production. I wanted to have this percentage increased.

Q. And when you say employed in the production you mean in these subsidiary industries that you have discussed and also in the production of weapons and munitions, is that right?

A. Yes. That is the total extent of my task.

Q. Did you ever discuss any means of raising the productive capacity of prisoners of war?

A. Yes, As a matter of fact we sent circulars to the factory managers in order to tell them how the prisoners of war should be treated so that their productive capacity could be raised. One circular was sent out in either April or May 1944. I know that because I just read it. I believe that is exemplary so far as the recommendations go for the prisoners of war.

And did that include also the treatment of prisoners of war who were worki in weapons and munitions factories?

. This was a general circular that was sent to all the managers of the factories. You must remember the fact here that some of the armament industry also produces other goods, take Krupp for instance, in addition to producing armaments they produce locomotives and other products.

. Did you ever discuss, by the way, the requirements of Krupp for foreign labor?

. It is certain that it was reported to me what lack Krupp had in foreign workers.

. Did you ever discuss it with any of the members of the Krupp firm?

. I cannot say that exactly but during the time of my activities I visited the Krupp factory more than once and it is certain that this was discussed, that is, the lack of manpower.

. Did you ever discuss the labour problem with Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Holbach?

. I think that this is out of the question because Krupp was very old and I only saw him once during the years of my activity. If any such question came up it was discussed with the responsible directors of the factory.

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Q. Did these directors ask you for foreign labour?

A. It is probable that they reported to me the total needs in manpower. It not probable that they informed me about their requirements for foreign labour unless they had the opinion that at that time German manpower was not available.

Q. Coming back to the full use of the capacities of prisoners of war, was it ever suggested in any conference that you know about that the productive powers of prisoners of war could be increased by giving jurisdiction over them to the SS?

A. No, I cannot remember that.

Q. Did you ever see the minutes of such a meeting? I will show you a memorandum of a conference of Sauer with the Führer and others, dated 6 March 1[illegible] in Berlin?

A. I cannot say whether this was the case. This conference took place in May of 1944, that is, during the period of my illness. If there is a notation on the document - Gesehen Speer, then I saw the document after my illness.

Q. In connection with your trip to Austria, was it the purpose of your trip to establish concentration camps close to the side of factories so that the concentration camp inmates could be readily used as labour in the new factories?

A. When was that trip to Austria?

Q. Was that in 1941?

A. In 1941? I was not a Minister then.

Q. What were you then?

A. I was an architect in 1941. That was not 1941 it must be later.

Q. You had discussions with -

A. I cannot remember the name at the moment.

Q. Do you know Eigruber?

A. Yes, it must have been about 1943 or 1944 but I don't know exactly. I will think about it. The fact that we were anxious to use workers from concentration camps in factories and to establish small concentration camps near the factories in order to use the manpower that was available there was a general fact. But it did not only come up in connection with this trip.

(Whereupon at 1700, 18 October 1945, the hearing was adjourned)

APPROVED:

INTERROGATOR: _____

INTERPRETER: _____

REPORTER: _____

Exhibit U.S.A. 230
Filed Dec. 13, 1945

S E C R E T

Testimony of FRITZ SAUCKEL, taken at Nurnberg, Germany, 10:30 to 12:10, 22 September 1945, by John J. Monigan, Jr., Major, CAC, USCC. Also present: Jesse F. Landrum, Capt., AGD, Court Reporter, and T/5 Gunter Kosse, Interpreter.

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Q. Would the Central Planning Commission, in their outline of workers to be provided for agriculture and for Speer and for Milch's industries, etc., just give you the numbers of workers which they required, or would you get the allocation of the workers, too, say panzers and machine guns, and so on, from the Central Planning Commission?

A. In general, I always got the numbers for the sections in large but except for Speer who always demanded individual numbers of workers for all agricultural works or mining industries; in other words, Speer always demanded a certain amount of workers for each work.

Q. Except for Speer, they would give the requirements in general for the broad field, but in Speer's work you would get them allocated by industry, and so on, is that right?

A. The others I only got whatever was left, because Speer told me once in the presence of the Fuehrer that I am here to work for Speer and that mainly I am his man;

S E C R E T

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Exhibit USA. 224
Filed Dec. 12, 1945

EXCERPTS
Testimony of FRITZ SAUCKEL, taken at Nurnberg, Germany, on 5 October 1945, 1030-1200, by Major John J. Monigan, Jr., CAC, OUSCC. Also present: Siegfried Ramler, Interpreter, and S/Sgt William A. Weigel, Court Reporter.

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Q. For a moment, I want to turn our attention to Holland. It is my understanding that the quotas for the workers from Holland were agreed upon, and then the numbers given to the Reichskommissar Seyss-Inquart to fulfill, is that correct?

A. Yes, that is correct.

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Q. After the quota was given to Seyss-Inquart, it was his mission to fulfill it with the aid of your representatives, was it not?

A. Yes. This was the only possible thing for me to do, and the same applied to other countries.

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Q. Was the same procedure substantially followed of allocating quotas in the General Government Poland?

A. Yes. I have to basically state again that the only possibility I had in carrying through these matters was to get in touch with the highest German military authority in the respective country and to transfer to them the orders of the Fuehrer and ask them very urgently, as I have always done, to fulfill these orders.

Q. Such discussions in Poland, of course, were with the General Governor Frank?

A. Yes. I spent a morning and afternoon in Cracov twice or three times, and I personally spoke to General Governor Frank. Naturally, there was also present Secretary Dr. Goebble.

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Q. Was the procedure the same regarding discussions and allocations of quotas for the territory of the East with Rosenberg?

A. As far as it concerns the Eastern territory, that was ordered through Reichsminister Rosenberg; yes. My representative was Staatsrat Peukert. Staatsrat Peukert had a very close connection with Rosenberg in his Department of Labor, and at the same time he was working for the Reichskommissar in the Ukraine, and he was also working in the Labor Staff East for General Stapf. This was an economic institution of the Four Year Plan, for the operational functions in the East which have been subordinate to the Army chiefs. In those three instances Staatsrat Peukert was my representative, as leader for the Department of Labor.

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Q. Was it necessary in order to accomplish the completion of the quotas given to have liaison with the OKW?

A. I remember that the Fuehrer had given directives to Marshal Keitel, telling him that my task was a very important one, and I, too, have often conferred with Keitel after such discussions with the Fuehrer, when I asked him for his support.

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Q. It was his task to supervise the proper performance of the military commanders in the occupied countries in carrying out their assigned mission, was it not?

A. Yes. The Fuehrer had told me that he would inform the chief of the OKW, and the Chief of the Reichschancellory, as to these matters. The same applies to the Foreign Minister.

Q. The methods by which the quotas were filled in the occupied countries was the task of the civilian or military commander concerned, as we have just discussed before, was it not?

A. Yes, naturally. Yes, the executive rights naturally rested with him. However, he received advice and technical expert advice from the representative of the labor administration.

H-1126

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL

DOCUMENT BOOK

In re: THE NAZI CONSPIRATORS' SLAVE LABOR PROGRAM, THE ILLEGAL USE OF PRISONERS OF WAR, AND THE SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF DEFENDANTS SAUCKEL AND SPEER THEREFOR.

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